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The goal of this dissertation is to combine philosophical and literary scholarship to 
arrive at a new interpretation of Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground. In this novel, 
Dostoevsky argues against the Russian socialists of the early 1860s, and attacks their 
ideal of a socialist utopia in particular. Dostoevsky’s argument is obscure and difficult 
to understand, but it seems to depend upon the way he understands the interaction 
between psychology and politics, or, in other words, the way in which he thinks the 
health of a society depends upon the psychological health of its members. It is usually 
thought that Dostoevsky’s problem with socialism is that it curtails individual liber-
ties to an unacceptable degree, and that the citizens of a socialist utopia would be 
frustrated by the lack of freedom. I maintain instead that his argument in Notes from 
Underground is that the socialists misunderstand and underestimate the psychological 
importance of spirituality: they fail to consider that people have an innate desire to 
feel like they are not merely animals, and to feel that human beings have a unique 
spiritual dignity.  
By placing the novel in a broader historical context, I show that this new approach 
can be illuminated and justified with reference to German philosophy and literature, 
and the works of Friedrich Schiller in particular. The influence of Schiller on Dosto-
evsky is well known, but it has not been sufficiently appreciated by those interested 
in his social and political philosophy. I argue that Notes from Underground should be 
seen as a revival of psychological themes from the Sturm und Drang (Storm and Stress) 
movement to which Schiller contributed, and, crucially, that these themes are the 
linchpin of Dostoevsky’s criticism of the socialists. This results in a new perspective 
on Dostoevsky’s stature as a philosopher, his place in the history of philosophy and 






Notes from Underground is Dostoevsky’s most intense examination of the fundamental 
psychological basis of society and politics, and was conceived as a polemical response 
to the utopian socialism of Nihilists like Nikolai Chernyshevsky. This dissertation 
presents a new interpretation of Notes from Underground, and in particular its argu-
ment against utopian socialism, based on a comparison with the German Sturm und 
Drang movement and related literary and philosophical texts. It is usually assumed 
that Dostoevsky’s problem with utopian socialism is that it curtails individual liber-
ties to an unacceptable degree, since human beings have an innate need for freedom. 
I argue that the appeal of this reading rests on the ambiguity of the word “freedom,” 
and that when its conceptual foundations are clarified, it leads to serious inconsisten-
cies in Dostoevsky’s social thought. The need for an entirely new approach thereby 
becomes evident. Having examined and clarified the meaning of relevant portions of 
the novel, I find that for Dostoevsky it is not the need for freedom that renders utopian 
socialism psychologically inadequate, but the need for deeper spiritual fulfilment.  
By placing the novel in its broader historical context, I show that this new approach 
can be illuminated and justified with reference to German philosophy and literature, 
and the works of Friedrich Schiller in particular. The influence of Schiller on Dosto-
evsky is well known, but it has not been sufficiently appreciated by those interested 
in his social and political philosophy. I argue that Notes from Underground should be 
seen as a revival of psychological themes from the Sturm und Drang movement to 
which Schiller contributed, and, crucially, that these themes are the linchpin of Dos-
toevsky’s polemic against utopian socialism. The Sturm und Drang movement was a 
reaction against the demystification of human nature by Enlightenment philosophy; 
its anti-heroes represented the psychological and spiritual dangers of this demystifi-
cation and the lack of spiritual fulfilment it entailed. Dostoevsky, I maintain, draws 
on these insights to argue that any ideology that rejects the spiritual needs of human-
ity, including utopian socialism, will lead to the dire psychological consequences il-
lustrated extensively in Notes from Underground. Overall, I present an original reap-
praisal of Dostoevsky’s novel that sheds new light on this crucial intersection of his 











No, there are times when it is not possible to turn society, or 
even one generation, towards the beautiful, so long as it is not 
shown the depths of its present abasement; there are times when 
one may not even speak of the sublime and beautiful, if the way 




“Underground, underground, poet of the underground,”  
 our feuilletonists have been repeating over and over again,  
 as if this were something derogatory to me. Silly fools,   







1 Gogol, 1969: 109. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction  
1. The Polemical Context 
Notes from Underground was published in 1864 in the journal Epoch, which was edited 
by Dostoevsky and (before his death) his brother Mikhail. This journal was the 
mouthpiece of the pochvennichestvo or “return to the soil” movement of which, apart 
from the Dostoevsky brothers, critics Apollon Grigoryev and Nikolai Strakhov were 
notable members.1 Generally speaking, this is the intellectual context to which the 
novel contributes. According to Ellen Chances, indeed, Notes from Underground “can 
be seen as a fictionalized version of pochvennichestvo.”2 This designation can hardly be 
said to exhaust the significance of the work, but, as we shall see, does alert us to its 
central social-philosophical message. The immediate stimulus for its publication was 
the need to respond to the pochvenniki’s main ideological opponents, the Nihilists. 
Indeed, though it eventually emerged as a work of fiction, Notes from Underground 
was initially conceived as an article including a review of Chernyshevsky’s What is To 
Be Done?, which was published in 1863.3 The resulting novel retains this polemical 
purpose, though its complex literary form makes the interpretation of its contents far 
more difficult. As Joseph Frank remarks, Dostoevsky never again presented his read-
ers with “so difficult a challenge to their literary and ideological acumen.”4 That it is 
universally acknowledged to occupy a pivotal position in Dostoevsky’s oeuvre, in-
troducing and explicating themes that would preoccupy Dostoevsky throughout the 
 
1 Frank, 1986: 34-47. 
2 Chances, 2015: 275. Cf. Jackson, 1958: 25. 
3 Jackson, 1958: 24; Frank, 1986: 298; Offord, 2009: 129. 




remainder of his career, makes it a challenge worth embracing. To clarify its polemical 
meaning is the central aim of this dissertation. I take for granted that it is intended as 
an argument against Nihilist utopian socialism from the perspective of pochvennich-
estvo; the question I hope to answer is, how exactly should this argument be under-
stood? 
1.1. Nihilist Utopian Socialism 
Before moving on to consider the novel itself, I shall first outline the social-philosoph-
ical ideologies that Notes from Underground argues for and against, namely poch-
vennichestvo and the Nihilist utopian socialism of Chernyshevsky’s What is To Be Done? 
I shall begin with the latter. 
The term “nihilism” was introduced at the end of the eighteenth century by Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacobi, who used it to refer to what he took to be the end result of modern 
philosophy, culminating in the destruction of traditional cultural values, including 
morality and religion.5 Used as a label for the more radical members of the Russian 
intelligentsia and their followers—“the Nihilists”—it was brought into currency by 
Turgenev in 1862, in the novel Fathers and Children. Here, the character Bazarov fa-
mously refers to himself as a Nihilist and declares that his vocation is to undermine 
the existing foundations of Russian culture, to prepare the way for a more rational 
and scientific mode of life—in effect, to deliberately foster the cultural upheavals 
feared by philosophers like Jacobi.6 Among the most important of the actual Nihilists 
were Chernyshevsky himself, as well as Dmitry Pisarev and Nikolai Dobrolyubov 
(both of whom we shall encounter again below). As an intellectual movement, Nihil-
ism was only one phase in the development of the radical intelligentsia in the nine-
teenth century, localized predominantly in the 1860s, though not every radical 
 
5 More on this in Chapters 6 and 8. 




intellectual active at that time can be considered a Nihilist.7 Despite individual varia-
tions, the basic features of the Nihilist ideology were: scientism or rationalism, accord-
ing to which all beliefs that cannot be derived from the natural science of the day, not 
excepting the tenets of morality, aesthetic taste and religion, should be rejected; and 
materialism, according to which humans are nothing more than clever animals, and 
all cultural values that do not pertain directly to the satisfaction of this animal na-
ture—that is, bodily needs—should also be rejected. The Nihilists further espoused—
by way of a theory of ethics supposedly derived from these principles—a narrowly 
egoistic form of utilitarianism, censuring all activity that does not promote the mate-
rial interests of the individual.  
As I shall argue, this nihilism can fruitfully be understood as an attack on human dig-
nity traditionally conceived, that is, what makes human beings special in comparison 
to animals and the rest of nature. Because it denies the religious doctrines that had 
previously been used to grant humanity a special status in the universe, and conceives 
of human beings in purely materialistic terms, it calls for a revaluation of the meaning 
of human existence itself. As we shall see, it is this core aspect of nihilism that is rele-
vant to understanding Dostoevsky’s argument against Chernyshevsky.     
A note on terminology: when discussing the radical intelligentsia of the 1860s, schol-
ars generally use the terms “nihilists” and “utopian socialists” interchangeably; James 
Scanlan, whose work I discuss below, also uses the term “rational egoists.”8 In this 
context, all of these words refer loosely to the same group of people, but draw atten-
tion to different aspects of their views: “rational egoism” designates their ethics and 
theory of human behaviour, “utopian socialism” suggests the social and political di-
mension of their views, and “nihilism” suggests their anthropology and broader phil-
osophical attitude. Because my focus is on Dostoevsky’s argument against Cher-
nyshevsky in particular, I shall use “Nihilism” and “utopian socialism” to refer, 
 
7 Alexander Herzen, for example, shared many of the Nihilists’ basic principles but did not 
endorse their wholesale rejection of earlier, less radical intellectual culture (see Kelly, 2016: 
chapter 21). More on Herzen in Chapter 9, below. 




unless otherwise specified, to the philosophy of Chernyshevsky, choosing whichever 
term seems most appropriate in each instance. Since “utopian socialism” is often used 
to refer to the views of early socialist thinkers like Charles Fourier, Victor Considerant 
and Henri de Saint-Simon (see page 252, below), I shall also use the term “Nihilist 
utopian socialism” to distinguish Chernyshevsky’s utopian socialism from other va-
rieties, and to emphasize its nihilist philosophical foundations. Furthermore, it is 
sometimes necessary to distinguish nihilism as a general philosophical attitude from 
Nihilism understood more narrowly as the movement in Russian intellectual history 
to which Chernyshevsky belonged. I shall always use “Nihilism” with an uppercase 
“N” to refer specifically to the latter.  
Now, Chernyshevsky’s utopianism was a natural outgrowth of his Nihilist philoso-
phy, and stands in sharp contrast with Dostoevsky’s Christian utopian vision.9 From 
the doctrines of materialism and utilitarianism, he derived the idea that human hap-
piness is ultimately a matter for natural science.10 If people are fundamentally no dif-
ferent from plants and animals, then it should be possible to discover the conditions 
under which the human organism flourishes best—even if these conditions are rather 
more complicated than their agricultural equivalents. Like other contractarians, Cher-
nyshevsky assumed that the needs of the individual typically coincide with the needs 
of society as a whole or, in other words, that it is in the selfish interest of each indi-
vidual to promote the interests of society.11 Along with the French utopian socialists 
and with British political economists like Adam Smith, he therefore regarded the sci-
ence of human flourishing as a science of economic association.12  
A sketch of Chernyshevsky’s utopia is provided in What is To Be Done?, in the last of 
the four visionary dreams through which the heroine, Vera Pavlovna, becomes con-
scious of her ideals.13 The structures of this utopia are modelled on the Crystal Palace 
 
9 Frank, 1986: 285-289; 1990: 187-201; Paperno, 1988: 210-212. 
10 Chernyshevsky, 1988: 16. 
11 Chernyshevsky, 1988: 17. 
12 Chernyshevsky, 1988: 18. 




built to house the 1851 Great Exhibition in London, which—for Chernyshevsky as for 
Dostoevsky—represented the apotheosis of natural science in the nineteenth cen-
tury.14 Sheathed in glass and aluminium, they provide their inhabitants with the per-
fect environmental conditions. Agricultural workers are looked after as well as the 
plants they are cultivating, bringing life to what was previously desert, shaded by 
vast movable canopies and sprinkled with mist.15 Everything is arranged for the ease 
and efficiency of manual labour; with strong nerves and constitutions, the populace 
actually enjoys working hard, singing songs while they toil in the fields, and can re-
turn early every day with plenty of energy for banquets, balls, good company and 
free sexual gratification.16   
Chernyshevsky also subscribed to the doctrine of rational egoism, according to which 
human beings naturally pursue whatever course of action they perceive to be in their 
own best interests. From this it follows that once they have understood the science of 
human flourishing, and have recognized that Chernyshevsky’s socialist utopia is the 
best way to guarantee their own flourishing, people will naturally want to do every-
thing in their power to obtain it.17 In order to set this utopian scheme in motion, it 
would be necessary not only to attain and disseminate the necessary scientific ad-
vances, but also to clear away everything standing in its way: the natural rationality 
and egoism of humanity had been shackled by the prejudices of religion and roman-
ticism, as well as the vested interests of the powers that be.18 So, while Chernyshevsky 
dedicated himself to enlivening the mechanism of rational egoism with scientific 
knowledge, he also believed that a revolution would be needed to ensure that this 
mechanism could have its full effect on the organization of society.19  
 
14 Frank, 1986: 289. On the Crystal Palace in Chernyshevsky and Dostoevsky, see Katz, 2002. 
15 Chernyshevsky, 1988: 274. 
16 Chernyshevsky, 1988: 376-378. 
17 Frank, 1986: 286f. 
18 Chernyshevsky, 1988: 16. 




In brief, then, this was the most important utopian vision of the Nihilism against 
which the pochvenniki did journalistic battle, and against which the social-philosoph-
ical polemic of Notes from Underground is directed. I shall elaborate on the details of 
Chernyshevsky’s views as they become relevant, and shall return to consider their 
conceptual foundations and context more fully in Chapters 8 and 10. I now turn to 
consider Dostoevsky’s very different brand of utopianism. 
1.2. Pochvennichestvo 
Until the 1860s, when Nihilism emerged, the Russian intelligentsia was divided be-
tween the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. The former argued that Russia should 
protect and strengthen its traditional cultural heritage in the face of the Westerniza-
tion of the gentry that had been taking place since the reforms of Peter the Great; the 
latter argued that Russia should embrace this Westernization. Pochvennichestvo was 
presented as a way of reconciling these parties, and more generally as a way of rec-
onciling conservatism and progressivism.20 It was first and foremost about reintegrat-
ing the Westernized mind (the educated classes) and the Slavic heart (peasantry) of 
Russia itself.21 As Dostoevsky says, it aimed to facilitate “the reconciliation of civili-
zation with the basic ideas of our common people.”22 Dostoevsky pointed towards 
major changes taking place “with the consent of the entire nation,” including the lib-
eration of the serfs in 1861, which he hoped would culminate in “total union between 
the educated section of our population with its national element and the participation 
of the whole of our great Russian people in the events of our current life.”23  
According to Wayne Dowler, what Dostoevsky meant by the reconciliation of the ed-
ucated classes and the peasantry, “in the most practical terms,” was that the former 
should empower the latter to express their inchoate spiritual wisdom and lend it to 
 
20 Dowler, 1982: 12. Frank, 1986: 34-47. The conciliatory attitude was favoured by Dostoevsky 
in particular, often to the chagrin of his associates (Frank, 1986: 51-55). 
21 Dowler, 1982: 75. 
22 Dostoevsky, 1964: 232. 




the political life of the nation. Thus the education of the common people was the first 
step, since it would enable them to make themselves understood by the educated 
classes.24 The peasants possessed the principle of genuine community and association, 
but they lacked the means of building a “viable economic or social system on it;” these 
means could be supplied by the educated classes, who would “infuse” the native 
forms of association “with knowledge and the highest goals.”25 Pochvennichestvo was 
criticized for being too vague; but its proponents stressed that they did not intend to 
provide a concrete program for action because they denied the viability of any such 
program, and argued that progress in society should come about as naturally and 
spontaneously as possible from the “heart” of the nation, and not merely from its 
“head.” That being said, for Dowler their approach to social and political issues 
“rested far less on a detailed and accurate evaluation of the forces at work in the past 
and present than it did on a utopian vision of the future.”26  
Overall, pochvennichestvo effectively superseded Slavophilism insofar as the latter was 
unable to accommodate the economic and social modernization taking place in Russia, 
and which would continue to take place even without the approval of the more con-
servative intelligentsia;27 the pochvenniki professed a more “evolutionary conserva-
tism” that was ready to embrace both what they considered to be valuable in the past 
and what the future might have to offer.28 Nevertheless, it was in some respects no 
less reactionary than Slavophilism, and incorporated such basically conservative 
Slavophile themes as the need to restore and defend the spiritual unity of the nation 
from the divisive and corrupting influence of the West.29 Dostoevsky was clear that 
he regarded the assimilation of Western civilization as a necessary step in the devel-
opment of the Russian nation, but only because it could facilitate the triumph of those 
 
24 Dostoevsky, 1964: 159. 
25 Dowler, 1982: 110f. 
26 Dowler, 1982: 92. 
27 Leatherbarrow, 2010: 112f.  
28 Dowler, 1982: 93. 
29 For Dostoevsky’s relations with Slavophilism, both in general and in his pochvennichestvo 




traditional spiritual forces that remained embryonic in the Russian peasantry: “all of 
us,” he wrote, “are conscious of the fact that civilization has brought us back to our 
native soil.”30 As such, although Dostoevsky was not conservative in the sense of val-
uing what is traditional just because it is traditional, he was conservative insofar as 
he thought that social and political change should respect the “spirit of the nation” 
and should not be imposed artificially according to some pre-established theory of 
what would be best for it.31 In practice this meant that he supported the tsardom and 
sought to protect Russia’s native religious heritage; ultimately, therefore, pochvennich-
estvo did not succeed in its hope of reconciling the conservative and progressive 
strands of the intelligentsia. In particular, it could not accommodate itself to the de-
mands of the more radical Westernizers, or, following them, of the even more uncom-
promising Nihilists, who believed that the cultural and technological fruits of civili-
zation were by no means adequate to the needs of the nation, which also required 
revolutionary upheavals in its politics, economics and religion. These thinkers es-
poused socialism and atheism, which the pochvenniki could not accept. Thus, despite 
its initially conciliatory attitude, the journalism of pochvennichestvo increasingly en-
gaged in polemics against the Nihilists.32 It is to this phase of Dostoevsky’s career that 
Notes from Underground belongs.  
Prior to Notes from Underground, the polemical and utopian aspects of pochvennichestvo 
were expressed by Dostoevsky in the less fictional Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, 
a short “travel diary” comprising reflections on society and politics prompted by Dos-
toevsky’s first visit to Western Europe. In large part a critique of prevailing Western 
culture and politics, it is also an attack on the Nihilists.33 Dostoevsky uses his obser-
vations on the moral and spiritual degradation of the West to indict the broadly ni-
hilistic ideology that, he thinks, gave rise to it, and would give rise to similar degra-
dation in Russia if it became prevalent there as well. He would use a very similar 
 
30 Dostoevsky, 1964: 157. 
31 Dowler, 1982: 110. 
32 Dowler, 1982: 12; Frank, 1986: 351; Hudspith, 2010: 285. 




polemical strategy—though in a very different form—in Notes from Underground. 
Thus Frank writes that Winter Notes can be seen as a prelude or preliminary draft of 
Notes from Underground.34 Winter Notes is also extremely important for its clear presen-
tation of Dostoevsky’s own Christian utopian ideal, the ultimate goal of his poch-
vennichestvo ideology. The result is a kind of social contract theory in which he elabo-
rates on the meaning of genuine brotherhood and social unity, in contrast to the arti-
ficial fraternité of Western socialism: 
What would brotherhood consist of if it were put into rational, con-
scious language? Of this: each separate individual, without any com-
pulsion, without any benefit to himself, would say to society, “We are 
strong only when we are together; take everything from me, if you re-
quire that of me; do not think of me as you make your laws; do not be 
at all concerned about me; I offer you all my rights; dispose of me as 
you please. This is my highest happiness: to sacrifice everything to you 
and to do you no harm in doing so. I shall annihilate myself, I shall melt 
away with complete indifference, if only your brotherhood will flourish 
and endure.” The brotherhood, on the other hand, must say, “You offer 
us too much. We have no right not to accept what you offer us, for you 
yourself say that in this lies all your happiness; but what is to be done, 
when in our hearts we are constantly concerned about your happiness? 
Take everything that is ours too. Every minute and with all our strength 
we shall try to increase your personal freedom and self-revelation as 
much as possible. Do not fear any enemies now, either among people 
or in nature. We are all behind you; we all guarantee your safety; we 
are forever doing our utmost for you because we are brothers; we are 
all your brothers; there are many of us, and we are strong: so be at peace 
and of good cheer, fear nothing, and rely on us.”35  
Dostoevsky’s “contractarianism” can be distinguished from traditional versions, such 
as those of Hobbes and Locke, as well as from Chernyshevsky’s, in several respects.36 
In the first place, it is not supposed to be “rational, conscious” or intellectually justi-
fied; it is supposed to be an entirely spontaneous manifestation of the moral attitudes 
 
34 Frank, 1986: 233. 
35 Dostoevsky, 1964: 50. 




of its members. Secondly, it is uniquely uncompromising—it demands of each indi-
vidual the sacrifice of all individual rights, and not merely the right to decide and 
enforce the laws, to declare war, etc. Thirdly, whereas traditional social contracts are 
supposed to be entered into by individuals seeking to protect themselves and their own 
property against injustice, Dostoevsky’s contract is entered into by individuals seek-
ing to dedicate themselves altruistically to one another; although it is clear that he 
thinks each individual will benefit greatly from this arrangement, any such benefit is 
plainly not what can or should motivate a person to enter into it. Indeed, he says that 
the prospects of genuine brotherhood are entirely ruined by even the slightest desire 
for personal advantage—the social bond must be based upon pure altruism.37 The 
material benefits of this association then follow as a natural but unintentional conse-
quence—“Love one another, and all these things will be added unto you.”38 That Dos-
toevsky’s vision of the perfect society is uncompromising in its demands for self-ab-
negation and altruism shall always be borne in mind in what follows, since it is has 
significant implications for how Notes from Underground should be understood. 
2. Society and Psychology 
In common with other nineteenth-century political thinkers, Dostoevsky believed 
that politics and psychology were intimately connected, and that the proper function-
ing of society depended on and contributed to the psychological wellbeing of its 
members. The intersection of psychology and social philosophy is plainly central to 
Notes from Underground, as we shall see in what follows, and it is in this work that 
Dostoevsky subjects the psychological basis of society and politics to his closest scru-
tiny. The main conclusion he draws from his insights is clear enough: utopian social-
ism will fail because it rests upon a mistaken view of human nature and its needs. But 
 
37 Dostoevsky, 1964: 49. 




what exactly he thinks is mistaken about this view, and how exactly Dostoevsky in-
tends to prove that it is mistaken, is far from clear.  
The complexities of the Underground Man’s own character, or the “underground 
psychology,” are the main focus of the Notes. The psychology of the Underground 
Man has received a great deal of critical attention, as have Dostoevsky’s social and 
political ideas. What I believe has not received its due is the vital link between the 
two. Bruce Ward’s Dostoyevsky’s Critique of the West, for example, recognizes the social 
and political importance of “the underground” but devotes only two pages to de-
scribing it, and overlooks the psychological difficulties it raises.39  For Ward, it is 
simply a symptom of modern society’s lack of a guiding “idea” which could provide 
stability and spiritual fortitude to its members. It seems to me that this is entirely 
correct, as far as it goes, but that there is a great deal more to the phenomenon illus-
trated by the Underground Man than Ward, whose concerns are more specifically 
social and political, sees fit to explore. Joseph Frank, by contrast, has given a more 
thorough analysis of Notes from Underground which attempts to unify its psychologi-
cal and social-philosophical perspectives using the ideas of free will and determin-
ism.40 Whilst I wholly agree with the aspirations of this approach, of which Frank’s 
analysis is now only one canonical example, I shall argue that it is subject to an insol-
uble contradiction. This concerns the relationship between Dostoevsky’s critique of 
utopian socialism and his own Christian utopian aspirations, both of which are abso-
lutely central to his social philosophy. The former is understood to revolve around 
the idea that materialistic socialism is incompatible with the basic human need for 
freedom. As I shall argue in Chapter 2, however, if this need for freedom is strong 
enough to make the socialist utopia impossible, then it must be strong enough to 
make Dostoevsky’s own utopia impossible as well: both are premised on the sacrifice 
of individual liberty for the sake of public good. In general, I do not believe that pre-
vious scholarship has taken this contradiction seriously enough, and has simply 
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bypassed it through describing the negative component of Dostoevsky’s social phi-
losophy, his attack on utopian socialism, in complete abstraction from the positive, 
his Christian utopianism.  
I contend that this contradiction disappears once the psychology of the Underground 
Man is understood in a different way. Examining Notes from Underground more 
closely, we find that the need for freedom is not, ultimately, what Dostoevsky uses to 
attack utopian socialism; and that in fact he deploys a more complex psychological 
argument based on the ideas of idealism, nihilism, disillusionment and caprice. 41 This 
argument is convoluted and difficult, but can be understood much more easily when 
it is put into the right theoretical and literary context: Dostoevsky is merely building 
on a train of thought belonging to the Sturm und Drang movement of eighteenth-cen-
tury Germany. It is through a comparative analysis of this tradition that, ultimately, 
I hope to elucidate the psychology of the underground man and demonstrate the way 
in which Dostoevsky uses it to construct an argument against Chernyshevsky’s uto-
pian socialism, and build his social-philosophical ideas, including his critique of uto-
pian socialism and his own utopian pochvennichestvo, into a coherent and rationally 
compelling system of thought.  
* * * 
This dissertation is divided into two parts.42 In Part 1, I focus on the text of Notes from 
Underground itself, and clarify the themes and ideas which any interpretation of Dos-
toevsky’s polemical intentions is required to understand. In Part 2, I build on these 
foundations to develop my interpretation of the Notes, drawing on comparisons with 
 
41 In general, I shall use “Nihilism” to refer to the Russian school of thought including Cher-
nyshevsky, Pisarev etc., and “nihilism” to refer to the more general philosophical position 
which they adopted, namely, extreme rationalism and reductive naturalism. (Proponents of 
“nihilism” who are not “Nihilists” include, for example, the philosophes La Mettrie and 
d’Holbach, who we shall encounter in Chapter 6.)  
42 To avoid confusion, I shall use Arabic numerals to refer to the parts and chapters of this 
dissertation (e.g. Chapter 3 of Part 2), and Roman numerals to refer to the divisions of Notes 




Schiller and Goethe, and a historical survey of relevant ideas that prevailed in the 
time separating Dostoevsky from the Sturm und Drang, in order to clarify and moti-
vate my understanding of Dostoevsky’s position.  
Before beginning, I shall briefly address some methodological issues. There are many 
different approaches to the study of Dostoevsky’s work, and it may be worth indicat-
ing where my own aims fall in relation to existing scholarship. It is well known that 
Dostoevsky wrote “novels of ideas,” that is, books in which sophisticated patterns of 
thought are conveyed in the form of fiction, by a variety of literary means. In his essay 
“Mr —bov and the Question of Art,” Dostoevsky himself wrote: 
[T]he high artistic quality of, let us say, a novelist is his ability to express 
the idea of his novel in the characters and images of his novel so that 
after reading it the reader understands the writer’s idea as well as the 
novelist has understood it himself when creating his work.43 
The goal of this dissertation is to explicate one of the ideas, or systems of ideas, ex-
pressed in Notes from Underground, namely, Dostoevsky’s argument against Nihilist 
utopian socialism. The assumption behind such an approach is, as Bruce Ward says, 
that the ideas expressed by Dostoevsky in his novels “can be rendered more system-
atic and explicit, and hence more accessible to those who are interested.”44 In his book 
Dostoevsky the Thinker, James Scanlan aims “to examine the conceptual structure of his 
philosophical beliefs and try to identify whatever grounding he believed he had for 
them. Overall, the effort will be to present a portrait of Dostoevsky’s philosophical 
thought that he himself [ … ] might recognize as tolerably faithful to both its letter 
and its spirit.”45 I have adopted much the same strategy. 
Of course, because Dostoevsky never wrote a systematic philosophical work, this 
kind of “philosophical ghostwriting” (as Scanlan calls it) is not unproblematic. In ad-
dition to the usual difficulties involved in unravelling a philosopher’s opinions, 
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readers of Dostoevsky must also attempt to navigate his use of irony, unreliable nar-
ration, the vested interests and ulterior motives of various characters, dialogue, de-
liberate falsehoods, allusions, symbols, and so on. Although similar complexities can 
sometimes be encountered in traditional philosophical texts, they are certainly more 
pronounced in works of fiction, and, as many scholars believe, in Dostoevsky’s novels 
in particular. This last conviction is due largely to the influence of Mikhail Bakhtin, 
who argued that Dostoevsky created a new type of novel that was fundamentally 
“polyphonic” and resistant to the imposition of a “monological” perspective.46 As 
Bakhtin himself put it: “A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and con-
sciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is in fact the chief character-
istic of Dostoevsky’s novels.”47            
This has lent support to a scepticism about the very possibility of arriving at any con-
clusive interpretation of Dostoevsky’s novels, and this scepticism has been exacerbated 
by the fact that so many conflicting views on Dostoevsky’s works have been proposed 
over the decades.48 “It seems to me,” writes Malcolm Jones, “that the fact that Dosto-
evsky attracts so many different readings is itself not accidental and it needs to be 
explained other than by the need of the critic to say something new, or by pious ref-
erences to his genius.”49 From this, Jones draws support for his view that Dostoevsky 
wrote “self-deconstructing” novels, confounding attempts to disentangle their vari-
ous meanings.50 As he writes elsewhere: 
[T]o find order where there appears to be chaos, clarity where there ap-
pears to be confusion, coherence where there appears to be conflict, pre-
cision where there appears to be indeterminacy; to reconcile all 
 
46 On the influence of this kind of Bakhtinian interpretation in the twentieth century, see Kelly, 
1988: 239-242. 
47 Bakhtin, 1984: 6. 
48 Presumably, this way of thinking also coheres with the more general post-modern scepti-
cism about fixed meanings, final interpretations and speculation about authorial intentions. 
49 Jones, 1990: xv. 




apparent contradictions, and to smooth over all apparent inconsisten-
cies. [ ... ] no. Dostoevsky’s novels are too broad for such treatment.51 
If this were true, of course, the kind of interpretation offered in this dissertation would 
be misguided. A related concern stems from the notion that Dostoevsky’s characters 
are psychologically so complex as to preclude the possibility of integration into an 
overarching theoretical structure. “It is as if the author himself had only limited con-
trol over them,” Victor Terras writes; “Even if born of an idea, even if owing his ex-
istence to a purely literary stimulus, the Dostoevskian hero is, first of all, a person in 
his own right, an autonomous microcosm, not a puppet at the mercy of an arbitrary 
creator.”52 Gary Saul Morson has also claimed that Dostoevsky regards human psy-
chology as “irreducibly complex.”53 In this respect, Dostoevsky is often contrasted 
with Chernyshevsky, whose heroes he regarded as psychologically unmotivated, de-
signed only to fulfil the needs of his theories.54 For Donald Fanger, “while Cher-
nyshevsky was reducing psychology to a scheme, Dostoevsky was proclaiming it an 
irreducible chaos.”55 
The perceived impossibility of understanding Dostoevsky’s characters psychologi-
cally has even been seen as an important element of his moral and spiritual outlook. 
For Terras, anyone “whose life can be accounted for in purely psychological terms is 
lacking free will and is without divine Grace.”56 He claims that Dostoevsky deliber-
ately violated his own psychological insights in the creation of his “good” characters, 
such as Zosima and Alyosha in The Brothers Karamazov, so as to preclude the possibil-
ity of their seeming subject to any kind of psychological necessity.57 Since, following 
Joseph Frank, I regard the character of the Underground Man as an essential 
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52 Terras, 1969: 159. 
53 Morson, 2010: 163. 
54 Belknap, 2009: 134. 
55 Fanger, 1965: 180. 
56 Terras, 1998: 50. Cf. Fanger, 1965: 180f. 




component of Dostoevsky’s polemic against utopian socialism, this too would be a 
fatal objection to my reading of the Notes.58  
It is not my intention to argue for or against any particular hermeneutical methodol-
ogy here, but only to acknowledge that this is a point of contention, and to clearly 
state my own assumptions. That Dostoevsky’s novels are “self-deconstructing” is 
only one possible explanation for the proliferation of rival interpretations; another is 
that he wrote books that are incredibly difficult to understand. Likewise, it is possible 
to recognize that Dostoevsky’s characters are often difficult to comprehend psycho-
logically, without drawing the conclusion that their thoughts and activities are an 
“irreducible chaos” incapable of conforming to their author’s designs.59 As to the 
question of “polyphony,” I agree with Scanlan’s view that Dostoevsky’s philosophy 
is “dialogical in style, monological in substance.”60 Overall, I adopt what Jones refers 
to as the “refreshingly common-sense view” of Joseph Frank, and assume that Dos-
toevsky’s novels, whatever else they may be, do serve as vehicles for his various the-
oretical commitments—including his arguments against utopian socialism—and that 
it may yet be possible, in principle, to uncover and explicate these commitments.61
 
58 Against Bakhtin, Frank writes that “the nucleus of Dostoevsky’s novels may be compared 
to that of an eighteenth-century conte philosophique, whose characters were also largely embod-
iments of ideas; but instead of remaining bloodless abstractions like [Voltaire’s] Candide or 
Zadig, they will be fleshed out with all the verisimilitude and psychological density of the 
nineteenth-century novel of social realism” (Frank, 1986: 346). 
59 Wasiolek, 1964: xii. 
60 Scanlan, 2002: 4. 




Chapter 2:  Dostoevsky and Freedom 
1. The Libertarian Interpretation 
The most well-developed interpretations of Dostoevsky’s polemic against utopian so-
cialism are those of Robert Louis Jackson, Joseph Frank and James Scanlan.1 These 
scholars all think that Dostoevsky’s chief complaint against utopian socialism is that 
it is a threat to freedom. I thus call the kind of interpretations they advocate libertarian. 
Many other scholars have endorsed similar views in passing, without delving deeply 
into the matter.2 In this chapter, I shall first outline the libertarian interpretation of 
Notes from Underground. I shall then argue that it is essential to specify what kinds of 
freedom Dostoevsky and his narrator, the Underground Man, are interested in. I dis-
tinguish three different varieties of freedom, which I further clarify with reference to 
Dostoevsky’s works and the views of several philosophers. On the basis of these dis-
tinctions, I show that the theme of freedom is a highly questionable guide to under-
standing Dostoevsky polemic, and lay the conceptual foundations for developing a 
new interpretation. 
Notes from Underground is perhaps the most important source for the libertarian inter-
pretation in general, since it is Dostoevsky’s most sustained—albeit, perhaps, most 
obscure—engagement with the utopian socialism of the Nihilists, and one of its 
 
1 Their interpretations are found primarily in Frank, 1986: 310-47; Scanlan, 2003; Jackson, 1995.  
2 E.g. Belliotti, 2016: 204; Barstow, 1978: 29; Cassedy, 2005: 48; Hudspith, 2004: 55; Katz, 2002: 
72; Leatherbarrow, 2005: 48; Lord, 1970: 40-43; Peace, 1971: 7-12; Young, 2015: 180. There have 
been alternative proposals, none of which I shall address in detail here, but most of which turn 
upon a claim of the following sort: Dostoevsky thinks utopian socialism will fail because hu-
man beings are too irrational, too chaotic, too mad, too irascible, too bored, or too capricious, 
to settle for any kind of utopian stability (e.g. Alexander-Davey, 2013: 124f.; Carter, 1991: 107-
111; Ealy, 2013: 196; Fanger, 1965: 180f.; Wasiolek, 1964: 58). The problem faced by all of these 
interpretations is that they attribute to Dostoevsky an extreme pessimism about human nature 
which, apart from finding little consistent support in his novels, flatly contradicts his commit-




narrator’s most pressing concerns is clearly the importance of freedom, which he calls 
the “most advantageous advantage” of humankind. Whilst there is much disagree-
ment about the relationship between Dostoevsky’s own opinions and the content of 
the Notes, most scholars agree that Dostoevsky shares, in some way and to some ex-
tent, the Underground Man’s concern for the preservation of freedom in the face of 
certain illiberal ideologies and social structures. In Frank’s formulation, Dostoevsky’s 
main argument against utopian socialism is as follows: 
The one “most advantageous advantage” for man is the preservation of 
his free will, which may or may not be exercised in harmony with rea-
son but which, in any case, always wishes to preserve the right to choose; 
and this primary “advantage” cannot be included in the systems of the 
lovers of humanity [i.e. the utopian socialists] because it makes forever 
impossible their dream of transforming human nature to desire only the 
rational.3 
In other words, utopian socialism will fail because it cannot satisfy the all-important 
and universal need for freedom. Similarly, according to Scanlan, Dostoevsky main-
tains that “the [socialist] utopia cannot be achieved without an unacceptable con-
striction of individual liberty.”4 And again: “[Dostoevsky’s] most repeated and most 
impassioned argument against [socialism] is that a socialist system would destroy 
human freedom.”5 In order to spell out this argument, which I call “the Libertarian 
Argument,” I shall consider Frank’s, Jackson’s and Scanlan’s interpretations of the 
Notes, from which they derive it.  
According to Frank, Dostoevsky presents the diseased psychology of the Under-
ground Man itself as an argument against utopian socialism. He claims that the Un-
derground Man has thoroughly assimilated all the ideals of the socialists, and that 
these ideals are what has made him into the person he is; in other words, his bad 
character illustrates what would happen if anyone genuinely believed and took to 
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heart the utopian socialist ideology. More precisely, he has accepted their doctrines 
on an intellectual level, but, being a flesh-and-blood human, he cannot reconcile them 
with his moral and emotional needs. As John Carroll puts it, he is “a man trying to 
live with the conviction that truth and value have become incompatible.”6 This con-
flict, Frank thinks, is what results in his “underground psychology” as a whole.  
I will consider the details of Frank’s understanding of the Underground Man’s psy-
chology, and its relation to utopian socialist ideology, in due course. For now, in order 
to clarify his understanding of Dostoevsky’s polemic, it is only important to note that 
he thinks the most dangerous aspect of utopian socialism, from a psychological point 
of view, is determinism. This, according to Frank, is the fundamental cause of the Un-
derground Man’s problems: he adopts Chernyshevsky’s idea (expressed in the An-
thropological Principle in Philosophy and What is to be Done?) that free will is an illusion 
because all human behaviour is determined by the laws of nature,7 and he tries to live 
in accordance with what this entails. Believing that there can be no moral responsi-
bility, for instance, he tries to suppress his moral and emotional responses to the in-
sults he receives; what is the use of feeling insulted or demanding justice, when the 
offending party is only acting in accordance with the laws of nature, and so can’t be 
guilty of anything? In spite of this reasoning, however, he finds that he simply cannot 
help feeling insulted. Thus his intellectual acceptance of determinism is undermined 
by his moral-emotional inability to come to terms with its consequences. This internal 
conflict drives him to the point of insanity, makes him masochistic and capricious, 
and, in general, creates the character of the “Underground Man.”8 Because of this af-
fliction, he is in no fit state to contribute productively to a harmonious society, as the 
socialists demand that their citizens should, and so he goes to show that utopian 
 
6 Carroll, 1974: 112. Cf. Ealy, 2013: 184-186. 
7 Chernyshevsky, 1953: 94f.; 1989: 118. 
8 On this reading, Dostoevsky’s novel can be seen as a kind of riposte to Diderot’s Jacques the 
Fatalist—also intended to illustrate the practical consequences of believing in determinism, 
which, for Diderot, are quite benign and amount only to mild eccentricity and a kind of Stoic 




socialism—because of its deterministic denial of free will—is self-defeating: the real 
consequences of the theory are diametrically opposed to its purpose.  
Jackson shares with Frank this theory of the Underground Man’s character as a prod-
uct of his acceptance of nihilist doctrines. Jackson’s understanding of the Notes from 
Underground is based on his reading of the Notes from the House of the Dead, Dostoev-
sky’s fictionalized account of his life in a Siberian prison camp. The themes of freedom 
and constraint are central to the latter, as may be expected from a book about prison, 
and Jackson draws upon them in explaining the psychology of the Underground Man. 
He focuses in particular on the experiences of certain convicts who, Dostoevsky re-
calls, would indulge themselves in senseless bouts of drinking and revelry, despite 
knowing that they would afterwards be caught and punished severely.9 As Jackson 
notes, the convicts behave this way in order to enjoy a sense of freedom that is other-
wise denied to them: 
starting out with a defense of personality, with the natural demands for 
self-expression, the individual spins out of control and plunges into the 
“abyss of the most unbridled and limitless freedom,” revelling in the 
fact that “nothing was sacred for him any more.”10  
These unbridled “convulsions” are a reaction to the frustration of a legitimate need 
for freedom, which expresses itself destructively only because it cannot do so natu-
rally and positively.11 Jackson thus agrees with Frank in his understanding of this 
dangerous irascibility as a reaction to the constriction of freedom. 
Jackson also refers to the idea of determinism, which is for him a means of transition-
ing from the House of the Dead to Notes from Underground: he takes it that “the iron clad 
 
9 Dostoevsky, 2003(a): 110. 
10 Jackson, 1995: 7. 
11 Jackson, 1995: 5. See also Jackson’s introduction to Notes from Underground and The Double: 
“In the most basic sense the underground behaviour and outlook of the new social type, as it 
pertains to Dostoyevsky’s early works in particular, is the consequence of a radical denial of 
man’s organic need for self-expression, of his natural drive to be himself and to occupy his 
own space and place in the world. The suppression of the basic drives of human nature, how-




determinism, that has overtaken both reason and the individual in prison”12 is much 
the same as that which the Underground Man grapples with in the form of Cher-
nyshevsky’s philosophy. Of course, the convicts are faced with a much more concrete 
embodiment of “determinism,” namely, the constraints of their prison, while the Un-
derground Man is oppressed merely by the thought of determinism; nevertheless, 
Jackson thinks both parties are subject to the same psychological affliction. Though 
the Underground Man is not an actual prisoner, his nihilistic view of the universe 
means that he suffers from the same anxiety of constraint, and the same capricious 
reaction against this constraint. We may also add that the socialist utopia, according 
to libertarian readers, would if implemented amount to a real attack on freedom, be-
cause it would result in something like the totalitarian regimes stemming from social-
ism in the twentieth century; thus the Underground Man is also oppressed in advance 
by the socialist utopia itself. “We have here, in a nutshell,” Jackson writes, “the whole 
problematic of Notes from the Underground. The Underground Man not only embodies 
‘convulsions’ in his psychology, but gives conscious articulation of these convulsions 
in his irrational will philosophy.”13 Thus Jackson agrees with Frank that the Under-
ground Man illustrates the effects of taking to heart the doctrine of determinism.14 
Jackson is less clear than Frank that this constitutes an argument against Chernyshev-
sky’s utopian socialism, but this claim is at least implicit; since Chernyshevsky is a 
proponent of determinism, the assertion that determinism leads to ”convulsions” is 
an attack on his position. 
In general, as stated, Frank does not think Dostoevsky uses the Underground Man as 
a mouthpiece for his own ideas; on the contrary, far from being anything with which 
Dostoevsky would agree, the splenetic ramblings of the Underground Man serve to 
illustrate the effect the radical ideology has had on his mind. Jackson would seem to 
concur with this interpretation. However, Frank goes on to explain that the Under-
ground Man does produce direct arguments against the utopian socialist ideal (to be 
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found especially in Chapters VII-X of Part I of the Notes), and he attributes these ar-
guments, which are illustrated by the Underground Man’s own experiences of trying 
unsuccessfully to put the radical ideology into practice, to Dostoevsky himself. The 
Underground Man’s central contention here is that utopian socialism, if propagated 
or ever put into practice, would necessarily fail because it would mean an unaccepta-
ble constriction of freedom, both in its theoretical espousal of determinism and in its 
utopian vision of “deterministic” social and economic reorganization. 
The Underground Man has already tried to live in accordance with the truth of deter-
minism and failed: he could not suppress his moral-emotional responses even though 
he believed them to be irrational. He is thus, we might think, well placed to under-
stand the importance of freedom in human life. The Underground Man grants (for 
the sake of argument, at least) that the socialist utopia is possible, but he denies that 
it would be able to endure for long because of its disregard for the liberties of the 
individual: in such a society, life would be regimented according to scientific theories 
designed to maximize the fulfilment of material and emotional needs. The “most ad-
vantageous advantage” of all, he says, is freedom, and people will disdain all other 
advantages, as well as defy reason itself, if they must do so in order to preserve a 
sense of freedom. Confronted with the stifling predictability of a scientific utopia in 
which freedom of choice is “obsolescent” (as Jackson puts it),15 people will go the way 
of the Underground Man himself and disrupt the general harmony so as to satisfy 
their craving for free choice. The need for freedom then manifests as a destructive, 
chaotic force with no internal restraints. Whether or not this force is a good thing in 
itself (according to Frank, the Underground Man thinks it isn’t), it springs from a 
good and worthy source, and “is envisaged only as a last-ditch defense against the 
hypothetical accomplishment of the Crystal Palace ideal.”16  
It seems that according to Frank there are two facets to Dostoevsky’s argument. The 
first, of which the personality of the Underground Man is supposed to be an 
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illustration, is the idea that propagating utopian socialist ideas will have negative psy-
chological consequences which undermine the aims of those ideas. The second, which 
is formulated explicitly by the Underground Man on behalf of Dostoevsky, is that a 
society founded on the utopian socialist model would have the same negative psycholog-
ical consequences and would provoke rebellion. The common element of both strands 
is the idea that a chaotic psychological backlash, exemplified by the Underground 
Man himself, is the end result of believing, under the influence of some kind of “de-
terminism,” that one has no free will. People who feel that they have no freedom—
whether because they accept determinism as an idea or because their society is ar-
ranged “deterministically,” that is, scientifically regimented—will behave capri-
ciously and therefore become enemies of social harmony. “In both cases,” Frank 
writes, “the cause of this chaos is the same: the revolt of the personality against a 
world in which free will (and hence moral categories of any kind) has no further rea-
son for being.”17  
We may generalize Frank’s understanding of Dostoevsky’s argument against utopian 
socialism, which for the sake of convenience I shall call the “Libertarian Argument” 
in what follows, like so: 
1. Humans have an ineradicable need for freedom, which is in general stronger 
than all other needs. So people who feel their freedom to be threatened will 
do anything to preserve it. They will go mad and attempt capriciously to 
throw off all limitations. 
2. Utopian socialism threatens freedom. 
3. Therefore, people will rebel against utopian socialism. 
Again, as Frank sees it, this argument is both illustrated by Dostoevsky in the charac-
ter of the Underground Man (Jackson also seems to endorse an interpretation of this 
 




kind), and advanced directly by the Underground Man, when, speaking on Dostoev-
sky’s behalf, he criticizes utopian socialism directly. 
Scanlan approaches the work from a completely different angle, but comes to much 
the same conclusions about Dostoevsky’s polemic in Notes from Underground. More 
precisely, he agrees with Frank’s second means of attributing the Libertarian Argu-
ment to Dostoevsky, namely, the idea that the Underground Man expresses this ar-
gument directly on Dostoevsky’s behalf. Scanlan rejects Frank’s contention—the 
starting point for his overall interpretation—that the Underground Man accepts the 
Nihilist doctrines on an intellectual level and has been corrupted by them. He argues 
instead that Dostoevsky typically uses the Underground Man as a mouthpiece for his 
own ideas, and that the Underground Man has no consistent intellectual sympathy 
for Chernyshevsky’s views.18 He points in particular to Chapter VII of Part I, noting 
that there is nothing to suggest any agreement with the doctrines the Underground 
Man is arguing against. In fact, Frank does recognise this, as we have seen. Unlike 
Frank, though, Scanlan thinks the primary polemical function of the Notes is not psy-
chological reductio ad absurdum, but direct philosophical refutation of Chernyshev-
sky’s position with cogent logical arguments, which are consistently expressed by the 
Underground Man on Dostoevsky’s behalf.19 Scanlan, unlike Frank and Jackson, does 
not think that the Underground Man’s psychology is used by Dostoevsky to illustrate 
the effects of believing in determinism because he does not think the Underground 
Man believes in determinism.  
Scanlan summarises his understanding of the Underground Man’s Libertarian Argu-
ment as follows: 
Human beings, on this view, are fundamentally wilful creatures who 
are moved to defy reason, common sense, and the expectations of oth-
ers in order to express their own wills. [ … ] Obviously this insistence 
on wilful behaviour is a fatal obstacle to the creation of a utopian social 
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order such as the Rational Egoists had in mind. Even if provided with 
all other benefits but free choice, in the most rationally ordered of soci-
eties, individuals will insist on asserting their independence, at the cost 
of destroying the system.20 
Although Scanlan sometimes (as here) suggests that capricious wilfulness is, for both 
Dostoevsky and the Underground Man, a fundamental and ineliminable feature of hu-
man psychology,21 it is clear that he regards the desire for and the exercise of such ca-
price to be circumstantial. He states that the Underground Man’s capriciousness “il-
lustrates the evils of a freedom unstructured by higher values; the Underground 
Man’s egoism is the perversion of a distinctive and precious human capacity by ex-
empting it from all spiritual authority.”22 This implies that the “fundamentally wilful” 
nature of human beings can manifest itself in ways that are not at all problematic, 
namely, when tempered and channelled by the “higher values” of morality and reli-
gion. Thus Scanlan seems to agree with Frank and Jackson that the destructive wil-
fulness described by the Underground Man is to be understood as a psychological 
reaction to Chernyshevsky’s nihilist doctrines, which eliminate these values.23 Again, 
utopian socialism fails because it entails a constriction of freedom which human be-
ings cannot accept, and thus generates a backlash against social order and stability 
that undermines its own aims. So, both Frank and Scanlan think that the Under-
ground Man voices this argument, and is speaking for Dostoevsky when he does so.  
In sum, we have seen that there are two main ways in which the libertarian interpre-
tation attempts to derive the Libertarian Argument from Notes from Underground: 
firstly, Frank and Jackson view the character of the Underground Man as an illustra-
tion of the effects of believing in Chernyshevsky’s doctrines, and in particular the idea 
of determinism; secondly, Frank and Scanlan read the Underground Man’s attack on 
utopian socialism as a direct expression of the Libertarian Argument. In the first case, 
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it is thought that Dostoevsky puts forward the argument obliquely, through illustrat-
ing the truth of the conclusion and allowing his readers to deduce the premises; in 
the second case, it is thought that Dostoevsky includes the argument straightfor-
wardly in the discourse of his narrator. It is important to distinguish these two strands 
of the libertarian reading, since they can be evaluated separately. I shall assess the 
first in Chapter 3, the second in Chapter 4. First, however, some more clarifications 
are required before the true import of both Dostoevsky’s text and the libertarian read-
ing of it can be ascertained. 
2. Disambiguation of “Freedom” 
As we have seen, Jackson, Frank and Scanlan all read the Underground Man’s dia-
tribe against utopian socialism as an argument based on the incompatibility of uto-
pian socialism and some kind of craving for freedom. On some level, this must cer-
tainly be true: the Underground Man clearly thinks that freedom is the “most advan-
tageous advantage” which the utopian socialists have failed to take into consideration, 
and which will be the spanner in the works of their system. But there is a great deal 
of confusion surrounding the notion of freedom here. In what follows I shall try to 
clarify the meaning and significance of words like “freedom” in Notes from Under-
ground and for Dostoevsky generally. This will enable us to understand the polemic 
of the Notes and determine whether it amounts, as Jackson, Frank and Scanlan think, 
to a defence of individual freedom against socialist paternalism. 
We may begin to unravel these complexities by determining the extent to which Dos-
toevsky and the Underground Man disagree about the significance of freedom. Ac-
cording to Scanlan, Dostoevsky accepts the Underground Man’s description of the 
monumental importance of freedom in human psychology, but disagrees with his 




discussion of the relation between Dostoevsky’s ideas and those of the Underground 
Man: 
Where Dostoevsky parts company with the Underground Man, of 
course, is in the appraisal of this egoistic insistence on boundless free-
dom. For all the importance of free choice in Dostoevsky’s worldview, 
when the Underground Man proceeds to the normative dimension of 
Rational Egoism and characterizes freedom itself as man’s “most ad-
vantageous advantage,” we cannot assume the he is still echoing Dos-
toevsky’s own convictions.24 
Scanlan’s point, I take it, is that Dostoevsky accepts the Underground Man’s descrip-
tion of human psychology, but not his evaluation of that psychology. In other words, 
Dostoevsky does believe that if their freedom is threatened, as in the socialist utopia, 
people will respond capriciously as the Underground Man suggests; but, unlike the 
Underground Man, he does not believe that that this capricious reaction is itself com-
mendable.  
This is how, according to Scanlan’s interpretation, Dostoevsky can retain custody of 
the Underground Man’s polemics—the Libertarian Argument, which is based only 
on the descriptive observation that humans require freedom at all costs and become 
capricious when it is threatened—without pardoning the Underground Man’s defi-
nition of capricious freedom as his or anyone else’s “most advantageous advantage.” 
This is an important point, because the kind of freedom the Underground Man pre-
sents as the “most advantageous advantage” is plainly not the kind that would appeal 
to Dostoevsky.  
For Dostoevsky, as Scanlan points out, the only kind of “freedom” which really mat-
ters “lies not in free choice as such but in the free acceptance of Christ as His moral 
message.”25 Indeed, as he goes on to explain, Dostoevsky didn’t care at all about “the 
unruly freedom” of the Underground Man, believing instead that true freedom is 
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actually a voluntary curtailment of free choice for the sake of moral self-mastery. 
Scanlan quotes from the following passage in the Writer’s Diary:26  
The way the world conceives freedom today is as license 
[разнузданность], whereas real freedom lies only in overcoming the 
self and the will so as ultimately to achieve a moral condition in which 
one at each moment is the real master of himself. But giving licence to 
your desires only leads to your enslavement. That is why almost the 
whole of today’s world supposes that freedom lies in financial security 
and in laws guaranteeing that financial security: “I have money and so 
I can do whatever I like [ … ].”27  
One could also add Dostoevsky’s statement about genuine freedom in Winter Notes, 
which is more contemporaneous with Notes from Underground: 
Understand me: voluntary, completely conscious self-sacrifice imposed 
by no one, sacrifice of the self for the sake of all, is, in my opinion, a sign 
of the very highest development of the personality, of the very height 
of its power, the highest form of self-mastery, the greatest freedom of 
one’s own will [высочайшей свободы собственной воли].28 
Clearly, as Scanlan points out, this conception of freedom is totally contrary to the 
one propounded by the Underground Man; but it is also very different from what is 
normally meant by the term “freedom” in ordinary discourse. “Real freedom” in Dos-
toevsky’s sense is perfectly compatible with a total lack of personal and civil liberties; 
one can presumably be morally “the real master of oneself” regardless of one’s exter-
nal circumstances, even within a prison cell. This is much closer to the idea of freedom 
as autonomy (auto-nomy, self-legislation) which was favoured by the German 
 
26 Scanlan quotes only the first sentence, in his own translation (Scanlan, 2003: 75). 
27 Dostoevsky, 1994: 883 (PSS 25: 62). Whenever quoting Dostoevsky’s Russian I shall cite the 
Nauka edition of his complete works (1972-1990, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, 30 vols, ed. G. M. 
Fridlender et al., Leningrad: Nauka), abbreviated PSS, followed by volume and page numbers. 




Idealists, following Rousseau: one chooses one’s own constraints so as to be truly free 
in a deeper sense.29 
For present purposes, it is plainly indispensable to disambiguate the term “freedom” 
more formally, and in what follows I shall distinguish three varieties. Firstly, I shall 
refer to what Dostoevsky denigrates with the term “licence”—an absence of all exter-
nal constraints which permits us to choose to do what we want from among various 
different possibilities—as “liberty.” Secondly, I shall refer to what the Underground 
Man calls the “most advantageous advantage,” his ideal of destructive wilfulness, as 
“caprice.” Thirdly, I shall refer to what Dostoevsky considers to be genuine freedom 
as “moral autonomy” or “moral freedom.” Henceforth, all of these words should be 
treated as technical terms; I shall continue to define them more fully in what follows.  
I do not mean to suggest that these are the only varieties of freedom to be found in 
Dostoevsky’s writings, but only that this conceptual division is the most useful for 
making sense of the polemics in Notes from Underground; this will, I hope, be borne 
out in what follows. Various scholars have proposed alternative disambiguations. For 
example, Evgenia Cherkasova has distinguished two notions of freedom in Dostoev-
sky’s work corresponding to two Russian terms, свобода and воля.30 She notes that 
воля is close in meaning to the German Willkür, “arbitrariness” or “power of choice,” 
but claims that it has no precise English equivalent.31 Understood this way, it is clearly 
related to the term “caprice” as I define it. Свобода, on the other hand, is more closely 
equivalent to “liberty” or “freedom.” For Cherkasova’s reading of Dostoevsky, the 
importance of the distinction is not so much semantic as figurative: “Svoboda differs 
from volia as a nicely arranged cocktail party differs from an unrestrained, drunken 
bacchanalia.”32 It is worth bearing this verbal distinction in mind since, as we shall 
see in what follows, Dostoevsky’s usage of the terms sometimes indicates what kind 
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of freedom he is referring to; it cannot always be relied upon as a guide to his meaning, 
however, since he does not define his terms or use them in a fully consistent fashion.33  
Other attempts to discern different kinds of freedom in Dostoevsky’s works are less 
relevant to present purposes. Berdyaev distinguished two varieties: “the first to 
choose between good and evil” and the second “the freedom that we have in view 
when it is said that man ought to free himself from lower influences, to have control 
of his passions, to throw off enslavement to himself and to his environment, and the 
highest desire for freedom the spirit aims at.”34 These would seem to overlap with the 
concepts of liberty and moral autonomy distinguished above, though not, perhaps, 
very precisely. Joseph Alulis, on the other hand, distinguishes no less than seven va-
rieties of freedom in Ivan Karamazov’s tale of the Grand Inquisitor.35 Richard Av-
ramenko has distinguished two kinds of freedom, which he calls “approximate” and 
“proximate,” but it seems that his distinction may instead best be understood as a 
distinction between two different ways of trying to make oneself or others free; at 
bottom, there is only what he calls “factual freedom,” which corresponds to what I 
have called “liberty.”36 Robert Louis Jackson mentions at least three kinds of freedom 
 
33  It is also worth noting that Dostoevsky sometimes uses other relevant terms, such as 
“разнузданность,” meaning licence or libertinism (as we saw above), and the loanword 
“каприз,” caprice (as we shall see below). 
34 Berdyaev, 1957: 68, 69. 
35 “From the Grand inquisitor’s apologia, then, one may collect at least seven meanings of lib-
erty. Being free means: (1) doing whatever one likes; (2) obeying the law; (3) having a share in 
making the law; (4) deciding for oneself what is right and true; (5) not being determined in 
one’s actions by forces external to one’s own will; (6) making and obeying the law for the right 
reason; (7) being free to decide about what it means to be human. These are, respectively, a 
kind of natural freedom, moral or social freedom, political freedom, freedom of conscience, 
freedom of the will, a true natural freedom that is also social and political, and freedom of 
faith. This history the Grand Inquisitor foretells turns on these seven meanings. The Grant 
Inquisitor’s critique of Christ is that because most human beings, possessed of freedom of the 
will, and loving to do whatever they like, are incapable of true natural freedom, they may not 
enjoy either political liberty, or freedom of conscience, with the result that obedience to the 
law, is stripped of its dignity” (Alulis, 2009: 213). 
36 On Avramenko’s reading, it seems, Dostoevsky’s claim is—rather implausibly—that the 
best way to obtain “factual freedom,” liberty, is to try not to care about it at all but, instead, to 
immerse oneself in the task of living and acting morally. On this view, to concern oneself with 





that seem to overlap with the three that I have proposed, as well as what he calls 
“freedom with”—which seems to refer to the value of community rather than a kind 
of freedom—but he does not attempt to distinguish or define them with precision.37 
None of these disambiguations shed additional light on Dostoevsky’s polemic in 
Notes from Underground, so I shall not consider them in detail, but instead proceed to 
clarify the ideas of liberty, moral autonomy and caprice. Since what I have called “lib-
erty” is simpler and more familiar, I shall focus primarily on moral autonomy and 
caprice, and, in the following two sections, investigate these two notions in turn. 
3. Moral Autonomy  
The traditional notion of Dostoevsky as a champion of freedom is vacuous, unless 
one specifies precisely what kind of freedom he is supposed to be a champion of. 
Presumably, Dostoevsky does care to a normal extent about ordinary liberties; he 
would of course be opposed to locking people up arbitrarily. Moreover, he must 
surely care about the possibility of manifesting one’s moral autonomy in real action—
that is, in morally good actions—which requires at least a measure of liberty.38 But he 
hardly deserves to be counted a champion of what we would normally think of as 
freedom, an absence of external constraints on our choices, which he thinks amounts 
 
scheme, is a sure way of losing one’s liberty. Avramenko uses Raskolnikov as an illustration: 
“this is the irony of his actions as a liberator. He killed the old woman in the name of freedom 
but in doing so, has not only failed to provide a single individual with more freedom, but has 
also removed his own” (Avramenko, 2013: 172). Raskolnikov’s final liberation would come as 
a moment at which he ceases to hanker after freedom as a distant goal, and instead dedicate 
himself, like Sonya, to life in the present. 
37 Jackson, 1995. 
38 “No doubt every interpretation of the word ‘liberty,’ however unusual, must include a min-
imum of what I have called ‘negative’ liberty. There must be an area within which I am not 
frustrated. No society literally suppresses all the liberties of its members; a being who is pre-
vented by others from doing anything at all on his own is not a moral agent at all, and could 
not either legally or morally be regarded as a human being, even if a physiologist or a biologist, 




only to “licence.” The kind of freedom he really cares about is, as he implies, a moral 
state rather than a real absence of constraints. 39 
 Indeed, though some personal liberties may be required in order to put one’s moral 
autonomy into practice—to actually impose morality upon one’s actions, to actually 
sacrifice oneself for others—it is unlikely that one will thereafter be in a position to 
enjoy these liberties; they belong among the goods that Dostoevsky expects a morally 
autonomous person to relinquish (thus Sonya, in Crime and Punishment, allows her 
liberties to be severely curtailed both when she becomes a prostitute to support her 
family and when she goes into Siberian exile to accompany Raskolnikov).  
Nevertheless, the ubiquity of the libertarian reading of Dostoevsky’s rejection of uto-
pian socialism means it is important to address its sources in Dostoevsky’s writings. 
It takes its impetus not only from Notes from Underground, but from other sources as 
well; I shall here consider two of the most important in turn, Winter Notes on Summer 
Impressions and the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor in The Brothers Karamazov.  
3.1. Winter Notes 
This is the “travel diary” in which Dostoevsky describes his first journey to Western 
Europe and makes some general observations about morality and social philosophy. 
Published the year before Notes from Underground, it deals with some of the same 
problems. I shall argue that it does not contain a defence of liberty, or the Libertarian 
Argument specifically. On the contrary, I argue that Dostoevsky explicitly distances 
himself from liberalism and rejects the ideal of liberty in his critique of Western poli-
tics.  
In the context of his observations on French society and culture, Dostoevsky considers 
socialism and expressly contrasts it with his own ideas about what utopia should look 
like. He derides the French socialist motto, liberté, egalité, fraternité, as an obviously 
 




empty formula, considering the fact that none of these ideals have actually been real-
ised in France after the Revolution.40 Fraternité interests Dostoevsky in particular. He 
talks about how genuine brotherhood is impossible in the West, because westerners 
are hopelessly individualistic. Lacking a natural basis for brotherhood in their society, 
therefore, the only kind of harmonious community they can try to attain is based on 
an artificial social contract, which entices people to join together for mutual benefit: 
In despair the socialist begins to act, to define a future brotherhood; he 
calculates the weight and the measure, entices people with the ad-
vantages, explains, teaches, and recounts who will receive how much 
from this brotherhood, how much each will win; he determines what 
each individual will look like and the burden allotted to each; deter-
mines in advance an account of earthly blessings; who will earn how 
much of them and what each must voluntarily turn over to society in 
exchange, to the detriment of his individuality.41 
Dostoevsky does not here dispute the attainability of such a society. He even admits 
that this social ideal, though not a genuine brotherhood by any means, is at least, on 
the face of it, a good compromise. “Of course,” he writes, “there is great attraction in 
living, if not on a brotherly basis, then on a purely rational basis, that is, in living well, 
when they guarantee everything and demand only your labour and your consent.”42 
His tone is certainly derisive, but he seems to agree that this is probably the best that 
Western Europeans can hope for, given their degenerate nature. And the socialists 
promise this peace and prosperity for each of their citizens in exchange for nothing 
but “a little drop of his personal freedom [личной свободы] for the sake of the gen-
eral welfare, a very, very little drop.”43 But in spite of all its appeal, Dostoevsky asserts 
that the socialist cause is hopeless, because the individual will eventually seek to re-
claim even the “very, very little drop” of freedom demanded of him by their social 
contract: 
 
40 Dostoevsky, 1988(a): 48. 
41 Dostoevsky, 1988(a): 51. 
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In his foolishness it seems to him that this is a prison and that he is 
better off all by himself, because that way he is free. And in his freedom, 
you know, he is beaten, he is offered no work, he dies of hunger and he 
has no freedom at all; and yet it seems to this odd fellow that he is better 
off with his freedom. Needless to say, the socialist can only spit and tell 
him he is a fool, an immature adolescent who doesn’t understand what 
is good for him [ … ].44 
This “odd fellow” is evidently a forerunner of the Underground Man, an individual 
who wants all his “freedom” (in all instances воля, “will”) even though it is a false 
freedom, merely caprice, which is good for nothing, and is simply an expression of 
disgruntled individualism. Indeed, we might think that the whole polemic against 
utopian socialism in Notes from Underground is merely an elaboration of what this 
“odd fellow” would say when confronted with the socialist ideal.  
However, both Frank and Scanlan read this as an argument for the importance of 
liberty, and a defence of liberty in the face of socialist authoritarianism. According to 
Frank, Dostoevsky here “accepts as axiomatic” that socialism encroaches on “the 
rights of personality” (i.e. free self-expression).45 Scanlan, for his part, uses the above 
quoted passage (omitting the second sentence) to illustrate his claim that for Dosto-
evsky “[the socialist] utopia cannot be achieved without an unacceptable constriction 
of individual liberty.”46 
On the face of it, such readings appear straightforwardly correct. Dostoevsky seems 
to say that if the socialists demand a sacrifice of liberty, the individual will respond 
rebelliously, thereby illustrating the overarching importance of liberty in politics. But 
if we look closely, they become overly simplistic and we can see that Dostoevsky’s 
actual point does not, in fact, correspond to the libertarian reconstruction. We may 
observe, in particular, that although the individual does rebel in response to a curtail-
ment of liberty, as the argument from freedom predicts, the need for liberty does not 
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play a decisive role here. What is actually happening is that for some unspecified 
reason, the socialists’ demand for a “little drop” of freedom (свобода), which I take 
to be liberty, has provoked in response an unlimited demand for free will (воля), 
which I read as being equivalent to the Underground Man’s demand for caprice. That 
is, even though the “odd fellow” has even less freedom of any kind to begin with—
“you know, he is beaten, he is offered no work, he dies of hunger and he has no free-
dom [воля] at all”—he nevertheless refuses to join the socialists. So the need for lib-
erty cannot be what motivates him: such irascibility doesn’t make sense as a reaction 
to a small curtailment of liberty, when the alternative—the absence of a social con-
tract—leads to a state of war in which “might is right” and no liberties are protected. 
It must be, rather, that like the Underground Man he is motivated by a self-destruc-
tive need for caprice.  
Scanlan would object to this interpretation, because he thinks Dostoevsky agrees with 
the “odd fellow,” and reads Dostoevsky’s apparent sympathy for the socialists’ hos-
tility towards him as an ironic mockery.47 On the contrary, I think that Dostoevsky 
does not agree with him—just as he doesn’t agree with the Underground Man—and 
only puts him forward as an example of the reaction that socialism must provoke. 
The tone is certainly sarcastic, as is typical of Winter Notes. But it seems to me that 
Dostoevsky is being honest when he writes of the “odd fellow” that “in his foolishness 
it seems to him that this is a prison”—unlike the Underground Man, Dostoevsky is 
being charitable to the socialist proposal. He is talking about liberty here, which the 
socialists really do try to respect: their social contract demands only a “little drop” of 
liberty for the general good, and indeed offers more in return, in the form of civil 
liberties which would otherwise be non-existent—without this trade-off the individ-
ual ex hypothesi “dies of hunger and he has no freedom at all.” But the “odd fellow” 
nevertheless feels this to be a total annihilation of his freedom, and the proposed so-
ciety to be a prison, because like the Underground Man his idea of freedom is (or 
becomes) caprice, and he therefore feels everything to be an attack on his freedom. 
 




Why he feels this way is not specified; one might suppose that Dostoevsky provides 
an explanation in Notes from Underground. 
So, in response to Scanlan’s reading, I contend that Dostoevsky’s sarcastic tone is not 
an indication that he is ironically feigning agreement with the socialists’ appraisal of 
the “odd fellow” as a fool in order to ridicule them. Rather, Dostoevsky agrees that 
the recalcitrant is a fool and doesn’t know his own advantage: he would surely be 
better off with the socialists. Dostoevsky’s tone is sarcastic because he alone under-
stands the underlying psychological reasons for this foolish rebellion, and is mocking 
the reaction of the socialists who can only spit and stamp their feet at the “odd fellow” 
spoiling their best laid plans, they know not why. By portraying their irritation in a 
comical light, with a condescendingly sarcastic tone, he jeers at the childish inferiority 
of their psychological acumen. 
*** 
Quite apart from its critique of socialism, Winter Notes contains some of Dostoevsky’s 
most forceful statements on the topic of freedom. As quoted above, Dostoevsky flatly 
asserts that “voluntary, completely conscious self-sacrifice imposed by no one” is “the 
greatest freedom of one’s own will.”48 This would seem to be a clear indication of his 
rejection of liberalism: he does not regard the ability to choose between various 
courses of action as true freedom, for there is only one course of action—namely, self-
sacrifice—that counts as genuinely free, that is, counts as moral autonomy.  
Even here, however, there is grist for the libertarian mill. In particular, Dostoevsky’s 
insistence that this self-sacrifice be “voluntary, completely conscious” and “imposed 
by no one” is somewhat puzzling. He is clear that one becomes free when one sacrifices 
oneself to others; yet he is also clear that to attain this freedom one must sacrifice 
oneself voluntarily and must therefore, it seems, already be free in order to do so. When 
he says that self-sacrifice should be “voluntary” and “imposed by no one,” is he not 
 




saying that liberty is one of its prerequisites? This seems to support the libertarian 
reading of Dostoevsky, and to suggest that liberty is, after all, an essential component 
of his political vision. This paradox is resolved by its context in Winter Notes. Dosto-
evsky is here arguing that the political unity or fraternité sought by the French Revo-
lution and the socialists is an impossible dream because of the degraded sate of hu-
man nature in Western Europe.49 The will to sacrifice oneself for the sake of others 
must, for Dostoevsky, “be present in one’s nature, unconsciously a part of the nature 
of the whole race.”50 A person “must be born with it, or he must have been in the habit 
from time immemorial.”51 Although Dostoevsky believes that brotherhood is “a law 
of nature,” he also warns that human nature can change gradually over long periods 
of time, and that after centuries of cultural decline Westerners are now naturally indi-
vidualistic; this is why they can only attempt to establish an artificial political unity 
through the socialist theory which entices them to join together out of self-interest.52 
Russians, by contrast, have preserved their natural inclination towards brotherhood 
and need not be coaxed into accepting political unity as a compromise or a means of 
furthering their own interests.   
Thus brotherhood is an “imposition” in the West but a spontaneous outgrowth of 
human nature in Russia. When Dostoevsky insists that self-sacrifice, if it is to consti-
tute true freedom, must be “voluntary” and “imposed by no one,” what he means is 
that it must spring from human nature rather than being an artificial political con-
struct designed to circumvent the natural tendencies of a given nation. Paradigmati-
cally, the “voluntary” self-sacrifice Dostoevsky views as constitutive of freedom is 
associated with Russian peasants who, he supposes, devote themselves to one an-
other spontaneously—even automatically—because it is a deeply settled part of their 
cultural heritage; this is not the kind of informed choice that might be made by an 
educated and reflective individual who has considered various different courses of 
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action. It is plain that the “voluntary” nature of this sacrifice should not be understood 
to indicate a condition of liberty. The Russian peasants regarded by Dostoevsky as 
being most capable of freedom are in fact largely bereft of liberty—deprived of a de-
cent education, living in poverty, and beholden to arbitrary religious and political 
authorities. Indeed, we may even say that it is precisely because they lack the liberties 
enjoyed or sought by more modern Western populations that the Russian peasants 
are capable of what Dostoevsky thinks of as genuine freedom: they embody the cul-
tural tradition of Christian altruism without being in a position to question it.  
So we can see that Dostoevsky’s ideal of freedom is compatible with a high degree of 
political despotism because it does not depend on the existence of personal or civil 
liberties. In practice, there is only one course open to the “free” individual, namely, 
self-sacrifice in imitation of Christ; and this course of action is open to all people re-
gardless of their economic and political circumstances.  
3.2. The Grand Inquisitor 
The other most important source for the libertarian reading of Dostoevsky is the tale 
of the Grand Inquisitor. Commonly known as the “Legend of the Grand Inquisitor,” 
this is a story told by Ivan to Alyosha in The Brothers Karamazov. It is set in fifteenth 
century Spain and describes the interrogation of Christ, who had made an unexpected 
appearance on the streets of Seville, by the Grand Inquisitor, who threatens to burn 
him at the stake for heresy. The Inquisitor argues, apparently in direct contradiction 
of the Underground Man, that the one thing human beings cannot endure is freedom: 
“I tell you, man has no preoccupation more nagging than to find the person to whom 
that unhappy creature may surrender the gift of freedom with which he is born. But 
only he can take mastery of people’s freedom who can put their consciences at rest.”53 
He blames Christ for having wanted to preserve this freedom, so as to allow humans 
to choose goodness of their own volition: “Instead of taking mastery of people’s 
 




freedom, you have increased that freedom even further! [ … ] you augmented it and 
saddled the spiritual kingdom of man with it forever. You desired that man’s love 
should be free [ … ].”54 The Grand Inquisitor argues that this is impossible, that the 
demand for a voluntary pursuit of goodness is unreasonable considering the inherent 
weakness of the human will. His ultimate goal, which he thinks Christ’s appearance 
will impede, is to establish a utopian kingdom in which people will no longer be trou-
bled by freedom and the agonising questions of moral responsibility it entails.  
The first question to ask, in light of the distinctions made above, is: what kind of free-
dom (свобода throughout55) does the Grand Inquisitor think is unendurable and 
want to take away from humanity? What kind of freedom does Christ implicitly rep-
resent and defend against him? Readers interested in the political dimension of the 
story typically invoke the concept of liberty. Joseph Alulis, for example, writes that 
“‘The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor’ is as eloquent a defense of liberty as was writ-
ten in the nineteenth century,” and that “Jesus appears in the Legend as the advocate 
of human liberty.”56 He takes Dostoevsky to be a champion of political liberties in the 
tradition of Alexis de Tocqueville, who, along with John Stuart Mill and other such 
figures, can be regarded as founding fathers of modern liberalism.57 Alulis admits that 
Dostoevsky’s strict Christian moralism is “hardly compatible with modern liberalism,” 
but, nevertheless, insists that “if liberalism means a commitment to liberty, including 
political liberty, as essential to a good human society, then Dostoevsky is a liberal 
thinker.”58 Scanlan likewise appears to read the Grand Inquisitor’s attack on “free-
dom” as an attack on liberty, for he formulates the Inquisitor’s utopian vision as a 
“combination of material well-being with contentment in the form of willing consent 
to be regimented.”59 Regimentation is a kind of external constraint, and thus a re-
striction of liberty; it is perfectly compatible, as Scanlan implies, with the kind of 
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moral freedom needed in order to consent to it. So Scanlan also seems to think that 
the kind of freedom humans cannot endure, according to the Grand Inquisitor, is lib-
erty. 
The authoritarian designs of the Grand Inquisitor are obviously illiberal; this does not 
mean, however, that the elimination of liberty is his primary ambition. It is, I think, 
merely a means to an end. For what he ultimately wants to destroy, and what he 
thinks humans cannot endure, is evidently more closely related to the kind of free-
dom Dostoevsky stated was the most important in Winter Notes: freedom of moral 
conscience. We can see from the Grand Inquisitor’s statements that his final goal is 
the subjugation of conscience to an absolute moral authority (himself), and so the de-
struction of moral autonomy; consider, for example, the following passage, in which 
he defines the problem of freedom which concerns him:  
There is for man no preoccupation more constant and more nagging 
than, while in a condition of freedom, quickly to find someone to bow 
down before. But man seeks to bow down before that which is already 
beyond dispute, so far beyond dispute that all human beings will in-
stantly agree to a universal bowing-down before it. [ … ] For the sake 
of a universal bowing down they have destroyed one another with the 
sword. They have created gods and challenged one another: ‘Give up 
your gods and come and worship ours or else death to you and to your 
gods!’60  
As I understand it, this “bowing down” is not consent to be politically regimented, it 
is a submission to moral authority. According to the Grand Inquisitor, people need an 
authority to replace their conscience, and they need to recognise this authority unan-
imously, so that they can be told once and for all, with no further possibility of doubt 
or debate, that this is right, that is wrong, and there is no longer any need to torment 
themselves with question of good and evil. It must be that this state of moral indeter-
minacy—reliance on a free conscience—is the “condition of freedom” which he thinks 
 




humans cannot endure, which shows that moral autonomy rather than liberty is the 
kind of freedom which the Inquisitor wants to eliminate.  
Furthermore, the Grand Inquisitor is well aware that humans enjoy liberty, and so he 
intends, in order to keep them contented, to grant them various additional liberties in 
his future utopia: 
Yes, we shall make them work, but in their hours of freedom from work 
we shall arrange their lives like a childish game [ … ]. Oh, we shall per-
mit them sin, too, they are weak and powerless, and they will love us 
like children for letting them sin.61  
There is no reason to think that his list of human needs is any different from the so-
cialists’ list of advantages described in Notes from Underground, “prosperity, wealth, 
freedom, peace, and so on and so forth.”62 And he intends to fulfil all of these needs, 
including liberty, to the extent needed to make people happy. It cannot be that he 
wants to eliminate liberty, therefore, or that he thinks it is unendurable for human 
beings. In effect, all the Grand Inquisitor wants is to supplant the human conscience 
with his own authority. The temporary elimination of liberties—harsh suppression 
and policing—is merely the means he uses to achieve this end. 
In the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, it seems, Dostoevsky is not primarily con-
cerned with socialism or social regimentation, or liberty in general. He is concerned 
with the elimination of freedom of conscience, which, being the foundation of the 
moral autonomy central to his own Christian utopian ideal, is far more important to 
him. A libertarian reader might respond that an overarching concern for the preser-
vation of liberty is implied by the fact that liberty is, after all, what the draconian 
Grand Inquisitor spends most of his time curtailing. Scanlan suggests that an inerad-
icable need for liberty is foiling the Grand Inquisitor’s utopian plans, just as, in his 
interpretations of Notes from Underground and Winter Notes, he suggests that such a 
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need foils the plans of the utopian socialists. Following this suggestion, one might 
think that the Grand Inquisitor is, as a matter of fact, basically engaged in a struggle 
against liberty, notwithstanding the fact that he takes himself to be grappling primar-
ily with the moral autonomy of his subjects. Scanlan points to the fact that the Inquis-
itor’s ideal is still far from being realized even after centuries of work, and that his 
organisation is having to resort more than ever to brute force in order to maintain its 
authority:  
By his person and behaviour, the Grand Inquisitor gives the lie to his 
own theories of peace and prosperity through willing slavery—theories 
thus shown to be nothing more than rationalizations of his own arro-
gant willfullness. Once again, then, Dostoevsky has brought home his 
conviction that the universal material prosperity sought by the social-
ists cannot be achieved without protest and suppression. On this point, 
the Underground Man was right and the Grand Inquisitor wrong, as 
the latter’s own activity revealed.63 
The tension which Scanlan perceives between the Grand Inquisitor’s theories and his 
practice suggests, he thinks, that the need for liberty is an insurmountable obstacle to 
the realisation of his plans. This in turn suggests that Dostoevsky is concerned in 
Ivan’s story to highlight the notion that attacks on freedom of thought and conscience 
ultimately boil down to attacks on individual liberties. However, I think this miscon-
strues the problems faced by the Grand Inquisitor.  
As I understand him, he is much more worried about the allure of freedom of mind 
and conscience, moral autonomy, than the allure of liberty: “There is nothing more 
seductive for man than the freedom of his conscience,” he says explicitly.64 He is wor-
ried about the “pride” which makes ordinary people think, wrongly, that they can 
decide autonomously to do the right thing. As he says to Christ: “Oh, we shall per-
suade them at last not to be proud, for you bore them up and by doing so taught them 
to be proud; we shall prove to them that they are feeble, that they are merely pathetic 
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children, but that childish happiness is sweeter than all others.”65 By suggesting that 
ordinary humans can follow his moral example of their own volition, Christ gives 
humanity an unrealistic idea of its own capacities which, ultimately, leads people like 
the utopian socialists to imagine that they can build utopia with their own free minds 
and science: “Oh, centuries yet will pass of the excesses of the free intellect.”66 But 
when people have realised their mistake, and with the help of the Grand Inquisitor 
have lost this pride, “their minds will grow timid,” and moral autonomy will lose its 
appeal.67 They will cease to be led astray by utopian dreams, and they will gladly 
submit to his moral dominion; at this point, suppression will no longer be necessary, 
and liberties can be restored. The Grand Inquisitor has no problem with liberty in and 
of itself, for it is only dangerous in combination with moral autonomy. Once moral 
autonomy has been eliminated, liberty can be reinstated and even increased in certain 
directions, because it will no longer provoke the psychological backlash of the con-
science—people will then be able to “sin” without internal conflict. They will be able 
to turn to their shepherd the Inquisitor, who, as supreme moral authority, will absolve 
them, and they will be happy.68 In sum, the tale of the Grand Inquisitor reveals Dos-
toevsky’s concern for the preservation of moral autonomy, rather than any special 
concern with defending liberty against authoritarianism, even if the suppression of 
liberty is a conspicuous element of its plot.69 
Having clarified the idea of moral autonomy, distinguished it from liberty, and ar-
gued that moral autonomy and not liberty is Dostoevsky’s preferred variety of free-
dom, I now proceed to consider the Underground Man’s ideal of caprice. 
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The Underground Man states that freedom is the “most advantageous advantage,” 
that is, the most important thing; this is taken by libertarian readers to mean that he 
regards liberty as the most advantageous advantage, and in particular as more im-
portant than the material gains promised by utopian socialists. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that when the Underground Man calls freedom the most advantageous ad-
vantage, he is referring to caprice, and not liberty. Scanlan points out that he does, it 
is true, claim that “what everyone needs more deeply than anything else” is “the ex-
ercise of free choice, action according to one’s own independent will.”70 But this inde-
pendence of will does not merely demand liberty, but ultimately amounts, as Scanlan 
also quotes the Underground Man as saying, to nothing more than “one’s own caprice, 
even the wildest, one’s own fancy, though inflamed sometimes to the point of mad-
ness.”71  
In its political implications, the Underground Man’s notion of freedom is so extreme 
that it is plainly incompatible not only with Chernyshevsky’s utopia, or with other 
more regimented societies, as libertarians point out, but with Dostoevsky’s ideal of 
brotherhood founded on moral autonomy as well. To be sure, the socialists proposed 
an especially neat social order, the “ant hill” in which all behaviour is rational and 
goal-directed, and it is no wonder that the Underground Man takes particular excep-
tion to their designs. But had he encountered, for example, a copy of Dostoevsky’s 
Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, his reaction would have been even more scathing. 
Dostoevsky’s utopian ideal, the universal Christian brotherhood, is not founded on 
strictly rational behaviour, but it does depend on strictly moral behaviour: its members 
must devote themselves fully to carrying out the Christian moral law. This would 
have been totally unacceptable to the Underground Man, who writes:  
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Where did these sages ever get the idea that man needs any normal, 
virtuous desire? How did they ever imagine that man needs any kind 
of rational, advantageous desire? Man needs only one thing—his own 
independent desire, whatever that independence might cost and wher-
ever it might lead.72 
So, not only does the Underground Man take issue with the constraints of rationality, 
he states explicitly that morality is equally insignificant compared to the power of “in-
dependent” desire. It is perhaps not easy to get to grips with what the Underground 
Man is claiming. The “independence” of desire is not here construed as a freedom 
from external constraints, like parental authority or government censorship, but ra-
ther as a “freedom” from virtue and even reason itself—things which we normally 
think of as being constitutive of our desires. Normally, we have desires like “I want a 
new pair of shoes,” which are goal-directed and include, tacitly at least, limitations on 
the range of their possible fulfilments. These limitations are imposed by reason and 
by morality, and are perfectly compatible with freedom of will as we normally think 
of it; they don’t count as constraints on our liberty. Under normal circumstances, we 
certainly do not have desires like “I want a new pair of shoes, whatever the cost and 
wherever it might lead!” There are certain things any normal desire for shoes cannot 
entail, like murder (which would violate morality) or eating fifty bananas while hang-
ing upside down in the hope that some shoes will fall from the sky (which would 
violate rationality). And yet this kind of insane desire is the only variety which the 
Underground Man contends is truly important to human beings.  
This kind of radical “independence” means that genuinely free will, for the Under-
ground Man, can only be the purest whim or caprice, with no apparent foundation 
either within or without the individual. This is why he even takes issue with mathe-
matical statements like two times two is four, which he finds psychologically oppres-
sive because of their strict necessity: “Two times two makes four—why, in my opin-
ion, it’s mere insolence. Two times two makes four stands there brazenly with its 
 




hands on its hips, blocking your path and spitting on you.”73 He experiences every-
thing which limits the range of his caprice, even if it is perfectly compatible with his 
liberty, as a direct attack on his personal sovereignty. “After all,” he writes, “I’m not 
standing up for suffering here, nor for well-being, either. I’m standing up for… my 
own whim and for its being guaranteed to me whenever necessary.”74 He wants to be 
able to act to his own disadvantage, to be able to believe that two times two is five.  
Jackson has devoted some attention to the concept of caprice (or what, following Dos-
toevsky in the House of the Dead, he calls “convulsions”) but, it seems to me, has not 
completely distinguished it from either liberty or moral autonomy. In the first place, 
he does not consistently distinguish caprice from mere irrationalism: we should not 
forget that the Underground Man finds morality no less repulsive than reason.75 Nev-
ertheless, it is clear that Jackson recognizes the existence of a distinction between Dos-
toevsky’s ideal of moral freedom and the caprice favoured by the Underground Man 
(and attained by the manic convicts), as can be seen in the following statement: 
In sum, then, we can distinguish in Notes from the House of the Dead two 
kinds of freedom or self-expression: the one self-willed and manifested 
in beating in frenzy at the cover of the coffin in an effort to obtain an 
illusion of self-determination and self-mastery, an illusion of freedom; 
the other an experience of integrity, communion, harmony and sym-
bolic liberation from the death house.76 
At this point, Jackson goes on to describe the notion of genuine moral autonomy ad-
vocated by Dostoevsky in Winter Notes, that is, freedom defined as altruism and self-
sacrifice. This is evidently meant to be an elaboration of the second, good kind of 
freedom Jackson identifies in The House of the Dead. Now, according to Jackson, manic 
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“convulsions” grant the convicts an illusion of freedom—but of what kind of freedom 
are they supposed to be an illusion? The quote above suggests, rather improbably, 
that it grants them an illusion of moral autonomy. But Jackson does not clearly dis-
tinguish between liberty and moral autonomy, and the following statement suggests 
that he takes capricious outbursts to grant convicts the illusion of a complex freedom 
consisting of both moral autonomy and liberty:  
[Dostoevsky] does not in any sense suggest that the convict experiences 
what for him was the highest ethical and spiritual freedom. Yet Dosto-
evsky’s thought is clear: the human being at all times needs to feel free. 
[ … ] Without this feeling—however illusory—he would not consent to 
live. Freedom here is embodied in self-expression.77    
The “highest ethical and spiritual freedom” is presumably the altruism described by 
Dostoevsky in Winter Notes, and the “self-expression” in which this freedom is em-
bodied is presumably dependent upon liberty. In any case, Jackson certainly seems 
to include moral autonomy in the species of freedom—whatever else it may include—
that the convicts enjoy an illusion of. But this seems implausible, because the caprice 
indulged in by the convicts does not bear any resemblance to the altruism and self-
denial constitutive of the moral autonomy; we cannot suppose that their wild drink-
ing bouts grant the convicts any sense of “integrity, communion, harmony” etc., how-
ever illusory, for an illusion must resemble that which it is an illusion of. Jackson could 
refer with somewhat more plausibility to liberty: through indulging in caprice, he 
could say, the convicts experience an illusion of liberty, that is, the kind of freedom 
they enjoyed—to some limited extent—when they were not in prison. Again, how-
ever, it is unclear how drunken abandon can really take the place of liberty: qua 
drunkenness, it might allow to the convicts to forget the fact that they have no liberty; 
qua wanton abandon or caprice, however, I cannot see that it would go any way to-
wards persuading them that they do have liberties they don’t in fact have.   
 




I would argue that the kind of freedom enjoyed or sought by capricious individuals 
like the Underground Man should not be thought of merely as an approximation to 
liberty, or an extreme love of liberty, or “libertinism” understood as a tendency to 
ignore the requirements of law, decency or decorum—in short, that it should not be 
defined with reference to the idea of liberty. It is a completely different kind of free-
dom, even though it can sometimes manifest in similar ways. In the writings of some 
liberals—for example, Tocqueville’s—the love of liberty can almost become capri-
cious, since it can become so heated as to scorn common sense, bourgeois virtues and 
“normal advantages” such as material prosperity:  
What has always kindled such a powerful love of liberty in the hearts 
of certain men is its intrinsic attractiveness, its inherent charm, inde-
pendent of its benefits. [ … ] Whoever seeks in liberty anything other 
than liberty itself is born for servitude. Some people pursue it doggedly 
through peril and misery of every variety. [ … ] What? The very desire 
to be free. Do not ask me to analyze that sublime desire; you must feel 
it. It finds its way unaided into great hearts that God has prepared to 
receive it. It fills them; it inflames them. To mediocre souls that have 
never felt it, one cannot hope to make it comprehensible.78 
Such exaltations notwithstanding, Tocqueville is not describing the kind of freedom 
that interests the Underground Man. The maximization of liberty involves the casting 
off of external constraints such as despots, prisons, regulations etc. But caprice is—or 
rather aims towards—a much more total independence of the will from everything 
beyond itself, including not only external constraints but also sources of motivation 
that are internal to the agent, such as morality and rationality. Taken to the extreme, 
this kind of independence amounts to an omnipotence usually denied even to God: 
at his most capricious the Underground Man would only be satisfied if everything he 
happened to desire, even if it were completely insane or even logically impossible, 
came to pass immediately. The maximally capricious individual attempts to think and 
 




act as if he or she were omnipotent in this sense, even if it is obvious that this way of 
living is bound to be disastrous.  
This is clearly not the kind of freedom that Tocqueville is talking about. Indeed, be-
cause it is so extreme, one is hard pressed to find any historical precedent for the 
Underground Man’s ideal of caprice. The kind of freedom he demands is incompre-
hensible to most philosophers, to whom it would never occur that anyone could ever 
desire it. “No one is so insane,” writes August Comte, “as to set himself up, know-
ingly, in revolt against the nature of things. No one takes pleasure in undertaking a 
course of action which he sees clearly must be ephemeral.”79 And yet this is precisely 
what the Underground Man claims is the most desirable thing of all, the most im-
portant right of every human being! 
Perhaps unexpectedly, we find that one of the philosophes does appreciate the kind of 
freedom demanded by the Underground Man, namely the Baron d’Holbach, whose 
1770 System of Nature (the “atheist’s bible”) is an ancestor of Chernyshevsky’s Anthro-
pological Principle in Philosophy and other materialist tracts.80 But d’Holbach’s appreci-
ation counts for little, because, though he agrees with the Underground Man’s defi-
nition of freedom as the total absence of limitations, he takes this notion to be an ob-
vious absurdity, and thereby denies the possibility of free will altogether: “For man 
to have free agency,” he writes, “it would require that he should be able to will or 
choose without motive, or that he should prevent motives coercing his will.”81 This is 
a statement that the Underground Man would agree with, since caprice demands that 
the will should motivate itself without interference from reason, morals etc. However, 
since it is clear to d’Holbach that such an independence from motives would be com-
pletely undesirable even if—which he doubts—it was possible, he can hardly be con-
sidered a predecessor of the Underground Man. 
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Other eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers are far less sympathetic. The 
Marquis de Condorcet explicitly denies the possibility of action without motive: “To 
speak abstractly of indifference is absurd, because if you assume there is no deter-
mining motivation, you are assuming that the action is not determined. Man himself 
necessarily determines his actions in accordance with the strongest motivation.”82 
And as Kant writes of romantic “geniuses” who suppose they can extend their mas-
tery through the abandonment of principles: “if reason does not wish to be subject to 
the law which it imposes on itself, it must bow beneath the yoke of laws which some-
one else imposes on it; for nothing—not even the greatest absurdity—can continue to 
operate for long without some kind of law.”83 The Underground Man demands pre-
cisely such lawlessness.  
One of the closest historical precedents for the Underground Man’s idea of caprice 
would seem to be Max Stirner’s theory of egoism or “ownness,” presented in his in-
fluential work The Ego and Its Own (1844).84 Stirner moved in the same circle as Marx 
and Engels, and developed his philosophy in opposition to the “Young Hegelians” 
and other progressive intellectuals, all of whom he regarded as insufficiently radical 
in their break with the past. Like the Underground Man, Stirner sets himself up as an 
opponent of the multifarious “lovers of humanity”—as the Underground Man would 
say—including rationalists, progressives, liberals, socialists, communists, and so on. 
He regards all of these philosophies as relics of outdated traditions and espouses an 
extreme form of personal independence that precludes devotion to political ideals, no 
matter how benevolent or progressive they may seem, simply because he regards 
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devotion itself as a form of degradation. Because of its apparent proximity to the Un-
derground Man’s ideal of caprice, it is worth considering Stirner’s theory of “ownness” 
in some detail so as to emphasize the peculiarities of the former. 
In a dialectical account of the development of human individuality, Stirner describes 
reason as the primary obstacle to full and independent maturity. Reason becomes a 
constraint when we cease to be “children” and learn to subordinate ourselves to prin-
ciples. In childhood, he says, we do not pay attention to reason: “We are not to be 
persuaded to anything by conviction, and are deaf to good arguments and principles”; 
we respond only to physical threats and rewards, and aren’t forced to grapple with 
the compulsion of rational arguments.85 “This stern life-and-death combat with reason 
enters later, and begins a new phase,” he writes; “in childhood we scamper about 
without racking our brains much.”86 This condition of childhood comes to an end 
when we realize that we are rational entities whose minds are not beholden to the 
complaints of the body—or beholden, therefore, to those who have power over the 
body, such as father, church and state. These sources of authority are thus dispensed 
with, and the child becomes an idealistic youth capable of withstanding worldly tor-
ments with sublime detachment:  
By degrees we get at what is behind everything that was mysterious 
and uncanny to us, the mysteriously dreaded might of the rod, the fa-
ther’s stern look, etc., and behind all we find our ataraxia—our imper-
turbability, intrepidity, our counter forces, our odds of strength, our in-
vincibility.87 
The discovery of our sublime independence from all earthly powers, our Stoic ata-
raxia, belongs to a new understanding of ourselves as spiritual, mental or rational 
beings: “From this high standpoint everything ‘earthly’ recedes into contemptible re-
moteness; for the standpoint is—the heavenly.”88 Stirner’s description conforms not 
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only to Platonic, Stoic, Christian and Kantian notions of the self or soul, but also to 
the romantic idealism that captivated the Underground Man in his youth and led him 
to renounce worldly prosperity in favour of the higher goods of taste and virtue, as 
we shall see in the following chapters. The condition of ataraxia is reinforced through 
devotion to principles of one kind or another; the youth withstands bodily and emo-
tional discomfort in the name of religion, virtue, liberty, patriotism, or some other 
nexus of ideals. He subjects himself willingly to such principles because he takes them 
to be matters of principle or “conscience,” and thus unquestionable: 
As in childhood one had to overcome the resistance of the laws of the 
world, so now in everything that he proposes he is met by an objection 
of the mind, of reason, of his own conscience. ‘That is unreasonable, un-
Christian, unpatriotic,’ and the like, cries conscience to us, and—fright-
ens us away from it. Not the might of the avenging Eumenides, not Po-
seidon’s wrath, not God, far as he sees the hidden, not the father’s rod 
of punishment, do we fear, but—conscience.89 
Of course, it is only because we believe such matters of conscience to be uncondition-
ally binding that they can serve to liberate us from worldly authorities: if they were 
not unconditionally binding, then we would be able to weigh them against other con-
siderations, such as happiness and prosperity, and thus be drawn back into the mael-
strom of childhood; their special dignity consists in their immunity from such weigh-
ing procedures. For Stirner, this is very much a mixed blessing. That which liberated 
him from the external world becomes another constraint on the individual insofar as 
it is a source of absolute and unquestionable moral and intellectual principles.  
Our ideals are, for Stirner, “spooks” that emanate from our own or others’ thoughts 
and then, solidified as fixed principles, return to haunt us as laws apparently imposed 
from outside; adherents and devotees of all kinds are “possessed” by their ideals.90 
The special dignity of all lofty principles is an illusion caused by the fact that we have 
forgotten their origins—we take them to have some kind of divine or universal 
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authority, when in fact they are merely the ossified remains of our own former whims, 
or those of our ancestors. Even if we wholeheartedly endorse a moral principle at one 
time, there is of course no guarantee that it will not come into conflict with our desires 
and aspirations at other times, and, quite naturally, it then becomes a constraint. 
Stirner completely rejects the Kantian idea that laws are not constraints as long as 
they are self-imposed, as long as they are our principles. If they really were our prin-
ciples, Stirner thinks, we would be able to control and dispense with them at will; but 
we cannot do so because they command unconditional respect. In passing from 
downtrodden childhood to headstrong youth, therefore, we merely trade one source 
of authority for another—the physical might of the father is replaced by the spiritual 
might of our principles.  
So far, Stirner seems to be in agreement with the Underground Man, who also de-
mands the independence of the will from all principles, which, though internal to the 
agent, he too regards as constraints no less effective than chains and prison cells. This 
agreement continues into Stirner’s attack on modern rationalism. As well as being the 
spiritual source of all ideals, reason is the source of scientific progress and criticism, 
and it is reason in this narrower capacity that Stirner takes to be the most common 
object of devotion among progressive thinkers of all stripes. Reason was the well-
spring of Enlightenment humanism; it was supposed to undermine the arbitrary and 
unjustified authority of tradition, church and state. But in the process it became just 
another “cause,” rationalism, which distracted individual people from their own con-
cerns; indeed, it distracted them from the concerns of every real person, and led them 
to adopt the spurious cause of “humanity” in general, a “spook” of the same order as 
God or the king: it “puts the individual man in irons by the thought of humanity.”91 In 
a phrase redolent of the Underground Man, Stirner writes that “reason is a book full 
 




of laws, which are all enacted against egoism.”92 Thus “if reason rules, then the person 
succumbs.”93  
The difference between Stirner and the Underground Man is, however, fully revealed 
in the former’s critique of liberalism and the ideal of freedom. Stirner asserts that the 
pursuit of liberty, taken to its logical conclusion, amounts to an absurdity:  
I have no objection to freedom, but I wish more than freedom for you 
[ … ]. Free—from what? Oh! What is there that cannot be shaken off? 
[ … ] However, the freer I become, the more compulsion piles up before 
my eyes; and the more impotent I feel myself. The unfree son of the 
wilderness does not yet feel anything of all the limits that crowd a civ-
ilized man: he seems to himself freer than this latter. In the measure 
that I conquer freedom for myself I create for myself new bounds and 
new tasks: if I have invented railways, I feel myself weak again because 
I cannot yet sail through the skies like the bird; and, if I have solved a 
problem whose obscurity disturbed my mind, at once there await me 
innumerable others, whose perplexities impede my progress, dim my 
free gaze, make the limits of my freedom painfully sensible to me.94 
For Stirner, perfect freedom is an impossibility, and those who seek it are misguided 
or insane. One can become free of many things, but not everything—absolute freedom 
is impossible for finite, earthly beings. Yet this kind of absolute freedom is precisely 
what the Underground Man considers “the most advantageous advantage.” Of 
course, he too is aware that this ideal is an absurdity, but, as far as he is concerned, 
that is not a good reason to reject it. Even more absurd would be to reject an ideal 
simply because it is impossible—“Oh, absurdity of absurdities!”95—for the intrinsic 
desirability of an object should surely be determined without reference to the condi-
tions of its actuality. Thus, initial appearances to the contrary, Stirner’s egoistic ideal 
of “ownness” is plainly a far cry from the Underground Man’s ideal of caprice. 
Stirner’s main difference with the Underground Man concerns his rejection of 
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absolute freedom as an idle fancy of the imagination and a pale substitute for the true 
self-possession or “ownness” of the mature egoist.  
5. Evaluating the Libertarian Interpretation 
So far, I have distinguished and clarified three very different varieties of freedom: 
liberty, the absence of externally imposed constraints that would prevent one from 
choosing between various different courses of action (or ways of life more generally) 
according to one’s own preferences; caprice, the mad desire or attempt to live without 
internal or external limitations of any kind; and moral autonomy, the self-imposition of 
moral constraints, amounting to the altruistic sacrifice of oneself (including one’s lib-
erties) for the sake of others. Caprice is favoured by the Underground Man, moral 
autonomy is favoured by Dostoevsky, and liberty is largely disregarded by both.  
The neglect of such distinctions naturally leads to confusion. Scanlan’s talk of “the 
importance of freedom in Dostoevsky’s worldview,”96 for instance, is quite mislead-
ing; since in the context of this statement he is considering the extent to which the 
Underground Man is voicing Dostoevsky’s own opinions, Scanlan would seem to be 
implying that Dostoevsky agrees with the Underground Man’s appraisal of freedom 
to some extent, but this would be incorrect because “freedom” in this context means 
caprice, which Dostoevsky does not value at all. Indeed, it’s clear that Dostoevsky 
completely rejects the Underground Man’s ideal of caprice. 
More importantly, the meaning of the Libertarian Argument attributed to Dostoevsky 
by Frank, Jackson and Scanlan can now be clarified. The argument depends on the 
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idea that freedom is in general more important to human beings than material com-
fort and social harmony, such that a socialist utopia which sought to attain these 
things on the basis of a limitation of freedom would necessarily fail. But this argument 
is ambiguous; what kind of freedom is at issue here? It is plainly what I have called 
liberty, the absence of external constraints on the number of one’s options and one’s 
ability to choose between them. We should now understand the Libertarian Argu-
ment as follows:97 
1. Humans have an ineradicable need for liberty, which is in general stronger 
than all other needs. People who feel their liberty to be threatened will do 
anything to preserve it. In a mad attempt to recover an illusion of their lost 
liberty, they will become dangerously capricious. 
2. Utopian socialism threatens liberty. 
3. Therefore, utopian socialism will cause people to become capricious. 
The question is, then, whether the Libertarian Argument so understood can be ex-
tracted from Notes from Underground. As stated above, I shall address this question 
properly in the following two chapters. Here I shall first consider a more general rea-
son for doubting the libertarian reading: attributing the Libertarian Argument to Dos-
toevsky renders his overall social-philosophical thought incoherent. Dostoevsky can-
not coherently believe in the Libertarian Argument for the simple reason that it con-
tradicts his own utopian ideal. We are to suppose that the problem with utopian so-
cialism is that it constrains liberty. But it is easy to see that Dostoevsky’s own social 
ideal is also threatened by this problem: his Christian brotherhood is characterised by 
a total sacrifice of liberty, which is far greater than the “little drop” demanded by so-
cialists. If the need for liberty is ineradicable, as the Libertarian Argument suggests, 
then Dostoevsky surely cannot expect his brotherhood to do any better than the so-
cialist utopia; indeed, he should expect it to be much less feasible. And yet he clearly 
doesn’t think this way.  
 




It is surely noteworthy that Chernyshevsky explicitly advocates the very principle 
that, according to the libertarian reading, Dostoevsky devises as an argument against 
him: “foolish acts,” he writes, “are committed only in two cases: either in the heat of 
the moment, a fleeting burst of passion, or when a person is deprived of freedom and is 
irritated by restraint.”98 Here Chernyshevsky himself states the core of the Libertarian 
Argument: people become capricious when deprived of liberty. Libertarian readers 
of Dostoevsky may take this in their stride, and point to the irony of Dostoevsky’s 
turning Chernyshevsky’s own idea against him. It seems to me, however, that Cher-
nyshevsky has at least as much right to argue this point against Dostoevsky, as Dos-
toevsky has to argue it against Chernyshevsky. If the need for liberty causes problems 
for Chernyshevsky, it must cause problems for Dostoevsky too. So, interpretations 
like those of Frank and Scanlan are faced with the problem of reconciling Dostoev-
sky’s argument against utopian socialism with his own utopian ideal. In fact, Scanlan 
seems to perceive this difficulty at two separate places in his book, and attempts to 
circumvent it in two distinct ways, which I shall now briefly consider in turn.  
5.1. Scanlan’s First Solution 
Scanlan’s first engagement with the problem occurs as part of his discussion of Dos-
toevsky’s own utopian ideal. In this instance, Scanlan attempts to explain why Dos-
toevsky’s utopia is so constituted that it escapes from the purview of the Libertarian 
Argument. He claims that Dostoevsky’s utopia doesn’t really demand a sacrifice of 
liberty, because, being good Christians, his citizens willingly give up their liberty. As 
such, he writes: 
The ineradicable human desire for freedom is not a threat to the stabil-
ity of the social structure as it was for the socialists, because no coercion 
is exercised over the individual. All are genuinely free because each 
 




individual wishes the well-being of others and willingly accepts what-
ever limitations of his activity are required to assure that well-being.99 
There are two problems with this explanation. The first, which Scanlan does take into 
consideration, is that the socialists certainly don’t intend to exercise coercion over 
their citizens; like Dostoevsky, they expect willing cooperation. The whole point of 
their utopian model, founded as it is on rational egoism, is that by definition it appeals 
to what people want and therefore ought to attract willing participants. As Cher-
nyshevsky himself describes his utopian ideal (the “Crystal Palace” depicted in What 
is to Be Done?): “But you see that every kind of happiness exists here, whatever anyone 
desires. Everyone lives as he desires; each and every person has complete will, yes, 
free will.”100 And again, he has one of his heroes assert that “I make it a rule that noth-
ing should ever be done to help a person against his own will. Freedom comes before 
everything else, even life itself.”101 Chernyshevsky also insists that although most 
people will live in his “Crystal Palaces” in the future—because this is what, he as-
sumes, most people will prefer—there may always be a minority that prefers to live 
otherwise, for instance, in cities such as “those Petersburgs, Parises, and Londons of 
yours.”102 Although he expects the vast majority of people to have broadly similar 
needs and preferences, he is well aware that each individual is unique and should be 
allowed to live idiosyncratically. “Whose business is it?” he writes, “Who would in-
terfere? Let each person live as he chooses.”103 
 
99 Scanlan, 2003: 163. 
100  Chernyshevsky, 1989: 378. In the Russian, Chernyshevsky uses the repetitious phrase 
“полная воля, вольная воля“ for emphasis (Chernyshevsky, 1966: 411). This could also be 
rendered “complete freedom, free freedom” or “complete will, wilful will.” Although воля 
often has connotations of “unrestrained, drunken bacchanalia” (Cherkasova, 2009: 34), in this 
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sky thereby signals that although his utopia is very well-ordered, it does not interfere with the 
fulfilment of individual desires. Dostoevsky uses the term воля in a different way in, e.g., 
Winter Notes (Dostoevsky, 1988(a): 51 (PSS 5: 81)), where it seems to refer to caprice (see pages 
33-34, above). 
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It is worth noting that Chernyshevsky’s ideal does not in fact depend on the homo-
geneity of human aspirations; rather, it depends on the vast majority of people being 
sensible enough to band together in order to establish whatever conditions are neces-
sary for the maximization of their own wellbeing, however this wellbeing is defined 
for each individual. The visionary sketch he presents of the “Crystal Palace” utopia is 
presumably, in its details, intended only as a taste of what might be possible. How-
ever naive such a position may be—and it is hardly more naive, in these general out-
lines, than our modern liberal democracies—it is not, on the face of it, illiberal.  
Furthermore, Dostoevsky does not seem to claim that it is. As Frank writes in his 
analysis of Winter Notes: “Dostoevsky, to do him justice, does not accuse the Socialist 
ideal of involving any compulsion. On the contrary, he explicitly recognizes that the 
Socialists desire an entirely voluntary acceptance of their goals.”104 Of course—and 
this is Scanlan’s point—Dostoevsky thinks that this is somehow unrealistic, that the 
Crystal Palace will ultimately amount to a limitation of liberty, and that people will 
not willingly give up any of their liberties for the sake of such peace and prosperity: 
“The unspoken implication of Dostoevsky’s analysis is that the socialist ‘utopia’ can 
only be sustained by force.”105 In fact, the implication is made explicit when in Winter 
Notes Dostoevsky points out that the socialists, confronted with recalcitrants like the 
Underground Man, can do nothing but spit and amend their slogan: “liberté, egalité, 
fraternité—ou la mort.”106  
So Scanlan’s contention that the citizens of Chernyshevsky’s utopia are compelled to 
live in a certain way seems unjustified. Yes, Dostoevsky implies that utopian social-
ism must eventually resort to force and compulsion. But the libertarian interpretation 
needs to be able to explain this fact, and not simply restate it, for Dostoevsky’s claim 
is by no means self-evident. Why would people be willing to give up their freedom 
for the sake of altruism, but not for their own benefit? Why, given Chernyshevsky’s 
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stated commitment to the preservation of individual liberties, should his utopia ulti-
mately lead to the destruction of liberty?107 Whatever it is about utopian socialism that 
Dostoevsky thinks will ultimately lead to the suppression of liberties must be buried 
somewhere below the surface. This is, presumably, precisely what he asks us to dis-
cover through reading works such as Winter Notes and Notes from Underground. The 
answer cannot be as simple as “Chernyshevsky is not liberal enough,” for, seemingly, 
Dostoevsky himself is far less liberal.  
The second problem with Scanlan’s explanation concerns his claim that Dostoevsky’s 
citizens somehow retain their liberty because they freely give it up. This makes little 
sense: freely giving up one’s freedom is still giving up one’s freedom, especially if one 
cannot readily get it back again; perhaps one may become a slave voluntarily, but one 
is no less a slave for it. And as Scanlan himself remarks, the sacrifice of liberty Dosto-
evsky attributes to his ideal citizens is tantamount to “giving oneself into slavery.”108 
Indeed, Dostoevsky’s brotherhood demands a far greater sacrifice of liberty than the 
socialist utopia. Chernyshevsky is the one that wishes to establish the conditions 
needed for most, indeed all people to live in whatever way most satisfies their own 
needs and inclinations; Dostoevsky, by contrast, thinks that people should forget 
about their own needs and inclinations and dedicate themselves to the service of oth-
ers. How, then, does he manage to avoid the argument of his own Notes from Under-
ground? Scanlan explains less paradoxically that Dostoevsky’s citizens don’t mind giv-
ing up their freedom, whereas the socialists’ do—perhaps it is only in this sense that 
they are still free. Frank makes a somewhat similar point, and thinks that perhaps 
because they have internalized the Christian ethics of brotherhood, they feel no “inner 
conflict” when sacrificing their freedom for the community.109 But here we are back 
 
107 To provide a Dostoevskian answer to this question we would, of course, have to forget what 
we know about totalitarian socialism in the twentieth century.  
108 Scanlan, 2003: 163. One might suppose that, unlike slaves, citizens of Dostoevsky’s utopia 
could chose to return to their former ways of life, and would therefore remain free; however, 
if the requisite attitude of altruism leads them to give away their time and property, as seems 
likely, this would presumably become difficult or impossible in practice.  




to where we started; once again, this difference is precisely what needs to be ex-
plained. Why don’t they mind giving up their freedom? Why can’t the socialist citi-
zens internalize the ethics of utilitarian egoism which their utopia is founded on? 
Chernyshevsky would maintain that, surely, normal people are far less likely to mind 
giving up some of their liberty for their own prosperity, than giving up all of their 
liberty for sake of others.  
5.2. Scanlan’s Second Solution 
So it seems like Scanlan’s first attempt to rescue Dostoevsky’s utopia from the Under-
ground Man’s attack does not succeed. Scanlan returns to the problem in his section 
on Dostoevsky’s views about socialism, where he explicitly raises the question of how 
Dostoevsky’s own social ideal can hang together with the Libertarian Argument 
against utopian socialism: 
But in relentlessly showing the failure of the socialists’ ideal—the im-
possibility of achieving it without unacceptable regimentation—is not 
Dostoevsky also casting doubt on the attainability of his own social 
ideal, which surely must be hostage to the same human egoism and 
rebelliousness that create a problem for the socialists?110  
This question clearly poses a threat to the basic coherence of Dostoevsky’s thought. 
Scanlan does not attempt to meet this challenge, however, and instead launches into 
a general discussion of the feasibility of Dostoevsky’s ideal, focusing on the problem 
of the “law of personality,” which Scanlan equates with egoism, and which Dostoev-
sky had once noted was “binding on earth.”111 The problem he discusses here con-
cerns whether Dostoevsky’s utopian ideal is implausible in light of some of Dostoev-
sky’s more pessimistic statements about the inherent egoism of human nature. In re-
sponse he argues that Dostoevsky came increasingly to believe that rebellious egoism 
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was not a universal and insurmountable phenomenon, and therefore not a threat to 
his utopian ideal.           
We may leave aside the details of this discussion, because in any case, Scanlan’s re-
sponse undermines his own interpretation of Dostoevsky’s argument against utopian 
socialism. If the only way to save Dostoevsky’s social ideal is to admit that he didn’t 
think the egoistic need for liberty was such a problem after all—that people like Un-
derground Man would not necessarily spring up to destabilise the social harmony 
with their capriciousness—then the argument loses all its force. We are still faced with 
the problem that his argument against utopian socialism, on Frank and Scanlan’s ac-
count, does not adequately discriminate between its intended target and Dostoev-
sky’s own ideal. This problem presents itself as a dilemma: either Dostoevsky thinks 
that the need for liberty is a universal phenomenon, or he doesn’t. In the first case, 
Dostoevsky’s argument refutes socialism but also refutes his own ideal. In the second, 
Dostoevsky’s ideal is saved from his argument against socialism, but so is the socialist 
ideal. Scanlan seems to stumble onto the first horn in his discussion of Dostoevsky’s 
utopia, and the second in his section on socialism. In both cases, it seems to me, he 
fails to address the problem satisfactorily, and his interpretation of Dostoevsky’s so-
cial philosophy dissolves into contradictions. I cannot see any way out of this di-
lemma, or indeed any way in which Dostoevsky could be said to coherently accept 
the Libertarian Argument against utopian socialism. 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I hope to have established the initial problem faced by the libertarian 
interpretation of Notes from Underground. According to this interpretation, Dostoev-
sky argues that utopian socialism will fail because it constricts individual liberties. 
Through disambiguating the notion of freedom, and clarifying the different kinds of 




interpretation is highly suspect: because Dostoevsky’s own utopian ideal is far more 
illiberal than Chernyshevsky’s, he cannot without contradicting himself complain that 
Chernyshevsky pays too little heed to the importance of liberty. This is not in itself an 
incontrovertible reason to reject the libertarian interpretation: after all, Dostoevsky’s 
thought might just be inconsistent. It will thus be necessary to consider the Notes in 
detail to see whether the Libertarian Argument can be extracted from Dostoevsky’s 
actual text; this will be addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, below.  
What might Dostoevsky’s argument against utopian socialism be, if it is not the Lib-
ertarian Argument? Dostoevsky evidently does believe that the phenomenon of ca-
price, in some shape or form, is a problem for utopian socialism, but not for his own 
Christian ideal. But why isn’t Dostoevsky’s ideal “hostage to the same human egoism 
and rebelliousness that create a problem for the socialists?”112 The answer must be 
psychological, because it concerns the problematic psychological reaction which Dos-
toevsky thinks utopian socialism will provoke if it is wholeheartedly believed or im-
plemented. I agree with Frank and Jackson that the character of the Underground 
Man himself—specifically, his capriciousness—is intended to illustrate the effects of 
believing in Chernyshevsky’s Nihilist utopian socialism. The question then becomes, 
which aspect of Chernyshevsky’s philosophy is responsible for causing the Under-
ground Man to become capricious? Frank and Jackson claim that Chernyshevsky’s 
determinism is responsible, since it convinces the Underground Man that he has no 
free will; I shall argue that this is not the case, and that in fact his philosophical nihilism 
more generally is to blame, in a manner to be investigated more fully in the following 
chapters. In any case, once we have grasped the genesis of the Underground Man’s 
caprice, we shall see exactly how Dostoevsky implicates utopian socialist doctrines in 
the problem of caprice, and thereby understand his polemical method. To that end, I 
shall be guided in what follows by this crucial question: why is the Underground Man 
capricious? It will be easier to answer this question when we have examined, in 
 




Chapters 3 and 4, the shortcomings of the libertarian interpretation of Dostoevsky’s 




Chapter 3:  The Underground Psychology 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, I criticized interpretations of Dostoevsky’s attack on Nihilist social 
philosophy that attribute to him what I called the Libertarian Argument, the view 
that utopian socialism is bound to fail because humans have a need for liberty which 
is incompatible with its deterministic ideology. In the following two chapters I will 
consider the two primary means by which such libertarian interpretations are justi-
fied. The second of these, to be considered in Chapter 4, concerns the Underground 
Man’s polemical attack on utopian socialism. The first focuses on the psychology of 
the Underground Man himself, and also constitutes an attempt to explain his caprice 
directly. 
As we have seen, this caprice is what, primarily, makes the Underground Man unfit 
for harmonious society: because of it, he is incapable of virtuous citizenship. Scholars 
have typically attributed the Underground Man’s caprice to a need to affirm his per-
sonal freedom in the face of determinism and a concomitant sense of helpless, crushing 
inertia. According to Robert Louis Jackson, the Underground Man’s “masochistic de-
light in suffering” is an “uncompromising subjective rebellion” against determinism.1 
On this view, Dostoevsky thus uses the Underground Man to flesh out “the basic and 
irreconcilable conflicts between human nature and all social or philosophical con-
structs that deny free will.”2 If this reading were correct, the social-philosophical im-
plications of the Notes would be straightforward: social models which contradict the 
basic human need for freedom will provoke “uncompromising subjective rebellion” 
and thereby undermine their own stability. This is the kernel of the Libertarian 
 
1 Jackson, 1981: 162. 




Argument. As we have seen, however, this reading is unlikely to be correct as an 
interpretation of Dostoevsky’s polemic, since it represents an attack on all societies 
that demand the curtailment of liberties, including Dostoevsky’s own Christian ideal, 
which demands the sacrifice of all of one’s goods, including one’s liberties, for the 
sake of other people. From this fact alone it is evidently necessary to gain a clearer 
understanding of the psychological mechanisms which, Dostoevsky would have us 
believe, lead somehow from utopian socialism to caprice and thereby cast doubt on 
the possibility of constructing a stable society on the basis of that ideology.  
2. Basic Features of Underground Psychology 
As we are now moving to consider the personality of the Underground Man in detail, 
I shall begin with a brief outline of the psychological content of Notes from Under-
ground, in order to establish the subject under consideration. All of this will be con-
sidered in greater detail in subsequent chapters, as it becomes relevant. Notes from 
Underground is the fictional narrative of a nameless former civil servant, and consists 
of two parts. The first is more consistently theoretical and sees the Underground Man 
describing and attempting to get to grips with various features of his own character, 
as well as with the psychological, social and ethical ideas of the Nihilists. The second, 
more “confessional” part recounts an extended episode from his past which follows 
from and illustrates the theoretical observations of Part I. Since Part I contains the 
most sustained analysis of the underground psychology, this is what I shall focus on 
below. I shall draw upon elements of Part II in later chapters, as and when they be-
come relevant as illustrations. 
In Chapter I of the Notes, the Underground Man opens with a description of himself 




calls “malice” or “spite” (злость).3 This feeling or attitude leads him to approve of the 
fact that his liver hurts, and to refuse to see a doctor, for no apparent reason other 
than this spite itself. It also colours his discourse with offensive sarcasm and a cynical 
willingness to reveal his own failings; this paradoxically blends into proud standoff-
ishness. We can already ascertain, therefore, that his spite contains elements of capri-
ciousness and masochism—a flagrant disregard for common sense, and a willingness 
to suffer and be humiliated—which will become much more significant later on in his 
narrative. He begins: 
I am a sick man. . . I am a spiteful man. I am an unattractive man. I think 
my liver is diseased. Then again, I don’t know a thing about my illness; 
I’m not even sure what hurts. I’m not being treated and never have been, 
though I respect both medicine and doctors. [ … ] No, gentleman, it’s 
out of spite that I don’t wish to be treated. Now then, that’s something 
you probably won’t understand. Well, I do. Of course, I won’t really be 
able to explain to you precisely who will be hurt by my spite in this case; 
I know perfectly well that I can’t possibly “get even” with doctors by 
refusing their treatment; I know better than anyone that all this is going 
to hurt me alone, and no one else. Even so, if I refuse to be treated, it’s 
out of spite. My liver hurts? Good, let it hurt even more!4 
He then claims that when a civil servant he was cynically rude and domineering—
also out of spite—and enjoyed wielding power over his petitioners—in particular, a 
“certain officer” who “refused to be humble,” but whom the Underground Man even-
tually cowed.5 Curiously, he then admits that he wasn’t genuinely spiteful or embit-
tered at all, that he was merely pretending, and that he was deeply ashamed of the 
fact. This is the second important characteristic introduced in this opening chapter, 
which he calls inertia, and which apparently prevents the Underground Man from 
really “being anything” at all, whether spiteful or magnanimous; that is, it prevents 
him from acquiring authentic character traits or ways of thinking and acting. He does 
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not attempt to explain this phenomenon immediately, but states that he “consoles” 
himself in the belief that his inertia is a consequence of his great intelligence, and 
states “that an intelligent man cannot seriously become anything and that only a fool 
can become something.”6 In the next chapter he continues on the theme of intelligence, 
and argues, in spite of the pride he takes in his own mental capabilities, that “con-
sciousness is a disease.”7 He illustrates this point by raising the puzzle of why his own 
“overly acute” or “heightened consciousness” of the “sublime and beautiful”—his 
great love of intellectual and aesthetic high culture—led him into a self-contradictory 
lifestyle of petty vice and degradation which he himself found repulsive: 
Tell me this: why was it, as if on purpose, at that very moment, indeed, 
at the precise moment that I was most capable of becoming conscious 
of the subtleties of everything that was “beautiful and sublime,” as we 
used to say at one time, that I didn’t become conscious, and instead did 
such unseemly things, things that. . . well, in short, probably everyone 
does, but it seemed as if they occurred to me deliberately at the precise 
moment when I was most conscious that they shouldn’t be done at all? 
The more conscious I was of what was good, of everything “beautiful 
and sublime,” the more deeply I sank into the morass, and the more 
capable I was of becoming entirely bogged down in it.8 
He then reveals that also he took a kind of masochistic pleasure in degrading himself 
in this way, and that this pleasure derived from his inertia, his inability to change his 
ways, which he then attributes to his heightened consciousness as well: 
Let me explain: the pleasure resulted precisely from the overly acute 
consciousness of one’s own humiliation; from the feeling that one had 
reached the limit; that it was disgusting, but couldn’t be otherwise; you 
had no other choice [ … ]. But the main thing and the final point is that 
all of this was taking place according to normal and fundamental laws 
of overly acute consciousness and of the inertia which results directly 
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from these laws; consequently, not only couldn’t one change, one 
simply couldn’t do anything at all.9 
He then elaborates further on the nature of this inertia, and explains that, unlike the 
“man of action,” the man of heightened consciousness (the overly intelligent “mouse”) 
is unable to settle on any deliberate course of action—revenge, forgiveness, mending 
his ways—because he can find no good reason to do so, no “primary reason” on 
which to base his decisions. What he lacks, as Bruce Ward writes, is “an idea of life 
sufficiently clear and powerful to govern his consciousness and bring his contradic-
tory impulses into some sort of order.”10 When the Underground Man tries to analyse 
the pros and cons of any possible course, he becomes trapped in an infinite regress or 
circle of doubt and ratiocination, and ends up doing nothing.11 “You see,” he says, 
“the direct, legitimate, immediate result of consciousness is inertia, that is, the con-
scious sitting idly by with one’s arms folded.”12 He also repeatedly mentions the 
“laws of nature,” and appears to implicate them, alongside his heightened conscious-
ness, in the formation of his inertia. In this connection, he provides the following ex-
ample. Supposing he had been slapped in the face, he muses, and wanted to respond 
magnanimously, he would be unable to do so even if he happened (counterfactually) 
to be magnanimous: 
After all, I probably wouldn’t have been able to make use of that mag-
nanimity: neither to forgive, as the offender, perhaps, had slapped me 
in accordance with the laws of nature, and there’s no way to forgive the 
laws of nature; nor to forget, because even if there were any laws of 
nature, it’s offensive none the less.13 
The “laws of nature,” whose own nature is here somewhat obscure, appear to under-
cut the possibility of laying blame, and contribute to the impossibility of the 
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Underground Man being able to commit wholeheartedly to any course of action. Why 
the resulting inertia should lead to his (possibly factitious) feeling of spite, and his 
preference for masochism and caprice, is not immediately obvious, but the reason 
seems to pertain to the frustration of his need for freedom and self-expression: spite 
is a reaction to the impossibility of overcoming his inertia to express himself in a nat-
ural way. Thus heightened consciousness, inertia, and spiteful caprice are all bound 
together into a causal nexus whose precise character is in need of clarification, but 
which is the basis of what we can call the “underground psychology.”  
The Underground Man continues with these psychological reflections and, in Chap-
ter VII, begins his famous critique of rational egoism and utopian socialism which 
continues until the end of Part I. It is in this part of the book that the notion of caprice 
comes to the fore, as what the Underground Man calls “the most advantageous ad-
vantage,” or, in other words, that which is valued by humans above all else. As de-
fined in the previous chapter, capricious activity is activity which is free from all ex-
ternal and internal constraints; it is the bare activity of will, unmotivated by anything 
other than the will itself. This is what the Underground Man believes will cause the 
downfall of utopian socialism, as, ultimately, the populace turns to chaos and destruc-
tion as a means of satisfying their need for it. Evidently, his own character is supposed 
to illustrate the psychological mechanisms responsible, in his view (and perhaps Dos-
toevsky’s), for the inevitable failure of utopian socialism.   
We are now acquainted with the basic characteristics of the underground psychology 
which we need to explain. “Spite” seems to be its most general quality, masochism 
and caprice its most typical manifestation. For present purposes this caprice is the 
most important of the Underground Man’s character traits, since it is what makes him 
incapable of participating in harmonious society, and is thus the linchpin of Dostoev-
sky’s psychological argument against utopian socialism. Inertia and heightened con-
sciousness seem to be more fundamental, however, and to be intended as means for 




3. The Libertarian Theory of the Underground Psychology 
According to libertarians, the underground psychology is the result of free will being 
threatened. As stated, the threat usually identified is the idea of determinism, the the-
ory that every event—from chemical reactions to the thoughts and activities of hu-
mans and animals—is predetermined by virtue of the fact that it belongs to the causal 
order of the universe. Determinism is incompatible with all kinds of freedom because 
it means that none of our activities can be otherwise than they are: there is no way in 
which we can meaningfully choose between alternative possibilities, because there 
are no such possibilities.14 According to Frank and Jackson, the Underground Man 
becomes capricious because, as a disciple of the Nihilists, he believes in determinism 
and perceives it as a threat to his free will. ”It would be possible to show,” Frank 
writes, 
how every self-contradictory response of the underground man in [the 
first six chapters] derives from this dialectic, which is driven by the con-
tradiction between the underground man’s intellectual acceptance of 
Chernyshevsky’s determinism and his simultaneous rejection of it with 
the entire intuitive-emotional level of his personality identified with 
moral conscience. 
The libertarian approach has enormous appeal as a means of explaining the Under-
ground Man’s character because, as we have just seen, he is clearly obsessed with 
defending his “freedom” (the “most advantageous advantage”), and because this no-
tion is clearly central to what seems to be the most important section of Part I, the 
attack on utopian socialism. Thus this kind of interpretation is usually assumed as a 
matter of course; as Gary Saul Morson writes: “The underground man’s rebellion 
against determinism and its consequences has become one of the most famous 
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moments in modern thought, and with good reason.”15 The question is, however, 
whether it can withstand the disambiguation of the word “freedom” proposed in the 
last chapter, and the fact that, as I have argued, libertarians are not talking about the 
same kind of freedom as the Underground Man.  
We must also ask whether this obsession may be taken at face value, or whether it 
must itself be explained with reference to a completely different set of psychological 
problems. Scholars have recognized that the reliability of the Underground Man’s 
assertions can always be doubted, but, it seems to me, have made something of an 
exception for his remarks on free will. Thus Frank, who is generally most careful in 
this regard, nevertheless takes the Underground Man’s attack on utopian socialism, 
conceived as an instance of the Libertarian Argument, to be a straightforward expres-
sion of Dostoevsky’s own views.16 Of course, Frank provides reasons for thinking this 
way; but this is also part of a general trend which, I think, stems from the widely 
accepted picture of Dostoevsky as a champion of freedom in the age of autocracy, and 
in the face of a new totalitarian threat wearing the mask of liberalism. I have already 
expressed doubts about this approach; on the other hand, I grant the intuitive appeal 
of the libertarian theory of the underground psychology and that, even if it is ulti-
mately inadequate, it is the best place to start.  
To proceed, I believe it is useful to divide the Part I of Notes from Underground into 
two main sections, already mentioned above: Chapters I-VI, which contain psycho-
logical and philosophical reflections pertaining to the Underground Man’s own con-
dition and Nihilist ideology, and Chapters VII-X, which contain the Underground 
Man’s direct critique of Nihilist utopian socialism. According to Frank, the Under-
ground Man’s attack on utopian socialism is simply a generalization based on the 
description of his own psychology in the preceding chapters.17 In Chapters I-VI, on 
this reading, we see how the Underground Man himself became diseased as a result 
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of his assimilation of the radical ideology; in Chapters VII-X, we see how everyone 
would suffer the same fate if this ideology was propagated and realized in the social-
ist utopia. 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, there are thus two ways we can approach 
the problem of understanding the Underground Man’s caprice: we can investigate 
the way in which the Underground Man explains his own caprice in terms of his own 
ideas, his heightened consciousness and his inertia; and we can investigate the way 
in which he uses the psychology of caprice to argue against utopian socialism. With 
respect to the first group of chapters, I shall argue that his heightened consciousness 
and inertia—the psychological basis of his whole condition—do not derive from any 
belief in determinism; with respect to the second group, that the utopian socialism he 
attacks is not fundamentally deterministic, and that he does not maintain that caprice 
will result from the threat it poses to liberty. In both cases, then, I contend that the 
libertarian interpretation does not correctly identify the psychological source of ca-
price, and is thus mistaken in deriving the Libertarian Argument from Notes from Un-
derground. 
4. Inertia 
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall examine the libertarian attempt to explain the 
Underground Man’s caprice by means of the psychological reflections in Chapters I-
VI of Part I, in which the Underground Man blames it on his “inertia,” his inability to 
make decisive changes to his behaviour or character. As we have seen, this is one of 
the two ways in which libertarian readers have attempted to derive the Libertarian 
Argument from Notes from Underground. Advocating the simplest form of this ap-
proach, Joseph Frank has argued that this inertia is a direct result of believing in de-
terminism and attempting to live according to its practical implications; it then fol-




explicit about the role of inertia in the Underground Man’s psychology, but the ex-
planation proposed by Frank is clearly analogous to his comparison of the Under-
ground Man to the convicts in The House of the Dead. The psychological mechanism 
seen to be at work here is fairly straightforward: belief in determinism robs the Un-
derground Man of the means to make decisions and to act naturally; this causes him 
to cease acting almost entirely, that is, to become inert; this unnatural state of inertia 
in turn provokes an extreme restlessness that manifests in caprice. I shall investigate 
this theory to see whether the Underground Man’s inertia really does derive from his 
belief in determinism, and, therefore, whether belief in determinism can be held re-
sponsible for his caprice.  
The fact that the Underground Man appears to blame the “laws of nature” for his loss 
of authentic activity has often quite naturally been taken as a direct reference to de-
terminism; this is the starting point for libertarian interpretations. Frank has also 
drawn attention to the fact that heightened consciousness, which the Underground 
Man states causes him to become “inert” in the first place, obeys strict “laws” of its 
own; he sees this as an indication that the Underground Man’s affliction results from 
his assimilation of deterministic science and philosophy. As the Underground Man 
says of his psychological development, “all of this was taking place according to nor-
mal and fundamental laws of overly acute consciousness and of the inertia which 
results directly from these laws.”18 As stated, Frank simply identifies this heightened 
consciousness with the acceptance of deterministic philosophy, and recognition of the 
impossibility of freedom and moral responsibility which follows from it.19 He writes: 
[T]he pseudo-scientific terms of the underground man’s declaration 
about “hyperconsciousness” are a parody of Chernyshevsky’s asser-
tion, in The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy, that no such thing as 
free will exists or can exist, since whatever actions man attributes to his 
own initiative are really a result of the “laws of nature.” The 
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underground man reveals the effects on his character of the “hypercon-
sciousness” derived from a knowledge of such “laws,” and thus mock-
ingly exemplifies what such a doctrine really means in practice. Such 
“hyperconsciousness,” based on the conviction that free will is an illu-
sion, leads to a bewildered demoralisation [ … ].20 
Frank then explains the Underground Man’s inertia, his “bewildered demoralisation,” 
as a consequence of this acceptance, which carries with it the elimination of all moral 
notions. Without recourse to moral ideas like blame and justice—meaningless in a 
universe without free will or moral responsibility—the Underground Man has no 
means of legitimating his moral emotions (his feelings of guilt, offence, indignation, 
and so on). He is therefore forced to keep them in abeyance, though he cannot elimi-
nate them from his heart, and denies himself the possibility of acting and satisfying 
his moral-emotional needs. For Frank, then, the Underground Man’s inertia is simply 
the psychological consequence of his attempting to apply Chernyshevsky’s determin-
ism to real life. 
This dehumanizing state of inertia, Frank supposes, then erupts into masochistic ca-
price because it is only through rebelling violently against the stifling edicts of his 
intellect—which has assimilated the idea of determinism—that he can hope to vent 
the frustration of his moral-emotional needs:  
Why does he refuse to see a doctor about his liver or insist that one may 
enjoy moaning needlessly and pointlessly about a toothache? It is be-
cause, in both instances, some mysterious, impersonal power—the laws 
of nature—has reduced the individual to complete helplessness [i.e. in-
ertia]; and his only method of expressing a human reaction to this power 
is to refuse to submit silently to its despotism, to protest against its des-
potism no matter in how ridiculous a fashion.21  
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It is in this way that libertarians can explain the Underground Man’s inertia in terms 
of the idea of determinism, and his caprice in terms of his inertia, and thus, ultimately, 
as a consequence of determinism as well.  
Liza Knapp has taken this approach to understanding the Underground Man’s inertia 
further than any other scholar, and, though Dostoevsky’s argument against utopian 
socialism is not her main concern, it is worth mentioning her views briefly as an illus-
tration of the extent to which it is possible to read Notes from Underground as a battle-
field between freedom and determinism. Furthermore, whilst she arrives at an expla-
nation congruent with Frank’s, she begins from a very different starting point, which 
goes to show that one need not approach the work with a specific set of assumptions 
in order to read it this way. Whereas Frank begins with trying to understand Dosto-
evsky’s engagement with contemporary utopian socialism, Knapp starts from the 
idea that all of his works can be seen as engaging with the idea of death and the pos-
sibility of defeating it.22 Drawing on the notebook entry Dostoevsky wrote upon the 
death of his first wife, she equates death with inertia, which she understands literally 
as a reference to Newton’s first law of motion. When Christ was resurrected he 
opened up the possibility of defying Newtonian mechanics, and defeating death and 
inertia, which are characteristic of postlapsarian humanity.23 “And when [Dostoevsky] 
equates man’s fallen state with inertia,” she writes, “he does not create a metaphor, 
but rather carries certain patristic concepts to their conclusion: sinning man loses his 
divine attributes and becomes nothing more than physical matter, subject to physical 
laws, primary among them inertia.”24 Her interpretation of the Notes follows this pat-
tern, and the Underground Man’s repeated mentions of “the laws of nature” and “in-
ertia” play easily into her schema. Thus Knapp views the Underground Man’s iner-
tia—his inability to act or become anything decisively—as a consequence of his sub-
jugation to Newtonian mechanics. Both the Underground Man and the “man of 
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action,” she states, are “ultimately materialists, who bow to scientific law.”25 She 
seems to mean that they wrongly think Newtonian mechanics either applies to the 
human psyche, or can be used as a guide in human affairs, or both. As I understand 
her, they think themselves to be nothing but objects in a mechanistic universe, and 
behave accordingly. The man of action can still act, but only in the sense that he can 
be moved, like any other inanimate object. Both are inert in the manner of Newtonian 
masses—their velocities can only be modified by forces acting from without, in ac-
cordance with fixed laws. Whether “at rest,” like the Underground Man, or “in mo-
tion,” like the man of action, all people in the fallen state are heteronomous agents.26 
As Knapp says:  
In Notes from the Underground, both the underground man and the men 
of action have lost the capacity for freely willed, self-generated, and 
self-directed motion. They have no vital force. This, Dostoevsky shows, 
is what happens when the Newtonian covenant replaces all other cov-
enants.27  
In the case of the Underground Man, who self-consciously gives himself over to inertia, 
this “Newtonian covenant” manifests itself in the “laws of hyper-developed con-
sciousness” which “are at least as tyrannical as, and, as the underground man’s con-
fession reveals, a form of, the laws of nature.”28 So for Knapp, as for Frank, the Un-
derground Man’s inertia proceeds from determinism, and is evidence in favour of the 
libertarian approach.  
There is certainly support for this kind of reading in the text, but, as we shall see, it is 
contradicted by other material. Indeed, it seems to me that there is an incongruity in 
the Underground Man’s explanation of his own inertia: on the one hand, as 
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emphasized by Frank and other libertarians, he blames it on what he calls the “laws 
of nature,” which is usually seen as a reference to determinism; on the other hand, he 
blames it on a tendency to deliberate excessively and overanalyse his motivations, a 
kind of sceptical reasoning which has been labelled “Hamletism” (in reference both 
to Shakespeare’s original and to his descendants in such Russian works as Turgenev’s 
“Hamlet of Shchigrovsky District,” which illustrate the same traits).29 It seems to me 
that the libertarian reading fails to take this second mode of explanation, and the in-
congruity between the two modes, seriously enough. To understand the Under-
ground Man’s inertia, it will be necessary to resolve this incongruity in some way, 
and come to a unified and consistent explanation. To that end, I shall firstly address 
the second mode of explanation adopted by the Underground Man, which appeals to 
his Hamletism, and which I take to be his clearest description of heightened con-
sciousness and the way in which it leads to inertia. I then proceed to address the first 
mode, which appeals to the laws of nature, and which libertarians draw upon in sup-
port of their interpretation. I provide an alternative reading of the “laws of nature” 
which does not invoke the notion of determinism. Ultimately, I attempt to assimilate 
the first mode to the second, and argue that in general the Underground Man’s inertia 
is a direct result of unbridled sceptical reasoning or Hamletism. 
5. Hamletism 
Whilst the Underground Man does seem to associate his inertia with the notion of 
determinism, as stated, he attributes it more straightforwardly to his Hamlet-like ten-
dency to procrastinate and overanalyse his actions, a quirk which does not seem to 
have any basis in the idea of determinism; indeed, the fact that he so earnestly delib-
erates about possible courses of action suggests that he believes his behaviour is free 
and not predetermined. Frank recognizes that the Underground Man belongs to the 
 




Hamlet type, but does not think this identification has much explanatory potential; 
he appears to prefer a libertarian reading for the reason that it makes more sense in 
the context of Dostoevsky’s polemical engagement with utopian socialism.30 It seems 
to be at least partly in service to his theory of this polemic that Frank displaces the 
idea of Hamletism with that of determinism; he relegates the former to a mere “the-
matic resemblance”—Dostoevsky’s allusion to the tradition of Hamlets and other 
“superfluous men” in Russian literature, of literary but not philosophical interest.31 
Of course, such considerations should play an important role in our interpretation of 
Notes from Underground, but, since at this stage in our investigation the polemical in-
tent of the novel remains almost entirely problematic, I prefer to allow a more direct 
reading of the text to guide us at first.  
To begin with, we may note that when the Underground Man proceeds to actually 
explain why heightened consciousness inevitably leads to inaction, he makes no men-
tion of determinism. Instead, he describes inertia as a consequence of the nature of 
reason, thought, intellect, or “consciousness” itself. In fact, his way of thinking exem-
plifies a traditional cornerstone of sceptical philosophy, the regress problem, which 
starts from the simple idea that our beliefs need to be justified: for any claim we make, 
we ought to be able to respond sensibly to a request for justification; but every other 
claim we make in order to justify it needs justification as well; and so on to infinity. 
Because of this infinite regress, it is impossible to reach a secure foundation—or as 
the Underground Man calls it, a “first principle” or “primary reason” 
(первоначальная причина)—that would provide justification for any belief, or, by 
extension, any course of action which one might undertake on the basis of that belief. 
As Malcolm Jones has noted, the Underground Man grapples not only with practical 
deliberations but with the more fundamental problem of “the impossibility of finding 
any stable basis at all for philosophical certainty.”32 This is ultimately why the Under-
ground Man thinks that no course of action can ever be adequately justified, and 
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commends himself to “sitting idly by with one’s arms folded.” This kind of sceptical 
reasoning is described most fully in the following passage: 
For, in order to begin to act, one must first be absolutely at ease, with 
no lingering doubts whatsoever. Well, how can I, for example, ever feel 
at ease? Where are the primary reasons I can rely upon, where’s the 
foundation? Where shall I find it? I exercise myself in thinking, and 
consequently, with me every primary reason drags in another, an even 
more primary one, and so on to infinity. This is precisely the essence of 
all consciousness and thought. And here again, it must be the laws of 
nature.33 
The fact that “первоначальная причина” is so often translated as “primary cause” 
demonstrates how entrenched the libertarian reading is: the English denotes an initial 
event at the beginning of a deterministic causal sequence.34 From the context, how-
ever, it is clear that the Underground Man is referring to reasons for action (another 
common meaning of “причина”), motivating factors which would take precedence 
over the other conflicting considerations which trap him in a state of deliberation, and 
would impel him to overcome his doubts and take decisive action.  
We may observe that the laws of nature are mentioned again here, but there is no 
reason to think that the idea of determinism is in play; the Underground Man is en-
gaged in a completely free process of reasoning. Indeed, freedom seems to be the prob-
lem: he has too much free time on his hands, and allows his mind to range too freely 
from practical matters. In this respect, he contrasts himself with the worldly “man of 
action.” The spontaneous man of action doesn’t ask “Where are the primary reasons 
I can rely upon, where’s the foundation?” because he doesn’t stop to realise that an 
infinite regress is inevitable; he is thereby able to think, choose and act as if he had 
found a properly justified foundation for his choice. He is not plagued by doubts be-
cause he doesn’t pause to question his own motives, to demand justification of 
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himself; ordinary, everyday motives are enough for his practical and pragmatic ap-
proach to life. For the Underground Man, this can only be the result of stupidity or 
dishonesty. He gives the example of wanting to take revenge for some offence. The 
man of action might convince himself he has a basis for taking action with reference 
to a moral idea like justice. “That means, he’s found a primary reason, a foundation: 
namely, justice.” But he doesn’t see any justice or virtue in the act. According to Frank, 
this is because he has assimilated the deterministic philosophy of the Nihilists, ac-
cording to which there are in general no such moral principles: “The underground 
man agrees with [his interlocutor’s] theory that all human conduct is nothing but a 
mechanical product of the laws of nature”; he therefore thinks that justice, a moral 
idea dependent on the possibility of free will and moral responsibility, cannot exist.35 
There is little evidence for this in the text, however: the Underground Man refers 
plainly to the fact that people who act according to moral ideas like justice do so be-
cause they “mistake immediate and secondary reasons for primary ones, and thus 
they are convinced more quickly and easily than other people that they’ve located an 
indisputable basis for action.”36 Whether or not he believes in the possibility of justice 
as an abstract principle, the Underground Man cannot possibly use it to sanction his 
actions, because in every case he seeks an unquestionable, “indisputable basis for ac-
tion” that can never be found. He will always lapse into a sceptical regress of doubts 
and questions, and so inertia. The description he provides clearly exemplifies the sti-
fling role played by doubt and ratiocination: 
Finally, we come to the act itself, to the very act of revenge. In addition 
to its original nastiness, the mouse [i.e. the intelligent man] has already 
managed to pile up all sorts of other nastiness around itself in the form 
of hesitations and doubts; so many unresolved questions have emerged 
from that one single question, that some kind of fatal brew is concocted 
unwillingly, some kind of stinking mess consisting of doubts, anxieties, 
and, finally, spittle showered upon it by the spontaneous men of action 
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who stand by solemnly as judges and arbiters, roaring with laughter 
until their sides split.37 
Further to this, we are given a concrete illustration of how his inertia develops, when 
the Underground Man recalls the embarrassing encounter he had with an officer and 
then his quest to take revenge.38 At no stage in this narrative does the Underground 
Man appear to be hindered by a belief in determinism or anything similar. On the 
contrary, we are provided with an illustration of the behaviour of a “mouse,” exactly 
as described above, agonizing, doubting and vacillating for years at a stretch, search-
ing for “primary reasons,” but doing very little, and only managing to take revenge 
at last through a kind of accident—for no reason at all—and in the most petty and 
ridiculous way possible.39  
Thus we can see that in practice his inertia is not the result of any particular scientific 
or philosophical doctrine, such as the mechanistic determinism of Newtonian me-
chanics or contemporary Russian Nihilism; he does not state or imply anything along 
the lines of “Determinism is true according to science, therefore there is no free will, 
or morality, so we must be inert.” Nor does any such reasoning appear to influence 
him on a subconscious level, as it might if he were in thrall to Knapp’s “Newtonian 
covenant.” On the contrary, as he says, his inertia comes about in the same way as the 
original Hamlet’s, through “hesitations, doubts and unresolved questions.” He has 
arrived at his theoretical endorsement of inertia a priori, through a sceptical demand 
for justification—for “primary reasons”—which he explicitly calls the “essence of all 
consciousness and thought.” This makes little sense as a reference to determinism. I 
therefore believe Scanlan is on the right track when he defines the Underground 
Man’s heightened consciousness quite simply as “perpetual reflection on his own re-
actions, motives, and behaviour” (this definition is more properly a description of the 
consequences of heightened consciousness, which I prefer to think of as nothing more 
 
37 Dostoevsky, 2001: 8f. (PSS 5: 104). Writing “brew” instead of “blow,” which I assume is a 
typographical mistake (translating бурда, which literally means “dishwater”). 
38 Dostoevsky, 2001: 34-39. 




than self-reflective intelligence, with a strong aesthetic inclination—as in “heightened 
conscious of the sublime and beautiful”). 40  Interestingly, although in general he 
shares the libertarian approach, Scanlan’s understanding of heightened conscious-
ness is diametrically opposed to Frank’s: whereas Frank ties it to the doctrine of de-
terminism, which denies free will, Scanlan thinks it enables the Underground Man to 
realise introspectively that he is a free agent.41 This comes closer, as he notes, to Exis-
tentialist interpretations which take the Underground Man to be oppressed and crip-
pled, not by real or imagined constraints, but by a radical surfeit of freedom. It is 
precisely this indeterminacy of his will, deriving from the perceived impossibility of 
establishing unshakable grounds for action, which leads him, like Hamlet, to refrain 
from acting.42    
* * * 
We have now considered one of the two ways in which the Underground Man ex-
plains his inertia. In this case, Hamlet-like sceptical reasoning, rather than any belief 
in determinism, seems to be responsible. The libertarian reading is thus unable to ac-
count for this mode of explanation. However, it is still necessary to make sense of the 
Underground Man’s second mode of explanation. In addition to the sceptical reason-
ing described above, he blames his inertia on the “laws of nature”—this is the evi-
dence used by Frank and other libertarians to support their contention that the Un-
derground Man is referring to determinism. According to Frank, as we have seen, the 
Underground Man’s inertia is the result of the elimination of moral notions by natural 
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science. Frank explains this “demoralization” by means of determinism: the deter-
ministic laws of nature make free will impossible, and thereby undermine the possi-
bility of moral responsibility. I shall therefore consider this line of thinking next. 
6. The Laws of Nature 
At one point, as we have seen, the Underground Man plainly attributes his inertia to 
the fact that, due to the laws of nature, no one can justly be blamed for anything. He 
gives the example of being slapped: “the offender, perhaps, had slapped me in ac-
cordance with the laws of nature,” and could therefore not be held accountable.43 It is 
indeed natural to take this as a reference to determinism. According to Frank this goes 
to show that the Underground Man “knows only too well that the stone wall of sci-
ence and determinism cuts the ground away from any type of moral reaction.”44  
Again, however, I believe an alternative reading of the text is to be preferred. Later, 
the Underground Man gives two concrete examples of what he calls “laws of nature,” 
deriving from “natural science and mathematics,” which appear to undermine 
Frank’s interpretation: the first, that we are “descended from monkeys,” and the sec-
ond, that “in truth one drop of your own fat is dearer to you than the lives of one 
hundred thousand of your fellow creatures.”45 Today we would hardly consider the 
latter to be a proposition of “natural science” at all, but it is necessary to remember 
that the field had a different purview in the past, and that “the laws of nature” did 
not always refer to the fundamental laws of physics and chemistry, as it typically does 
now. For the Underground Man, in this instance moral notions are threatened not by 
the deterministic implications of Newtonian mechanics, but by Darwinism and crude 
egoistic utilitarianism, which threaten to replace traditional notions of virtue with 
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more “scientific” ideals of competition and enlightened self-interest. The “laws of na-
ture” are thus not only scientific descriptions of the way the world works, but ethical 
prescriptions supposedly derived from the findings of natural science. So, from this 
perspective, the Underground Man would not be able to blame someone who slapped 
him “in accordance with the laws of nature” because that would mean, perhaps, that 
they had slapped him in pursuit of their own utility or advantage; the slap would 
then be entirely reasonable and just, and he would not be right to find fault with it. 
To act in accordance with such “laws,” as the offender did, is therefore not to act 
without moral responsibility, as Frank thinks, but to act with it. In that case it would 
be impossible to blame them because they have not acted in a reprehensible way: their 
action is justified by the moral implications of such (supposedly) scientific assertion 
as “one drop of your own fat is dearer to you than the lives of one hundred thousand 
of your fellow creatures.”  
The example of the justified slap is a poor caricature of the kind of ethics that the 
Nihilists actually hoped to draw from the “laws of nature,” intended as a reductio ad 
absurdum. More charitably, we may say on their behalf that to act in accordance with 
the laws of nature is to arrange one’s life in such a way as to benefit from advance-
ments in science and technology. Analogously, farmers abide by the laws of material 
and vegetable nature when they use the best equipment, plant and harvest at the right 
times, and so on. It is simply a matter of acting in accordance with prescriptions de-
rived from the empirical investigation of natural phenomena. The Nihilists argued 
that this approach, which had made such good progress in the fields of industry and 
agriculture, should also be taken with respect to people themselves. Human beings, 
like plants, were seen to be natural organisms with certain natural requirements, 
which could be discovered and understood by means of sciences like physiology, 
psychology and—on a grander scale—political economy. Once it was understood 
how best to meet these requirements, life could be made to provide the greatest pos-
sible satisfaction of our needs. Thus the “laws of nature” attacked by the Under-




through fulfilling the requirements of one’s human nature. The egoistic utilitarian 
ethics which may justify a slap in the face, and the social Darwinism by which 
Raskolnikov attempts to rationalize the fate of a vulnerable young woman in Crime 
and Punishment,46 are the human equivalent of rules for producing the highest yield 
of crops on a farm. 
Now, because the hyperconscious Underground Man never acts without pausing to 
question the rational foundations of his intentions, he is bound to take this into ac-
count, and to realise that he has no clear right to blame the offender, or, as such, either 
to forgive or to take revenge. I would further add that it is not necessary to think, with 
Frank, that the Underground Man accepts the Nihilistic implications of the “laws of 
nature” which he attributes to his interlocutors. On the contrary, to his sceptical, 
Hamlet-like intellect, the mere possibility of their truth is enough to cast doubt on his 
proposed course of revenge; and this doubt is all it takes to undermine the possibility 
of his acting with the unassailable justification he demands. Frank is right, as such, 
that the Underground Man’s inertia is in this case caused by the elimination of moral 
notions, which carries with it the impossibility of satisfying his moral-emotional 
needs. It seems to me that he is wrong, however, to think that the idea of determinism 
is responsible for eliminating these notions in the Underground Man’s mind. The psy-
chological significance of the laws of nature, rather, consists in the way in which “nat-
ural science” threatens to undermine traditionally unquestionable moral values, and 
thereby fans the flames of the Underground Man’s sceptical intellect; this prevents 
him from being able to utilize traditional moral notions as justification for desired 
courses of action.47    
Here we can explain the incongruity which at first seemed to mar the Underground 
Man’s descriptions of inertia, concerning Hamletism on the one hand, and the “laws 
of nature” on the other. At bottom, the second mode of explanation resolves neatly 
into the first: it turns out that the “laws of nature” simply contribute to one of the 
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ways—perhaps the most important way—in which his sceptical reasoning under-
mines his activity. This is because one of the most important means by which actions 
may be justified is morality; if the assumptions upon which one’s morals are based 
are questioned by natural science, then this whole source of justification becomes sub-
ject to doubt, and so fails to meet the Underground Man’s strict epistemic require-
ments. Thus the “laws of nature,” referring precisely to the findings of science which 
call traditional morality into question through purportedly sanctioning new moral 
codes, are responsible for undermining a significant source of justification for action.48 
* * * 
There is one extremely puzzling passage which deserves special consideration in this 
context. Immediately after describing the way in which heightened consciousness 
makes it impossible to locate “primary reasons,” the Underground Man makes the 
following statement, regarding the attribution of blame: 
You look—and the object vanishes, arguments evaporate, a guilty party 
can’t be identified, the offense ceases to be one and becomes a matter of fate 
[фатумом], something like a toothache for which no one’s to blame 
[ … ]. So you throw up your hands because you haven’t found a pri-
mary reason.49 
 
48 One may indeed note that, even though they undermine traditional morality, these findings 
do, by the very same token, introduce new sources of morality—why can’t the Underground 
Man use these new sources to justify his actions? In fact, though this is not made explicit in 
the text, we may deduce that he cannot do so for two reasons. Firstly, he is old-fashioned; he 
doesn’t have any desire to behave in accordance with utilitarianism or social Darwinism, be-
cause he cares about traditional virtues (this is clear from the sarcastic tone in which he enu-
merates the “laws of nature” which underwrite these newer moralities (Dostoevsky, 2001: 10)). 
So even if certain courses of action could be justified on this basis, he would not want to take 
them, and would remain inert. Secondly, and more importantly, the Underground Man de-
mands absolute certainty in his “primary reasons” for action (Dostoevsky, 2001: 13); the fact 
that ethical systems can in general be undermined and superseded, when in the past they have 
been thought unquestionable, is surely enough to discredit them in his eyes. The destruction 
of traditional sources of moral justification is thus, for the Underground Man, a fatal blow to 
the possibility of such justification.   




How should this be understood, coming as it does immediately after the description 
of sceptical reasoning which seems most clearly to support the Hamlet reading? The 
Underground Man here states that the legitimacy of blame is undermined because 
human actions are subsumed into the normal causal order of the world, which con-
sists of toothaches and other “matters of fate.” This passage, above all others, seems 
to suggest that the Underground Man believes in determinism, and thereby lends 
credence to the libertarian interpretation. Even here, however, it is possible to offer 
an alternative reading. 
In the first place, we should recognize that fatalism is not equivalent to determinism—
to regard something as a matter of fate, one need not regard it as determined by the 
causal order of the universe, for one might also think of it as being, for instance, the 
will of a deity, or as something whose origin is simply mysterious. Loosely speaking, 
one can think of things like toothaches as being “matters of fate” in the sense that 
nobody knows why they occur—they simply exist. This is often, I think, what people 
mean when they say of an apparently inexplicable occurrence that “it must be fate” 
or that it is a “twist of fate.” Understood this way, what the Underground Man is 
saying is that, thanks to his sceptical deliberations—which, prior to this quote, he has 
just been discussing—the actions of human beings cease to make sense to him. He no 
longer understands why people do the things they do, just as he doesn’t understand 
why toothaches occur; “no one’s to blame” because the possibility of attributing 
causal efficacy to any object or person with certainty requires understanding how and 
why it has given rise to its supposed effects.50 This is what the sceptically befuddled 
Underground Man cannot do. As such, this kind of “fatalism” is in fact the very op-
posite of believing in determinism, and is again a simple consequence of “Hamletism.” 
Even if we suppose that this reading is incorrect, and grant that the Underground 
Man’s “matter of fate” is a reference to determinism, it is still possible to understand 
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the above passage in a way that does not support the libertarian reading. Note that 
the Underground Man states not that a commitment to fatalism forces him to change 
his evaluation of the world, but, on the contrary, that his heightened consciousness—
which leads him to re-evaluate the moral status of the human domain—causes him 
to perceive the world as fatalistic. Thus his statement, even if fatalism is determinism 
here, does not support the idea that determinism has a psychologically causal signif-
icance for the Underground Man. The offence “becoming a matter of fate” is a conse-
quence, and not a cause, of the sceptical reasoning which leads the Underground Man 
to “throw up his hands” and become inert. How might this come about? The Under-
ground Man is describing a view of the world for which there is no significant differ-
ence between human activities and other physical events. We have seen that sceptical 
reasoning can strip away all moral attributes from human existence, in the manner 
described above, and thus reduce human actions to the moral status of “toothaches,” 
and moreover that it can do so without supposing in advance that there is no free will. 
To the sceptical Underground Man, there is no difference between a toothache and a 
slap in the face simply because neither provides legitimate grounds for a moral-emo-
tional response. From this it is only a short step to the conviction that the human 
will—conceived as progenitor of moral responsibility—has no real place in the world, 
and that human actions are, to all intents and purposes, only the meaningless prod-
ucts of a blind fate.  
Moreover, and more importantly, we may note even if he does on occasion find him-
self lapsing into a kind of despairing fatalism, or even full-blown determinism, the 
Underground Man continues throughout to act as if free will exists: this is obvious 
from the way in which he deliberates between different courses of action, and 
searches for “primary reasons” which could help him decide—as he says again in the 
quote above. As such, his adoption of a fatalist attitude, whatever its origin, does not 
in any case contribute significantly to his psychological economy; he evidently does 
not, as Frank maintains, take it to heart and attempt to live in accordance with its 




or not the quoted passage counts as evidence for belief in determinism, therefore, it 
does not support the libertarian theory of the psychological significance of such be-
liefs. 
So, whilst I do not think there is good textual support for the supposition that the 
Underground Man’s inertia is caused by belief in deterministic laws of nature, I do 
not wish to deny that some notion of determinism may belong among his beliefs, and 
may even contribute to the repression of his moral-emotional responses and so his 
inertia. I only doubt that determinism has the fundamental psychological importance 
attributed to it by scholars like Frank, Jackson and Knapp. Frank’s straightforward 
identification of heightened consciousness with belief in determinism seems espe-
cially dubious. Whether or not one is ultimately convinced by my reinterpretation of 
the evidence used to justify the libertarian reading, however, should not be the sole 
deciding factor here. Ultimately—and this is by no means a remote possibility—the 
Underground Man may simply be confused. What I believe to be the most important 
consideration, therefore, is that libertarianism is inconsistent with the way in which 
we see the Underground Man’s inertia illustrated in practice. Rather than being 
prompted by recognition of the consequences of determinism, his inertia is precipi-
tated, as we have seen, by interminable deliberation characterized by doubts, hesita-
tions and vacillations—as stated above, he could not behave in this way unless he 
believed he had the power to choose between the various possibilities subject to his 
deliberation. This implies either that he does not believe his thoughts and actions are 
predetermined, or that does not allow this belief to influence his life in the manner 
suggested by Frank and others. His main problem is that he can never find an abso-
lutely convincing reason to choose one option over another; this, I have argued, is the 
basis of his inertia. If he does in addition subscribe inconsistently to determinism, the 
most it can do is function as an adjunct to this process of sceptical reasoning, or as 
another way in which the doctrines of nihilism add fuel to the furnace of doubt which 




* * * 
There is one final reason to think that the idea of determinism is not the cause of the 
Underground Man’s inertia, and, more directly, that it is not responsible for his spite-
ful caprice either. After his initial reflections in Chapters I-VI, the Underground Man 
refers again to inertia only towards the end of Part I, where he argues that humans 
would never accept the historical finality of the utopian socialist ideal. He contends 
that humans, unlike ants, are not content with predictable monotony and stability, 
however pleasant it may be. As such, they would inevitably revolt against the “anthill” 
of the Crystal Palace. If such a utopia was somehow established, however, and—he 
grants for the sake of argument—it was also somehow impossible to rebel against its 
absolute finality, he thinks that the end result would be something like the inertia he 
previously attributed to himself. He writes: 
Of course, after two times two [i.e. the rationalistic finality of the Crys-
tal Palace], there’s nothing left, not merely nothing to do, but nothing 
to learn. Then the only thing possible will be to plug up your five senses 
and plunge into contemplation. Well, even if you reach the same result 
with consciousness [that is, in the manner of the Underground Man 
himself], [ … ] at least you’ll be able to flog yourself from time to time, 
and that will liven things up a bit. Although it may be reactionary, it’s 
still better than nothing.51 
Here, then, the determinism implied by the (ex hypothesi) absolute finality of the Crys-
tal Palace is blamed for a kind of inertia, substantially but not genetically similar to 
the “conscious” inertia afflicting the Underground Man. This proves that his inertia—
which we are trying to explain—does not originate in this way; his inertia derives 
from heightened consciousness, conceived most naturally as involving endless reflec-
tion and scepticism, rather than from determinism. Moreover, his inertia is crucially 
distinguished from the inertia caused by the Crystal Palace by its leaving open the 
possibility of masochistic entertainment, which the Underground Man is so ironically 
 




grateful for. This completely undermines the libertarian assertion that the Under-
ground Man’s masochistic caprice is a backlash against determinism: the triumph of 
determinism, represented here by the hypothetically irreversible accomplishment of 
the Crystal Palace, actually excludes the possibility of such caprice. 
7. Conclusion 
In sum, I have argued that the Underground Man’s inertia, the source of his caprice, 
derives from “heightened consciousness” leading to sceptical reflection and deliber-
ation in the tradition of Hamlet, and not from belief in determinism. I have attempted 
to justify this reading through analysis of all relevant portions of the text, including 
passages which initially appear to lend support to the libertarian interpretation. 
I agreed with Frank that the Underground Man’s inertia is caused at least in part by 
the perceived elimination of moral responsibility and the resulting impossibility of 
laying blame. Frank argued this was brought about by his acceptance of determinism; 
I have argued that it proceeds instead from sceptical reasoning about the philosoph-
ical foundations of morality, spurred on by the findings of natural science—and 
moral prescriptions supposedly based on these findings—which he calls “laws of na-
ture.” Moreover, such a posteriori reasonings are in my view only one of the concrete 
ways in which the Underground Man’s heightened consciousness contributes to his 
inertia. In general, his sceptical intellect demands indisputable “primary reasons” for 
action which can never be found, and thus dooms him a priori to inactivity. Why is 
this so? Why does the Underground Man allow himself to indulge in sceptical reflec-
tions that paralyze his existence? Whilst we have attained a good description of the 
Underground Man’s inertia, we are not yet in a position to answer this question—the 
psychology behind it remains largely obscure. Thus, although we have seen that the 




better interpretation, it is evident that our explanation of the underground psychol-
ogy is far from complete.  
For now, having argued against the libertarian interpretation of his inertia, I maintain 
that there is no good evidence in this part of the novel to suggest that the Under-
ground Man’s caprice is a response to the threat to freedom posed by the idea of de-
terminism. Frank and Jackson both maintain that caprice is such a response, a reaction 
equivalent, as Jackson says, to the “convulsions” of the convicts in The House of the 
Dead. On this basis, they attribute the Libertarian Argument to Dostoevsky: they 
claim that Dostoevsky argues, using the Underground Man as an illustration, that 
Nihilist utopian socialism is problematic because, since it incorporates the idea of de-
terminism, it will cause its adherents to become capricious. We may now say that this 
means of extracting the Libertarian Argument from Notes from Underground fails, and, 
further, that it does not constitute an adequate explanation of the Underground Man’s 
caprice. In the next chapter, I shall turn to the second source of evidence for the liber-






Chapter 4:  Chernyshevsky’s Crystal Palace 
1. Introduction 
As stated in Chapter 2, the libertarian approach to Notes from Underground consists of 
two strands: the contention that the Underground Man’s caprice is caused by belief 
in determinism, and the contention that he attacks utopian socialism because it is 
founded on determinism. Supposing Dostoevsky’s thought to be coherent, we should 
expect both of the strands to be false if either is. Thus, having argued in the previous 
chapter that the first strand is unsuccessful, it will not be surprising if the second, to 
be considered in this chapter, also fails. This is indeed what we shall find.  
Frank and Scanlan maintain that the Underground Man attacks utopian socialism by 
way of the same psychological phenomena which, according to Frank and Jackson, 
he illustrates in his own character, namely, the caprice caused by deterministic threats 
to liberty. As they see it, the Underground Man puts forward the Libertarian Argu-
ment directly: the determinism inherent in utopian socialism contradicts the innate 
human need for liberty, thereby provoking—by a basic psychological mechanism—a 
capricious response which will destroy it. For the assessment of this approach, the 
most relevant passages are found in Chapters VII-X of Part I, where the Underground 
Man argues against utopian socialism directly. I shall argue that the brand of utopian 
socialism attacked by the Underground Man does not actually incorporate the idea 
of determinism, and so, more to the point, that he does not attack it because it does. 
This undermines the second and final strand of motivation for thinking that the Lib-
ertarian Argument can be derived from Notes from Underground, and, furthermore, 




2. Rational Egoism and Determinism 
In Chapters VII-IX, Chernyshevsky’s Crystal Palace ideal is presented as a threat to 
free will. The Underground Man reacts to this threat with a sustained defence of ca-
price as the “most advantageous advantage.” The libertarian approach depends upon 
“free will” here meaning liberty. As we saw in Chapter 2, there is good reason for 
thinking that when the Underground Man talks about freedom, he is typically talking 
about caprice, his “most advantageous advantage.” However, in order to assess this 
approach charitably and allow the best interpretation to emerge as naturally as pos-
sible from the text of the Notes, for now I shall leave the significance of the terms 
“freedom” and “free will” undecided so as not to prejudge the Underground Man’s 
meaning. Now, the Underground Man argues that the socialist utopia will fail be-
cause it is incompatible with free will. The question is, does it threaten free will be-
cause it entails determinism, or for some other reason? In order to answer this ques-
tion, we should look more closely at the nature of the Crystal Palace ideal, and in 
particular at the most important theory upon which it is founded: rational egoism. 
According to Scanlan, the rational egoism of the Nihilists has two components: “Co-
existing somewhat uneasily in the thinking of the Rational Egoists were a descriptive 
thesis and a normative (prescriptive) thesis—a view of how human beings actually 
behave and a view of how they ought to behave.”1 The second, prescriptive compo-
nent specified that people ought to act rationally and egoistically, in order most effec-
tively to pursue their own advantage. For present purposes, the descriptive compo-
nent is more interesting: it stated simply that people already do act in this way, and 
must do so always. Scanlan defines it thus: 
The descriptive side of rational egoism was a deterministic theory of 
human motivation that is sometimes called “psychological egoism.” 
The Rational Egoists, denying free will, contended that human beings 
 




are necessitated by their nature to act as they do, and that their choices 
are always governed by their own interests.2 
 
Psychological egoism formed the supposedly “scientific” foundation of 
Rational Egoism—scientific because it expressed the “natural law” that 
people invariably act in accordance with what they think are their own 
best interests.3 
Here we have the crucial idea of determinism, which is linked to science and the laws 
of nature. Of course, Scanlan notes, the two components of rational egoism are not 
really compatible: the determinism of psychological egoism undermines the prescrip-
tions of the normative component—how can people change their behaviour as the 
Nihilists prescribe, if they have no free will? Scanlan argues that Dostoevsky per-
ceived the bipartite nature of rational egoism as well as the incompatibility of its parts:  
The puzzles and questionable assumptions lurking in this effort to com-
bine psychological and normative egoisms into a coherent theory are of 
course numerous, and the radical writers never adequately addressed 
them. [ … ] Dostoevsky, on the other hand, appears to have been fully 
aware of the complexities of Rational Egoism and of the problems cre-
ated by the exclusion of freedom of the will from its theoretical struc-
ture. The Underground Man addresses both the descriptive and the 
normative theses and rejects them both, along with their supporting as-
sumptions.4 
In Scanlan’s view, the Underground Man argues against the descriptive component 
in the first chapters of the book, where he provides evidence from history, as well as 
his own behaviour, in support of the claim that people often do act irrationally and in 
ways which do not promote the fulfilment of their needs. We are to deduce from this 
that psychological egoism is not descriptively accurate.5 He then goes on to argue 
against the normative component in the later chapters of Part I, in which he claims 
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that freedom of choice is the “most advantageous advantage,” i.e. the greatest need 
of all. Here, for Scanlan, he grants the truth of psychological egoism for the sake of 
argument, so that he may consider and reject the utopian socialists’ ideal on their own 
terms; the overriding need for freedom, the Underground Man contends, would 
make it impossible for the mechanistic stability of the Crystal Palace to endure.6  
One obvious problem with Scanlan’s general line of interpretation is that if Dostoev-
sky did understand the incoherence of the Nihilists’ views, why didn’t he attack it? 
Blatant logical incoherence is a serious problem for any theory, and it would make no 
sense for an opponent to leave it unchallenged. Yet whether he perceived the contra-
diction or not, he did not exploit it. Not once does the Underground Man complain 
that his opponents are simultaneously commanding him to change his ways and try-
ing to convince him that he has no free will—and so, presumably, no capacity to re-
spond to their demands one way or the other. He takes for granted that their theory 
does at least make sense, and, on Scanlan’s interpretation, refutes the two components 
separately. Why? The answer to this question, I believe, is key to understanding Dos-
toevsky’s polemical approach. To state my conclusion in advance, it seems to me that 
he adopted a more charitable interpretation of rational egoism than Scanlan, which 
does away entirely with psychological egoism, and thereby resolves the problem of 
incoherence. As I shall argue below, that is to say, the theory which the Underground 
Man attacks is not founded on a commitment to determinism.  
* * * 
Let us first consider in more detail the theory of determinism which the Underground 
Man is supposed by libertarians to engage with. In The Anthropological Principle in 
Philosophy, Chernyshevsky claims that “moral” facts, like human thoughts and 
 





actions, must be part of the normal causal order of the world, and can therefore be no 
more “free” than any physical or chemical process. He writes:  
[P]resent-day psychology does not accept, for example, the assump-
tions that in one case a man performs a bad action because he wanted 
to perform a bad action, while in another case he performs a good ac-
tion because he wanted to perform a good action. It says that the bad 
action, or the good action, was certainly prompted by some moral or 
material fact or combination of facts, and that the “wanting” is only the 
subjective impression which accompanies, in our consciousness, the 
genesis of thoughts or actions from preceding thoughts, actions, or ex-
ternal facts.7  
Here we have the claim that determinism is true, free will is an illusion and moral 
responsibility in the traditional sense cannot exist. In support of this theory, Cher-
nyshevsky considers an example of what would normally be considered an act of free 
will, namely, the decision to put one foot out of bed before the other. All things being 
equal, he thinks, we will always exit the bed in whatever way is most physiologically 
convenient at the time. He admits that we can (as we might ordinarily put it) decide to 
override this natural process with a choice to the contrary, but argues that this appar-
ently free act of will is not as free as it seems:  
Whence came the thought of displaying independence of external con-
ditions? It could not have arisen without a cause. It was created either 
by something said in conversation with someone, or by the recollection 
of a previous dispute, or something like that.8  
So even in cases like this, Chernyshevsky thinks, the idea of free will has no place: it 
dissolves when we stop to consider the fact that nothing—not even the act of wanting 
to act without a cause—actually arises without a cause, and therefore that thoughts 
must follow thoughts in the same way as physical events follow one other, like a chain 
of dominoes. Even if the psychological “laws” which describe the flow of thoughts 
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often remain obscure, Chernyshevsky believes they must exist and will in due course 
become known to science. Even without a complete science of human life, however, 
Chernyshevsky thinks we can state one general psychological law with certainty: that 
humans always act in whatever way they believe will maximize their own selfish ad-
vantage.9 Here we have the descriptive component of rational egoism as defined by 
Scanlan. 
3. The Crystal Palace in Notes from Underground 
Now, the question is whether this deterministic theory of rational egoism is what un-
derpins the brand of utopian socialism which the Underground Man attacks. There 
is already some reason to think so, since, as we know, Notes from Underground is a 
polemical response to Chernyshevsky. On the other hand, Chernyshevsky clearly 
specifies in What Is To Be Done? that the citizens of his utopia have “complete will, yes, 
free will,” which implies that his theoretical commitment to determinism, quoted 
above, may have a rather complicated relationship with his utopian project.10 Let us 
turn directly to Dostoevsky’s text, therefore, to see whether we can ascertain the sig-
nificance of determinism therein without needing to puzzle over the actual ideas of 
his polemical target. 
The Crystal Palace attacked by the Underground Man depends on the possibility of 
tabulating human needs and the optimal means of fulfilling them, so that life can 
proceed smoothly and efficiently, but scientifically and therefore somewhat mechan-
ically. This can be seen in the following passages, spoken by interlocutors: 
And, since all desires and reasons can really be tabulated, since some-
day the laws of our so-called free choice are sure to be discovered, then, 
all joking aside, it may be possible to establish something like a table, 
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so that we could actually desire according to it. If, for example, some-
day they calculate and demonstrate to me that I made a rude gesture 
because I couldn’t possibly refrain from it, that I had to make precisely 
that gesture, well, in that case, what sort of free choice would there be, 
especially if I’m a learned man and have completed a course of study 
somewhere? Why, then I’d be able to calculate in advance my entire life 
for the next thirty years.11 
 
[S]cience itself will teach man [ … ] that in fact he possesses neither a 
will nor any whim of his own, that he never did, and that he himself is 
nothing more than a kind of piano key or an organ stop; that, moreover, 
there still exist laws of nature, so that everything he’s done has been 
not in accordance with his own desire, but in and of itself, according to 
the laws of nature.12 
That man has never had either will or whim (ни воли, ни каприза) could mean that 
he “has never been capricious,” in other words, has always been rational and desired 
his own advantage (even if he has not always known how best to identify or obtain 
this advantage). However, the analogy of musical apparatus (derived from the uto-
pian socialist Charles Fourier, who envisaged the ideal society as a “harmony” of di-
verse elements13) strongly suggests determinism: piano keys are not self-motivated, 
but are moved only in accordance with external forces; they have no free will at all, 
whimsical or otherwise.  
These passages, then, appear to show that the Underground Man’s interlocutors do 
subscribe to determinism, and strongly suggest that they intend to found their uto-
pian ideal on the assumption that free will does not exist. That being so, I shall con-
tend that whilst the Underground Man’s opponents may profess belief in determin-
ism, they do so in opposition to their own fundamental goals and convictions, since, 
as we shall see, the idea of determinism does not underpin their rational egoism or 
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utopian socialism. This becomes increasingly apparent the further we investigate the 
interlocutors’ proposal. Consider the following statement from an interlocutor: 
Consequently, we need only discover these laws of nature, and man 
will no longer have to answer for his actions and will find it extremely 
easy to live. All human actions [ … ] will be tabulated [ … ] and will be 
entered on a schedule; or even better, certain edifying works will be 
published, like our contemporary encyclopedic dictionaries, in which 
everything will be accurately calculated and specified so that there’ll be 
no more actions or adventures left on earth.14 
The idea is that thanks to the discovery of psychological laws, we would be able to 
understand once and for all how we work—what makes us happy, angry, sad, and 
so on; we would be able to manufacture human happiness with the same scientific 
precision with which we can control the growth of plants. It would then be possible 
to develop an encyclopaedic compendium of all useful hypothetical imperatives—
prescriptions which tell us how best to act in every possible situation, in order to 
maximize the fulfilment of our needs and desires. This initially seems to be a natural 
extension of psychological egoism, but in fact it coheres very poorly with the kind of 
determinism described above; it implies that people will behave predictably and in a 
law-bound manner, not because they will have no free choice, but, on the contrary, 
because they will choose to do so: they will choose to look at a compendium of hypo-
thetical imperatives instead of deciding for themselves, in each and every case, what 
to do.  
The compendium of prescriptions is clearly based on the psychological laws which 
ought, on Scanlan’s reading, to belong to the discoveries of descriptive psychological 
egoism. Scanlan maintains that in this chapter the Underground Man is dealing only 
with the deterministic aspect of rational egoism. And yet these laws do not seem to 
be descriptive. As the Underground Man himself adds, when the laws of nature are 
discovered and utilised in this way, the Nihilists hope that “man will voluntarily stop 
 




committing blunders.”15 The laws of nature upon which the Crystal Palace is founded, 
therefore, are of the same kind as those, discussed in the previous chapter, which the 
Underground Man blames for his inertia: rules by which humans may maximize the 
fulfilment of their needs, as a farmer maximizes the yield of his crops. Throughout 
his entire discourse, furthermore, the Underground Man assumes that we would be 
able, even if rational egoism were true, to go against the recommendations of the 
Crystal Palace compendium: 
even if man really turned out to be a piano key [i.e. an object motivated 
solely by external forces], even if this could be demonstrated to him by 
natural science and pure mathematics, even then he still won’t become 
reasonable; he’ll intentionally do something to the contrary, simply out 
of ingratitude, merely to have his own way.16 
What is clear above all is that the Underground Man believes it possible—and his 
Nihilist interlocutors do not deny it, even in the context of their most deterministic 
statements—to disobey the laws of nature upon which the Crystal Palace is founded: 
his whole argument against utopian socialism is that if and when these laws of nature 
are discovered, people will choose to flout them. If the laws were descriptive, it would 
not be possible to “disobey” them in the manner he anticipates and recommends. So 
they must be prescriptive: they must tell us not what we actually will do, as physical 
laws tell us how inanimate objects will behave under different circumstances, but 
what we ought to do. This flatly contradicts the interlocutor’s assertion, quoted above, 
that human beings are nothing but piano keys; both the Underground Man and his 
interlocutors assume that people are self-motivated and can make meaningful choices.  
The fact that the Underground Man’s opponents do, like Chernyshevsky himself, pro-
fess the doctrine of determinism, as such, has little bearing on their utopian aspirations, 
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and does not inform the plans of their Crystal Palace ideal.17 This conclusion is anal-
ogous to that reached, in the previous chapter, regarding the Underground Man’s 
supposed adherence to determinism: even if he does believe in it, we found, he does 
not allow it to influence to any significant degree his other thoughts and actions. On 
the basis of these considerations, I contend that the Nihilists attacked by the Under-
ground Man do not base their utopian ideal on the two-component theory of rational 
egoism described by Scanlan. They do think that people are rational and egoistic; but 
not that they necessarily behave rationally; only that humans are rational animals and 
so, in a manner of speaking, have no reason not to act rationally. Alternatively stated, 
they believe that humans are rational and egoistic enough that they would naturally 
be grateful for the “edifying works” of the Crystal Palace. This is weaker than deter-
ministic psychological egoism because it does not assert that people literally cannot 
act irrationally, but it is still strong enough to motivate the utopian theory of the Crys-
tal Palace, because it still implies that humans are fairly predictably rational. In other 
words, it supports the normative thrust of rational egoism without rendering it inco-
herent.  
4. Free Will in the Crystal Palace 
However, this much is also clear: the Underground Man does think that the Crystal 
Palace and its laws of nature pose a threat to free will. How can this be so, if, as I have 
just argued, the laws in question are not descriptive but prescriptive, and we can 
simply choose to disobey them? At this point, the disambiguation of “freedom” pro-
posed in Chapter 2 is plainly called for. The question is easily answered if we bear in 
mind that when the Underground Man defends “freedom” he is referring to caprice, 
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means to an end, as part of their general campaign to discredit tradition religious and romantic 




the only kind of freedom he really cares about; so we should expect his primary con-
tention to be that the Crystal Palace poses a threat to caprice. Why should the Under-
ground Man think this way? This question, too, is an easy one: liberty may not be 
incompatible with prescriptive laws (understood as hypothetical imperatives), but 
caprice clearly is. Recall that caprice demands the absence not only of external con-
straints like cages and prisons, but of internal constraints including reason and moral-
ity. The prescriptive laws of the Crystal Palace are nothing other than the recommen-
dations of reason and morality, and, as such, count as constraints on caprice in the 
same way that prisons may count as constraints on liberty. Thus it makes perfect 
sense for the Underground Man to fear the Crystal Palace as a threat to his freedom—
even though it is not founded on determinism—since freedom in this case is merely 
caprice. Let us, however, turn to examine the Underground Man’s actual polemic and 
the evidence for this reading which is to be found in the text itself. In what follows, I 
shall describe his attack on utopian socialism in more detail and, in particular, illus-
trate the way in which the Crystal Palace is revealed to be such a dangerous threat to 
caprice. 
* * * 
As stated, the Underground Man seems to understand the Nihilists’ denial of free will 
differently from Scanlan, Frank and other scholars; he seems to adopt a more charita-
ble interpretation of their determinism which is not incompatible with their norma-
tive ethics, because it does not imply the absolute impossibility of free will (or therefore 
of moral responsibility), but only its voluntary adherence to the prescriptions of rea-
son informed by natural science. We find perhaps the clearest evidence for this at the 
end of Chapter VIII, when in describing his utopian aspirations the interlocutor does 
not suggest that human behaviour is or will be ultimately unfree, but that in the Crys-
tal Palace people will freely want to behave in a predictable fashion. The Underground 




You’ll shout at me (if you still choose to favor me with your shouts) that 
no one’s really depriving me of my will; that they’re merely attempting 
to arrange things so that my will, by its own free choice, will coincide 
with my normal interests, with the laws of nature, and with arithmetic.  
“But gentlemen, what sort of free choice will there be when it 
comes down to tables and arithmetic, when all that’s left is two times 
two makes four? Two times two makes four even without my will. Is 
that what you call free choice?”18 
As his response makes clear, what the Underground Man really fears is that his will 
might be compelled and apparently constrained, not because of the truth of determin-
ism, but by reason; in other words, he is afraid that as a rational human being he would 
inevitably choose to act in accordance with the rational behavioural prescriptions made 
available in the Crystal Palace. He has good reason to be afraid, because he is rational, 
as demonstrated by the intellectual rigour of his sceptical “heightened consciousness.” 
The utopian socialists wished to ascertain the most reasonable ways of satisfying the 
needs of human beings; but the Underground Man prefers not to know what the most 
reasonable courses of action are, so that he may decide what to do “freely,” i.e. capri-
ciously, without the interference of his domineering rationality. The more he culti-
vates his intelligence and learns of science and philosophy, therefore, the more he 
feels his rationality as a constraint on his will, and the more he feels impelled to attack 
reason and the rational egoism of the Nihilists.  
“Two times two makes four,” for example, is a statement derived from the “laws” of 
mathematics; it is reasonable to believe it to be true. By the same token, it makes sense 
to say—since rationality is compelling if anything is—that we are compelled to believe 
it. Nevertheless, we can, and this is the Underground Man’s point, choose not to be-
lieve it; this is because reason can never determine or literally constrain our volition, 
but only compel it in the sense that we would be mad not to obey it. We can choose 
instead to believe that two times two makes five, and we can even put this into prac-
tice by being indignant when, for instance, after buying two apples and two oranges, 
 




we find ourselves with only four pieces of fruit. It is in this way that we can disobey 
the “laws of nature” in the sense advocated by the Underground Man. We know ex-
actly how he himself goes about rebelling against such laws, even before the advent 
of the Crystal Palace—he refuses to see a doctor about his liver ailment, for example, 
in spite of the fact that science has determined this to be the best course. If there is 
something wrong with your liver, science declares, see a doctor and take the pre-
scribed cure. This is a “law of nature” in the Underground Man’s sense, because it is 
an imperative derived by reason from the findings of natural science. As such, there 
is no room for arbitrary will here; the law holds whether one wills it to or not. And 
that is the source of the Underground Man’s dismay: he wants free will, in the sense 
that he wants his volition to be completely free from the determining influence of 
rational imperatives, to be entirely arbitrary. If for every possible situation there was 
a prescribed course of action, as there already is in the case of matters of health, then 
there would always be something that one knows one ought to do. And this ought 
would hold whether one wanted it to or not. Of course, in general this doesn’t seem 
like such a bad thing; it is surely good that the most reasonable course of action has 
been discovered for cases of liver disease. That is precisely the point of the Nihilist 
“lovers of humanity” whom the Underground Man sets up as his opposition. But the 
Underground Man, hypersensitive as he is to any kind of constraint, thinks it is a very 
bad thing. Ultimately, faced with the hypothetical reality of the Crystal Palace he pre-
fers insanity—that is, the total abandonment of reason—in order not to constantly feel 
constrained by the allure of rational courses of action. As a last resort, he says, “man 
would go insane deliberately in order not to have reason, but to have his own way!”19 
Reason is the true threat, not determinism, and natural science is problematic only 
because it will arm reason with new prescriptions—just as medicine has already al-
lowed reason to establish the “law of nature” that ill people ought to seek help from 
doctors. 
 




* * * 
This reading further allows us to make some sense of the apparently deterministic 
statements of the Underground Man and his interlocutors. If prescriptive laws are 
always followed, they can be treated as descriptive laws for the purpose of making 
predictions. For example, assuming one was perfectly rational, and was always aware 
of the most reasonable course of action, and chose to always act reasonably, one’s be-
haviour would always be entirely predictable, even though it was the product of an 
entirely free will. In such a scenario the laws of reason, which are in fact prescriptive—
they tell us what we ought to think and do—could be used to make predictions just as 
if they were descriptive like the laws of physics or chemistry. This is precisely the state 
of affairs that the utopian socialists hoped for, according to the Underground Man. 
Thus it is that he and his interlocutors can coherently speak of the elimination of free 
will and the predictability of human actions: in an ideally rational and ideally enlight-
ened utopia, provided one chose in advance to be reasonable, there would be no pos-
sibility of choosing how to act in particular instances—having initially chosen to be 
reasonable, one would already be committed to following the predetermined courses 
of action specified in the guidebook to the Crystal Palace. (Again, however, free will 
isn’t strictly eliminated, but only—as Jackson says—made “obsolescent.”) If the Crys-
tal Palace were realised, the only way to avoid this predetermined existence would 
be to decide not to be reasonable. And this is precisely what the Underground Man rec-
ommends and believes will happen. 
For the Underground Man, then, we can say that the Crystal Palace does carry with 
it the threat of a kind of determinism, which we might call conditional determinism. It 
is conditional on our prior commitment to reason; we can escape it through deciding 
to be unreasonable. Thus I disagree with Frank’s statement that utopian socialism 
threatens to transform the individual into a “rational-ethical machine that can behave 
only in conformity with reason.” 20  With respect to freedom, entering the Crystal 
 




Palace would thus be the same as voluntarily giving oneself into slavery—in both 
cases there is a sense in which one ends up with no free will, but not in the sense that 
one’s power of choice is not free. As such—assuming one is allowed to leave the Crys-
tal Palace and rescind one’s commitment to be rational—it does not imply the actual 
impossibility of free will or moral responsibility, in the way that scientific determin-
ism does in the traditional interpretation advocated by libertarians.  
* * * 
As final justification for this reading, consider the following very telling passage, in 
which an interlocutor describes what will happen to freedom of choice when the laws 
of nature are made available as guidelines: 
Well, and when all this has been analysed, calculated on paper [ … ] 
then, of course, all so-called desires will no longer exist. For if someday 
desires are completely reconciled with reason, we’ll follow reason instead of 
desire simply because it would be impossible, while retaining one’s rea-
son, to desire rubbish, and thus knowingly oppose one’s reason, and de-
sire something harmful to oneself. . . .21 
The all-important qualification—”while retaining one’s reason”—proves that reason 
rather than determinism is ultimately the scourge of free choice. The “reconciliation” 
of desires with reason means, since reason is law-bound, that desires too will become 
law-bound. Even though these laws are not imposed by an external authority—they 
stem from our own innate rationality—they are unbending and universally valid. 
This is also why, throughout his discourse, it is so important for the Underground 
Man to destroy the assumption that humans are in fact necessarily rational and that 
reason occupies the most important place in human life. If he can prove that humans 
can and do choose to behave irrationally, then he can prove that the determinism of 
the Crystal Palace will not be unconditional, that rebellion will be possible (and, on 
the assumption that other people share his need for caprice, inevitable). Thus he 
 




argues first that reason makes up only a fraction of the “faculties of life,” and that 
human beings cannot be satisfied by the findings of reason alone.22 He then goes on 
to argue that reason has never occupied a particularly significant position in world 
history, that, indeed, history itself has never been rational. “In short,” he says, “any-
thing can be said about history, anything that might occur to the most disordered 
imagination. There’s only one thing that can’t possibly be said about it—that it’s ra-
tional. You’ll choke on the word.”23 Of course, the utopian socialists, subscribing to 
the developmental conception of history commonly associated with Hegel, say just 
that. The Underground Man aims to show, firstly, how naive the utopian socialists 
are for believing that the Crystal Palace could be established upon the dominion of 
reason, and, secondly, that even if it were possible, the total triumph of reason could 
never achieve the goal of satisfying our desires once and for all. Desires can never be 
totally “reconciled with reason,” as the socialists hope, because reason cannot possi-
bly sanction what the Underground Man thinks is the most important desire of all, 
the desire to be free from all constraints—including reason itself. This is the “most 
advantageous advantage,” caprice, which “destroys all our classifications and con-
stantly demolishes all systems devised by lovers of humanity for the happiness of 
mankind.”24 
If the above is correct, then the Underground Man does not attack the significance of 
reason in order to refute the descriptive component of rational egoism, as Scanlan 
believes; there is no descriptive component. Adopting this interpretation, therefore, 
we do not need to suppose that Dostoevsky perceived the two aspects of rational ego-
ism, and their incompatibility, and yet wanted to attack each aspect on its own terms, 
without pointing out their incompatibility. We can account neatly for the same textual 
components of the Notes—the defence of free will, the attack on rationalism—without 
supposing that Dostoevsky unaccountably let go of what would have been an 
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excellent polemical opportunity, namely, to point out that his opponents had founded 
their social ideal on a contradiction.25  
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analysed the Underground Man’s attack on utopian socialism 
in an attempt to assess the second strand of the libertarian theory of Notes from Un-
derground. According to this approach, the Underground Man voices the Libertarian 
Argument directly: it is thought that he claims that the determinism of utopian so-
cialism, through its incompatibility with free will, causes the caprice that will under-
mine it. We have seen that the kind of utopian socialism the Underground Man at-
tacks is not founded on determinism, and that he only attacks it because of the threat 
posed to his pre-existing commitment to caprice by its rationalism. He puts forward 
what we can call the Argument from Caprice, the contention that utopian socialism 
will fail because it contradicts the basic human need for caprice. As such, the Under-
ground Man’s discourse does not support the libertarian interpretation.  
With respect both to his inertia, and to his attack on utopian socialism, the Under-
ground Man’s primary concern is reason. Sceptical reasoning causes him to become 
inert, and the rationalism of the Crystal Palace is what provokes his ire and his Argu-
ment from Caprice. Still, the psychology underlying all of this remains almost entirely 
obscure. Why is reason such a problem for the Underground Man? Are misology—
the hatred of reason—and the caprice it apparently causes simply basic human qual-
ities? Dostoevsky surely cannot think so; we must continue to assume that it has a 
foundation in the pathology of the underground psychology. At this stage, however, 
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eliminates free will and that people are free—but, unlike in Scanlan’s interpretation, that this 
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I hope only to have established more clearly the data which our theory of the Under-
ground Man’s caprice must take into account, and demonstrated that a new approach 
to this data is needed. The libertarian interpretation is certainly right to attribute psy-
chological importance to the attack on utopian socialism, which is the culmination of 
the Underground Man’s reflections on his own character. Having examined his argu-
ment against utopian socialism in this chapter, we shall turn, in the next chapter, to 




Chapter 5:  Romantic Idealism and Misology 
1. Introduction 
At the end of Chapter 2, we set out to criticize attempts to derive the Libertarian Ar-
gument from Notes from Underground, and, more generally, to understand the Under-
ground Man’s caprice. In Chapters 3 and 4, we considered two related libertarian ap-
proaches to Notes from Underground. Assessing the first approach involved examining 
the psychological basis of the Underground Man’s inertia; assessing the second in-
volved interpreting the Underground Man’s direct attack on utopian socialism. I ar-
gued that neither approach succeeds in deriving the Libertarian Argument from the 
Notes. Indeed, it has become clear that the Underground Man is not ultimately con-
cerned with determinism at all—determinism is not what causes him to become inert, 
and it is not what provokes his attack against utopian socialism, as the libertarian 
readings suggest. On the contrary, sceptical reasoning causes him to become inert, 
and the threat of its rationalism prompts him to attack utopian socialism.  
Moreover, therefore, neither libertarian approach succeeds in explaining the psychol-
ogy of caprice that presumably underpins Dostoevsky’s actual argument against uto-
pian socialism. Reason and its prescriptions are implicated in the genesis and the ex-
acerbation of his caprice. In criticizing the libertarian approaches, then, we have 
gained a clearer understanding not only of the need for a new interpretation of Dos-
toevsky’s polemic, but of the psychological phenomena under consideration as well. 
As we can see from his attack on the Crystal Palace, the Underground Man hates 
reason because, being capricious, he perceives its prescriptions as constraints. His mi-
sology is merely an aspect of his caprice. To better understand his caprice, then, it 
seems wise to investigate his misology further. As we shall see in what follows, this 




opens up the possibility of the new interpretation of caprice, and Dostoevsky’s po-
lemic against Chernyshevsky, to be developed in Part 2. 
2. Normal Advantage 
The Underground Man argues against utopian socialism on the grounds that it threat-
ens to make capricious behaviour more difficult or impossible, through establishing 
a society of rational egoists in which everyone is always aware of (and so compelled 
by their own natural rationality to adopt) the most reasonable courses of action. I have 
called this the Argument from Caprice. We have yet to consider the place of this ar-
gument within the broader context of the Notes, and its full implications for our un-
derstanding of the underground psychology.  
Direct engagement with utopian socialism begins in Chapter VII, and ends in the pe-
nultimate chapter of Part I, Chapter X. The Argument from Caprice is localized more 
specifically in Chapters VII, VIII and IX. Thus, in order to make psychological sense 
of this argument, we should firstly note that it does not occur in a vacuum: it is sand-
wiched between reflections pertaining more specifically to the Underground Man’s 
own life and character. Moreover, as I shall argue below, this surrounding material 
does not cohere particularly well with the Argument from Caprice itself, at least when 
it is taken at face value. Psychological and polemical features drawn from the work 
as a whole make a straightforward interpretation problematic. 
In this connection, we may firstly note that the Argument from Caprice, which is di-
rected against utopian socialism, is part of a larger critique of what the Underground 
Man calls “normal advantage”1—i.e. utility, or the satisfaction of bodily and emo-
tional needs—and the rational, utilitarian behaviour which is directed towards such 
advantage. This critique extends throughout Part I of the Notes, though its contents 
 




are not entirely uniform; in fact, it is divided into two main blocks. In Chapters VII-
IX, as we have seen, the idea of advantage, which is there represented primarily by 
utopian socialism, is set up against the need for caprice (the “most advantageous ad-
vantage”); this contains the Argument from Caprice. In preceding and succeeding 
chapters, however, we shall see that the idea of advantage is instead set up against 
the Underground Man’s romantic idealism, and criticized on broadly aesthetic 
grounds.2 So there are two separate arguments against normal advantage: an argu-
ment from the incompatibility of advantage and caprice (the Argument from Caprice), 
and an argument from the incompatibility of advantage and romantic idealism. The 
relation between these two arguments, and the two groups of chapters which contain 
them, will be a primary concern in what follows, as I attempt to reassess the psycho-
logical significance of the Argument from Caprice in light of the exegetical failure of 
the libertarian reading.  
Again, what we are ultimately concerned with here is making sense of why the Un-
derground Man attacks rationality in these chapters, since this attack is a manifesta-
tion of his capriciousness, and should thus provide us with a means of understanding 
this caprice. Because we have already considered this attack in Chapter 4, above, I 
now turn to consider in more detail the Underground Man’s other mode of engaging 
with the idea of normal advantage, in which, so I shall argue, he adopts the standpoint 
of romantic idealism.  
3. The Disadvantages of Romanticism 
In Chapter VI, immediately prior to the beginning of his attack on rational egoism 
and utopian socialism, the Underground Man gives us an important clue—puzzling 
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in light of what follows it—to his thinking on the matter of “normal advantage.” 
Building on the descriptions of his inertia in preceding chapters, he ironically laments 
the fact that in life he has not simply been lazy rather than “inert.” Laziness can at 
least be a positive quality, he thinks, an authentic character trait, whereas inertia is 
really the absence of any such character. Supposing himself to have been a lazy “slug-
gard and a glutton,” he says, he would not have suffered the pangs of the under-
ground psychology, and would have lived an entirely fulfilling and respectable life. 
He writes:   
I knew a gentleman who prided himself all his life on being a connois-
seur of Lafite. He considered this a positive virtue and never doubted 
himself. He died not merely with a clean conscience, but with a trium-
phant one, and he was absolutely correct. I should have chosen a career 
for myself too: I would have been a sluggard and a glutton, not an or-
dinary one, but one who, for example, sympathized with everything 
beautiful and sublime. [ … ] The “beautiful and sublime” have been a 
real pain in the neck during my forty years, but then it’s been my forty 
years, whereas then—oh, then it would have been otherwise! I 
would’ve found myself a suitable activity at once—namely, drinking to 
everything beautiful and sublime. [ … ] I would have sought out the 
beautiful and sublime in the nastiest, most indisputable trash. I would 
have become as tearful as a wet sponge. [ … ] And what a belly I’d have 
grown by then, what a triple chin I’d have acquired, what a red nose 
I’d have developed—so that just looking at me any passerby would 
have said, “Now that’s a real plus! That’s something really positive!” 
Say what you like, gentlemen, it’s extremely pleasant to hear such com-
ments in our negative age.3 
Due to its brevity, and its proximity to the heavier and more polemical themes of 
Chapters V and VII, this chapter initially appears to be little more than a comic inter-
lude. In fact, however, I consider it vital to both polemical and psychological dimen-
sions of the work. Essentially, in this chapter the Underground Man tells us, in ironic 
terms, what his life might have been like if he had concerned himself with his own 
 




“normal advantage.” His aesthetic ideals, the sublime and beautiful, would not have 
been a “pain in the neck”—would not have prevented him from enjoying himself, or 
forced him to become inert—because he would have subordinated them to the satis-
faction of his emotional and bodily needs, or his need for social approval and those 
of his sensuality. Furthermore, he would have been able to pursue this advantage 
with a “clear conscience,” in the sense that he would not have been guilty, in his own 
eyes, of betraying his own ideals or debasing himself. This is evidently because his 
“conscience” would in that case have been much less demanding: he would have had 
no honest appreciation for his ideals, and, as he says, he would have been able to find 
them realized in the most worthless “trash” of contemporary art and criticism—
which to his high romantic taste is totally base and vulgar.4 Precisely because his ide-
als are in fact incompatible with the pursuit of his normal advantage, the only way he 
can pursue this advantage is by lessening his respect for these ideals. This is precisely 
what the Underground Man illustrates in this hypothetical scenario, in which, as a 
gluttonous aesthete, he continues to pay lip service to the “sublime and beautiful,” 
but contradicts their demands in practice. 
* * * 
Scanlan has argued for a contrary interpretation, and maintains that the Underground 
Man’s inert neglect of normal advantage actually derives from existential difficulties 
which undermine his sense of identity; he claims that for this reason the Underground 
Man does not in general know what his normal advantage is, and so, insofar as he has 
determinate interests at all, neglects them by default. According to Scanlan: 
He finds that he cannot be “determined” to act by any particular per-
ception, whether of his own interests or anything else. This leads him 
into meditations on the indeterminate identity of the conscious being—
meditations that twentieth-century existentialist philosophers took as 
signs that Dostoevsky was an early champion of their philosophical 
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orientation. Proto-existentialist or not, for our purposes the Under-
ground Man’s lamentations about his inability to become anything, to 
have a determinate identity, show that he finds nothing on the basis of 
which to fix his best interests: if he cannot define himself, how can he 
define his best interests?5 
In my view, the Underground Man’s eyes have always been open to his “true, normal 
interests”—he knows it is in his interests to go to the doctor about his liver ailment,6 
he knows he ought to go the dentist about his toothache,7 and, as we have just seen, 
he knows he would have been much better off as a lazy glutton. Whether or not he 
has been unable to “define himself” or to “become anything”—as he says in relation 
to his inertia8—has not blinded him to these basic facts, which, after all, derive from 
the needs of human beings in general, and not from any particular identity or mode 
of existence which the Underground Man may have failed to adopt. It is clear that he 
deliberately rejects his own advantage in a way that he could not if, as Scanlan main-
tains, he did not know what his advantage consisted in. 
4. Romanticism in Practice  
It will be well to observe the manner in which the Underground Man’s rejection of 
advantage manifests in practice, in his actual behaviour, and not merely in his philo-
sophical reflections. This is because his reflections may appear to be somewhat incon-
sistent. For example, some confusion is caused by the Underground Man’s own dis-
cussion, in Chapter I of Part II, of the difference between Russian and Western ro-
manticism. He identifies himself with a kind of person very different from the hyper-
critical intellectual described above. I argued that he devotes himself to Hamletism, 
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rejects his advantage, because of his refusal to compromise his fastidiousness; here, 
however, he suggests that he has never actually allowed his romantic ideals to pre-
vent him from pursuing his worldly ambitions in practice. This implies that his ro-
manticism may be purely academic and have no real bearing on his inert rejection of 
advantage. He writes:   
We Russians, generally speaking, have never had any of those stupid, 
transcendent German romantics, or even worse, French romantics, on 
whom nothing produces any effect whatever: the earth might tremble 
beneath them, all of France might perish on the barricades, but they 
remain the same, not even changing for decency’s sake; they go on sing-
ing their transcendent songs, so to speak, to their dying day, because 
they’re such fools. We here on Russian soil have no fools.9 
“Our romantic,” he writes in contrast, “has a very broad nature and is the biggest 
rogue of all, I can assure you of that. . . even by my own experience.”10 Although they 
have just as great an appreciation of the “sublime and beautiful,” in daily life the 
Russian romantics are nevertheless willing to concern themselves with very un-ro-
mantic practical matters without experiencing this pragmatic “versatility” as an af-
front to their ideals. They are not straightforwardly hypocritical, but their peculiarity 
is:  
not to be reconciled with anyone or anything, but, at the same time, not 
to balk at anything; to circumvent everything, to yield on every point, 
to treat everyone diplomatically; never to lose sight of some useful, 
practical goal (an apartment at government expense, a nice pension, a 
decoration)—to keep an eye on that goal through all his excesses and 
his volumes of lyrical verse, and, at the same time, to preserve intact 
the “beautiful and sublime” to the end of their lives; and, incidentally, 
to preserve themselves as well, wrapped up in cotton like precious 
 
9 Dostoevsky, 2001: 32. Dostoevsky is echoing Belinsky’s opinion that Germans are indifferent 
to reality; they care only of grasping an ideal, and aren’t concerned if reality falls short of it 
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jewellery, if only, for example, for the sake of that same “beautiful and 
sublime.”11 
The Underground Man is certainly not a “transcendent romantic” of the French or 
German variety—should we then take him at his word and assume he is a “Russian” 
romantic of the kind described here?12 He identifies himself as one and gives an ex-
ample from his own life: “For instance, I genuinely despised my official position and 
refrained from quitting merely out of necessity, because I myself sat there working 
and received good money for doing it.”13 To agree with him here would be overly 
complacent, however. From what we have seen of his activities, it is clear that in gen-
eral he is not one of the broad-natured Russian romantics. Certainly, he hasn’t entirely 
ignored practical matters, and has worked when necessary in order to ensure that he 
has been relatively comfortable throughout his life. On the other hand, we know from 
his autobiographical sketches that he has shown far less enthusiasm for advantage 
than have the Russian romantics he describes: we know that he turned down a good 
position after graduating from school, and became an economic and social failure as 
his cohort went on to humiliate him through their worldly success. Such negligence 
can only be a deliberate result of his haughtiness. So, although he lacks the absolute 
transcendence of the German and French romantics, who, he says, are totally indif-
ferent to the actual world, he is nevertheless unwilling to compromise his ideals en-
tirely in the “Russian” manner.14 
 
11 Dostoevsky, 2001: 32. 
12 Some scholars have accepted his claims in passing, e.g. Paris, 2008: 15, Lyngstad, 1975: 26, 
without seeking to draw significant conclusions therefrom. 
13 Dostoevsky, 2001: 33. 
14 It is also noteworthy that Apollon Grigoryev’s characterization (published after the Under-
ground Man’s remarks, in the same journal—Dostoevsky’s Epoch) of Russian, French and Ger-
man romantics is precisely opposed to the Underground Man’s: the German, he says, could 
remain morally steadfast, pragmatic and level-headed despite “the most phantasmagoric hal-
lucinations,” while the Russian “accepted every idea, no matter how wild and amusing it may 
have been, and carried it to its furthest limit, and moreover put it into operation” (Grigoryev, 





To be sure, he has made no serious attempt to actually realize these ideals in practice. 
This can hardly be held against his earnestness, however, because it is clear that he 
could not have done so no matter how much he wanted to. The Underground Man’s 
daydreams—presumably the most unfettered expressions of his romantic ideals be-
cause of their complete detachment from reality—are not merely improbable, but 
quite literally impossible to realise. He gives the following example which, though 
recalled twenty years after the fact in a spirit of sarcastic self-mockery, gives a clear 
indication of the kind of hopes which he has cherished:   
[ … ] being a famous poet and chamberlain, I would fall in love; I’d 
receive an enormous fortune and would immediately sacrifice it all for 
the benefit of humanity, at the same time confessing before all peoples 
my own infamies, which, needless to say, were not simple infamies, but 
contained a great amount of “the beautiful and sublime,” something in 
the style of Manfred.15 Everyone would weep and kiss me (otherwise 
what idiots they would have been), while I went around barefoot and 
hungry preaching new ideas and defeating all the reactionaries of Aus-
terlitz. Then a march would be played, a general amnesty declared, and 
the Pope would agree to leave Rome and go to Brazil; a ball would be 
hosted for all of Italy at the Villa Borghese on the shores of Lake Como, 
since Lake Como would have been moved to Rome for this very occa-
sion; then there would have been a scene in the bushes, etc., etc.—as if 
you didn’t know.16 
The strict impossibility of this fantasy is emphasized by the Underground Man: it 
involves the physical transportation of Lake Como across Italy. Of course, this partic-
ular detail is an embellishment, but its purpose is to highlight the gulf already sepa-
rating the young Underground Man’s romantic ideals from the realm of possibility. 
Thus the fact that he has not striven constructively towards realizing his dreams 
should not be taken to show that he subordinated them to his normal advantage in 
practice, in the manner of the “Russian” romantic. On the contrary, taking their 
 
15  The Underground Man refers significantly to the romantic anti-hero of Lord Byron’s 
Manfred (Byron, 2000: 274-314). I shall return to this point later, in Chapter 9. 




impossibility into account, he has devoted himself to them with considerable effort. 
His efforts consist in refusing to become complacent or to enjoy the worldly ad-
vantages available to him. Though the activities recommended by his romantic ideals 
are impossible, it is not impossible to refrain from the activities forbidden by them; it 
is in this way that he is able to act on his ideals by doing nothing at all and becoming 
inert, by giving up a promising career, the respect of his peers, and the opportunity 
to live more comfortably. This is what sets him apart from the “Russian” type and 
proves, once again, that he really has actively sacrificed his “normal advantage” for 
the sake of his romantic ideals. 
Why though does the Underground Man present himself dishonestly as a “Russian” 
romantic? He extolls the advantages of Russian romanticism in the same way as he 
says that his friend the connoisseur of Lafite was “absolutely right,” and that he him-
self ought to have become a romantic glutton. In mocking “those stupid, transcendent 
German romantics, or even worse, French romantics” the Underground Man mocks 
himself, for he too has striven to “remain the same, not even changing for decency’s 
sake,” stubbornly holding on to his ideals even in the face of his own best interests. 
But his blatantly ironic tone places him above this mockery, and inverts it: in reality 
he is mocking those who take such mockery seriously, namely, the Russian “roman-
tics” who do not disdain “to circumvent everything, to yield on every point, to treat 
everyone diplomatically” so as to ensure their own comfort even as they pontificate 
on everything sublime and beautiful. The air of counterfeit camaraderie he builds by 
identifying himself as a fellow Russian romantic—for “we here on Russian soil have 
no fools”—heightens this irony, which goes over the heads of his imaginary readers 
and interlocutors. Of course, there is an even higher level of mockery here; for the 
Underground Man is well aware that the moral high ground he occupies is less than 
worthless and has cost him not only his “normal advantage” but his self-respect as 
well. Not only has he failed to live up to his ideals, the degradation he has endured 
in their name is a travesty of those ideals themselves: his wretched “underground” 




sense in which the hypocritical romantics he despises are less offensive to his ideals, 
and are indeed “absolutely right.” But this is by the by. Here we need only remark 
that it is constancy to these ideals, however misguided, that has led the Underground 
Man to become the way he is. 
* * * 
At this point it will be worth clearing up a confusion which may have become appar-
ent. I stated just now that his devotion to his romantic ideals forces the Underground 
Man to become inert: he does nothing because there is nothing he can do which would 
satisfy his ideals; he has no means of realizing them. Doesn’t this contradict the fact, 
previously established, that his sceptical reasoning is what causes him to become inert 
through undermining his faith in “primary reasons”? Shouldn’t his sceptical reason-
ing undermine his devotion to romantic idealism as well, so as to be the sole cause of 
his inertia? 
Here we may observe that the Underground Man’s inertia consists not in the aban-
donment of all principles, but in the abandonment of constructive, deliberate, princi-
pled activity (taking revenge, forgiving etc.) and the authentic character traits that cor-
respond to such activities. This inertia, I believe, derives from the fact that whilst he 
does in one sense have a guiding “idea,” namely romantic idealism, he is unable to 
act constructively upon it because his sceptical reasoning makes him aware of the 
futility (irrationality) of all such activity. Thus the manner in which his scepticism is 
directly responsible for his inertia, through demanding and then undermining the 
provision of “primary reasons” for action, is perfectly compatible with his romantic 
idealism. Indeed, his devotion to romantic idealism is precisely what means, in many 
cases, that this demand for primary reasons will not be fulfilled, since, as we have just 
seen, his romantic ideals cannot possibly be realized and so cannot possibly be ration-
ally justified: eo ipso, no “primary reasons” for action can be found among them. 
What’s more, we may note that the fastidiousness of his intellectual conscience, his 




and the reason why he is so stubbornly conscientious in his devotion to his ideals; 
these are merely the two ways in which, as he says, the “direct result of consciousness 
is inertia.” Here we are thus shown, from another angle, precisely how the Under-
ground Man’s heightened consciousness is to blame for his inertia. (As such, we may 
observe, the Underground Man’s inertia is in general caused by the conflict between 
his idealism and his rationalism, and not one or the other in isolation. This is an im-
portant point that I shall return to in Chapter 10.) 
* * * 
I have endeavoured to establish that the Underground Man neglects his normal ad-
vantage for the sake of his romantic ideals, and outlined the manner in which I believe 
he does so in practice. This is illustrated most concretely in the tale of his encounter 
with his former schoolmates, which precedes his confrontation with the prostitute 
Liza. This tale, which harks back to the Underground Man’s early manhood and the 
initial stages of his underground condition, is presented in the second part of the 
novel. In Chapters III and IV of Part II, the young Underground Man foists himself 
on a group of his former schoolmates, from whom he has become almost entirely 
estranged, as they celebrate a farewell feast for the wealthy and universally admired 
officer Zverkov. In school, the Underground Man had clashed with Zverkov, but on 
a relatively even footing: he had been able to use his superior wit to score some vic-
tories in spite of his social inferiority.17 In meeting Zverkov again as a young man, 
with an even greater gulf between their social standings, the Underground Man 
hopes that he can demonstrate once and for all his cultural pre-eminence and prove 
that he is worthy of respect. “But that’s not all,” he says:  
in the strongest paroxysm of cowardly fever I dreamt of gaining the 
upper hand, of conquering them, of carrying them away, compelling 
them to love me—if only “for the nobility of my thought and my indis-
putable wit.” They would abandon Zverkov; he’d sit by in silence and 
 




embarrassment, and I’d crush him. Afterward, perhaps, I’d be recon-
ciled with Zverkov and drink to our friendship [ … ].18 
Naturally, these romantic dreams come to naught and he is totally crushed and hu-
miliated. Without even recognizing the Underground Man as a potential “opponent,” 
Zverkov treats him with fatherly condescension; he is immediately embarrassed and 
loses his composure, he drinks too much, and, having made a fool of himself by at-
tempting to insult Zverkov, sanctimoniously paces up and down the room for three 
hours as the friends chat amongst themselves. Dostoevsky takes pains to ensure that 
the Underground Man’s humiliation is complete. In spite of this crushing failure, 
however, he still dreams of realizing his hopes and winning Zverkov over: “Oh, if 
you only knew what thoughts and feelings I’m capable of,” he thinks to himself, “and 
how cultured I really am!”19 This episode comes to a head as the friends leave the 
Underground Man alone in the restaurant and depart for a brothel. He then works 
himself into a frenzy of wounded vanity and decides, in Chapter V, to rush after them 
and challenge Zverkov to a duel. On the way to the brothel, he allows his romantic 
dreams to take hold of him fully:    
“[ … ] Fifteen years later when they let me out of jail, a beggar in rags, 
I’ll drag myself off to see him. I’ll find him in some provincial town. 
He’ll be married and happy. He’ll have a grown daughter. . . . I’ll say, 
‘Look, you monster, look at my sunken cheeks and my rags. I’ve lost 
everything—career, happiness, art, science, a beloved woman—all be-
cause of you. Here are the pistols. I came here to load my pistol, and . . . 
and I forgive you.’ Then I’ll fire into the air, and he’ll never hear another 
word from me again. . . .” 
I was actually about to cry, even though I knew for a fact at that 
very moment that all this was straight out of Silvio [i.e. Pushkin’s The 
Shot] and Lermontov’s Masquerade.20 
 
18 Dostoevsky, 2001: 49. 
19 Dostoevsky, 2001: 55. 




Automatically borrowing a romantic cliché from Pushkin and Lermontov, he projects 
his situation onto a fantasy world which is capable of meeting his aesthetic and emo-
tional demands. In combination with the anticipated chivalry of this denouement, the 
suffering implied by his “sunken cheeks and rags”—in reality, his ridiculous behav-
iour and trousers with a yellow stain on one knee—elevates him in his mind to the 
stature of a tragic hero. It is on the basis of this fantasy that the Underground Man 
attempts to act and prove himself. Because it is just a fantasy, however, reality con-
founds his schemes and his actions have disastrous consequences; in this case, he gets 
off relatively lightly because the friends have already left the brothel by the time he 
arrives, and his plan to challenge Zverkov is simply abandoned. In general, however, 
his dedication to such illusions must lead only to the kind of humiliation and defeat 
he experienced in the restaurant. Significantly, none of this is lost on the Underground 
Man himself: 
The fact of the matter was that at that very moment I was more clearly 
and vividly aware than anyone else on earth of the disgusting absurdity 
of my intentions and the whole opposite side of the coin, but . . .21 
This shows that, not being stupid, he was always aware of his real circumstances and 
where his best interests really lay—he knew what he had to do to avoid further strife 
and embarrassment—but that he persisted in his romantic delusions of grandeur re-
gardless. As such, it is clear that the Underground Man deliberately disengaged with 
reality and self-consciously pursued a ruinous course of action based on his literary 
fantasy. He was neither ignorant of his own advantage, nor motivated entirely by 
caprice, but deliberately sacrificed his advantage for the sake of his romantic strivings. 
We may note in passing that this was the only occasion (mentioned in the novel) on 
which he allowed his ideals to positively motivate his behaviour; after this point, we 
are led to suppose, he realized once and for all the stupidity of attempting to actually 
realize his ideals, and became “inert.” Whether in this Quixotic attempt to challenge 
 




Zverkov, or in his mature Hamletism, however, his romantic ideals have always been 
to blame for his rejection of advantage.   
5. Caprice Attacks  
It is only after the short and apparently digressive Chapter VI of Part I—designed to 
make clear that his romantic ideals have prevented him from pursuing his normal 
advantage—that the Underground Man launches into his more famous critique of 
rational egoism, utilitarianism and utopianism, and his theoretical vindication of ca-
price as “most advantageous advantage.” This new discussion may initially appear 
to have little in common with what immediately preceded it, but the Underground 
Man ties them together by beginning the new chapter with a passing reference to the 
so-called “golden dreams” of Chapter VI, with its connoisseur of Lafite; what follows 
is his famous precis of rational egoism:   
But these are all golden dreams. Oh, tell me who was first to announce, 
first to proclaim that man does nasty things simply because he doesn’t 
know his true interest; and that if he were to be enlightened, if his eyes 
were to be opened to his true, normal interests, he would stop doing 
nasty things at once and would immediately become good and noble, 
because, being so enlightened and understanding his real advantage, 
he would realise that his own advantage really did lie in the good; and 
that it’s well known that there’s not a single man capable of acting 
knowingly against his own interest; consequently, he would, so to 
speak, begin to do good out of necessity. Oh, the child! Oh, the pure, 
innocent babe!22 
So begins the Underground Man’s attack on utopian socialism. He goes on to elabo-
rate the Argument from Caprice which we examined in Chapter 4, above. I would 
argue that reading such passages in light of what preceded them in Chapters I-VI—
 




namely, the Underground Man’s descriptions of his own heightened consciousness, 
inertia, spite—should give us an indication of one of the ways in which he thinks 
people can go against their own “advantage.” In Chapter VI we saw that his own 
advantage, his “golden dreams,” lay in being a lazy, self-satisfied and hypocritical 
aesthete. The example is of course presented ironically—laziness is hardly a respect-
able occupation—and, as part of his satire on hypocrisy, the Underground Man 
thereby heaps scorn on the shallow aspirations of less cultivated people. Nevertheless, 
along with the Zverkov episode and the descriptions of his youthful “dreaming,” it 
shows both that he always had a clear sense of his normal advantage, and that he 
decided to forgo it for the sake of his unrealistic romantic ideals.  
However, as we know, he quickly proceeds beyond an apology for this decision, 
which, if eccentric, is at least comprehensible, to a much more ambitious defence of 
caprice and whim in general. This shift gives rise to a problem which I do not believe 
has been appreciated before, namely, that the Underground Man appears to contra-
dict himself on one of the most crucial points in his discourse. In the earlier chapters 
of the book, culminating in Chapter VI, and in the reminiscences of Part II, when he 
purposefully goes against his own advantage he does so for the sake of a positive 
ideal—ostensibly, romantic idealism. But in Chapter VII he begins to argue that in 
general, people go against their advantage for no reason at all, that is, capriciously, and 
defends this tendency as right and normal. And he claims that this is the only thing 
that truly matters: “After all,” he says at the end of Chapter IX, “I’m not standing up 
for suffering here, nor for well-being, either. I’m standing up for. . . my own whim 
and for its being guaranteed to me whenever necessary.”23  
This seems obviously to contradict the way he portrays his own opinions and behav-
iour, and the examples he draws from his life experiences; certainly, his actions have 
been “whimsical” in the weaker sense that they have been idiosyncratic and often 
self-defeating, but they have not been capricious in the sense of being directed solely 
 




by and for the sake of his whim. However fruitlessly and negatively, they have been 
oriented with reference to an ideal: as we have seen, it is precisely because of his un-
compromising idealism that he has, in his own life, rejected “normal advantage” and 
become “inert.”  
6. Resolving the Contradiction 
How can we make sense of this apparent contradiction? Why does the Underground 
Man argue for the omnipotence of caprice in Chapters VII-IX, when in other chapters 
he makes clear that his own activity (and lack thereof) has not been motivated by 
caprice, but instead by romantic idealism? As we shall see, the matter is further com-
plicated by the fact that in Chapter X, apparently the culmination of his polemic 
against utopian socialism, he returns to his earlier mode of rancorous idealism, and 
faults the Crystal Palace on moral-aesthetic grounds rather than through the Argu-
ment from Caprice of Chapters VII-IX. What’s more, he even seems to repudiate the 
contents of these chapters directly—something which has not been adequately appre-
ciated by scholars of Dostoevsky’s social philosophy. Let us now turn to consider 
Chapter X in detail, so as to ascertain exactly how and why the Underground Man 
contradicts himself. 
It is known that Chapter X was radically altered by the censors, to the point that Dos-
toevsky considered the published version to be unintelligible, and to completely ob-
scure the suggestion of a Christian resolution to the problems posed earlier in the 
book (as he complained to his brother in a letter).24 As such, it is necessary to address 
the exegetical difficulties surrounding Chapter X before attempting to draw signifi-
cant conclusions from its contents. As stated, the material damaged by the censors 
concerned Dostoevsky’s attempt to introduce a positive Christian element into the 
 




negative climax of part one. According to Frank, the “need for faith and Christ” was 
to be derived from the Underground Man’s own utopian strivings. He argues that the 
Underground Man raises the possibility of a new utopian ideal, called the “crystal 
building” or “crystal edifice” (хрустальное здание) in rather subtle contrast to the 
“crystal palace” (хрустальный дворец) of his socialist interlocutors. For Frank, this 
“edifice” is founded on recognition of the spiritual needs of human beings, rather 
than the materialistic rationalism which underpins the “palace.” Frank writes: 
Dostoevsky thus indicates that the underground man, far from reject-
ing all moral ideals in favour of an illimitable egoism, is desperately 
searching for one that would truly satisfy his spirit. Such an ideal 
would be one which, rather than spurring the personality to revolt in 
rabid frenzy, would instead lead to a willing surrender in its favour. 
Such an alternative ideal would thus be required to recognize the au-
tonomy of the will and the freedom of the personality, and to appeal to 
the moral nature of man rather than to his reason and self-interest con-
ceived as working in harmony with the laws of nature. For Dostoevsky, 
this alternative ideal could be found in the teachings of Christ; and from 
a confusion that still exists in the text, we can catch a glimpse of how he 
may have tried to integrate this alternative into the framework of his 
imagery.25  
The “confusion” alluded to is the distinction between “palace” and “edifice,” the lat-
ter of which Frank takes to adumbrate the need for a Christian solution. He points 
out that the censors may have been shocked by the association of socialist and reli-
gious terminology, and excised the Christianized image of the Crystal Palace as po-
tentially subversive. In fact, however, the verbal distinction between “palace” and 
“edifice” is not consistently maintained: Dostoevsky uses the former term in Chapters 
VII and IX; then in Chapter X he switches wholesale to the latter, even when referring 
to the utopian socialist ideal. For instance, the first use of “edifice” is a clear reference 
to the ideal of the interlocutors, i.e. the socialist Crystal Palace—”You believe in the 
 




crystal edifice,” says the Underground Man.26 And then, later, “[ … ] I myself have 
just rejected the crystal edifice [ … ].”27 As such, I do not believe it is possible to draw 
any firm conclusions from the terminological peculiarities of Chapter X, whether be-
cause the chapter was garbled by the censors, or because Dostoevsky simply wasn’t 
verbally consistent. (Thus it scarcely matters that both terms are often translated in-
discriminately into English as “palace.”28) Regardless, Frank is certainly right in this 
respect: the Underground Man does introduce the idea of his own utopian ideal, 
which he contrasts with the socialist utopia in terms of its ability to satisfy those of 
his needs which are not purely material, and which would be spurned as hopelessly 
romantic by the socialists. He does so using an analogy, in which he compares a 
chicken coop with an actual palace or mansion. He admits that the chicken coop—
which represents the utilitarian parsimony of the socialist Crystal Palace—may be just 
as good as the mansion when it comes to having a roof over one’s head during a storm, 
but denies that we should, on account of this fact alone, rate it to be just as good as 
the mansion in general and in all respects:  
Don’t you see: if it were a chicken coop instead of a palace [дворца], 
and if it should rain, then perhaps I could crawl into it so as not to get 
drenched; but I would still not mistake a chicken coop for a palace out 
of gratitude, just because it sheltered me from the rain. You’re laughing, 
you’re even saying that in this case there’s no difference between a 
chicken coop and a mansion. Yes, I reply, if the only reason for living is 
to keep from getting drenched.29 
The utopian socialists, figuratively speaking, have claimed that the mansion has no 
genuine advantage over the chicken coop, because there are no genuine needs beyond 
“keeping dry” and other purely material concerns. “But what if I’ve taken it into my 
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27 Dostoevsky, 2001: 26, translation altered (writing “edifice” instead of “palace”). 
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head,” replies the Underground Man, “that this is not the only reason for living, and, 
that if one is to live at all, one might as well live in a mansion? Such is my wish, my 
desire.”30  
From Dostoevsky’s letter it is quite natural to deduce, with Frank, that the mysterious 
new ideal—the genuine “mansion”—mentioned by the Underground Man is, or 
somehow adumbrates, Dostoevsky’s own Christian solution. This does not seem 
straightforwardly correct, however. Frank is right that it is derived from something 
other than materialistic rationality, and that it is inconsistent with the “laws of nature,” 
rather than being based on them; I believe he is wrong to deduce from this, however, 
that it has anything to do with Christianity. From the text itself, it is clear that the 
utopian ideal posited by the Underground Man is not at all Christian but is derived 
from the romantic idealism of his youthful “dreams,” from writers like Pushkin and 
Byron; it is aesthetically rather than spiritually motivated. We can see this in what 
remains concerning the Underground Man’s alternative utopia:  
But let’s say that the crystal palace [здание] is a hoax, that according to 
the laws of nature it shouldn’t exist, and that I’ve invented it only out 
of my own stupidity, as a result of certain antiquated, irrational habits 
of my generation. But what do I care if it doesn’t exist? [ … ] Laugh, if 
you wish; I’ll resist your laughter and I still won’t say I’m satiated if I’m 
really hungry. I know all the same that I won’t accept a compromise, 
an infinitely recurring zero, just because it exists according to the laws 
of nature and it really does exist. I won’t accept as the crown of my de-
sires a large building with tenements for poor tenants to be rented for 
a thousand years and, just in case, with the name of the dentist Wagen-
heim on the sign.31 
The “antiquated, irrational habits” of his generation are evidently the more idealistic 
tendencies of the 1840s, whose radicals had been educated on romantic literature and 
philosophy, as opposed to the hard-line nihilism of the present-day (1860s) 
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intelligentsia. The Underground Man will not accept the Crystal Palace—now likened 
more realistically to a tenement block—simply because it is the best we can hope for 
in real life. We may observe that it represents “normal advantage” in precisely the 
same way as the lazy aestheticism he rejected in Chapter VI: he recognizes it as being 
more comfortable than his underground way of life, but rejects it out a sense of moral-
aesthetic dignity appropriate to his romantic idealism. This also recapitulates what 
the Underground Man said earlier (in Chapter III) about what he called the “absurd-
ity of absurdities”—the pragmatic maxim that one ought to give up one’s ideals if 
they are unrealizable.32 In a similar vein, the Underground Man also alludes to the 
example of the toothache, which he presented in Chapter IV as an illustration of “aim-
less pain,” which his “consciousness finds so humiliating” because it undermines his 
romantic conceptions of human dignity: “in spite of all possible Wagenheims,” he 
wrote, “you’re still a complete slave to your teeth; [and] if someone so wishes, your 
teeth will stop aching, but if he doesn’t so wish, they’ll go on aching for three more 
months.”33 
Compared to the high-flown sufferings of a Childe Harold or a Manfred,34 the roman-
tic heroes of Lord Byron, envied by the Underground Man for their tragic nobility,35 
the toothache is an indignity and embarrassment. It is utterly humiliating for a human 
being—especially a self-proclaimed paragon of higher culture like the Underground 
Man—to suffer at the combined mercy of his own teeth and the dentist Wagenheim, 
who is presumably an utterly prosaic individual, barren of sublimity, and emblematic 
of everything the Underground Man despises.36 The toothache—much like the liver 
complaint with which the Notes are introduced—is thus a supreme example of the 
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futility of romantic idealism: in spite of all his flights into the empyrean realms of the 
sublime and beautiful, the Underground Man is still subservient to the most con-
temptible functions of his body, and in general to “the whole system of natural laws 
about which you really don’t give a damn, but as a result of which you’re suffering 
none the less.”37 Unwilling to ignore reality dishonestly in the manner of a “trans-
cendent” French romantic, he is prepared to accept that this state of affairs is inevita-
ble; but he refuses to reconcile himself with it on account of this inevitability: “I won’t 
accept a compromise, an infinitely recurring zero, just because it exists according to 
the laws of nature and it really does exist.”38 If the best we can expect from reality is a 
disappointment, “an infinitely recurring zero,” then the Underground Man prefers 
not to deal with reality on its own terms—that there are no other terms, of course, 
means that he simply misses out on the bargain. 
The socialist Crystal Palace, in contrast, is just such a compromise, and this is why the 
Underground Man hates it so much. It represents the ultimate capitulation to the 
mundane elements of the natural world and human nature. From the Underground 
Man’s perspective, utopian socialism can only qualify as “utopianism” through 
changing the standards by which such things are judged, and elevating that which is 
possible into an ideal simply because it is possible (at least according to the findings of 
“natural science,” i.e. Nihilism), and not because it actually inspires respect. This idea 
of capitulation was also prefigured in Chapter VI: the connoisseur of Lafite was able 
to “die with a triumphant conscience” only because his conscience—his sense of 
moral-aesthetic dignity—was so much less demanding than the Underground Man’s, 
for whom moral-aesthetic ideals can only be a “pain in the neck,” which is to say, 
prevent him from accepting a gratifying compromise at their expense.  
The Underground Man’s version of the crystal edifice, as such, must be an embodi-
ment of his romantic ideals which is impossible simply because it does away with 
tenements and Wagenheims—no doubt it is better represented by something more 
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along the lines of Manfred’s castle in the Bernese Alps, in which something so mun-
dane as a toothache is completely out of place and hardly conceivable. According to 
Frank, however, the ideal sought by the Underground Man is to be “found in the 
teachings of Christ”—he implies that the Underground Man, if only he knew where 
to look, would find satisfaction in Christianity. Of course, Frank is not suggesting that 
this Christian ideal would appeal to the Underground Man in his current state, but 
only that it would, if he could learn to accept it as an ideal, satisfy the needs which 
led him to spurn the Crystal Palace.39 According to Frank, these needs concern “the 
autonomy of the will and the freedom of the personality,” and thus pertain to “the 
moral nature of man rather than to his reason and self-interest conceived as working 
in harmony with the laws of nature.”40 It seems to me that Frank’s understanding of 
the needs which motivate the Underground Man can only stem from his reading of 
Chapters VII-IX, which we considered in Chapter 4, above. Even if we were to take 
these chapters at face value, I argued that the kind of freedom championed there by 
the Underground Man—caprice—is diametrically opposed to the kind of moral auton-
omy Dostoevsky takes to be embodied in Christianity, which demands a sacrifice of 
personal liberties for the sake of altruistic morality. As such, even if we take Chapters 
VII-IX to express the Underground Man’s genuine spiritual needs, as I believe Frank 
has done, we should not conclude that he would find satisfaction in a Christian utopia 
of the kind Dostoevsky may have attempted to adumbrate in Chapter X. Moreover, 
if we look instead to the needs expressed by the Underground Man in Chapter X itself, 
and in other parts of the book, we find that they do not pertain to freedom at all—
whether caprice or moral freedom—but to the unrealistic projections of his bookish 
romanticism, in which points d’honneur are settled with duels, and the hero always 
shoots into the air in imitation of Pushkin’s Silvio; or in which he confesses his sub-
lime and beautiful crimes “in the style of Manfred” to awestruck crowds around the 
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artfully repositioned Lake Como in Rome. 41  That Dostoevsky’s Christian utopia 
would not be able to satisfy these needs should be clear enough. Even if we divest 
from them their most obviously unchristian characteristics, they are fundamentally 
egoistic—almost ego-theistic—and thus totally incompatible with the spirit of hum-
ble self-abnegation demanded by Dostoevsky’s ideal of Christian brotherhood. Thus, 
in sum, it is clear that the Underground Man’s alternative utopian ideal does not ap-
proximate or foreshadow Dostoevsky’s, but embodies the same romantic ideals 
which, as we have seen, motivate his thoughts and behaviour throughout the bulk of 
the novel. 
If Frank is wrong about Chapter X, however, how are we to suppose that Dostoevsky 
originally tried to motivate “the need for faith and Christ,” as he says in his letter? I 
shall attempt to answer this question more thoroughly in Chapter 10; at this stage, the 
following brief remarks may suffice. I believe we are to take from the Underground 
Man’s romanticism the Christian principle that “man does not live by bread alone”—
which Dostoevsky understood to mean that the utilitarian parsimony of the tenement 
block is inadequate to the needs of human nature. The Underground Man denies 
along with Dostoevsky that “the only reason for living is to keep from getting 
drenched,” i.e. that human needs are fundamentally no different from those of a 
chicken or an ant. But we are to see something more which the Underground Man, 
blinded by his egotism and isolation, cannot: that there is a realistic and satisfying al-
ternative to the Crystal Palace conceived as chicken coop or tenement block, namely, 
the replacement of self-seeking with altruistic utopianism, and the establishment of a 
Christian brotherhood based on love. The moral is then that someone who is noble-
minded enough to realize that “earthly bread” is not enough, such as the Under-
ground Man, is not necessarily doomed to pointless rebellion against reality, so long 
as the Christian ideal of altruism and love can be recognized. The tragedy of the Un-
derground Man, as we see illustrated in the Liza episode of Part II (to be considered 
further below), is that his entrenched egoism prevents him from recognizing this 
 




possibility: when Liza offers him her love selflessly and humbly, he is embarrassed, 
his vanity is wounded, and he is unable to reciprocate.42 The solution is obviously that 
the Underground Man should have abandoned his romantic ideals, which, though 
they have preserved him from lapsing complacently into Nihilist utopianism,43 have 
spawned a host of unfulfillable and selfish needs and have prevented him from rec-
ognizing the Christian alternative. Thus it seems to me that Dostoevsky intended his 
Christian resolution to be deduced from the apparent deadlock reached between the 
romantic Underground Man and his utopian socialist interlocutors—that is, from the 
inadequacy of both of their utopian ideals, and the impossibility of moving beyond 
them without accepting Christianity as a viable alternative. As stated, I shall expand 
on these themes in Chapter 10. 
* * * 
Having considered the exegetical problems surrounding Chapter X, and clarified its 
congruity with stance of the romantic idealism prevalent in Chapter VI and elsewhere 
in the book, we are now in a position to elaborate on the way in which Chapter X 
exposes and explains the contradiction between the Underground Man’s two ways of 
arguing against utopian socialism. As stated above, I believe that in Chapter X the 
Underground Man may be seen to explicitly disavow his Argument from Caprice; 
thankfully, however, he also provides something in the way of an explanation for this 
disavowal, which allows us to begin to make sense of his overall position. Beginning 
with exposition, we may note that the Underground Man opens Chapter X with the 
following remark: 
You believe in the crystal palace [здание], eternally indestructible, that 
is, one at which you can never stick out your tongue furtively nor make 
a rude gesture, even with your fist hidden away. Well, perhaps I’m so 
 
42 When Liza’s disinterested love and concern provide him with an opportunity to loosen the 
reigns of his proud self-control, and give him an example of the way in which he must proceed, 
he only lapses back into sardonic detachment (Dostoevsky, 2001: 87). 




afraid of this building precisely because it’s made of crystal and it’s 
eternally indestructible, and because it won’t be possible to stick one’s 
tongue out even furtively.44 
To my mind, this is simply a continuation of the Argument from Caprice which pre-
ceded it: the Underground Man faults utopian socialism for the strictures it threatens 
to place on his previously avowed need to behave capriciously, to “stick his tongue 
out.” Just as in Chapters VII, VIII and IX, he is “frightened” by the Crystal Palace 
because it represents the final institutionalization of rationality and utility, and the 
banishment of caprice. Immediately after this statement, however, he changes tack 
and begins the aesthetic critique of the Crystal Palace we considered above. The 
above-mentioned analogy of the chicken coop makes clear his aesthetic dissatisfaction 
with utopian socialism; in these passages the Underground Man reveals that he is 
simply too romantic and idealistic to respect the Crystal Palace as a utopia, even if it 
could satisfy all his needs. This about-face is not entirely unexpected: the Under-
ground Man is simply returning to the mode of thought which he so abruptly aban-
doned in the transition between Chapters VI and VII.  
At this point, indeed, his defence of caprice vanishes entirely. As Frank remarks in 
this connection, “Dostoevsky thus indicates that the underground man, far from re-
jecting all moral ideals in favour of an illimitable egoism, is desperately searching for 
one that would truly satisfy his spirit.”45 Frank does not see, however, that this fact 
alone seems to invalidate the preceding material of Chapters VII-IX—material which 
he considers central to the Underground Man’s rejection of utopian socialism, and to 
be a direct expression of Dostoevsky’s own opinions! From here, the Underground 
Man himself goes on to brush off his Argument from Caprice as an aberration, thus 
making the contradiction explicit: 
Never mind that I myself have just rejected the crystal palace for the 
sole reason that it won’t be possible to tease it by sticking out one’s 
 
44 Dostoevsky, 2001: 25 (PSS 5: 120).  




tongue at it. I didn’t say that because I’m so fond of sticking out my 
tongue.46  
In other words, despite the fact that he has just rejected utopian socialism because of 
its eradication of capricious behaviour, he doesn’t really need or advocate capricious 
behaviour in general. He goes on: 
Perhaps the only reason I got angry is that among all your buildings 
there’s still not a single one where you don’t feel compelled to stick out 
your tongue. On the contrary, I’d let my tongue be cut off out of sheer 
gratitude, if only things could be arranged that I’d no longer want to 
stick it out. What do I care if things can’t be so arranged and if I must 
settle for some tenements?47 
Essentially, the Underground Man is incensed by the fact that no utopian ideal has 
yet been proposed—at least, no potentially realizable utopian ideal—which does not 
provoke a derisive reaction. This derision manifested in Chapters VII-IX as the Argu-
ment from Caprice, during which the Underground Man “got angry” and “rejected 
the crystal palace for the sole reason that it won’t be possible to tease it by sticking 
out one’s tongue at it.” From what the Underground Man says here, we can thus con-
clude that the whole argument was itself merely the manifestation of a capricious out-
burst—merely a way for the Underground Man to “stick out his tongue” at the uto-
pian socialist ideal which provoked him, rather than a statement of his normal, essen-
tially romantic views.  
What is it about utopian socialism which provokes this reaction? We have seen that 
the libertarian interpretation, which points to the need for free will, is flawed as an 
explanation. Evidently, the Underground Man was motivated in part by the aesthetic 
inadequacy of the Crystal Palace qua chicken coop. On its own, however, this is not 
sufficient as an explanation either—the Argument from Caprice simply doesn’t make 
sense as a response to such purely aesthetic considerations. Why would it lead him 
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to argue that caprice is the most advantageous advantage? As a devoted romantic, he 
would seem to have no reason to care about his supposed right to behave capriciously.  
We may suppose that preceding material, Chapters I-VI, ought to have put us in a 
position to understand this phenomenon. We have already considered the contents 
of these chapters in broad outline: the Underground Man describes his heightened 
consciousness, his inertia, his spite, as well as some of their behavioural manifesta-
tions, including his refusal to be treated for his liver ailment, his inability to take re-
venge, his debauchery and the pleasure he derives from it, etc. etc. An explanation of 
these phenomena which can finally make sense of his misology is not yet forthcoming; 
this shall be the task of Chapters 6 and 7. In closing this chapter, we may simply re-
capitulate the progression of psychological themes surrounding the Argument from 
Caprice: in Chapter VI, the Underground Man begins thinking about the comfortable 
life he might have lived if he had cared to place his material needs above the require-
ments of his “heightened consciousness”; this leads him to reflect on the idea of “nor-
mal advantage” and the way in which he has spurned it for the sake of his romantic 
ideals; thus he is reminded of the fashionable theory that people always act in pursuit 
of their own advantage (rational egoism), and, in Chapter VII, begins to experience 
an urge—and this is where our explanation falters—to “stick his tongue out,” and to 
express this urge in the form of his Argument from Caprice, which is both a general 
defence of capriciousness and a capricious outburst in itself. When at the end of Chap-
ter IX this outburst reaches its climax in a desperate panegyric on the inherent desir-
ability of suffering and destruction, the Underground Man cools off and returns, in 
Chapter X, to a more level-headed rejection of the Crystal Palace from the standpoint 





With the goal of understanding the Underground Man’s caprice, we were led in this 
chapter to investigate the psychological significance of his misology or opposition 
reason. As we have seen, the Underground Man’s misology manifests in his rejection 
of “normal advantage.” He attacks advantage from two different standpoints: on the 
basis of the aesthetic demands of his romantic idealism, and, in Chapters VII-IX, 
through the Argument from Caprice. Bearing in mind the context of Notes from Un-
derground in Dostoevsky’s polemical engagement with the utilitarian utopian social-
ists, scholars attempting to understand the Underground Man’s opposition to ad-
vantage have naturally gravitated towards Chapters VII-IX, since it is here that he 
most directly engages with utopian socialist ideas. This has led to a skewed represen-
tation of his views, because, as we have also seen, these chapters are not characteristic 
of the work as a whole; the Underground Man even disavows them towards the end 
of Chapter X. Rather than spurning normal advantage out of sheer capriciousness, as 
Chapters VII-IX would in isolation suggest, he has in general deliberately and me-
thodically sacrificed his interests for the sake of his romantic ideals. We have also 
further clarified the way in which his inertia is caused with reference to these ideals: 
being a romantic idealist and also a committed rationalist, his rational awareness of 
the impossibility of his most cherished ideals fuels his sceptical deliberation and 
Hamlet-like indecision; he prefers not to act at all than to act in a way that would 
offend his rationality by its impossible grandiosity, or offend his idealism by its ba-
nality.  
Though this investigation of his romantic idealism has shed light on his inertia and 
his rejection of normal advantage in everyday life, it has not resolved the difficulty of 
understanding his attack on the Crystal Palace or his defence of caprice. Indeed, in 
light of his general commitment to romantic idealism, it is now more difficult than 




socialism: why should a romantic idealist be capricious at all?48 However, though we 
have not yet explained the Underground Man’s misology or caprice, we have a new 
line of investigation to pursue. In Part 2, I shall proceed to consider in detail the rela-
tionship between the Underground Man’s romantic idealism and his misology. Hav-
ing done so, we shall finally be in a position to understand the nature and origin of 
his caprice, and its relevance to Dostoevsky’s grand social-philosophical scheme in 
the Notes. 
 
48 According to Jones: “His rejection of mathematical models of reality is part of the very life-
blood of Romanticism [ ... ]. So too is his cult of passion and irrationalism: the revolt against 
Reason” (Jones, 1976: 60). Although romanticism is commonly associated with opposition to 
rationalism and nihilism, however, it is not usually associated with outright caprice, and the 
Underground Man’s own romanticism—his dreams of Lake Como, of tragic heroism in imi-
tation of Manfred or of Pushkin’s Silvio—are plainly not misologistic or capricious. Caprice is 




Chapter 6:  Sturm und Drang 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, we saw how the Underground Man’s caprice is bound to an atti-
tude of misology, or hatred of reason, provoked in response to the humiliation of his 
romantic ideals by nihilism and utopian socialism. His romanticism causes him to 
become exasperated with his enemies, whose utopian proposals—which are, he 
grants, rational and thus realistic ideals—fall so far below anything that the Under-
ground Man would consider to be a genuine ideal that he is prompted to “get angry” 
and “stick his tongue out” at them. This is the capricious reaction that he argues will 
inevitably follow as a consequence of utopian socialist doctrines. So far, however, the 
precise nature of the connection between the Underground Man’s romantic idealism, 
his disappointment, and his capriciousness has remained a mystery. In order to un-
derstand the psychological basis of this reaction, which is key to understanding Dos-
toevsky’s polemic against utopian socialism, we move on in this chapter to investigate 
the Underground Man’s accusation of the “sublime and beautiful,” the aesthetic cat-
egories emblematic of his romantic idealism, as, in some unspecified sense, the source 
of his own caprice.  
The basic structure of the chapter is as follows. First, I trace the Underground Man’s 
claims to “heightened consciousness of the sublime and beautiful” to the works of 
Friedrich Schiller, and more generally to the Sturm und Drang literary movement to 
which Schiller contributed, and explain why this approach can be expected to shed 




demand for unlimited freedom prompted by the frustration of romantic ideals by ni-
hilism; we find that the Sturm und Drang movement is a clear precedent for this phe-
nomenon, and, in combination with Schiller’s later theoretical writings, will ulti-
mately allow us to make sense of it. I then introduce concepts—beginning with the 
concept of the sublime—that are fundamental to the theoretical context from which 
the Sturm und Drang emerged. Although not all of the plays of the movement are 
overtly philosophical to the same extent as, say, Goethe’s Faust, they nevertheless be-
long to a particular moment in the history of ideas and should be understood in ref-
erence to it. Finally, I then go on to address Schiller’s play The Robbers with a view to 
illustrating some of the theoretical foundations laid in the preceding sections, and 
demonstrating the extent to which they are relevant to comprehending characters like 
those in Schiller’s play, and the Underground Man, who is found to resemble them 
closely in crucial respects.  
2. “The Sublime and Beautiful” 
While scholars interested in Dostoevsky’s social-philosophical polemic have, as we 
have seen, focused on the ideas of freedom and determinism in their interpretations 
of the psychological dimension of Notes from Underground, it seems to me that we 
should take seriously the Underground Man’s explicit reference to his youthful ap-
preciation of the “sublime and beautiful” as the catalyst for his current degraded con-
dition. In the nineteenth century, this phrase became a cliché of romantic criticism; 
the Underground Man therefore uses it ironically, to mock the futility of his own for-
mer romantic idealism, which he now regards as naive and ridiculous. By the same 
token, however, the Underground Man is referring to a long tradition of literature, 
philosophy and criticism—the sentimentalism and romanticism prevalent during his 
youth, and the source of his own idealism. Frank notes that the Underground Man’s 




Turgenev’s “superfluous men” and “Hamlets,”1 who are also victims of overly en-
thusiastic romanticism and sentimentalism and also “destroyed by an excess of con-
sciousness that unfits them for the possibilities offered by their lives.”2 However, 
Frank does not think this connection needs to be pursued in order to make sense of 
Dostoevsky’s polemic: 
Such thematic resemblances need not be denied; but this pervasive mo-
tive in Russian literature of the 1850s and 1860s is given special twist 
by Dostoevsky and shown as the unexpected consequence of the doc-
trines advanced by the very people who had attacked the “Hamlets” 
most violently—the radicals of the 1860s themselves.3 
For Frank, the literary tradition merely provides Dostoevsky with a thematic platform 
for developing his critique of contemporary utopian socialism, rather than a substan-
tive body of ideas. He does not take seriously the Underground Man’s direct impli-
cation of the sublime and beautiful in the genesis of his anti-social condition, and pre-
fers, as we have seen, to focus on the ideas of freedom and determinism, which seem 
to be more directly relevant to the social-philosophical dimension of the novel. I think 
Frank is right that Dostoevsky sought to saddle the Nihilists’ doctrines with the “un-
expected consequence” of the Hamlet type’s debilitating psychological peculiarities. 
However, I think he is wrong to overlook Dostoevsky’s insistent references to the 
sublime and beautiful, and the likelihood that he intends the Underground Man—
and his attack on Chernyshevsky’s utopian socialism—to be understood with refer-
ence to the body of thought and literature symbolized by this phrase—even if its po-
lemical relevance is not immediately clear.  
The sublime and the beautiful are concepts central to aesthetics; in the context of Dos-
toevsky’s writings they point in particular to Friedrich Schiller, who wrote exten-
sively on both concepts and, as I shall demonstrate below, gave them a psychological 
 
1 We shall consider some of these characters in Chapter 9. 
2 Frank, 1986: 319. 




significance recognizable in Dostoevsky’s fiction. Schiller is notable for having inter-
woven the aesthetics of beauty and sublimity into his ethics, psychology (or “anthro-
pology” as it was then known) and social philosophy, thereby—as we shall see—set-
ting the stage for Dostoevsky’s own preoccupation with the interconnectedness of 
these domains.4 In general, Schiller was one of the most important influences on Rus-
sian intellectual culture during Dostoevsky’s lifetime: he consistently appealed to 
young intellectuals dreaming of a utopian future for Russia, and his “enthusiasm for 
justice and freedom, for the good and the beautiful, for brotherhood and universal 
love” were a beacon to idealists, especially during the reactionary first decades of the 
nineteenth century.5 As such, he was seen as “the leader” of the intellectual figure-
heads and educators of the 1840s.6 As Dostoevsky himself put it: “Schiller undoubt-
edly got into the blood of Russian society.”7 The extent of Dostoevsky’s debt to Schil-
ler is well known, though it is difficult to determine the nature of this debt precisely.8 
In his fiction, Dostoevsky tends to use the name “Schiller” to refer to a psychological 
type based on the popular Russian stereotype of Schiller, rather than the man him-
self.9 This type is characterized by naive but obstinate idealism, as well as a tendency 
towards day-dreaming inactivity; it thus incorporates the “excess of consciousness” 
of the “Hamlet” type noted by Frank above.10 Dostoevsky’s “Schillers” are typically 
confronted by antipodally world-wise antagonists, and forced to endure the 
 
4 Schiller, 1993. 
5 Kostka, 1965: 14. In this respect he was also highly influential on the pochvenniki (Chances, 
1975: 164). 
6 Kostka, 1965: 18. 
7 Dostoevsky, 1964: 155. 
8 See, e.g., Kostka, 1965, 1975: 101; Simons, 1967, 1972; Hart, 1971; Jones, 1974; Lyngstad, 1975; 
McReynolds, 2004; Meisel, 2016: 267-269. 
9 Meisel, 2016: 268. 
10 Charles Passage (1946) shows that, in Russia, Schiller was known in the early part of the 
nineteenth century predominantly for his Sturm und Drang plays and, thanks to the transla-
tions of Zhukovsky, his poetry. The Russian reception of Schiller during this period thus 
tended towards romanticism, at the expense of the more realistic works of Schiller’s later clas-
sical period. This may account for the somewhat exaggerated stereotype of Schiller as a naive, 




humiliation of their lofty ideals.11 He established this paradigm most explicitly in the 
confrontation between Vanya and Prince Valkovsky in Humiliated and Insulted; in 
Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov fares no better at the hands of Porfiry and Svid-
rigailov, who mock his idealism and expose its shameful roots of pride and vanity.12 
Through confessing his youthful appreciation for the “sublime and beautiful,” the 
Underground Man identifies himself as a former “Schiller” of this kind. But it is far 
from easy to understand the precise significance of this “Schillerism” in Notes from 
Underground.  
In what way might the Underground Man’s “Schillerism” be relevant for understand-
ing his caprice? David McKinney has noted suggestively that the Underground Man’s 
appreciation of romantic aesthetics is directly linked to his craving for freedom: “The 
quintessence of the Underground Man’s ‘romantic’ nature is an impulsive demand 
for absolute freedom.”13 It remains to be seen, however, exactly why this might be the 
case. As stated, the characteristic fate of Dostoevsky’s “Schiller” type is painful disil-
lusionment brought about by a humiliating confrontation with the sordid or un-
seemly aspects of reality. Such confrontations drive home the futility of the charac-
ter’s idealism, and the unrealizability of his ideals.14 Thus Mochulsky sums up the 
 
11 Kostka (1965: 244) suggests that Dostoevsky himself experienced this kind of disillusion-
ment in exile in Siberia, and was led thereby to renounce his own youthful “Schillerism.” We 
should note, however, that Dostoevsky was never uncritical of “Schillers,” even in his early 
fiction (see, for example, “White Nights” in Dostoevsky, 2010).  
12 Dostoevsky, 2003(b): 535-551, 555-576; 2012: 240-259. In The Brothers Karamazov, by contrast, 
Dmitry mocks his own “Schillerism,” which he struggles to maintain in the face of his own 
base desires: “I find it intolerable that there should be men, even those with the loftiest hearts 
and lofty intellects, too, who start out with the ideal of the Madonna and end up with the ideal 
of Sodom” (Dostoevsky, 2003(d): 145); Ivan Karamazov’s confrontation with the devil more 
neatly fits the paradigm of the mocked idealist (Dostoevsky, 2003(d): 811-831).  
13 McKinney, 1978: 192. 
14 Pierre Hart briefly explores Dostoevsky’s attempt to transpose Schiller’s treatments of me-
dieval chivalry into nineteenth century Russia in his story “The Little Hero.” Hart notes that 
this attempt illustrates Dostoevsky’s early thinking on the psychological workings of idealistic 
“Schillerism” in the modern world, and establishes naivety and futility as essential components 
of “Schillerism.” He writes: “Dostoevskij’s solution to the problem of creating a credible rep-
resentative of Schillerean idealism in ‘The Little Hero’ is a revealing one. By recasting him as 





Underground Man as a “disenchanted idealist.”15 And as Malcolm Jones writes: “per-
sonal ideals play a key role in Dostoyevsky’s psychology. The conflict between per-
sonal ideals of harmony, freedom, beauty, joy and justice, and a reality which seems 
to deny them all, is the primary source of the spiritual problems of Dostoyevsky’s 
heroes and heroines.”16 As I shall argue, it is indeed the disillusionment resulting 
from this conflict that is, in general terms, the psychological mechanism that explains 
the Underground Man’s caprice.17  
That Notes from Underground is based on the theme of disillusioned “Schillerism” has 
been noted by various commentators. According to Rudolf Neuhauser, Notes from 
Underground is the culmination of Dostoevsky’s evolution “from an enthusiastic ac-
ceptance of German and French romantic models to an increasingly critical and scep-
tical attitude towards romantic and idealistic, ‘Schillerian’ literature.” 18  Edmund 
Kostka, too, argues in his study of Schiller’s influence on Russian literature that Notes 
from Underground is the point at which Dostoevsky moves completely beyond his 
youthful devotion to Schiller: “full of fierce despair, [Dostoevsky] mercilessly demol-
ishes the idols of his youth.”19 McKinney sees it as a parody of Russian “Schillerism.”20 
Richard Peace sees it as a direct attack, “permeated by a spirit of rejection.”21 Alexan-
dra Lyngstad goes further still, and calls “Schillerism” the “ultimate target” of the 
novel: 
Granted, Schillerism is not the only object of attack in this work; need-
less to say, it is combined with scientism, utilitarianism, and 
 
attitudes in the adult world. Here then is the first suggestion of a condition that would prevail 
in the mature Dostoevskij’s works. It is for the young and inexperienced to maintain the Schil-
lerean ideal of the good and the beautiful in the face of the world’s corruption” (Hart, 1971: 
306f.). 
15 Mochulsky, 1967: 256. Italics removed. 
16 Jones, 1976: 51. See also Jones, 1974: 345. 
17 Preben Villadsen (1981) has also attempted to explain the Underground Man’s character in 
terms of his acceptance of impossible romantic ideals, and the contrast between these ideals 
and reality; he does not go beyond such generalities, however. 
18 Neuhauser, 1974: 333. 
19 Kostka, 1965: 225. Cf. Shestov, 1969: 172. 
20 McKinney, 1978: 195. 




utopianism. But it is a major strain. A leitmotif is the phrase “the sub-
lime and the beautiful,” which occurs at least fifteen times. By its in-
sistent presence, this phrase—which perhaps a bit too neatly sums up 
Schiller’s aesthetic idealism—does not allow the reader to forget the ul-
timate target of Dostoevskij’s satire.22 
Whilst I do not agree that Schiller is actually the target of Notes from Underground, I 
agree that Dostoevsky plays on broadly Schillerian ideas—and, perhaps, what he re-
gards as the weaknesses of naive “Schillerism”—in his development of the under-
ground psychology and in his attack on utopian socialism.  
To repeat, Dostoevsky’s “Schillers” are not supposed to represent the real Schiller; 
nor does “Schillerism” refer with any degree of accuracy to his actual system of beliefs. 
Dostoevsky is drawing on the popular image of Schiller as an unwavering idealist, a 
champion of intellectual freedom and art, somewhat out of touch with reality, and 
optimistic about the prospects of humanity. When the Underground Man blames his 
condition on the sublime and beautiful, he is blaming it on his prior adherence to such 
“Schillerism” and his disillusionment with it. This led C. M. Woodhouse to conclude 
that Schiller’s influence on Dostoevsky was shallow and limited only to the vague 
connections of his name.23 But there is reason to think that Dostoevsky is also alluding 
to the works of the real Schiller, and those of his contemporaries, not in order to attack 
them, but in order to draw upon them in service of his own polemical goals. As Mal-
colm Jones writes, “references and allusions to Schiller in Dostoyevsky are not just 
casual decoration, but have their roots in the psychological and ideological structure 
of Dostoyevsky’s novels.”24 
Jones himself provides some examples of how Schiller’s essay On the Aesthetic Educa-
tion of Man sheds light on several of Dostoevsky’s characters (primarily in The Adoles-
cent), but ultimately concludes that he borrowed haphazardly from Schiller in 
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accordance with “a fundamentally emotional principle of organisation.”25 In focusing 
much more closely on Notes from Underground and several of Schiller’s works, delving 
further into the “psychological and ideological structure” of Dostoevsky’s novel, I 
find instead that Dostoevsky’s argument against Chernyshevsky builds on some of 
Schiller’s most sophisticated theories in a manner that withstands philosophical scru-
tiny. Whilst I am content to remain neutral on the question of whether and to what 
extent Dostoevsky consciously borrowed from Schiller, it seems to me extremely 
likely that, given his knowledge and appreciation of Schiller’s works, the congruence 
of their thought is not coincidental. 
* * * 
Pursuing this line of investigation, we find ample precedent for the Underground 
Man’s caprice and misology in the Sturm und Drang literature to which Schiller was a 
major contributor.26 On reflection this is hardly surprising, since the Sturm und Drang 
is renowned precisely as a reaction against the rationalism of the Enlightenment, pit-
ting destructive but idealistic heroes against the strictures of society, in much the 
same way as Notes from Underground pits the Underground Man against the utopian 
socialists. Thus not without reason has the Underground Man been called (if only in 
passing) “a hero directly from the Sturm und Drang.”27 Of course, the resemblance is 
obscured by great differences in style and content—Schiller’s plays depict titanic he-
roes with stirring energy and passion; Dostoevsky, on the other hand, presents a sar-
donic former bureaucrat calculated to provoke revulsion and laughter. As we shall 
see in Chapters 9 and 10, such differences are highly significant in themselves. For 
present purposes, however, it is the similarities that are most interesting: the related 
themes of idealism, nihilism, disillusionment, and raging capricious protest against 
 
25 Jones, 1974: 354.  
26 I stated in Chapter 2 that there are no clear philosophical precedents for the Underground 
Man’s ideal of caprice—as it turns out, however, there are literary ones! 




all constraints—regardless of whether this protest is warlike and righteous, or self-
consciously petty and ridiculous. 
Schiller’s Robbers, which provided Dostoevsky with themes and inspiration through-
out his career, is an important source of such ideas; another is Goethe’s Faust, espe-
cially in its early forms. In both of these works, just as in Notes from Underground, 
idealistic characters behave capriciously in response to essentially nihilist doctrines—
the disenchantment of reality by modern science and materialist philosophy—and, as 
I shall argue, do so for similar reasons.  
Furthermore, I argue that in his later aesthetic essays Schiller has provided a body of 
theory which goes a long way towards describing a psychological mechanism that 
can explain the phenomenon of caprice illustrated in these works.28 It is helpful for us 
to consider these theoretical and literary works side by side, for two reasons: firstly, 
because Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground is itself a hybrid of abstract theory and 
concrete illustration it invites comparison with both strands of Schiller’s writings. Sec-
ondly, Schiller’s theoretical works tend to be extremely abstract, while his plays are, 
of course, much more concrete in their depictions of psychological phenomena; as 
such, the two classes of writings form a complementary whole in which the abstrac-
tions of the one both explain and are illustrated by the concrete descriptions of the 
other.29 Although Schiller’s essays provide some important clues for making sense of 
the Underground Man’s condition, these are somewhat tangential to his main theo-
retical concerns and he does not go into enough detail to make his psychological 
 
28 Lest it be thought improbable that Dostoevsky’s fiction could have drawn directly on Schil-
ler’s theoretical works, it is worth noting that Dostoevsky was familiar with these essays, and 
not merely with Schiller’s plays and poetry: “The exact times and places of his exposure to 
Schiller’s philosophical texts are often difficult to establish, but they left identifiable traces on 
Dostoevsky’s works. In the 1840s he dreamt of publishing a full edition of Schiller in Russian 
translation as a joint venture with his brother Mikhail. It never materialized, but with Fyodor’s 
encouragement and involvement, Mikhail translated and published On Naïve and Sentimental 
Poetry, in addition to several Schiller plays” (McReynolds, 2004: 365). 
29 Ernst Stahl (1954: 5-8) also noted that Schiller’s early heroes can be read in terms of his later 
essays, and in particular his views on the difference between idealism and realism, to which I 




views clear. So, although he provides no concrete illustrations of these views, which 
might serve to make their referents more tangible, we can easily supply our own from 
Schiller’s plays and from those of his contemporaries, especially Goethe, to which he 
refers obliquely. His theoretical remarks thus become much more comprehensible, 
and their relevance to Dostoevsky’s fiction clearer, when we read them in conjunction 
with the Sturm und Drang literary works to be considered later in this chapter and the 
next.   
Having established, in Chapters 6 and 7, that the Underground Man’s caprice can be 
illuminated by comparison with the Sturm und Drang and by Schiller’s psychological 
theories, I proceed in Chapters 8 and 9 to justify this comparison further, and to ex-
plain why Dostoevsky should have recapitulated themes from the Sturm und Drang 
in particular when devising his polemic against utopian socialism, by way of survey-
ing some of the literary and philosophical developments separating Dostoevsky’s 
work conceptually and temporally from the Sturm und Drang.   
3. Sturm und Drang 
Just as the Underground Man reacts against the Nihilism of the 1860s, the Sturm und 
Drang movement was a reaction to the nihilism of the Enlightenment.30 The character 
of its reaction is also much the same: it takes the form of a capricious demand for 
absolute freedom and independence. Its heroes typically see themselves as constantly 
oppressed and beleaguered by all manner of constraints, by the order of the world 
itself, which they struggle vainly to free themselves from.31 As in the case of Notes 
from Underground, this sense of oppression stems from the idealism of the hero, which 
is frustrated when its impossible demands are not fulfilled. Thus Lesley Sharpe 
 
30 As stated, I am using “Nihilism” to refer to the Russian school of thought including Cher-
nyshevsky, Pisarev etc., and “nihilism” to refer to the more general philosophical position 
which they adopted, namely, extreme rationalism and reductive naturalism. 




identifies the inability of Schiller’s characters to realize their grand visions—the “gulf 
between the idealist’s vision and the intractability of life”—as a constant preoccupa-
tion of his career.32  
It is customary to stress the political context of this phenomenon.33 We shall however 
see that in The Robbers no less than in Faust, the characters feel constrained by their 
own human limitations, which they see in reductive, materialistic terms as a result of 
their Enlightenment scepticism, and not merely by the more concrete shackles of po-
litical despotism or social hierarchies. They are, like the Underground Man, idealists 
who have succumbed to disillusionment and become frustrated. With reference to his 
Sturm und Drang cohort, Goethe himself speaks of “the need for independence which 
arises in times of peace,” and notes that a “tender, sometimes morbid” longing for 
freedom arises precisely when our freedom is least threatened by external constraints: 
“in times of peace our love of freedom becomes more and more prominent, and the 
greater our freedom the more we wish for it; we will tolerate nothing above us; we 
will not be restrained; no one shall be restrained!”34 Other commentators, therefore, 
stress the religious rather than the political context of the movement. According to 
Alan Leidner, for example: 
The needs of these characters are deeper than even the grim German 
political situation can suggest, and classic works of the movement often 
contain an urge to extend oneself that seems more religious than polit-
ical, as if the Sturm und Drang is expressing the needs of a place that 
has not yet had the same benefit of secularization as its eighteenth-cen-
tury European neighbors.35 
We should also note, however, that the spiritual preoccupations of the movement, 
noted here by Leidner, can hardly be accounted for as products of pre-Enlightenment 
religiosity alone: the dubious benefits of secular Enlightenment philosophy are, in 
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33 For a survey of politically-oriented scholarship, see Pugh, 2000: 144ff. 
34 Quoted in Lewes, 1908: 120f. 




large measure, precisely what the Stürmer und Dränger were reacting against. Sharpe 
rightly notes that Schiller’s early dramas “present the rootlessness of a generation that 
has inherited the Enlightenment’s intellectual liberation from the constraints of tradi-
tion but cannot realize its vision of a better world.”36 This is a theme I shall return to. 
Whatever its cause, however, it should here be noted that the dissatisfaction of the 
Stürmer und Dränger is not limited to any specific political, religious, or other state of 
affairs. As David Hill has remarked, the heroes of the movement are not ultimately 
striving towards, or away from, anything in particular: although in specific instances 
they may direct their rebellions against the religious, cultural or political status quo, 
the freedom they ultimately crave is nebulous and unspecified. This can be observed 
in the eponymous play of the Sturm und Drang movement, in F. M. Klinger’s dissolute 
(and aptly named) hero Wild: “I want to have myself stretched over a drum so as to 
take on new dimensions. [ … ] Oh, if I could but exist in the barrel of this pistol until 
a hand blasted me into the air.”37 Such characters are, like the Underground Man after 
them, capricious—they have a yearning for absolute freedom and find constraints of 
any kind intolerable. The rebellion of the Sturm und Drang is thus, according to Hill, 
an emotionally laden gesture expressing frustration, a desperate insist-
ence on some undefined alternative to constriction: the Sturm und 
Drang is a kind of protest movement, impatient with everything that 
limits the possibilities of the individual, and “freedom” is the name 
used to refer to an imagined state in which there are no such limits.38 
Although Hill again mentions a political context for this frustration—the “political 
weakness of the middle class” at the time—it is the “desperate insistence on some 
undefined alternative to constriction,” the hatred of constraints of every kind, that 
gives this movement its main relevance to Notes from Underground. Indeed, the resem-
blance of this frustrated attitude to that of the Underground Man could not be clearer. 
 
36 Sharpe, 1991: 1. 
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“The problematic nature of the idea of freedom does not,” Hill adds, “detract from 
the intensity with which its absence was deplored: it is the energy and frustration of 
incoherent protest that fuelled the Sturm und Drang.”39  
The demand for unlimited and unspecified freedom is precisely caprice of the kind 
advocated by the Underground Man. This demand, it seems to me, is peculiar to Dos-
toevsky’s character and the Stürmer und Dränger that prefigure him. The lawless, un-
refined agitation of the Sturm und Drang clashed with the emphasis soon to be 
placed—by the “Weimar classicism” of Goethe and, of course, Schiller himself, as well 
as romanticism and German Idealist philosophy—on harmony, balance and sagacity. 
However, though the kind of freedom emblematic of the Sturm und Drang had fallen 
out of favour long before Dostoevsky’s day, it seems to have been well understood 
by nineteenth-century critics who commented on the early works of Goethe. One of 
the most perceptive of these was George Henry Lewes, one of Goethe’s earliest biog-
raphers. (It may also be worth noting that Apollon Grigoryev—Dostoevsky’s fellow 
pochvennik—regarded Lewes’ Life and Work of Goethe as an example of the “organic 
criticism” he himself professed,40 and thus, presumably, that Lewes was regarded as 
an important authority on Goethe by at least one person close to Dostoevsky at the 
time he was writing Notes from Underground.) Lewes refers to the Sturm und Drang as 
the “Werther epoch,” after Goethe’s Sorrows of Young Werther (1774),41 and sees the 
main characteristics of the movement encapsulated in the title character of this novel: 
Werther is a man who, not having yet learned self-mastery, imagines 
that his immense desires are proofs of immense superiority [ … ]. He 
laughs at all rules [ … ]. He hates order [ … ]. In a word, he hates all 
control. [ … ] Very characteristic of the epoch is the boundless enthusi-
asm inspired by Ossian, whose rhetorical trash the Germans hailed as 
the finest expression of Nature’s poetry. [ … ] It is abandonment of the 
mind, throwing the reigns on the horse’s neck, which makes such writ-
ing possible; and it was precisely this abandonment to impulse, this 
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disregard of the grave remonstrances of reason and good sense, which 
distinguished the Werther epoch.42 
The character described closely resembles the Underground Man, in both attitudes 
and development. The “rhetorical trash” of the Ossian poems43 plays the same role 
here as the Underground Man’s favourite Romantic literature and his extravagant 
and disordered dreams “in the style of Manfred”: where the Underground Man in-
dulges in delusions of grandeur, Werther turns for solace to these poems—written by 
James Macpherson, supposedly collected and translated from ancient bardic tradi-
tion—which represent the same abandonment of reality, rules and strictures. As his 
state of mind worsens, he ceases to read Homer and begins reading Ossian instead, 
thereby replacing the wholesome and youthful vigour of the Greeks with the (as 
Schiller says) ”gloomy, formless, melancholy” world of northern sentimentalism.44 
This neglect of reality in favour of vague yearnings is characteristic of the Sturm und 
Drang, as is the harsh disillusionment that must accompany it. The inevitable concom-
itant is, as Lewes says, “throwing the reigns on the horse’s neck”—caprice, since the 
“horse” here is the raw will and impulse of the hero himself. These are characters who 
strive to satisfy their desires even after they have been disillusioned by their struggles 
against unyielding realities. Their response to this disillusionment is one of defiance: 
they are ultimately doomed to failure, but they refuse to relinquish their ideals, and 
so exert all their powers in order to bend the world as far as possible to their will. 
Another Victorian critic highly sensitive to the Sturm und Drang psychology of caprice 
was Thomas Carlyle. (Grigoryev considered Carlyle’s work to be another example of 
“organic criticism,”45 and even called him “the greatest of English thinkers”46—de-
spite his being Scottish—so, like Lewes, he was certainly known in Dostoevsky’s 
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circle, though never to my knowledge mentioned by Dostoevsky himself.) As Carlyle 
puts it in one of his essays on Goethe, the beleaguered spirit of the disillusioned ide-
alist “lacerates itself, like a captive bird, against the iron limits which Necessity has 
drawn round it.”47 In the defiance of caprice, such idealists attempt not only to sur-
mount but to destroy every obstacle they encounter, knowing that they themselves 
will be destroyed in the process. This also leads them into conflict with reason and 
morality, the internal constraints on thought and activity that the Underground Man 
finds especially irksome. As Ronald Miller says: “From Werther’s point of view, 
‘Vernunft’ (reason) and morality are principles that militate against his inner idealism, 
and they do so moreover in the interests of a world which, with its materialism, has 
shown itself to be so lacking in idealism.”48  
The movement from disillusionment to defiance and capriciousness is captured most 
brilliantly in J. M. R. Lenz’s short review of Goethe’s 1773 drama Götz von Berlichingen. 
Lenz, himself an important member of the Sturm und Drang movement, first laments 
the necessities of ordinary human life, from birth, through work and strife to death, 
all of which he regards as worthless. He thereby indicates the prevailing attitude of 
Enlightenment nihilism: such things are indeed worthless in light of the fact that they 
possess no higher meaning, they are vacuous; there is no God to reward honest toil 
in heaven, and the limits of human nature do not permit us to do anything genuinely 
worthy of respect here on earth. Lenz then rises to a panegyric on absolute freedom 
gained through sheer force of will, in the style of the play he is reviewing: 
This is what we learn, that this our power of action should not rest, 
should not desist from effectiveness, from motion, from tumult until it 
has created freedom around us, room for action: good God, room for 
action, even if it were chaos you had created, wild and void, but free-
dom dwelled only there and we could brood over it in imitation of you 
until something emerged from it—bliss! bliss! a feeling fit for gods!49 
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Lenz’s glorification of free activity for its own sake, with no thought of motivation or 
consequences—in other words, caprice—as a response to the banality of modern life 
finds expression throughout the Sturm und Drang. It is a response to a world in which 
his spiritual capacities have first been aroused by the “sublime and beautiful” heights 
of sentiment, and then jilted by the boring universe of the sceptical Enlightenment. 
Götz von Berlichingen himself embodies this disillusionment in the specific domain 
of politics, in the transition between the age of largely independent feudal knights 
and the age of the centralized modern state.50 His ideal is a life of heroism and chiv-
alry, but he is confronted by underhanded political and legal machinations, which he 
despises but which he is ultimately unable to overcome.51 The life he thinks worth 
living is no longer liveable. Mark Kistler’s description of Götz is very apt: 
He perishes of complete frustration in a world which does not under-
stand him, hurts him at every turn, and will not allow him to be himself. 
In his desire to break with all social conventions and live according to 
the dictates of his own heart, he sees, alas, the gulf between the real and 
the ideal become wider and wider, until he has to turn away in anger and 
disgust from a world which will not submit to his desires.52 
The immodesty of the hero’s demand for the whole world to capitulate to his will, so 
that he needn’t capitulate to its natural necessity, is characteristic of the Sturm und 
Drang in general. It represents a confrontational, inflexible idealism which will settle 
for nothing less than realization of the ideal itself, and would rather go to complete 
ruin than adopt a more pragmatic attitude. And because their ideals are unrealistic, 
its heroes inevitably do go to ruin. As Ronald Miller writes of Werther, whose disil-
lusionment famously ends in suicide: “any tendency to compromise with the world 
[ ... ] he could only regard as a betrayal of his idealism.”53  
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Statements quoted so far should indicate the extent to which Notes from Underground 
recapitulates the characteristics of Sturm und Drang heroes like Werther and Götz von 
Berlichingen. What we are trying to understand is the causal relation between the 
Underground Man’s romantic idealism, nihilistic disillusionment and caprice. We 
have seen that the Sturm und Drang movement sets a clear precedent for this relation. 
As we shall see more fully in what follows, it is thus highly instructive to compare 
Notes from Underground with these works: to situate Dostoevsky’s highly enigmatic 
and apparently paradoxical novel with reference to a well-known and rather more 
transparent literary tradition is to open it up to scrutiny. Such comparisons ultimately 
reveal how consistently Dostoevsky was building on the works of writers like Goethe 
and Schiller in developing the Notes, and that he did so not merely in order to develop 
isolated themes or allusions, but his whole polemic against Chernyshevsky. He could 
have expected his readers to recognize his engagement with this tradition immedi-
ately—after all, Schiller in particular “got into the blood of Russian society,”54 and 
Goethe was hardly less influential55—and to understand his work in this context. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall examine the conceptual foundations of the 
Sturm und Drang movement, and one of its most famous and influential works, Schil-
ler’s Robbers, which encapsulate clearly and concisely the ideas I wish to emphasize 
in relation to Notes from Underground. In Chapter 7, I shall then consider how Schiller’s 
theoretical essays shed light on the phenomenon of caprice, using Goethe’s Faust as 
an illustration, before returning to apply what we have learned from the Sturm und 
Drang to the interpretation of Dostoevsky’s novel. 
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4. The Sublime and Human Dignity 
We begin with the concept of the sublime. For philosophers after Kant, sublimity was 
the aesthetic character pertaining to things which make us aware of our spiritual su-
periority over nature.56 A raging sea, for instance, is a power capable of destroying 
our bodies and our possessions, or causing us to act foolishly out of fear; but (so long 
as we are not actually threatened by it) by observing it we can come to sense that no 
matter how powerful it is, there is something in us that it cannot destroy (namely, the 
soul). We feel that our true personhood is completely independent of our fragile bod-
ies and wayward passions. Sublime objects provide an occasion for this realization 
precisely because they encourage us—as Isaiah Berlin says—to “retreat to the inner 
citadel,”57 and discover that it is far better protected than we might otherwise have 
assumed. As Schiller writes: 
We call an object sublime if, whenever the object is presented or repre-
sented, our sensuous nature feels its limits, but our rational nature feels 
its superiority, its freedom from limits. Thus, we come up short against 
a sublime object physically, but we elevate ourselves above it morally, 
namely, though ideas.58 
And as he says elsewhere: 
Thus, by means of the feeling of the sublime, we experience that the 
state of mind is not necessarily oriented to the state of our senses, that 
the laws of nature are not necessarily our laws as well, and that we have 
within us a self-sufficient principle that is independent of all sensuous 
stirrings.59   
 
56 For a general history of the idea of the sublime in aesthetics, see Kirwan, 2005. Before Schiller, 
the most important theorists of the sublime were Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant (Burke, 
2015; Kant, 1987, 2007). Vanessa Ryan has argued against the tendency of scholars to assume 
that Burke and other thinkers before Kant were also concerned with the spiritually uplifting 
qualities of the sublime (Ryan, 2001).  
57 Berlin, 2002: 181-187. 
58 Schiller, 1993: 22. 




The spiritual ascendancy over nature that sublime objects reveal to us gives us a feel-
ing of absolute freedom, because in our mental capacities we really are unlimited—
we can imagine anything we want to imagine, or think anything we want to think, 
irrespective of whether what we imagine and think is true or can come true in real-
ity.60 This capacity cannot be diminished by any external constraints; our minds are 
free even when our bodies are imprisoned. Of course, Schiller is operating with a 
Christian-Platonic conception of the spirit or soul, which is why the independence of 
the mental powers of imagination and intellect from external constraints is also taken 
as evidence for the complete independence of the spirit or soul from the body.61 Thus, 
sublime experiences reveal to us that even if the body is destroyed utterly, the abso-
lute independence of the spirit will ensure that it remains safe and free.62  
It is worth noting here that the word “sublime” is ambiguous, for it refers not only to 
the aesthetic character of sublime objects, but also to that aspect of ourselves which 
such objects reveal to us: thus human beings are themselves “sublime” insofar as they 
are elevated above nature; and we can say that sublime objects make us aware of our 
own sublimity as spiritual beings.63 It is also worth noting that for Schiller, as for Plato 
and Kant, human sublimity is human rationality: it is through reason that we ascend 
from the confines of the “sensory realm” to the freedom of the “realm of ideas,” and 
by virtue of our rationality that we belong in spirit to the latter. Reason is here under-
stood as a kind of spiritual principle or, in some sense, the “soul,” and not merely as 
 
60 “Everything existing has its limitations, but thought is unbounded” (Schiller, 1993: 234).  
61 As Kirwan writes of eighteenth-century thinkers in general: “To all but the most thorough-
going atheist, there was also some objective correlative for the feeling inspired [by the sub-
lime], so that merely in itself that feeling need not be delusional” (Kirwan, 2005: 37). 
62 Cf. the famous statement in Pascal’s Pensées, no. 231: “A human being is only a reed, the 
weakest in nature, but he is a thinking reed. To crush him, the whole universe does not have 
to arm itself. A mist, a drop of water, is enough to kill him. But if the universe were to crush 
the reed, the man would be nobler than his killer, since he knows that he is dying, and that 
the universe has the advantage over him. The universe knows nothing about this” (Pascal, 
1995: 72f.). 
63 Indeed, “eighteenth-century thinkers move away from understanding the sublime as a set 
of qualities that are presumed to be internal to a given object, and shift their attention to the 




an intellectual capacity or faculty. The association of sublimity and rationality is im-
portant, because it leads us to another of Schiller’s theoretical claims. 
In his most important theoretical work, On the Aesthetic Education of Man (known as 
the Aesthetic Letters, published 1794), Schiller writes that when human beings first be-
come aware of their rationality—of their sublimity—they also become aware of a need 
to know what he calls the “absolute” or the “unconditioned,” which reason inherently 
demands as the end result of its striving for pure and adequate knowledge. Schiller 
calls this need the “form drive.” As a result, they are encouraged to abstract from real 
life, which is always “conditioned” by contingent physical facts, and which they can 
only sense passively; they must seek the absolute through intellect and imagination, 
which are not passively fettered to such contingencies, but are completely free: “This 
demand, since it can never be wholly satisfied in any single condition of his physical 
life, forces [man] to leave the physical altogether, and ascend out of limited reality 
into the realm of ideas.”64 Man’s reason strives to “wrest him from the bondage of 
time, and lead him upwards from the sensuous world towards the ideal world.”65 
Schiller is here building on what are ultimately Platonic themes. Through his famous 
allegory of the cave, Plato illustrates the idea that in ordinary life people are trapped 
within the “cave” of sensory experience, through which we have no direct access to 
the ultimate truths of reality, but only a faint, second-hand approximation.66 Schiller 
follows this Platonic notion in thinking that reason gives rise to and potentially, 
through philosophy, satisfies the need to transcend the limited perspective of our 
physical human nature and grasp the ideal “forms” and the “absolute” which condi-
tions them. The “absolute” itself is an obscure notion in Schiller, as in Plato: it is 
simply the highest reward of philosophy and mastery of the ideal world. As his col-
league Fichte also remarked: “mankind has an innate desire to catch a glimpse of that 
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realm which transcends the individual—to view this realm, not merely in a reflected 
light, but directly.”67  
Schiller is also building on Kant’s idea of the “needs of reason,” which include the 
need to know about the existence of God, of free will, and of immortality.68 They are 
called needs of reason because reason is what gives birth to them: it is through culti-
vating our rationality, through thinking beyond our limited animal circumstances, 
that we discover ideals of perfection we cannot help but strive to realize. And they 
are called needs of reason because they necessarily compel all rational beings to pur-
sue their satisfaction: they concern the most important and consequential ideas we 
are capable of framing, the “most important vistas” of the mind.69 I shall generally 
use the more general term spiritual needs in what follows (without implying by “spir-
itual” that these needs are always religious), since “needs of reason” may seem to 
imply that the needs are narrowly intellectual, which, if by “intellectual” we under-
stand a cold and disinterested curiosity, is certainly not the case.  
According to Schiller, reason lifts us above the world of sense, and gives us a feeling 
for our own sublimity. As we have seen, it thereby makes us unsatisfied with the 
world of sense, in which we are shackled by our weak human bodies, buffeted by our 
tempestuous emotions and sensual desires, and limited by our finite human senses. 
Reason thus inculcates in us a feeling that there must be something beyond the world 
of sense, if human existence is not to be a complete farce, that would anchor us to a 
higher spiritual world if only we could comprehend it. Our spiritual needs or the 
needs of reason, then, boil down to the overarching need to transcend, in some mean-
ingful way, the limitations of the world of sense, in which we are merely clever ani-
mals and lack any grounds for thinking that we are uniquely privileged as spiritual 
beings. We need confirmation of our sublimity, and, since we cannot find this in the 
world of sense, we must look for it in the realm of ideas. We thereby discover ideals 
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that, if realized, would vindicate our absolute intellectual freedom and confirm our 
sense of human dignity. For Schiller, the needs of reason concern knowledge of the 
unspecifiable “absolute,” and of—in Kantian terms—the “Ideas of reason,” e.g., God, 
freedom and immortality.70 To fully satisfy these needs would in this case be to realize 
the ideal of obtaining knowledge of the existence of these things; to know that they 
exist is to have confirmation of humanity’s supernatural origin and vocation.  
More generally, however, I shall say that to satisfy our spiritual needs would be to 
realize the ideals which we discover, in using our absolute freedom in the realm of 
ideas, at the behest of these needs. Evidently, ideals come in different forms, and the 
forms they come in determine the conditions under which we can say that they have 
been realized; the ideal of knowing the existence of God is one example. We can also 
think of other examples: the chivalry of Don Quixote or the romanticism of the Un-
derground Man. These too are ideals, or bundles of ideals, which are discovered 
through the exercise of mental freedom in abstraction from merely “animal” concerns, 
in cognizance of the sublimity of the human spirit. To be a chivalrous knight or a 
romantic hero is to pursue the realization of ideals, such as noble self-sacrifice or Pro-
methean defiance of injustice, that could not occur to a person who had not, in Schil-
ler’s terms, begun to leave animality behind, “leave the physical altogether, and as-
cend out of limited reality into the realm of ideas.” 71  These ideals, unlike the 
knowledge of Kant’s Ideas of reason, involve activities other than simply knowing 
the existence of something or other; they involve real physical actions and events. To 
realize them is therefore to actually do something in the world—to challenge Zverkov 
to a duel, for example. But they serve the same fundamental need as Kant’s need to 
know the existence of God, or Schiller’s need to know the Absolute. In general, to 
satisfy one’s spiritual needs is to realize the ideals discovered through sublime ab-
straction from nature and thereby to find the longed-for confirmation of human dig-
nity. 
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5. Nihilism in the Enlightenment 
The eighteenth century had a complicated relationship with human dignity. Consid-
ered as a deliberate project, the Enlightenment is typically associated with French phi-
losophes like Diderot, Voltaire and d’Alambert, and their Encyclopédie (1751-1772), 
which was envisioned as a compendium of all useful information for the progress of 
science and morals.72 In general the philosophes used satire and philosophical criticism 
to attack traditional cultural forms that they considered irrational and outdated, and 
appealed to science as a source of new, more rational kinds of society, politics, religion 
and economics. In both of these negative and positive aspects of their project, the phi-
losophers of the Enlightenment can be regarded as antagonistic to the traditional no-
tion of human dignity as sublimity; an old-school idealist like Götz could approve 
neither their rejection of traditional values, nor their attempts to create new rationally 
sanctioned values. In this section I shall outline this dimension of Enlightenment phi-
losophy in order to clarify what exactly the Stürmer und Dränger were reacting against, 
and why.  
Sweeping rational criticism had been associated with philosophy since Descartes, 
who famously subjected himself to a method of doubt designed to ensure that he did 
not have any unreasonable beliefs.73 During the Enlightenment, this kind of critique 
was directed against all aspects of human life, often in opposition to church and state, 
in a manner foreign to Descartes—who merely wanted to ensure that his existing re-
ligious and metaphysical beliefs had a secure rational foundation. Thus, according to 
Diderot, the project of the Encyclopaedia requires a strident intellectual courage; 
nothing is to be exempt from rational criticism, no matter how venerable or well-
loved; tradition has no scientific value and can thus be disregarded. “Now,” he says, 
“in our own age, we must trample mercilessly upon all these ancient puerilities, 
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overturn the barriers that reason never erected, give back to the arts and sciences the 
liberty that is so precious to them.”74 
The philosophers of the Enlightenment tended to assume, almost on faith, that reason 
was an unalloyed good that could not possibly bring anything other than benefit to 
humanity.75 D’Holbach makes several statements to this effect: “The wicked are never 
more than men who are either drunk or mad”76—“The source of man’s unhappiness 
is his ignorance of nature”77—“Truth is invariable—it is requisite to man—it can never 
harm him.”78 Knowledge is virtually equated with both happiness and virtue; it not 
only liberates us from the injustice of traditional authorities, it supplies a new, just 
authority to take their place. This is also evident in a pithy and highly characteristic 
remark from d’Alambert’s Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopaedia: “liberty requires 
only enlightenment to preserve itself from excess.”79  
That this view survived the Reign of Terror, which was partly inspired by and popu-
larly conceived as a direct result of the philosophes’ ideas, testifies to its central im-
portance in the project of Enlightenment and progress. Condorcet would echo it in 
his 1795 Esquisse—“the most influential and arguably the most powerful formulation 
of the idea of progress”80—despite the fact that this was written in hiding from the 
revolutionary authorities. Science always makes us happier and better, he asserts; if 
the progress of civilization has not always improved us, he adds almost parentheti-
cally, this is not because of the progress of knowledge itself but because of the “prej-
udice and error” that has polluted it.81 What is called for, then, is not restraint or cau-
tion but merely a more ruthlessly scientific kind of progress. Enlightenment philoso-
phy has already had an impact on the masses and made the judgements of reason 
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into public property: each individual now feels it is his right to “submit all opinions 
to his own reason”; this liberation is a precious achievement.82 Indeed, he thinks, the 
most important benefit of all science is not its immediate technical usefulness, but 
rather its influence on culture at large: “All errors in politics and morals are based on 
philosophical errors and these in turn are connected with scientific errors. There is 
not a religious system nor a supernatural extravagance that is not founded on igno-
rance of the laws of nature.”83 Scientific progress was thus the key to human happi-
ness; and if the optimism of the philosophes had blinded them to the possibility of a 
bloody revolution inspired by their ideas, this was not the fault of the philosophes or 
their ideas but of the half-hearted and inconsistent attempt of society at large to as-
similate them.  
This confidence in the power and beneficence of reason exacerbated an existing prob-
lem in European intellectual culture, namely, the problem of making sense of human-
ity’s place in the universe, or, as I have called it, the problem of human dignity. In this 
connection, the Enlightenment’s rationalism played two contradictory roles. On the 
one hand, reason allows humanity to understand nature scientifically, including hu-
man nature and its relationships with other aspects of the physical universe. It allows 
us to see from the naturalist’s perspective that we are merely a species of animals, 
more intelligent than most, but physically weaker to compensate. On the other hand, 
and precisely because reason allows us to understand the natural world in this way, 
it sets us apart from—and above—the other animals, who are merely passive compo-
nents of the physical world, and cannot master it, as we can, through intellect and 
imagination.84 As Pascal wrote: “Through space the universe grasps and engulfs me 
like a pinpoint; through thought I can grasp it.”85 
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This double nature of human beings—“an odd mixture of sublime talents and shame-
ful weakness”86—had always been a concern for philosophers, but it acquired a new 
and more urgent fascination after the Renaissance, and especially during the Enlight-
enment, when rapid progress in natural science exposed the duality of reason and 
nature ever more starkly. Manfred Kuehn appropriately ends his biography of Kant 
with a quote from the Essay on Man of Alexander Pope—Kant’s “favourite author”—
which famously sums up this predicament: 
In doubt to deem himself a god, or beast;  
In doubt his mind or body to prefer;  
Born but to die, and reas’ning but to err;  
Alike in ignorance, his reason such,  
Whether he thinks too little, or too much:  
Chaos of thought and passion, all confus’d;  
Still by himself abus’d, or disabus’d;  
Created half to rise, and half to fall;  
Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;  
Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurl’d:  
The glory, jest, and riddle of the world!87 
Such sentiments were prevalent during the eighteenth century because, through sci-
ence, it became increasingly apparent just how similar humans are to the other ani-
mals, in every aspect except their rationality; and, by the same token, philosophers 
discovered just how far their rationality elevates them above the animals—above 
their own animality—precisely because it became so scientifically powerful. This 
prompted the “doubt to deem himself a god, or beast” from which the question of 
human dignity becomes a serious problem. And it is from this that the spiritual needs, 
which demand transcendence over nature, acquire their special urgency. If we are the 
“jest” of the world—featherless bipeds with delusions of grandeur—how can we be 
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its “glory”? The answer to this question was complicated by scepticism about tradi-
tional metaphysics. 
There had always been more-or-less overt sceptical tendencies in Enlightenment phi-
losophy, simply because in general it viewed reason as the final arbiter of belief, and 
because many Enlightenment philosophers took natural science as the paradigm of 
rational justification. Because metaphysical beliefs—including many religious be-
liefs—are difficult or impossible to justify in the same way as scientific beliefs, the 
elevation of reason to this position of epistemic authority immediately raised the 
problem of scepticism about religious and other super-natural notions traditionally 
accounted valuable. This was extremely troubling for many philosophers. One of the 
most famous statements of the anxiety and depression provoked by such scepticism 
was published by the most important sceptical philosopher of the Enlightenment, Da-
vid Hume, in his Treatise on Human Nature (1738-1740):  
[T]hat reflections very refin’d and metaphysical have little or no influ-
ence upon us? This opinion I can scarce forbear retracting, and con-
demning from my present feeling and experience. The intense view of 
these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has 
so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all 
belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more prob-
able or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From what causes do 
I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose fa-
vour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings sur-
round me? and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influ-
ence on me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to 
fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d 
with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use of every 
member and faculty.88 
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Hume found that “nature herself” inevitably rescued him from episodes of this ma-
laise, and that, once distracted by some business or amusement, he was content to 
allow these problems to remain unsolved.89 Other philosophers were not so willing 
to acquiesce in ignorance, or to defer the resolution of their metaphysical questions 
indefinitely.90 Hume’s sceptical philosophy thus gave new prominence to the old di-
lemma: “either a rational skepticism or an irrational leap of faith.”91 The notion of 
reality which stems from choosing reason over faith, and embracing this kind of scep-
ticism, can be called reductive naturalism or nihilism, meaning the belief in nothing 
beyond what is amenable to scientific investigation.  
Some Enlightenment philosophers actively supported this kind of nihilism. Perhaps 
the most deliberately nihilistic philosopher of the French Enlightenment was the 
Baron d’Holbach. In his System of Nature (1770), d’Holbach explicitly denies the exist-
ence of free will and rails against attempts to set human beings apart from the rest of 
the universe; such pretensions were, to his mind, dangerous diversions from the true 
path to happiness.92 This, he councils, involves a reconciliation with nature and the 
teachings of natural science which, though they may seem harsh to the unenlightened, 
promise to realign humanity with the grand scheme of life on earth. Thus d’Holbach 
openly rejects the traditional notion of human dignity qua sublimity—for him, there 
is nothing about humans that is different in kind, rather than degree, from any other 
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physical object. What’s more, he denies that human dignity in this sense should be 
regarded as important in the first place. It is worth quoting d’Holbach at length, since 
in the following statement he fully encapsulates the nihilistic strain of Enlightenment 
thought: 
Let it not then be said, that it is degrading man to reduce his functions 
to a pure mechanism; that it is shamefully to undervalue him, to com-
pare him to a tree—to an abject vegetation. The philosopher devoid of 
prejudice, does not understand this language invented by those who 
are ignorant of what constitutes the true dignity of man. A tree is an 
object which, in its station, joins the useful with the agreeable; it merits 
our approbation when it produces sweet and pleasant fruit, and when 
it affords a favourable shade. All machines are precious, whenever they 
are truly useful, and when they faithfully perform the functions for 
which they are designed. Yes, I speak it with courage, the honest man, 
when he has talents and possesses virtue, is, for the beings of his species, 
a tree that furnishes them with delicious fruit, and affords them refresh-
ing shelter: the honest man is a machine, of which the springs are 
adapted to fulfil its functions in a manner that must gratify the expec-
tation of all his fellows. No, I should not blush to be a machine of this 
sort; and my heart would leap with joy if I could foresee that the fruit 
of my reflections would one day be useful and consoling to my fellow 
man.93 
The enormous significance of d’Holbach’s position emerges when we consider that it 
is the complete denial of sublimity, and thus, as he recognizes quite explicitly, of hu-
man dignity traditionally conceived; he rejects the value of spiritual transcendence as 
well as its reality, rejects the “spiritual needs” of humanity as a contrivance, and 
would regard Schiller’s Kantian theory of the sublime as a useless fantasy. “Man is 
the work of Nature: he exists in Nature: he is submitted to her laws: he cannot deliver 
himself from them; nor can he step beyond them even in thought. In vain his mind 
would spring forward beyond the visible world, an imperious necessity always com-
pels his return.”94  D’Holbach’s position is, as such, complete nihilism. In this he 
 
93 D’Holbach, 1999: 172. 




follows the even more notorious Julien de La Mettrie, whose witty and scientifically 
informed comparisons between humans, machines, animals and plants were directed 
squarely against the idea of human dignity: “there is no animal so paltry and vile,“ he 
says in L’Homme plante (1748), ”whose examination does not diminish the philoso-
pher’s pride in himself.”95  
Nihilism of this kind was perceived by many to be an imminent danger throughout 
and after the Enlightenment, but especially towards the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury.96 The risk it posed can be understood, in light of what was said above, as a prob-
lem of human dignity, that is, of what makes human beings special in comparison to 
animals and the rest of nature. Traditionally, religion had served to guarantee this 
special status. And even as religion lost credence among many progressive intellec-
tuals, essentially religious notions—such as immortality and the idea of an omnipo-
tent dispenser of justice—were retained to fulfil this indispensable function. As Karl 
Ameriks writes,  
Enlightenment philosophers tended no longer to see any need to insist 
on the miraculous doctrines of Christian ‘‘special revelation,’’ but for a 
long time they continued to assert that rational philosophy and ‘‘natu-
ral teleology’’ point toward at least the likelihood of a God who pro-
vides a meaningful existence and final end for human individuals.97  
As the Enlightenment progressed, however, the philosophical credentials of these 
substitutes for revelation were more often called into question as well.98 D’Holbach, 
as we have seen, explicitly rejected God and religion. So, although the Enlightenment 
elevated the place of humans within the natural world through the prospect of a sci-
entific conquest of nature and a rational reordering of human affairs, it also, and by 
the same token, undermined the traditional sources of human dignity and superiority 
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over this world, namely, Platonic and Christian metaphysics and religion, through 
subjecting them to the same standards of rational inquiry as natural science. Again, 
the situation can be illustrated by means of Plato’s analogy of the cave: science prom-
ised to equip the cave with every imaginable comfort and convenience, but at the cost 
of sealing the entrance forever. Not only the defenders of religious orthodoxy, but 
also many who embraced the Enlightenment ideal of progress away from orthodoxy, 
were unhappy with this situation; both were heavily invested in the Christian-Pla-
tonic conception of human dignity as sublime transcendence over nature, and were 
far less willing than d’Holbach to embrace the alternative ideal of the tree, the “object 
which, in its station, joins the useful with the agreeable.” Thus “while most writers 
knew that orthodox religion was intellectually bankrupt, its emotional hold was not 
so easily shaken off.”99 This led to the condemnation of traditional philosophy and 
science by the philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, who was responsible for popu-
larizing the word “nihilism” as a label for the sceptical consequences of Enlighten-
ment philosophy. Jacobi’s challenge to the Enlightenment set the tone of German phi-
losophy at the end of the eighteenth century.100 If the development of rational philos-
ophy led inevitably to nihilism, Jacobi wrote, 
reason would be an asset to man only to the extent that it remains in its 
childhood, and gets along with delusion and deception. As it grows up and 
makes progress towards perfection, death simple and pure develops 
from it. This death is called science and truth, and these mean victory 
over everything that uplifts man’s heart and gives bliss to it; what trans-
figures his countenance, directs his eye upwards—the victory over eve-
rything great, sublime, and beautiful.101 
The Underground Man’s romantic distaste for rationalism here finds its precedent. 
And yet, in spite of the cost to human dignity, it seemed to many that nothing could 
or even should be done to halt the advance of rational science and philosophy; after 
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all, reason is reason and the truth is the truth. The pronouncements of reason must be 
heeded even if they contradict “everything that uplifts man’s heart and gives bliss to 
it.” As Thomas Carlyle later saw it, many people could continue to flourish by re-
stricting themselves to practical matters, but those afflicted with the “malady of 
Thought” could not102—like the “hyperconscious” Underground Man, who deni-
grates the “men of action” too limited or too dishonest to face the unavoidable impli-
cations of rational thought, they can countenance neither a self-imposed ignorance 
nor the cultural vacuum that rational enlightenment entails. To quote the close of La 
Mettrie’s L’Homme machine (1747): “So there is my system, or rather the truth, short 
and simple, if I am not very much deceived. Deny it if you can!”103 As the Under-
ground Man himself would later put it, “it’s impossible to protest! It’s two times two 
makes four!”104 
Those who did wish to protest, it seemed to many philosophers, would be forced to 
abandon reason altogether and return, cap in hand, to the old sources of spiritual 
authority. Of course, this was no problem for the religious old-guard, who had been 
expecting it from the beginning;105 but for those who had entered into the spirit of 
Enlightenment and progress, it would mean a victory for conservatism and, ironically, 
yet another blow to human dignity: it would mean that humans are not even capable 
of protecting their own spiritual needs without subjecting themselves to religious au-
thorities or giving in to romantic “enthusiasm” or “fanaticism” (in German, Schwär-
merei) and rejecting the most insistent conclusions of the one thing which, to them, 
raised them above the animals in the first place—their rationality and the culture and 
civilization which came with it. The problem was a metaphilosophical one: must the 
unfettered use of reason and imagination—the absolute freedom granted by human 
sublimity—necessarily lead, as Jacobi argued, to the destruction of all values which 
give human existence its special dignity?  
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* * * 
It is in this context that the Sturm und Drang movement emerged. It can be understood, 
at least in the paradigmatic cases considered here, as a direct response to the threat 
posed to human dignity by the nihilism of the Enlightenment.  Of course, it is not 
always seen in this way—I noted above that it is perhaps most often seen as politi-
cal—but the more abstract philosophical dimension is also generally recognized. Da-
vid Hill, for example, reads Schiller’s Robbers in basically political terms, as a critique 
of feudal despotism, but also states that “Karl [in The Robbers] is motivated by despair, 
that is to say, the disappointment of his belief in a moral universe.”106 It is solely in 
this way that I propose to view these texts here. The blind striving of the hero is the 
desperate final gesture of beleaguered idealism, struggling to maintain a sense of sub-
lime transcendence in the face of Enlightenment sceptical rationalism. As we shall see, 
one can find abundant evidence for this in both The Robbers and Faust. As Carlyle puts 
it, in his commentary on the latter: 
The day of Magic is gone by; Witchcraft has been put a stop to by Act 
of Parliament. But the mysterious relations which it emblemed still con-
tinue; the Soul of Man still fights with the dark influences of Ignorance, 
Misery and Sin; still lacerates itself, like a captive bird, against the iron 
limits which Necessity has drawn around it; still follows False Shows, 
seeking peace and good on paths where no peace or good is to be 
found.107 
The individual still feels the pull of the romantic, the supernatural, the ideal, and 
struggles to come to terms with this aspect of human existence even in the wake of 
widespread secularization and the demystification of nature, and it is precisely 
against this demystification that “the Soul of Man” struggles “like a captive bird” and 
craves freedom from reality itself. Just like the Underground Man, the characters of 
Schiller’s and Goethe’s plays illustrate the consequences of simultaneous 
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commitments to both idealism and nihilism. It is through these characters that I hope 
to illuminate Dostoevsky’s intentions in Notes from Underground.  
6. The Robbers 
This play, published in 1781, centres on two brothers, Franz and Karl Moor. Franz 
embodies the Enlightenment spectre of sceptical nihilism: he uses reason to method-
ically demolish ideas of morality, virtue and religion.108 He sees such things as means 
of maintaining the dominion of traditional authorities, and of preventing great people 
from realizing their full potential: he calls it “the witchcraft that they veil in clouds of 
holy incense to abuse our fearful nature.”109 Of course, on the basis of such concep-
tions he resolves to pay no attention to moral scruples, and to circumvent the prompt-
ings of his conscience: 
Fear nothing, and you are as powerful as if all fear you. It is the fashion 
nowadays to lace one’s breeches so that one can wear them tight or 
loose as one pleases. We will have ourselves a conscience made in the 
latest style, so that we can let it out nicely as we grow.110 
He is particularly anxious to do so, because he is by no means content to accept the 
humble position nature has allotted him—he claims he has “every right to be resent-
ful of nature”111—and must resort to devious means of compensating for his natural 
inadequacies. Karl is the first-born and favoured son, and stands to inherit their fa-
ther’s estate; what’s more, he is good-looking and charismatic, and has won the love 
of their father’s ward Amalia. Franz envies him on both counts, and intends to cheat 
in order to put right the wrongs which misfortune has heaped upon him. To be a great 
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hero is to be “master” over others and over one’s weaknesses: “Am I, too, to let myself 
be led along by it, like a little boy? Very well, then! courage, and to work! I will crush 
everything that stands in the way of my becoming master. And master I must be, to 
force my way to goals that I shall never gain by kindness.”112 
Karl is no less intent on great deeds and heroism, but his conception of greatness is 
quite different. He reads of heroes in the Lives of Plutarch, and admires chivalry and 
traditional virtues, whereas the rationalist Franz regards all virtues as spurious and 
fictitious.113 In spite of his much more romantic tastes and morals, Karl shares his 
brother’s nihilism—even though he loves virtue and heroism, he finds himself unable 
to avoid the consequences of the sceptical reasoning that Franz embraces more will-
ingly. According to Kevin Hilliard, though Karl shares Franz’s positive attitude to-
wards evil, he lacks the “doctrinal underpinning in materialism and atheism”—he re-
pudiates the modern “scribbling” writers who propound such doctrines.114 He thus 
implies that Karl’s evil, unlike Franz’s, is unrelated to nihilism. That Karl refers to 
nihilistic philosophers and explicitly rejects them, however, goes to show that he 
knows what they stand for, and deliberately opposes it. His attitude towards life is 
thus a deliberate stand against materialism, since he perceives it as a threat to the 
human dignity exemplified by Plutarch’s ancient heroes.  
He too views the world in reductive materialistic terms, as dominated by the inhu-
man, destructive forces of nature; and he feels compelled to view human life in tragic 
terms. In a line which encapsulates the central theme of the Underground Man’s com-
plaints against utopian socialism, Karl laments: “Why should a human being succeed 
where he imitates the ant and be thwarted when he’s like the gods? Or is this the limit 
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destined for his endeavour?”115 He is in much the same position as the Underground 
Man. The latter’s “heightened consciousness of the sublime and beautiful” is evidence 
of his respect for the romantic ideals of honour and justice that motivate Karl; and, 
like Karl, he is unable to overlook the extent to which the world described by modern 
science falls short of these ideals. It is noteworthy that Karl uses the same analogy as 
the Underground Man: human society can prosper only when it becomes antlike, and 
devotes itself to a mindless industry that respects none of the higher values prized by 
human beings. That both men cling to their ideals in spite of this scientific disillusion-
ment merely intensifies their despair. Thus, in spite of the advantages he has over 
Franz, Karl shares his brother’s sense of chronic disappointment. He recognizes in 
himself an idealistic yearning that can never be satisfied, no matter what he may do, 
because of the inherent inhospitability of the real world: “why this burning hunger 
for happiness? Why this ideal of unattained perfection? This looking to another world 
for what we have failed to achieve in this [ … ]?”116 
In general, Karl, Franz and the Underground Man all have the same attitudes towards 
nihilism and their respective idealisms. All three of them are heavily invested in quite 
similar romantic ideals of human dignity, greatness and heroism. We can think of this 
in terms of the “spiritual needs” discussed above; each of these characters has in-
vested his self-esteem and dignity in the sublime “loftiness” honoured by Coleridge 
in his “Sonnet to the Author of the ‘Robbers.’”117 They need to know that they are 
greater than the world around them, are not limited by the same conventions and 
laws, not bound by contingent circumstances, and can expect their ideals to triumph 
over reality. Although Franz tends to emphasize the usefulness of nihilism—it pro-
vides him, he thinks, with the strength to ignore morality—he nevertheless recoils 
from its dehumanizing implications, complaining that his “high-flying spirit” is 
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“shackled” by the natural world materialistically understood.118 Karl has the opposite 
problem, and though he denounces nihilist philosophers as “scribblers,” he is never-
theless a man of “consciousness” (as the Underground Man would say) and so cannot 
simply dismiss the truths of rational science and philosophy, even though they un-
dermine his ideals. The Underground Man sometimes seems to align himself with 
Franz’s pragmatic attitude to morality, but is generally more akin to Karl.  
What is of most interest here is that in response to their disillusionment with reality, 
both Karl and Franz feel the craving for unlimited freedom which characterizes the 
Underground Man. Franz is prepared to accept the dehumanizing consequences of 
science and scepticism, since they allow him to overstep the limits of traditional mo-
rality; but (as suggested above) he is left with a gnawing sense of contempt for the 
world, which he now views in such an unflattering light, and a mad desire to trans-
cend its limitations: “must my plans submit to the iron yoke of mechanical laws? Is 
my high flying spirit to be bound to the snail’s pace of material necessity?”119 This 
feeling of constraint is evidence in Franz of a residual unwillingness to relinquish the 
sublimity of his “high flying spirit” and to capitulate entirely to mundane reality. It 
is in Karl, however, that the feeling of constraint is strongest, and it is through his 
character that The Robbers also illustrates the destructive potential of pure caprice. 
Whereas Franz uses his nihilism as an excuse to satisfy his desires immorally, Karl 
sometimes takes the transgression of limits for an end in itself, and appears at times 
to be motivated by no thought other than the unfettered exercise of his own power. 
“I am supposed to lace my body in a corset,” he says, “and straitjacket my will with 
laws. The law has cramped the flight of eagles to a snail’s pace. The law never yet 
made a great man, but freedom will breed a giant, a colossus.”120 I shall explore the 
theme of Karl’s caprice in the remainder of this chapter. 
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* * * 
In Chapter 5, I argued that the Underground Man remains an idealist in spite of his 
disillusionment, and that his argument against utopian socialism, which extols the 
value of caprice as “the most advantageous advantage,” must be understood in the 
context of this idealism. Were it not for the persistence of his idealism, he would not 
be unwilling to capitulate to the designs of the utopian socialists. In the first place, he 
rejects these designs because they are insulting to his far loftier conception of utopia; 
in the second place, and more importantly, he rejects them because their nihilist foun-
dations provoke in him a capricious reaction. The Underground Man becomes capricious 
when his idealism is confounded by the nihilism of his utopian socialist opponents. 
It is precisely the same with Karl Moor: he becomes capricious when his nihilism and 
his idealism come into conflict. His capricious reaction to the impossibility of his ideal 
must thus be understood as a product of his continued, albeit disillusioned, devotion 
to that ideal. 
Karl is disillusioned in three main stages. Firstly, when he is led to believe that his 
father has disowned him; this leads him to lose faith in the justice of God’s creation. 
Secondly, when he finds that his robber band has been murdering women and chil-
dren for no good reason; this leads him to lose faith in his own ability to correct the 
injustice of God’s creation. Thirdly, when he is reconciled with his father and lover 
but cannot, having vowed allegiance to the robbers, honourably renounce his crimi-
nal lifestyle. In all three cases, Karl’s ideal of justice is insulted. In all cases, further-
more, his nihilism lies at the basis of his disillusionment; and in all cases his disillu-
sionment leads to a capricious reaction, as we shall see below.  
6.1. Karl’s First Disillusionment 
Despite his rebelliousness, it is clear early in the play that Karl has always intended 
to return to his ancestral seat, be reconciled with his father and marry Amalia. This 




father into thinking that Karl is beyond redemption and should be disowned; he 
sends Karl a letter to this effect. Franz’s plan is successful beyond expectation, and 
Karl explodes when he reads the letter which, he thinks, strips him of family ties and 
robs him of his beloved father’s love. He immediately drops his plans of returning 
home, and throws himself with redoubled effort into villainy.121  
Although Karl’s rebellion is triggered initially by the (supposed) fact that his father 
has disowned him, it is clear that this event is merely a catalyst or an excuse, rather 
than his main rationale. Karl sees this letter as a manifestation of more pervasive forces 
of injustice: he takes it as evidence of the fact that there are no laws of morality bind-
ing father and son, and by extension that there is no morality at all, and from this 
deduces the vacuity of his own most cherished notions. (It is noteworthy that Karl 
consistently relates his own personal disappointments to broader philosophical and 
theological themes: the problem of evil, theodicy, justice and morality.122) It is evidence 
of the truth of nihilism, the defeat of Plutarch at the hands of the modern “scribbling” 
philosophers, and thus the frustration of his spiritual needs and sense of human dig-
nity.  
Indeed, Karl had only just been “deep in a book,” his Plutarch, reading of “great men,” 
when he received Franz’s letter. When he reads the letter he feels not only that his 
dream of happiness has been denied, but that his lofty ideals of justice, honour and 
bonds of blood have also been undermined; he has become a disillusioned idealist. It 
is at precisely this point, significantly, that he begins to desire freedom at all costs:  
See, the scales have fallen from my eyes! What a fool I was, to seek to 
return to the cage! My spirit thirsts for deeds, my lungs for freedom—
murderers, robbers! at that word I trampled the law beneath my feet—
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122 When Karl discovers that Franz has imprisoned their father in a dungeon, for example, he 
articulates his outrage in extremely high-flown language: “Look, look! the laws of creation are 
made a game of dice, the bonds of nature are rent asunder, the ancient strife is let loose, the 




men showed me no humanity, when to humanity I appealed; so let me 
forget sympathy and human feeling!123 
This is the first point at which Karl seems genuinely capricious, in the sense of the 
Underground Man, and to crave absolute freedom from all limitations on his wilful-
ness.124 In defence of his “freedom,” Karl goes on to fight with all his might against 
every constraint he encounters: not only the law, but also economic inequality (as a 
kind of Robin Hood figure), the militia, the church, family ties. This is no doubt part 
of what has led critics to view the work in political terms; he is seen to be oppressed 
by the constraints imposed upon him by rigid social hierarchies and unjust laws. Ev-
idently, though, Karl is not really oppressed by constraints beyond the normal limi-
tations of human corporeal existence (he is of course wanted for his crimes, and thus 
oppressed by the militia, but this is a purely accidental constraint that he brought 
upon himself after becoming rebellious). His problem is that the more he feels his ide-
als—in this case, virtue, justice, mercy, etc.—to be incapable of realization, the more 
he feels shackled by reality at large, and the more he struggles to free himself from 
every constraint on his power; his destructive craving for freedom is thus a patholog-
ical consequence of his disillusionment. As stated, there are two similar outbursts 
later in the play, both of which follow the same pattern: idealism comes into conflict 
with nihilism, producing disillusionment and then caprice. 
Even after this abrupt abandonment of his former hopes, and this declaration of vil-
lainy, Karl does not lose sight of his ideal. It becomes apparent that although he has 
abandoned the idea that human relations are governed by enduring, God-given prin-
ciples of honour and justice (which pertain, most significantly for him, to the father-
son relationship125), he is nevertheless devoted to the idea that human beings can, 
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124 According to Waldeck, The Robbers thus illustrates the pitfalls of a “false idea” of freedom, 
conceived as lawlessness, which threatens to destroy the foundations of society. This seems 
correct as far as it goes, but Waldeck does not attempt to explore the psychological founda-
tions of Karl’s craving for this false freedom (Waldeck, 1986: 4-6).  




through force of will, forge such principles and implement them in spite of God’s fail-
ure to do so. He thus remains an idealist, although he has changed his mind about 
the conditions under which he can hope for his ideal of justice to be realized. Karl’s 
idealism manifests throughout the play in his unyielding hatred of injustice. In spite 
of his decision to “forget sympathy and human feeling,” as the leader of his “robbers” 
he is explicitly compared by one of his band to Robin Hood, suggesting that although 
his actions are technically illegal, they are nevertheless morally justified.126 It is clear 
that far from having rejected the ideal of justice, he sees himself as fighting for it. This 
is why he recoils from base or horrible crimes like petty thievery or the murder of 
innocents, that are selfish or benefit no one.127 He sees no justice in the natural order 
of God’s creation, so he takes the dispensation of justice upon himself. He even pre-
sents himself as a usurper of God’s role as judge: “I shall come amongst you,” he says, 
“and terrible shall be my judgment upon you.”128  
6.2. Karl’s Second Disillusionment 
The fact that he remains an idealist means that he is liable to be disillusioned again. 
Indeed, he finds to his shame that the roles of Robin Hood and divine judge were 
only ever a comforting illusion, and lead to crimes that he finds repulsive. This first 
becomes apparent when his band attacks a town to rescue a comrade, and one of his 
men murders a baby by throwing it into the flames of a burning infirmary. This act 
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127 “I am no thief,” he says, and prefers to think of himself as a heroic or titanic villain (Schiller, 
1992: 237). Similarly, when Franz attempts unsuccessfully to pray for his salvation, he is al-
most comically unable to admit that his grand criminal schemes are actually wrong: “Lord God, 
I have been no common murderer— Lord God, I have never stooped to trifles—” (Schiller, 
1992: 288). This is an important idea for Dostoevsky. In The Brothers Karamazov, the Schil-
leresque gallant Dmitry is also horrified by the idea that he might be considered capable of 
thievery (e.g. Dostoevsky, 2003(d): 159); in Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov is (unlike Franz) 
ostensibly tormented less by his conscience than he is disgusted by the aesthetic paucity of his 
crime (Dostoevsky, 2003(b)). I shall not attempt to investigate the full significance of this theme 
here. 




brings Karl to despair, for it shows that he is incapable of controlling the negative 
consequences of his supposedly good, or at least high-minded, intentions:  
Hear them not, avenger in heaven! How can I prevent it? How can you 
prevent it, when your pestilence, your famine, your floods devour the 
just man with the wicked? Who can command the flame, and bid it 
spare the hallowed crops when it shall destroy the hornets’ nest? Oh 
shame upon the murder of children! of women! of the sick! How this 
deed bows my head!129 
This mood of despair does not persist, however; far from relinquishing command of 
the robbers, Karl is spurred to greater feats of daring and rebellion. As a pretext for 
the exercise of this renewed combativeness, Schiller has the secret camp of the robbers 
be discovered by the militia. Though taken by surprise at the moment of his disillu-
sionment, Karl quickly regains his wits: he deliberately allows the militia to surround 
his camp, so that his men will be forced to fight “in desperation,” just as he himself 
would like to.130  
The camp is then visited by a priest, sent by the authorities to frighten Karl into sur-
rendering, but introduced by Schiller as a foil for Karl’s demonic abandonment of all 
moral and rational restraints. Shocked by Karl’s unrepentant and haughty mockery, 
the priest offers pardon to the robber band, if they will betray him and turn him in. 
To his astonishment, Karl joins him to insult the robbers, goad them on and explain 
in rational terms why they ought to take up the priest’s offer: “[justice] speaks to you 
with heaven’s voice of reconciliation, and you are in truth damned. There is not a hair 
upon your heads, not upon one of you, that is not destined for hell. Will you still 
consider? Are you still in doubt? Is it so hard to choose between heaven and hell?”131 
Such language, combined with the presence of the priest, whose offers Karl and his 
band reject, gives the scene a sense of religious rebellion and emphasizes the fact that 
Karl is rebelling not against any particular human institution, but against the deficient 
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moral order of the world itself. The robbers pledge themselves to Karl in spite of his 
insults and attempts to persuade them not to. His derisive tone then changes to one 
of exaltation: “(tearing himself free, joyfully) Now we are free.—Comrades! I feel an 
army in my fist—death or liberty!—at least they shall take none of us alive!” At this 
point, Karl has insured that they are indeed free of both rationality and morality—
they follow him in spite of his assurances that this is neither the sensible nor the right 
thing to do—they, like Karl, are now prepared to fight and die for no reason at all but 
sheer wilfulness and the will to exert themselves as powerfully as possible. 
6.3. Karl’s Third Disillusionment 
The cycle of idealism, disillusionment and caprice reaches a third and final climax 
only at the play’s tragic conclusion. Having escaped the authorities, taken revenge on 
Franz, been reunited with his father and Amalia, Karl is forced to confront the impli-
cations his actions. Upon discovering that his father still loves him, he realizes that he 
himself has made genuine reconciliation impossible. When Amalia then professes her 
love for him, Karl reacts with violence and a yearning for chaos and destruction. They 
remind him of his ideal, and remind him of its impossibility: he is now “Robber Moor” 
and cannot possibly return to a life of domestic happiness. He then cries out: “Tear 
her from my neck! Kill her! Kill him! me, yourselves! Everything! The whole world 
falls in ruins!”132 He goes into a frenzy, leashing out against his men and running into 
a tree.133 This is the final apotheosis of Karl’s caprice, brought about by the coinci-
dental meeting of his highest ideal—personified in Amalia—with the fact that this 
ideal is completely hopeless—the nadir of his own infamy and disgrace. When Ama-
lia persists in her love, despite Karl’s manic assurances that he is unworthy of it, he 
eventually relents and, for a brief moment, is prepared to believe that happiness is 
once again possible; his robbers, however, remind him of his oath of loyalty to them, 
and he is forced to reject Amalia. 
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Karl then kills Amalia at her own behest, and this is understandably the final blow to 
his aspirations. Not only has he failed to implement justice, he has had to conclude 
by murdering the object and symbol of his original idealism. This final consequence 
of his own demonic rebellion against God’s order teaches him that he must be humble 
and accept his own limitations:  
I took it upon myself, O Providence, to smooth the jagged edges of your 
sword and make good your partiality—but—oh, childish vanity—here 
I stand at the limit of a life of horror, and see now with weeping and 
gnashing of teeth, that two men such as I would destroy the whole moral 
order of creation. Mercy—mercy for the youth who sought to anticipate 
Thy judgment—Thine alone is a vengeance.134 
Here Karl seems to have realized that idealism must be replaced by faith: rather than 
demand that the world conform to his hopes and expectations, or the real conform to 
his ideal, he must acquiesce in the assurance that God will ensure that everything is 
for the best. Despite the protestations of his comrades, Karl then decides to surrender 
to the authorities and accept punishment for his crimes. Although he appears to have 
understood the importance of humility and faith, however, Karl’s final resolution still 
smacks of pride. Giving himself up is the only means of restoring his self-esteem: in 
his dejected state, fleeing the law would be cowardice, so he turns himself in as a 
means of proving his bravery. He also likes the idea of being admired for it.135 Schiller 
thus suggests that Karl is still motivated by his ideal of heroism, rather than the God-
fearing humility he has come to understand and to profess. Here, though, the play 
comes to an end. 
Karl’s belated acknowledgement of the “moral order of creation” is somewhat puz-
zling, but may be intended to suggest that the tragic sequence of events depicted in 
the play was not accidental, but the predictable consequence of the choices made by 
the characters, and Karl in particular. While Franz is the really evil brother, Karl 
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himself may be seen as the primary agent of his own downfall—even though Franz 
tricked him into devoting himself to villainy, it is clear that Karl is no less to blame 
for allowing himself to be tricked so easily. If Karl had not been so disposed—if he had 
been willing, instead of becoming the leader of the robbers, to simply return to his 
father’s estate in a spirit of reconciliation, or at least to ascertain the truth for himself—
he would have uncovered Franz’s plot and the tragic outcome of the play might well 
have been entirely averted. Indeed, as I have argued, Franz’s deception was merely a 
convenient pretext for Karl’s decision to extricate himself, through criminality and 
rebellion, from the strictures of normal existence. That he would at some point make 
this decision was the natural consequence of his impetuous dedication to romantic 
ideals of justice and Plutarchian heroism, impetuous in light of the fact that he knew 
such ideals to be old-fashioned and probably untenable—that is, the natural conse-
quence of his conflicting attitudes of idealism and nihilism.  
* * * 
It is important to note again that Karl remains an idealist even after being repeatedly 
disillusioned. His disillusionment is recognition of the impracticality or impossibility 
of his ideal; it does not mean that he has relinquished this ideal, but only that he has 
come to see his devotion to it as futile, that his idealism is frustrated. Alan Leidner 
remarks that the play could not have been so successful if there was any doubt about 
whether Karl’s idealism was genuine: frustrated idealism belonged to the spirit of the 
age.136 As I have argued, it is precisely the frustration of Karl’s idealism by nihilism 
that is responsible for his rebelliousness in general, and his various capricious out-
bursts—in which he curses everything and craves absolute freedom—in particular. 
According to Ilse Graham:  
Karl’s higher promptings, his fidelity and his rectitude, have indeed 
been displaced by the upsurge of excessive instinctual drives. But so far 
from ceasing to function without a proper domain of their own, these 
 




moral impulses attach themselves to his anarchic instincts, surrepti-
tiously reinforcing them until their tyranny becomes absolute and un-
tenable and the whole diseased system breaks down.137  
It is not “instinctual drives” that co-opt the force of Karl’s idealism, his “higher 
promptings,” as if he was merely unable to control his evil inclinations; rather it is 
despair of being able to fulfil his ideals. This despair is caused ultimately by his nihil-
ism, his disbelief in higher principles, which is in turn the consequence both of his 
exposure to the hated modern “scribbling” philosophers and his own experiences of 
injustice. I nevertheless endorse Graham’s general suggestion that Karl’s idealism, far 
from being destroyed by it, actually causes and fuels his capricious abandonment. It 
is the same with the Underground Man.138   
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have established that there are significant parallels between the 
Sturm und Drang and Notes from Underground. Both present idealistic characters react-
ing against nihilism, and reacting capriciously against everything. We have seen that 
nihilism was prevalent during the Enlightenment, and perceived by many as a seri-
ous threat to human dignity; and we know it enjoyed a resurgence in Russia in the 
nineteenth century. I have seen in this phenomenon, and the disillusionment it entails, 
the cause of the capriciousness present both in the heroes of the Sturm und Drang and 
the Underground Man; this was illustrated with reference to Schiller’s Robbers in par-
ticular.  
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not so much been destroyed as suppressed, and from their refuge in the unconscious they 
exercise a baleful influence on the conscious life of the individual as rival second ideas, to 





In laying some theoretical foundations for understanding Sturm und Drang heroism, 
I introduced concepts derived from or pertaining to Schiller’s theoretical writings: the 
sublime, the Kantian “needs of reason,” human dignity, nihilism. Having exercised 
these concepts in reading Schiller’s Robbers, and in comparing the Underground Man 
to its hero Karl Moor, I shall elaborate on them further in the next chapter with a view 
to attaining a full explanation of the capriciousness of these characters. My main in-
tention in this chapter has been to begin to place Dostoevsky’s novel into a context 
that allows us to make sense of it, and in particular, at first, to disentangle the psy-
chological peculiarities of its narrator. The connection between idealism, disillusion-
ment and caprice has been identified as a central preoccupation of Schiller and other 
Sturm und Drang writers. In the next chapter, I shall begin by focusing on Schiller’s 
essays, which complement works such as The Robbers in that they investigate similar 
phenomena from a theoretical rather than an artistic perspective. Indeed, Schiller ex-
plicitly refers to Goethe’s heroes, and implicitly to his own, in ways that are highly 
illuminating to the present investigation. I shall argue that Schiller provides an expla-
nation for the phenomenon of caprice that coheres perfectly with his characterization 
of Karl Moor and—as we shall see—Goethe’s characterization of Faust. Through 
showing how this explanation illuminates such characters as Moor and Faust, and 
having linked them by way of comparison to the Underground Man, I arrive at an 
explanation for the Underground Man’s caprice that allows us, finally, to make sense 
of the psychological underpinnings of Dostoevsky’s social-philosophical polemic in 





Chapter 7:  The Savage and the False Idealist 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, I outlined Schiller’s theory of the sublime, and his psychological 
theory of the way in which appreciation of the sublime is connected to the arousal of 
“spiritual needs,” which pertain to the need of a human being to feel that he or she is 
not merely an animal, but has a special “human dignity” that distinguishes him or 
her from the rest of the natural world. These spiritual needs concern ideals—such as 
the Underground Man’s or Karl Moor’s romantic ideals of heroism, love, and hon-
our—which the individual needs to realize in order to find confirmation of his or her 
human dignity. In this chapter, I find that Schiller’s theory of spiritual needs can be 
used as an explanation for the psychology of caprice discussed and illustrated above. 
The explanation is based on Schiller’s description of what happens to people whose 
spiritual needs are persistently frustrated and left unfulfilled: such people, he thinks, 
become capricious in a way that should be recognizable to readers of both The Robbers 
and Notes from Underground.  
In the following, I examine some passages from Schiller’s theoretical works, including 
his major essays On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1794) and On Naive and Sentimental 
Poetry (1795-1796). While examining Schiller’s essays, I shall note some points of rel-
evance to The Robbers and Notes from Underground, where Schiller describes psycho-
logical phenomena similar to those embodied by Dostoevsky in the Underground 
Man. In particular, I argue that Schiller’s descriptions of “savages” in transition to 
civilization, and of idealism—especially what he calls “false idealism”—suggest a 
theoretical framework for making sense of the Underground Man’s “Schillerism” and 
its relation to his capriciousness. I illustrate these observations with reference to Goe-




from Underground. Having examined Schiller’s essays, we will be in a much better 
position to understand the ideas embodied in these works, and the way in which 
Dostoevsky adopted and adapted them for use in Notes from Underground, because 
we will be in possession of psychological notions fit to make sense of their characters’ 
thoughts and actions. 
As we have seen, the aesthetics of sublimity and the “needs of reason” or spiritual 
needs both pertain to the problem of human dignity: both give us a sense that we 
ought to have a kind of spiritual ascendancy over nature, and challenge us to establish 
the certainty of this ascendency as a matter of utmost importance. During the Enlight-
enment, as we have also seen, scepticism threatened to lead to a nihilism that denied 
the validity of spiritual needs in general. Because they pertain to the dignity and 
worth of human existence itself, however, the spiritual needs are extremely pressing 
and cannot easily be dismissed. In this context, it is especially interesting to note what 
Schiller thinks will happen if our spiritual needs are frustrated and not satisfied, since 
this reveals the extent to which he regards their satisfaction as fundamental to the 
healthy development of human character and morals. It also reveals the psychological 
and moral risks associated with investing one’s sense of dignity and self-esteem, ide-
alistically, in sublime transcendence over the natural world—that is, in the satisfac-
tion of one’s spiritual needs—especially in the context of nihilism’s rejection of this 
whole project. These risks prove to be highly suggestive as descriptions of the psy-
chology of caprice, and may explain why, for instance, Schiller characterized Karl 
Moor in the way that he did. By extension, they are highly suggestive as guides to 
Dostoevsky’s characterization of the Underground Man. 
2. Spiritual Frustration and Caprice 
In his essays, Schiller optimistically assumes that all cultured people are capable of 




the cultural development of humanity, he does consider the limitations of those in a 
transitional stage between “savagery” and civilization, and the implications of these 
limitations. Schiller states that “savages” who are unaccustomed to the use of pure 
reason will, when they first begin to think abstractly about things they cannot per-
ceive with their five senses, also begin to feel the urgency of the needs of reason, but 
will lack the intellectual proficiency required to satisfy them. For Schiller, since spir-
itual needs can only be properly articulated in the infinite “realm of ideas,” and since 
this realm is terra incognita to the uncultured savages—much like the inhabitants of 
Plato’s cave—these people will search in vain for ideals that remain inchoate. Having 
been aroused before they can be satisfied, their spiritual needs will thus be frustrated. 
It is at this point that Schiller states, in general terms, his theory of the consequences 
of this frustration. The problem is that these people have sufficient culture to frame 
the notion of the “absolute” as an ideal, however obscurely, but insufficient culture 
to actually attain it and know it. Schiller writes: 
On the wings of fancy, man leaves the narrow confines of the present 
in which mere animality stays bound, in order to strive toward an un-
limited future. But while the infinite opens up before his reeling imagi-
nation, his heart has not yet ceased to live in the particular or to wait 
upon the moment. [ … ] [As such,] he will merely be induced by that 
demand to give his own individuality unlimited extension, rather than 
to abstract from it altogether.1  
In other words, the drive towards “the infinite” or the ideal, when it is tethered 
through lack of culture to “the finite” or the worldly, has the effect of creating an 
infinite, unfulfillable longing for finite, worldly goods. An infinite quantity of finite 
things is supposed to compensate for a failure to grasp “the infinite” itself, the ideal 
whose perfection is unbounded and undiluted. To “give one’s individuality unlim-
ited extension” is to demand that the world conform to one’s whims: to treat the 
 




world as an extension of one’s self, as if it ought to be malleable, like the flights of 
intellect and imagination by which one approaches the ideal, by force of will alone.2  
Schiller’s description is quite abstract, but its significance seems clear enough. The 
capriciousness of the savage is the misdirection of the unlimited freedom of the spirit, 
which we are supposed to enjoy when, through the experience of sublimity, we leave 
the real world behind and enter the realm of ideas. Recall that in experiencing the 
sublime, we feel that “the laws of nature are not necessarily our laws as well.”3 Plainly, 
this deliverance from the laws of nature only makes sense in the realm of ideas; but 
the savage, who lacks the powers of intellect and imagination needed for navigating 
this realm, goes astray and wrongly demands the same kind of freedom in the real 
world.  
This is significant here because it closely resembles the capriciousness of Sturm und 
Drang heroism, of Karl Moor, and of the Underground Man, which, after all, we are 
ultimately trying to explain. It is not hard to see that such an individual will be un-
willing to submit to constraints of any kind, and, perpetually frustrated, will inveigh 
against everything that comes in the way of his “unlimited individuality,” as the Un-
derground Man himself does at some length. This is the essence of caprice: the refusal 
to acknowledge the authority of the laws of nature, the laws of rational thought, the 
laws of morality, or anything else that seems to diminish the absolute freedom of the 
will.  
Of course, there are differences between the Underground Man and the savages de-
scribed by Schiller. Schiller’s savage is striving blindly to know the transcendent “ab-
solute” in quasi-Platonic fashion, while the Underground man is striving to live the 
life of a dashing romantic hero. As stated above, however, this obvious difference 
conceals a deeper similarity: they are both striving at the behest of their spiritual 
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needs to confirm their visions of human dignity. It might also seem problematic for 
this comparison that the Underground Man is at the very opposite pole of civilization 
and culture from the savages. If Schiller’s psychological explanation only pertains to 
budding philosophers at the dawn of civilization, of what relevance can it be for un-
derstanding the Underground Man’s capriciousness? On this front, I would argue 
that the aptness of Schiller’s description to the Underground Man is by no means a 
coincidence. To see why, however, we must read between the lines of Schiller’s essays.  
In his theoretical writings, as noted above, Schiller glosses over the difficulty of actu-
ally satisfying one’s spiritual needs. But for Schiller this optimism would have been 
misplaced at any other time during the Enlightenment, when, as we saw in the pre-
vious chapter, the problem of scepticism and the concomitant threat of nihilism cast 
doubt on the validity of the spiritual needs of humanity, and endangered the possi-
bility of satisfying them at all. Writing his essays in the 1790s, Schiller had already 
been convinced by Kant and post-Kantian philosophers like Fichte, his colleague at 
the University of Jena, that the challenge of Enlightenment scepticism could be de-
feated philosophically, and that there was therefore less need to worry about the frus-
tration of the needs of reason by scepticism; this is why he suggests it is only a prob-
lem for “savages,” and does not treat it at length.4 His earlier dramatic work was, 
however, completed before this period of optimism, and reveals a much greater pre-
occupation with scepticism and frustration—as we saw in the case of The Robbers. This 
earlier preoccupation also becomes apparent, as we shall see below, in his description 
of modern sentimentalism and idealism in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, which 
draws on the literary models he and Goethe had created while most troubled by the 
threat of scepticism, and most worried about the possibility of ever satisfying their 
spiritual needs.  
Thanks to the nihilistic consequences of Enlightenment scepticism, Franz and Karl 
Moor are in exactly the same position as the savages described by Schiller in his 
 




Aesthetic Letters. Their plight illustrates the more general applicability of Schiller’s 
views on sublimity and spiritual needs to civilized people as well as savages. It is 
clear that for Schiller cultivating our appreciation of the sublime, whether in the con-
text of savagery (ignorance of higher values) or in the context of nihilism (denial of 
higher values), will therefore have negative effects: the sense of ascendency, of om-
nipotence, that it is meant to inspire, and that we are meant to exercise in pursuit of 
our spiritual needs in abstraction from the physical world, will have no outlet; it will 
come into continuous conflict with the limitations of our natural abilities, and, if Schil-
ler is right, lead to capricious demandingness. Why not simply accept the reality of 
such constraints, since they are unavoidable in any case? Moreover, why not simply 
relinquish the impossible ideals in relation to which these constraints are conceived 
as such? As we have seen, they pertain directly to the matter of human dignity. Thus 
characters like Karl Moor cannot simply relinquish their ideals, because to do so 
would be to become despicable in their own eyes; that is why they so stubbornly resist 
the limitations of reality. And caprice is nothing more than this sense of perpetual 
and inescapable frustration; the capricious individual is one who perceives every-
thing real as a constraint, and feels just as unfree in ordinary life as any other person 
would feel in a prison.  
This phenomenon, I believe, can be observed in Notes from Underground no less than 
in The Robbers. This suggests that Schiller’s theory of the sublimity of humanity, and 
the spiritual needs which stem from this sublimity, may provide a useful guide to 
understanding the Underground Man’s transition from “sublime and beautiful” ro-
manticism, through nihilism, to infinitely demanding capriciousness. Like Franz and 
Karl Moor, the Underground Man is highly cultured; he has a strong sense of sublim-
ity and feels the pull of his spiritual needs. His ability to leave his limited circum-
stances “on the wings of fancy” has inculcated him with a sense of his own absolute 
freedom, and the ability to frame ideals that are absolutely perfect, but he does not 
believe in the possibility of exercising this freedom constructively: the “realm of ideas” 




encounters there; and what is real is so far from matching up to these ideals that it 
leaves him in despair. So this sense of freedom is constantly frustrated by the material 
constraints that he is unable to transcend. The Underground Man becomes capricious 
because, like Schiller’s savages, he feels the pull of the ideal but cannot attain it—not 
because he lacks the intellectual capacity to do so, but because he suffers from the 
influence of a nihilism that had troubled Schiller, too, in his youth.  
3. Sentimentalism and Modern Idealism 
Naturally, the dispiriting implications of the Enlightenment were most damaging for 
those who had most deliberately invested their sense of dignity in the kind of sublime 
idealism described by Schiller, namely, sentimentalists and romantics. As we have 
seen, Schiller had briefly addressed the implications of frustrated idealism theoreti-
cally in his Aesthetic Letters, where, however, he was not interested in the hazards of 
Enlightenment philosophy but in the transition from savagery to civilization. But, 
given the climate of scepticism prevailing towards the end of the eighteenth century, 
we should expect his analysis to apply as well to those modern idealists whose aspi-
rations were thwarted by nihilism, or the conviction that the spiritual needs of hu-
manity are spurious and can never be satisfied. Indeed, we have already seen this 
illustrated by him in The Robbers. As stated above, Schiller considers the problem of 
frustrated idealism again theoretically, and more directly than in the Aesthetic Letters, 
in his later essay On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, which contrasts ancient and modern 
forms of art, referred to as “naive” and “sentimental” respectively. His consideration 
of sentimental art is particularly interesting here, because it builds on the theme of 
the gulf between the real and the ideal, and the difficulties that beset the human ten-
dency to strive towards the latter at the expense of the former—i.e. the difficulties that 
stem from our spiritual needs. This leads Schiller to discuss the related themes of ar-
tistic genius and idealism, which both involve a kind of preference for the ideal over 




Schiller seems to delve further into the dangers posed by the sublime and the spiritual 
needs that accompany human sublimity, which now threaten not only pre-civilized 
savages but highly civilized moderns as well. Just like the savages of the Aesthetic 
Letters, sentimental poets and geniuses must strive to elevate themselves beyond the 
world of sense, in order to discover the lofty ideals they are to represent artistically, 
and, like the savages, must navigate various challenges in order to do so. Much more 
than in the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller here engages with psychological and spiritual 
problems surrounding the fact that all people, no matter how civilized, are tethered 
to the real world, and cannot expect to transcend it easily or with impunity. Once 
again, we find that Schiller’s analysis of such problems is highly pertinent to Dosto-
evsky’s characterization of the Underground Man.  
The savage becomes capricious, according to Schiller, because of the frustration of his 
spiritual needs. It is evident that the problem of caprice arises out of disillusioned 
idealism, which in turn arises out of the belief that there is an unbridgeable gulf be-
tween the real and the ideal, such that the ideal is thought to be unrealizable. Logi-
cally, there are two ways in which this gulf can be established in a person’s mind: 
either the real is excessively degraded below the ideal, or the ideal is excessively ex-
alted above or away from reality. These two ways are not mutually exclusive, but can 
be compounded, as we shall see. Above, the first of these phenomena was observed 
in the case of the savages described by Schiller, as well as in Karl Moor; these people 
are called to find confirmation of human dignity in the fulfilment of ideals but dis-
cover, either because they are culturally limited or because of the influence of nihilis-
tic doctrines and harsh experiences, that they are unable to attain spiritual fulfilment 
in reality. We have seen that for this reason nihilism poses a special problem for mod-
ern idealists like Karl Moor and the Underground Man. In what follows we shall con-
sider Schiller’s treatment of the second phenomenon, excessively exalted or wayward 
idealism, which he takes to be a special problem for modern artists and intellectuals. 
The kind of idealism Schiller considers in relation to artistic genius and modern sen-




preference for the imaginary over the actual: “Instead of striving for sensuous objects 
outside ourselves,” he says, “we prefer to sink meditatively into ourselves where we 
find, in the world of ideas, nourishment for the awakened urge.”5 For Schiller, ideal-
ism of this kind is prototypically associated with strict morality and genuinely good 
ideals, because it ought to be oriented towards ideals sanctioned by reason, as per the 
Kantian conception of the spiritual needs as “needs of reason.” But although idealism 
aims towards morality, Schiller warns that it is dangerously haphazard in its practical 
results. Idealists are defined in contrast to realists: the former prioritize lofty but dis-
tant goals, while the latter concern themselves with mundane but achievable results; 
idealists tend to overindulge and become lost in idle fantasies. 
In other words, because the idealist must extricate himself from the time-tested, reli-
able mores of the realist (or “man of action,” as the Underground Man would say), he 
becomes capable of extraordinary and even heroic deeds, but, by the same token, is 
also prone to waywardness and extravagance in his aims. As such, the higher and 
more violently he strives towards his ideal, however morally good it may be in itself, 
the more likely he is to depart from his original course, “since constancy and necessity 
are, of course, characteristic of nature, but not of freedom.”6 Schiller here seems to 
deviate from Kant’s belief that human beings will be wise and good just as long as 
they can extricate themselves from the dominion of the material world and the senses. 
For Schiller, it is not so simple; precisely because idealists leave this world behind and 
immerse themselves in the element of absolute freedom—the realm of ideas—they 
become accustomed to independence from all constraints, and are liable to forget 
even those constraints they ought always to impose upon themselves, namely, those 
of reason and morality.  
This tendency to waywardness is essential to idealism because, he says, “the path 
from [real] experience to the ideal is quite immense, and in between lies the unbridled 
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capriciousness of fantasy.”7 Schiller implies it is good for the idealist to depart from 
reality, but only if, by the guiding lights of reason and morality, he does so in search 
of ideals that are useful and can be realized, so that he may later return to reality and 
indicate the ways in which it should be improved; if instead he departs from reality 
to indulge in impossible fantasies—a kind of intellectual libertinism—then the ideals 
he discovers will be hollow and useless. Whereas the savage struggled to leave the 
world of sense at all, the modern genius must struggle to retain some degree of con-
tact with it, to avoid chasing after ideals that cannot possibly be realized: 
in the effort to set aside all limitations, the sentimental genius is ex-
posed to the danger of transforming human nature completely, that is, 
the danger of not merely elevating or idealizing himself beyond any spe-
cific and limited actuality toward the absolute possibility—what it is 
permitted and supposed to do—but rather of passing beyond the pos-
sibility itself or giving himself up to the reverie of impossible dreams.8 
This is, of course, precisely what the Underground Man does: as we saw in the last 
chapter, the ideals he aspired to were totally unrealistic.9 When, after indulging in his 
idealistic dreams he feels the need to return to reality and attempt to realize his ideals, 
he is thwarted and disappointed because these ideals were not discovered at the be-
hest of reason but, as Schiller would say, of “the unbridled capriciousness of fantasy.” 
His romantic ideals of love, friendship and community, for instance, are supposed to 
be realized—for want of more suitable candidates—in the company of his only regu-
lar acquaintance, office chief Anton Antonych, who is a completely ordinary person 
falling far below the aspirations the Underground Man would foist upon him.10 Like-
wise, when the Underground Man attempts to force Zverkov to recognize his supe-
rior culture, and then rushes after him to challenge him to a duel, he acts not from 
any consideration of how the world is, but from a fantastic notion of how he and the 
world ought to be, and is doomed to fail. As Malcolm Jones has written, Dostoevsky 
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thereby shows that the “ideal of harmony and beauty which so fascinates mankind is 
a mixed blessing. Dostoyevsky stresses how easily such ideals are distorted by man, 
and his novels furnish many examples of such distortion.”11  
Above, I pointed out that people can become disillusioned in one or both of two ways: 
reality can be degraded below the ideal by nihilism, misfortune or ignorance; or the 
ideal can be exalted above or perverted away from reality through waywardness and 
extravagance. In both cases, the gulf between the real and the ideal is widened. For 
Schiller, a modern “sentimental idealist” like the Underground Man is especially 
prone to the latter mode of disillusionment. He becomes lost in fantasies that cannot 
be realized, and is inevitably frustrated when he returns to life and is confronted by 
the shortcomings of reality. In this way, we may observe, he suffers the same disap-
pointment as the savage, but from a different direction. The savage has an unduly 
limited conception of reality, and becomes frustrated because his spiritual needs call 
for something beyond what, in his ignorance, he takes to be possible. The modern 
idealist becomes frustrated because his lofty ideals, formed in wayward abstraction 
from reality, really are impossible. The modern idealist who is also a nihilist, however, 
suffers doubly from an unduly limited conception of reality and an excessively ex-
alted conception of the ideal. It is to this third category, in fact, that the Underground 
Man belongs. To understand this class of disillusioned idealists more fully, we may 
turn to another, even more famous of its members: Goethe’s Faust. As we shall see, 
Faust too is thoroughly disillusioned in both possible ways: he is stretched in contrary 
directions by nihilism and wayward idealism, despairs and then—like Karl Moor, 
and in anticipation of Schiller’s theories—dedicates himself to caprice. 
 





Like The Robbers, Goethe’s Faust belonged to the deepest foundations of intellectual 
culture in Dostoevsky’s day; Pushkin had called it “the Iliad of our times,” and Belin-
sky agreed.12 As Herzen recalled, at the turn of the 1840s a “knowledge of Goethe, 
especially of the second part of Faust (either because it is inferior to the first or because 
it is more difficult), was as obligatory as the wearing of clothes.”13 Andre von Gro-
nicka has shown that Goethe, and in particular Faust, had a pervasive influence on 
Dostoevsky’s fiction, but he limits himself to general observations on Dostoevsky’s 
attitude towards Faustian striving, Mephistophelean negation, and the meek humil-
ity of Gretchen, all of which have parallels in several of his characters. The presence 
of Faust in Dostoevsky’s fiction is perhaps most immediately noticeable in The Broth-
ers Karamazov, in which we encounter a recognizably Mephistophelean devil.14 Von 
Gronicka doesn’t even mention Notes from Underground, however, and he certainly 
doesn’t attempt to draw psychological parallels between Faust’s and the Under-
ground Man’s caprice. It is worthwhile to pursue this connection here, because to do 
so is to illuminate the psychology of Sturm und Drang caprice itself, and, at the same 
time, to reveal one of the most important channels—next to Schiller’s Robbers and his 
essays—by which it was made familiar to Dostoevsky and his contemporaries. 
It should be noted that Faust is a complex work composed and published sporadically 
over many years, and encompasses a wide variety of themes and embedded episodes 
obscure and difficult to comprehend in varying degrees. Goethe’s initial designs for 
Faust, known as the Urfaust, belong to his Sturm und Drang phase and reveal his pre-
occupation with the same problem of frustrated idealism that motivated Werther and 
Götz.15 It is the themes belonging to and stemming from these elements of Faust that 
interest me here. I shall thus omit a full summary of the plot and focus instead on 
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those scenes and themes that are especially relevant to the present investigation. In 
the following three subsections, I shall consider Faust in relation to the idealism, ni-
hilism, and caprice of its hero, emphasizing the manner in which he conforms to the 
psychological scheme worked out above and anticipates the psychology of caprice in 
Notes from Underground. 
4.1. Faust’s Idealism 
If his theory of the frustrated and capricious savage is best illustrated with reference 
to his own Robbers, Schiller’s descriptions of the wayward intellectual libertine are 
mirrored most precisely in Faust, which he himself refers to in this connection—along 
with several of Goethe’s other works—in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry.16 Goethe’s 
Faust is introduced as an aging scholar and magician who, having dedicated his life 
to understanding the deepest mysteries of the universe, has become jaded after failing 
to advance even a step towards this avowedly “infinite goal.”17 Like Karl Moor, Faust 
is a disillusioned idealist. Unlike Moor’s, however, Faust’s ideal is theoretical rather 
than practical; he is not interested in feats of virtue and heroism, but rather in the 
attainment of special insight into the essence of the universe. His idealism thus con-
forms quite neatly to the model of the Kantian “needs of reason” discussed in the 
previous chapter, except that the goal of Faust’s striving, his ideal, is nebulous and 
unspecified. In this respect he is akin to the “savages” described above. But he is also 
a wayward idealist of the highest order, whose immense intellectual abilities have 
been channelled into an illusory and inherently unrealizable ideal. As Alexander Gil-
lies puts it: “Only a god or the imagination of a poet can grasp what Faust requires, 
and Faust indeed elevates himself to the level of a god in making his unbounded de-
mands.”18 It is unclear that Faust himself grasps what he requires, except that he must 
transcend the normal course of human experience in order to obtain it. Ronald Miller 
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aptly calls this “the idealism of transcendence”19; Jane Brown identifies it more spe-
cifically as the striving for “a form of gnosis on the typical Neoplatonic model” 
whereby Faust wishes to attain direct insight into “the Absolute.”20  
Naturally, Faust is no more able to attain this ideal than Karl Moor is able to restore 
justice to the world. In general, his tragedy too “is that of titanism”—the futile desire 
to usurp powers that do not belong to him, in pursuit of a lofty but unattainable 
ideal.21 Thus Faust is like The Robbers and other Sturm und Drang works in that it grap-
ples with the fundamental inability of human beings to satisfy their spiritual needs. 
Faust’s supernatural abilities mean that he is especially well suited to playing this role. 
Of course, in reality there is no magic; Goethe highlights the basic limitations of hu-
manity by showing that even if we did have magic and virtually omnipotent servants 
like Mephistopheles at our disposal, we humans would still be too limited to attain 
fulfilment of our highest ideals. If not even the great Faust can fulfil his spiritual needs, 
what hope do the rest of us have? Nigh indomitable heroes like Karl Moor and Götz 
von Berlichingen represent the apex of human potential; by granting Faust superhu-
man powers, but not releasing from his fundamental humanness, Goethe effectively 
raises the theme of human weakness to its highest possible pitch.  
Faust’s disillusionment, and its consequences, are concomitantly extreme. The way-
wardness and “titanic” extravagance of Faust’s idealism sets him up for harsh disap-
pointment, and it is in this way that Faust is also well suited to illustrate Schiller’s 
views on the vagaries of idealism. Having tried and failed to attain the impossible, he 
laments the weakness of humanity and comes to despise his own vain aspirations. 
One of the central themes of Faust is, as Coleridge noticed, “misology, or hatred and 
depreciation of knowledge caused by an originally intense thirst for knowledge baf-
fled.”22 Having this statement in mind, I borrowed the term “misology” in Chapter 5 
to describe the Underground Man’s attitude towards reason in all its manifestations, 
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from common sense to science, mathematics and political philosophy; Faust’s attitude 
is much the same in its general outlines, in that he too comes to regard his intellect as 
the bane of his existence and, as the Underground Man would say, of his “normal 
advantage.” Thus on one level Faust envies the common people and refreshes himself 
in their company but, like the Underground Man, cannot lower himself consistently 
and wholeheartedly to their level; he too is a man of “heightened consciousness.”23 
Neither abandonment of the ideal, nor self-imposed ignorance of its impossibility are 
acceptable to Faust; his intellectual conscience is too strict, and his emotional invest-
ment in the fulfilment of his ideal is too great. To acquiesce on either count would be 
to forfeit his human dignity; thus Faust gives in to despair. Here “rejection of life can 
present itself as a noble, unflinching commitment to truth, where other weaker mor-
tals would prefer to look away.”24 Again, a strain recognizable in Notes from Under-
ground. 
Like Moor, and the Underground Man, Faust becomes disillusioned because of his 
contradictory attitudes of idealism and nihilism: on the one hand, he is idealistic in 
that he cannot rest content with the limitations of reality as he finds it, but strives to 
transcend them; on the other hand, he is nihilistic in that he suspects it is impossible 
to do so, because there is nothing—not for human beings at least—beyond them. In 
general, Faust is keenly aware both of his human dignity, of the absolute power and 
independence of his spiritual nature, as well as of the limits of his real, earthly exist-
ence. His experience seems to confirm the Platonic idea that the bodily, spatiotem-
poral aspect of human existence is a distraction and an obstacle to the fulfilment of 
his true purpose:  
The spirit’s noblest moments, rare and high, 
Are choked by matter’s alien obtrusion, 
And rich with this world’s goods we cry 
Scorn on those better things as mere illusion.25 
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And though a god lives in my heart, 
Though all my powers waken at his word, 
Though he can move my every inmost part— 
Yet nothing in the outer world is stirred.26 
Faust’s disillusionment comes to a head at the beginning of the play, when he uses 
his magic to summon the Earth Spirit, the quintessence of the natural universe, in 
order to satisfy his craving for “gnosis.” Although it represents the essence of “nature,” 
or rather “Nature,” the Earth Spirit is plainly a supernatural phenomenon, in the sense 
that it transcends the normal course of human experience. In summoning it, Faust too 
wishes to transcend this normal course. This attempt at supernatural communion is 
a disaster, as the enigmatic and overwhelming spirit mocks Faust’s delusions of gran-
deur. Faust’s final attempt to comprehend and master the Absolute, to stare into “the 
mirror of eternal verity,” fails because of his basic human limitations.27 At this point 
his nihilistic doubts are confirmed and he despairs of his former hopes and aspira-
tions; he gives in to “misology.” Nevertheless—like Karl Moor, as we saw in the pre-
vious chapter—he does not relinquish his idealism, but only mocks it and abandons 
hope of fulfilling it. In this respect he is also akin to the Underground Man, of whom 
Donald Fanger rightly notes:  
He is tormented by dreams he can neither disavow nor realize and 
drawn intermittently to a reality he cannot embrace [ ... ]. So when re-
ality intrudes to show up the dreams, he must ridicule them, for he is 
too intelligent to ignore reality. Yet the dreams—which are of what life 
should be—are too far superior to that reality to be relinquished.28  
 
26 Goethe, 1987: 48 (Part One, Sc. 7, lines 1566-1569). 
27 Goethe, 1987: 18f. (Part One, Sc. 4, lines 460-517). 




4.2. Faust’s Nihilism 
The driving force of the play comes from the conflict in Faust himself between ideal-
ism and nihilism, where the latter is typically represented in the character of Mephi-
stopheles, a devil who has taken up the challenge of bringing Faust to the point of 
total despair (Goethe establishes this element of the plot with reference to the Book of 
Job).29 As David Luke writes, the dialectical relation between the cynical devil and the 
romantic idealist “has strong claims to be considered the unifying and integrating 
theme of the work as a whole.”30 Goethe makes it clear that the contradiction between 
Faust’s idealism and his nihilism is the source of his troubles; nihilism alone would 
not be sufficient. This is highlighted by the juxtaposition of Faust with his assistant 
Wagner, the archetypal scholar, whose pedantry inoculates him against the idealistic 
striving that plagues his master. Though he is no less dedicated to science than Faust, 
Wagner is much more limited in his aspirations: where Faust is always seeking 
through science some kind of spiritual transcendence, and despairs when this proves 
to be impossible, Wagner is content to remain cloistered within the confines of the 
library and laboratory. Goethe thus indicates that nihilism on its own, without any 
admixture of idealism, may be morally and intellectually desiccating but will not lead 
to misology or the despairing capriciousness that comes from the disillusionment of 
idealism. This may seem obvious since, of course, Faust would not feel so disap-
pointed if, like Wagner, he had no aspirations beyond those that can be satisfied in 
books and laboratories; it is nevertheless an important point to observe if we are to 
understand the psychology of Sturm und Drang heroism and its relation to the nihil-
ism against which it reacts. 
Dejected, Faust consigns his soul to Mephistopheles, on the condition that the latter 
can procure for him a moment of genuine satisfaction: 
If ever to the moment I shall say: 
Beautiful moment, do not pass away! 
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Then you may forge your chains to bind me, 
Then I will put my life behind me31 
This may be compared with the Underground Man’s longing for something at which 
he cannot “stick out his tongue,” a real utopia and not a glorified chicken coop. Faust’s 
commitment is the culmination of his decision not to be taken in by illusions, not to 
settle for less than what he can really respect.32 It is also the ultimate despairing and 
spiteful test of his idealism: either it will be satisfied—and he is willing to bet his soul 
that it will not—or he will spend the rest of his days sampling experiences that always 
fall short of his desires. Mephistopheles, of course, has no need to win this bet; his 
goal is to crush Faust’s spirit. Instead of “the spirit’s noblest moments, rare and high,” 
Faust is inundated with trivial and revolting adventures. As David Luke puts it, 
Mephistopheles aims “to destroy his idealism by exploiting his restless craving for 
experience.”33 To win the wager, Faust must prove, through sampling everything, 
that nothing can truly satisfy him; of course, he believes he knows a priori that nothing 
can do so. His wager thus confirms him, just as Mephistopheles desires, as a “princi-
pled nihilist” determined to prove that the world is barren.34 Mephistopheles reveals 
his plan in monologue:  
Fate has endowed him with the blind 
Impatience of an ever striving mind; 
In headlong haste it drives him on, 
He skips the earth and leaves its joys behind. 
I’ll drag him through life’s wastes, through every kind  
Of meaningless banality; 
He’ll struggle like a bird stuck fast, I’ll bind 
Him hand and foot; in his voracity 
He’ll cry in vain for food and drink, he’ll find  
Them dangling out of reach—ah, yes!35 
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Faust’s idealism, his yearning for something beyond the “meaningless banality” of 
“life’s wastes,” is Mephistopheles’ target and his leverage. Faust is already convinced 
that reality is defective, that his aspirations are misguided. It remains for Mephistoph-
eles to drive home this conviction and compound his disillusionment. Disillusion-
ment brought Faust to the point of suicide; he was only saved by a heavenly chorus, 
and the peal of Easter bells, reminding him of the innocent piety of his youth and the 
miracle of Christian resurrection.36 As an agent of nihilism, “spirit of perpetual nega-
tion,” Mephistopheles works against this piety.37  
In this respect, he plays the same role as Franz Moor in The Robbers. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, the latter manipulates his brother Karl into devoting himself to de-
structive wilfulness in much the same way as the former manipulates Faust into giv-
ing himself over to frivolity. The catalyst for Karl’s caprice is his nihilistic disillusion-
ment with the moral order of the universe, his disappointment at the replacement of 
Plutarchian heroes with modern “scribbling” moralists, statesmen and philosophers; 
Franz exacerbates this disillusionment through convincing him that the sacred bonds 
of family are now dissolved, and that there is therefore no reality corresponding to 
the ideal of justice. Mephistopheles likewise intends to exacerbate Faust’s nihilism 
through confirming that there is nothing that could possibly satisfy his gnostic yearn-
ings or his “idealism of transcendence” as a whole: the world is barren of sustenance 
for one who has cultivated his mind and spirit to such an extent, who has such an 
exalted conception of his own spiritual dignity. More generally, Mephisto’s method 
of frustration by “meaningless banality” parallels, in its effects, the Underground 
Man’s and Karl Moor’s own frustrating and unfulfilling lives, as well as the dispirit-
ing influence of the nihilistic doctrines they have encountered—it confirms Faust’s 
disbelief in the possibility of spiritual fulfilment.   
Consequently, Faust is trapped by disillusionment, as Schiller’s savage is trapped by 
ignorance, within the confines of the mundane. His pact with Mephistopheles reveals 
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that he has given up all hope of “transcendence,” for it shows that he has no concern 
whatever for his fate beyond this world, and turns it over to the devil without hesita-
tion: “Out of this earth all my contentment springs, / This sun shines on my suffer-
ings.”38 Schiller—in his optimistic post-Kantian phase—would say he ought to have 
left behind the world of sense before he pursued the spiritual, and that his failure to 
do so is responsible for his disappointment and despair. Faust would reply that he is 
unable to do so, because there is no higher world in which he can subsist and be sat-
isfied; he is constitutionally unable to transcend his human limitations, and is re-
buked by the Earth Spirit when he attempts vainly to do so. In this way Faust illus-
trates the problem of nihilism, the threat looming over the Enlightenment, the dark 
side of its humanism, rationalism, empiricism and materialism. 
4.3. Faust’s Caprice 
After the wager with Mephistopheles—in which Faust bets his soul that nothing in 
the world can satisfy his idealism, thereby confirming himself as a “principled nihil-
ist”—Faust becomes recognizably capricious in the Sturm und Drang fashion. His long-
ing for “the infinite,” the Absolute, having been frustrated, is transmuted into an in-
finite longing for finite things, just as predicted by Schiller’s theory of the philosoph-
ically frustrated savage, appropriately generalized: as we know, Faust is really in the 
same position as such savages because he feels himself to be tethered to the same 
material world in which the savage is bound by ignorance. Faust’s caprice is de-
scribed especially in the following lines—Mephistopheles has just promised every 
kind of pleasure, knowing that Faust has no interest in pleasure per se, thereby goad-
ing him into a more extreme kind of libertinism, indifferent to pleasure and pain, 
concerned only with the quantity of experience and activity— 
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I tell you, the mere pleasure’s not the point! 
To dizzying, painful joy I dedicate 
Myself, to refreshing frustration, loving hate! 
I’ve purged the lust for knowledge from my soul; 
Now the full range of suffering it shall face, 
And in my inner self I will embrace 
The experience allotted to the whole 
Race of mankind; my mind shall grasp the heights 
And depths, my heart know all their sorrows and delights.39  
This seems to be exactly what Schiller has in mind when he refers to the savage’s 
“demand to give his own individuality unlimited extension.”36 Faust wishes to bring 
everything into the compass of his own will; to enjoy completely unlimited access to 
the material world.  
This infinite restlessness is also something like the desire of Klinger’s Wild who, as 
we saw, wanted to have himself “stretched over a drum so as to take on new dimen-
sions” and then be fired out of a pistol.40 It is “throwing the reins on the horse’s neck,” 
as Lewes put it, and demanding that every whim of the idealist’s indomitable will be 
indulged.41 Mephistopheles is the instrument by which this caprice is supposed to be 
exercised. He warns Faust that his ambition is nevertheless futile, and suitable only 
to a God. Of course, a limited mortal cannot encompass infinite experience; this new 
striving is just as unfulfillable as his prior striving for the transcendent infinite. Meph-
istopheles knows this veiled provocation will only spur Faust on. Sure enough, Faust 
cries: “I swear I’ll achieve it!” Mephistopheles then flatters him and offers his services 
as guide; from here they go on various adventures apparently designed to grate 
against Faust’s exalted sensibilities, and reduce him further to despair.  
It is worth emphasizing that I regard Faust’s Mephistophelean phase as Sturm und 
Drang caprice, rather than as a continuation or reorientation of his idealism, as some 
scholars have thought. Alexander Gillies, for example, thought that Faust’s worldly 
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striving was a straightforward continuation of his “titanism,” the same megalomania 
that led him to strive, at the beginning of the play, away from the human sphere and 
into the spiritual.42 According to Jane Brown’s more nuanced interpretation, Faust’s 
idealism does not dissipate after his disillusionment, but, retaining its general orien-
tation towards spiritual fulfilment in “the Absolute,” merely changes form: “After the 
earth spirit scene,” she writes, “the focus of striving shifts openly from gnosis to me-
diated knowledge of the Absolute through activity in the world.”43 Whilst I agree 
with Brown that Faust comes to place emphasis on “Nature over the transcendent 
Absolute,”44 insofar as he determines to live in and for the material world rather than 
attempt to breach the spiritual, I think it important to recognize that his worldly striv-
ing represents a complete break with his former idealistic striving—he has renounced 
knowledge of the Absolute, mediated or otherwise, and dedicated himself to base 
materialism. 
Citing the heavenly chorus that appears to Faust in his despair, Brown points out that 
the striving of Faust’s idealism ought really to be satisfied within nature, rather than 
in transcendence over it. Plausibly, this is true and the chorus does reveal to Faust 
that he ought to seek spiritual satisfaction in “mediated knowledge of the Absolute 
through activity in the world,” as Brown claims;45 but the central challenge he faces 
is, I think, precisely to reorient his striving in this direction. There is little indication 
that this is what he is in fact doing when he dedicates himself to “dizzying, painful 
joy” and “refreshing frustration,” having “purged the lust for knowledge from [his] 
soul.”46 Galivanting about with Mephistopheles, performing magic tricks in taverns 
and cavorting with talking apes and witches, is manifestly not what the heavenly 
chorus had in mind for Faust. His turn towards the material world is not only a turn 
away from his former “idealism of transcendence,” it is a rejection of idealism 
 
42 Gillies, 1957: 54f. 
43 Brown, 1986: 57. 
44 Brown, 1986: 57. 
45 This would give Faust a distinctly German Idealist flavour; see Chapter 8, Section 4, below. 




altogether—it is an embracing of everything low and base, not with a view to discov-
ering the divine within the worldly, but with a view to exerting and indulging the 
blind force of his will. Faust’s turn towards the material world is, if anything, life-
denying rather than life-affirming in any wholesome, natural, or uplifting sense. The 
kind of experience Mephistopheles promises him is nothing but self-indulgent, wan-
ton abandonment, and appeals only to his caprice.  
That being said, there is also a strong sense in which Faust’s worldly striving is no 
less “transcendent” than his first phase of gnostic striving, even though it is no longer 
idealistic. Though Brown is right that he no longer wishes to transcend the sensory 
realm in some spiritual capacity, he nevertheless wants to transcend the ordinary hu-
man perspective in a different way—laterally rather than vertically, so to speak. 
Whereas he initially strove to unlock a sphere of knowledge inaccessible to human 
nature, he now demands to know the “experience allotted to the whole / Race of man-
kind,” which is plainly more than can ever be allotted to any one human individual; 
this is a task no less superhuman than to commune with the Earth Spirit. In sum we 
may say that Faust, despite his turn towards the material world, has not taken the 
advice of the heavenly chorus at all; he has not turned to the natural world as a source 
of spiritual fulfilment, but as an infinite playground for his whims; and he has not 
given up his urge to transcend humanity, though he has given up his idealism.  
Faust’s caprice stems from the same wellspring of energy that inclined him towards 
the transcendent absolute before he was disillusioned. We saw that the power of 
Karl’s heroic idealism is not dissipated but redirected by disillusionment: his energy 
and strength of will is diverted from the ideal of justice towards the experience of 
untrammelled freedom. Mephistopheles depends upon the same phenomenon occur-
ring in Faust, knowing that the energy of his “ever striving mind” will not rest content 
in a state of disappointment, but will force its way out, like a dammed river, in man-
ifold other directions. This happens in accordance with Schiller’s bipartite division of 
the mind into “drives”: the form drive being frustrated and blocked in its own domain, 




experience the infinite—is redirected towards the real—the finite—and becomes an 
unfulfillable urge for absolute dominion over the sensory world.47  
* * * 
In conclusion, Faust’s development in the early scenes of the play perfectly illustrates 
the implications I have drawn from Schiller’s reflections on the “savage” and the 
modern idealist, and in this way sheds light on the psychology of the Underground 
Man—it allows us to make concrete sense of Schiller’s theoretical views and apply 
them to the reading of Dostoevsky. Starting out as an idealist with no regard for the 
limits of human nature, and no checks on the extravagance of his aspirations, Faust 
strays from the path of reason and morality and forms the hopeless, vaguely specified 
ideal of “gnosis.” This ideal is a product of “the unbridled capriciousness of fantasy”48 
and dreams “passing beyond possibility itself”49—like most of the ideals of a modern 
sentimental idealist, it is therefore unrealizable, and in dedicating his life to it Faust 
is ensuring his eventual disillusionment. This disillusionment dawns gradually on 
Faust but reaches its nadir when he fails to court the attention of the Earth Spirit, and 
comes to think that his idealism was misguided; Mephistopheles appears and con-
firms him in this nihilistic worldview. After this point, Faust becomes capricious and 
employs Mephistopheles to satisfy his craving for completely unlimited freedom. He 
becomes capricious because of the combination of two factors: first, his ideal is a false 
one that is inappropriate for human life, and second, his conception of reality has 
been debased by a life of scientific failures and by the nihilism of Mephistopheles. A 
wayward idealism coupled with a heightened awareness of the intractability of real-
ity guarantee that Faust becomes disillusioned and, as Schiller’s theory of the savage 
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predicts, seeks to vent the frustration of his spiritual freedom in and upon the material 
world. In all of these respects the Underground Man is a direct descendent of Faust.50 
5. The False Idealist 
Above, we considered Schiller’s theory of the transition from savagery to civilization, 
and recognized in it a possible explanation for the wilfulness and caprice of disillu-
sioned idealists like Karl Moor, Faust and the Underground Man. We then saw how 
this explanation, though concealed in a somewhat obscure corner of Schiller’s theo-
retical work, can be rediscovered, revealed and illuminated in the literary works that 
came before it. Though the dangers of sentimental idealism, and the predilection for 
disillusionment and despairing caprice among modern idealists, were less salient to 
Schiller in his post-Kantian phase, he found them extremely pressing in his youth and 
embodied them—along with other Stürmer und Dränger like Goethe—in the heroes of 
his early plays. And they were not entirely forgotten; these dangers find their philo-
sophical apotheosis in Schiller’s closing vision, in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, of 
 
50 As stated above, I do not pretend to have covered more than one aspect of the first part of 
Faust; though the theme of disillusioned idealism is undoubtedly one central theme, there are 
others that are equally salient. In particular, I have not even mentioned Faust’s relationship 
with Gretchen, the humble young woman he falls in love with after drinking a tonic procured 
by Mephistopheles in order to reinvigorate Faust’s flagging capacities for sensual enjoyment 
(Goethe, 1987: 81f. (Part One, Sc. 9-10, lines 2600-2626)). It is not immediately clear whether 
the Gretchen theme can or indeed should be accommodated to the theme of Faust’s “idealism 
of transcendence.” If Mephistopheles is trying to drag Faust “through life’s wastes” in order 
to deprive him of spiritual sustenance, why allow him to fall in love with such a woman? In 
fact, I think, Mephistopheles can expect one of two outcomes from the Gretchen affair, both of 
which are to his benefit: either it will end well for the couple and Faust will be truly contented, 
in which case he loses the wager and Mephistopheles can claim his soul; or—more plausibly, 
and as in fact happens—it will end badly and Faust will fall deeper into despair, having found 
that the most perfect worldly ideal of romantic love is also fleeting and chimerical. In the end, 
however, it does turn out to have been a mistake for Mephistopheles—as may be expected of 
a power who wills evil, but unwittingly serves good (Goethe, 1987: 42 (Part One, Sc. 6, lines 
1336-1337))—since Faust’s soul is apparently drawn heavenwards by the “eternal feminine” 





what he calls the “false idealist.” It is here, in the final paragraph of Schiller’s essay, 
that he draws a portrait fit not only for the wayward anti-heroes of the Sturm und 
Drang that he must have had in mind, but, as readers of Dostoevsky will see right 
away, of the Underground Man as well. I quote the whole description, and consider 
its implications below: 
Whereas the effects of true idealism are, by contrast [to those of realism], 
uncertain and often dangerous, those of false idealism are terrifying. 
The true idealist takes leave of nature and experience only because he 
does not discover there what reason obliges him to strive for: what is 
immutable and unconditionally necessary. Out of sheer arbitrariness 
the visionary [i.e. false idealist] takes leave of nature in order to be able 
to indulge his self-absorption in desires and the whims of his imagina-
tion all the more wantonly. He puts his freedom, not in being independ-
ent of physical constraints, but in being released from moral ones. Thus 
the visionary does not merely deny the human character—he denies all 
character, he is utterly lawless, hence he is nothing and is also good for 
nothing. Precisely because this fantasy is a deviation, not from nature, 
but from freedom, because it thus springs from a disposition in itself 
worthy of respect and infinitely perfectible, it also leads to an infinite 
fall into a bottomless depth and can only end in complete annihilation.51  
Schiller attributes this false idealism to “sheer arbitrariness”; it is thus a kind of ide-
alism only insofar as it abandons reality in favour of products of the imagination, and 
not because it is directed towards what he would consider a genuine ideal, sanctioned 
by pure reason. But even though Schiller implies that false idealists corrupt them-
selves wilfully, through indulging gratuitously in their intellectual freedom rather 
than using it to serve the needs of reason, his awareness of the precariousness of mod-
ern sentimentalism and idealism more generally suggests that false idealism should 
be a broader problem.  
When the waywardness of idealism is coupled with the influence of nihilism, the 
problem of the false idealist takes on new significance; quite apart from the dubious 
 




moral and intellectual value of his “utterly lawless” imaginings, the very extrava-
gance of his ideals exacerbates the problem of caprice; accustomed to the wildest in-
tellectual libertinism, the false idealist must be all the less able to countenance the 
limitations of reality. This is precisely what happens in the case of Faust. Thus the 
modern idealist is liable to end up in a worse state of capriciousness than the savage, 
because he is all the more unable to exercise his absolute intellectual freedom in a 
meaningful and satisfactory way. Even though, unlike the savage, the modern idealist 
is perfectly capable of abstracting from reality, he is nevertheless incapable of satisfy-
ing his spiritual needs because, as a victim of modern ideas, he believes that the trans-
cendent ideals he strives for—whether they are moral or epistemic, chivalric or “gnos-
tic”—are mere fantasies. These modern ideas may influence characters directly, as in 
The Robbers and Notes from Underground, or may be represented concretely in their 
experiences, as in Faust. In all cases, the idealist is led to think of the world as a cold 
and inhospitable environment that robs human beings of their spiritual dignity. As 
we have seen, during the Enlightenment this was a pressing issue, because modern 
science was eroding confidence in the reality of anything beyond the merely animal 
and material: for intellectuals at the end of the eighteenth century, the real world was 
not seen as a suitable arena for the realization of their sentimental and romantic ideals, 
which emphasized human dignity as sublime transcendence over animal nature.   
We have seen this illustrated in Karl Moor, in Faust, and in the case of the Under-
ground Man himself, for whom, as Victor Terras says, life is “a loud and ugly disso-
nance between what man is trying to be and what he is.”52 On the one hand, he is a 
wayward “Schiller” and devotee of the “sublime and beautiful” aesthetics, with a ro-
bust sense of his own sublime transcendence over nature and of the way he and the 
world ought to be; on the other hand, he is rationally persuaded by the claims of the 
Nihilists, and believes that understands well the way the world is. And he is well 
aware that the way the world ought to be according to his extravagant idealism, and 
the way the world is according to his nihilism, are fundamentally irreconcilable: in 
 




other words, he believes that his ideals are unrealizable. Further—as we saw in Chap-
ter 5—he believes that the only “ideals” that are realizable in light of the findings of 
modern science, namely, those of the utopian socialists, are not ideals worthy of the 
name at all. The “crystal palace” of Chernyshevsky represents nothing more than the 
dreary utilitarianism of the tenement block; yet it may really be the best that human 
beings can hope to attain, given the (for him) bleak picture of reality painted by the 
Nihilists. This realization leaves the Underground Man frustrated and disillusioned, 
his noblest ideals acknowledged as fantasies, in the same straits as Schiller’s capri-
cious “savages,” or, more precisely, the dangerous “false idealist” whose refusal to 
relinquish the absolute freedom of his fancies leads to the rejection of all limitations, 
real, rational, and moral.    
6. Conclusion 
Investigation of Schiller’s theoretical works and the plays of the Sturm und Drang was 
motivated by a concern to understand the complex and obscure relationship between 
the Underground Man’s most important psychological peculiarities: his stubborn ide-
alism, his equally stubborn nihilism, and, finally, his caprice. It is the latter trait that 
makes him unfit for life in any harmonious, not to say utopian society; to understand 
it is thus to understand the most important premise of Dostoevsky’s social-philosoph-
ical polemic in Notes from Underground.  
We have now arrived at an explanation of the Underground Man’s caprice, based on 
Schiller’s essays and comparisons with The Robbers and Faust. When the inherent ten-
dency of idealism towards outlandish fantasies and “false idealism” is coupled with 
the disenchantment of reality by modern science, which is taken by nihilists to prove 
that the real world is utterly prosaic and natural, the fate of an idealist like the Un-
derground Man is sealed. The likelihood of his ideals seeming to be strictly impossi-




reductive naturalism or nihilism, the more farfetched his ideals are likely to seem to 
him. In short, the modern idealist, left to his own devices, becomes attached to lofty 
ideals that, he later finds, are proved by natural science to be impossible. In just this 
way, his romanticism leads the Underground Man to strive for ideals which are in 
themselves farfetched, while his Nihilist intellectual authorities render them doubly 
so, by professing a conception of reality stripped of all traditional values—whether 
aesthetic, moral, religious—and thus totally inhospitable to anything a romantic ide-
alist like himself might find worthy of respect.  
The absolute freedom he experiences in thought, in the “realm of ideas,” when he is 
using his intellect and imagination to abstract from reality and to form ideals, is thus 
rendered worthless by the extent to which nihilism shows the ideals formed in this 
way to be unrealistic. This destruction of the idealist’s ideals implies the frustration 
of his absolute intellectual freedom, which finds the realm of ideas empty of all but 
misleading and fruitless fantasies. In this respect, the Underground Man is in the 
same situation of the savage described by Schiller, who has not gained access to the 
realm of ideas at all. In pursuit of their spiritual needs, they both expect to be able to 
exercise absolute freedom; but in the real world, they find that as human beings they 
are finitely powerful and cannot do so. Reality, of course, cannot possibly meet their 
needs, so they are perpetually frustrated. This then leads to a sense of limitation and 
constraint, which the Underground Man, like the savages, constantly battles against; 
he feels everything real as an intolerable limitation of his absolute freedom. He cannot 
bear the thought that when he has a toothache, he must see a dentist or he will con-
tinue to suffer; being beholden to the limitations of reality is juxtaposed painfully 
with the unlimited power he enjoys in the world of his fantasies.53 
Why should this explanation be taken seriously as an interpretation of Notes from Un-
derground? First, because it is coherent and is supported by Dostoevsky’s text; second, 
because of the works from which it has been extrapolated—taken together, these 
 




works constitute a key to the Underground Man’s caprice that Dostoevsky could 
plausibly have expected his readers to have internalized and have been able to draw 
upon in the interpretation of his novel. The Underground Man belongs to a tradition 
that had settled into the bedrock of Russian intellectual culture, and had exerted a 
formative influence on more than one generation of writers. Broadly speaking, the 
context to which Dostoevsky states the Underground Man belongs is, as Evgenia 
Cherkasova remarks, the age of “bitter disillusionment.”54 The spirit of this age was 
most forcefully expressed in the Sturm und Drang movement. In Russia, this tradition 
had mingled with other foreign influences—most notably, Byron, Schelling, Hegel, 
and later writers like Dickens, Balzac and George Sand—and taken on several new 
forms: Onegin, Pechorin, various Gogolian characters, Oblomov, Turgenev’s “ham-
lets” and “superfluous men.”55 In Notes from Underground, I shall argue, Dostoevsky 
drew on all of these developments but returned much more decisively than ever be-
fore to their common ancestral seat, the German Sturm und Drang movement, with 
which, in its urgent and emotionally charged preoccupation with the problem of ni-
hilism, he seemed to have a special affinity. In Chapters 8 and 9, I turn to consider 
this historical development more fully.  
Having established the plausibility and suitability of this interpretation of the Under-
ground Man, in Chapter 10 I shall then return to solve the original problem of under-
standing Dostoevsky’s social-philosophical polemic in Notes from Underground. 
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Chapter 8:  The Spectre of Nihilism 
1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter we arrived at an explanation of the Underground Man’s ca-
price that can be derived from the works of Schiller and his contemporaries. I sug-
gested that Dostoevsky could plausibly have expected his audience, in light of the 
immense popularity of the works in question, to arrive at a similar understanding of 
the Underground Man; these works belonged to a common stock that most educated 
Russians of Dostoevsky’s generation could recall and draw upon when prompted. In 
this chapter and the next, as stated, I shall explore this issue in more detail by way of 
an extended survey of philosophical and literary developments separating Dostoev-
sky from Schiller and the Sturm und Drang.  
This survey is designed to address two main questions. First, to what extent is the 
Underground Man really a throwback to the Sturm und Drang movement specifically, 
as I have claimed? I have already observed that, despite certain crucial similarities 
pointed out in the last chapters, the Underground Man is in general a far cry from the 
heroes of Schiller and Goethe; generally speaking, as we shall see below, he has much 
more in common with the post-Byronic characters prevalent during the first half of 
the nineteenth century. I shall identify ideas and themes that Dostoevsky seems to 
have co-opted from his various predecessors in developing his novel. Without claim-
ing to be anything like an exhaustive list of sources for Notes from Underground, this 
survey of influences will nevertheless serve an important role in the present investi-
gation. Its purpose in this context is to reveal that there is at least one important theme 
that Dostoevsky could only have drawn from Schiller and Goethe directly, and not 
from more recent developments in the same tradition—namely, the association of dis-




to the Sturm und Drang era. This will provide crucial justification for my claim that 
Dostoevsky refers specifically to heroes like Karl Moor and Faust in his characteriza-
tion of the Underground Man’s caprice, by throwing into relief the close ties between 
Notes from Underground and the Sturm und Drang works considered in preceding 
chapters, and thus justify the method of interpreting the Notes put forward above.  
The second main question is the following: if the Underground Man is indeed such a 
close relative of Karl Moor and Faust, and a throwback to the Sturm und Drang in 
respect of his caprice, why did Dostoevsky establish this relationship? Why did Dos-
toevsky revive the Sturm und Drang association of disillusionment and caprice? I have 
already pointed out that the Stürmer und Dränger, like the Underground Man, were 
reacting against nihilism; at the end of the eighteenth century, the nihilistic implica-
tions of Enlightenment philosophy were hotly debated; and in Dostoevsky’s day, the 
threat of nihilism was once again looming, this time with greater vehemence and self-
assurance.1 There is much more to be said on this front, however. The central histori-
cal observation I wish to make is that thinkers of Dostoevsky’s generation stood—
and typically saw themselves as standing—at the culmination of intellectual devel-
opments taking place over the preceding hundred or so years, primarily in Ger-
many—namely, the rise and fall of the idealistic romanticism inspired by German 
Idealist philosophy. This philosophy developed in large part as a solution to the prob-
lem of nihilism, which—as we saw in Chapter 6—was perceived at the end of the 
eighteenth century to be the inevitable result of the Enlightenment’s uncritical devo-
tion to the power of reason. With the decline of German Idealism through the 1840s 
and 1850s, and then the emergence of Nihilism in the 1860s, Russian intellectuals were 
forced to grapple—as the Stürmer und Dränger had grappled before them—with the 
apparent impossibility of reconciling reason and faith, real and ideal, material nature 
and the special dignity of humanity. Through investigating this history of ideas, we 
gain a clearer sense—in answer to the question posed above—of why Dostoevsky 
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might have struck upon themes developed by writers like Schiller and Goethe in his 
engagement with the resurgent forces of nihilism.  
The second question is addressed first, in the remainder of this chapter, which con-
cerns the development of German Idealism considered as a response to nihilism and 
the problem of human dignity. It concludes with the decline of this philosophy and 
the transition from romanticism to realism in literature, during which time Russian 
intellectuals became increasingly preoccupied with the phenomenon of disillusioned 
idealism. The first question is then addressed in Chapter 9, which is chiefly concerned 
with literary depictions of disillusionment after the Sturm und Drang period; it pur-
sues the legacy of Byronism, which shaped the manner in which most Russian writers 
responded to the decline of German Idealism.2 Chapter 9 concludes with the emer-
gence of Nihilism in the 1860s, thereby arriving at the immediate context of Notes from 
Underground itself. I shall defer answering both questions explicitly until the end of 
Chapter 9. We shall then be in a position to judge the extent to which the dominant 
post-Byronic tradition can be distinguished from the Sturm und Drang in its under-
standing of disillusionment, and appreciate the extent to which Dostoevsky deviated, 
and why he did so, from the former and returned to the latter in his characterization 
of the Underground Man. In Chapter 10, I then synthesize the results of these historical 
sketches in order to illuminate the way in which Dostoevsky uses this revival of the 
Sturm und Drang theme of caprice as a response to the re-emergence of the problem 
that prompted it in the first place, namely, the threat of nihilism.  
* * * 
Some methodological clarifications are in order. First: all of the works to be consid-
ered are well-known and well-studied; I do not believe I have drawn any startling 
conclusions or attained original insights into them. That being said, I have deviated 
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described in the present chapter serve as a useful prelude to the literary developments con-




from standard histories in focusing my attention on the ideas developed in previous 
chapters—human dignity, spiritual needs, idealism, disillusionment—and in grant-
ing philosophical and literary works equal weight as means of grappling with these 
ideas. Second: given the large number of works under consideration, the following 
survey is necessarily limited in scope and depth; it is intended only to deliver a rep-
resentative sample of some of the most important (relative to our present interests) 
literary and philosophical developments, and to examine them in detail sufficient 
only for present purposes.3 For the same reason, I have abstracted almost entirely 
from the economic and political developments which were occurring during the pe-
riod of time under consideration—namely, the French and Industrial Revolutions, 
along with their various repercussions—despite the fact that these developments nat-
urally exercised considerable influence over literature and philosophy.4 Third: this is 
not an “influence study” in the sense of an enquiry into which writers and thinkers 
influenced Dostoevsky; I take for granted that he was familiar with all the literary 
works under consideration. As for the more theoretical works—I assume on the con-
trary that the details of most, at least, were unknown to him.5 I am interested in all of 
 
3 Of course, there are no hard and fast rules for deciding what to include in such a survey. 
According to intellectual historian Stefan Collini: “‘context’ is never something given, never 
one fixed range of neighbouring activities: what can fruitfully count as context will depend on 
what we already understand about the text which we are choosing to surround with other 
elements, what questions we are seeking to answer or puzzles to resolve. Anything that helps 
to make or restore sense may be seen as an essential context, but there will necessarily be a 
plurality of such framing moves, always involving a selection from the almost limitless resi-
dues of the past. We like to think that the judicious selection of context is what helps protect 
us from misinterpreting what we read, and so it does in the best cases. But there can be no 
recipe for calling such contexts into play: the journeying between past and present which is 
constitutive of the historian’s activity includes an increasing familiarity with the mental 
worlds to be found at either end of those journeys, but the judgement about what needs ex-
plaining, what needs saying, is, like other forms of practical judgement, something built up 
by experience, not arrived at by applying a template” (Collini, 2006: 29f.). 
4 For a more inclusive approach, see Hobsbawm, 1962. 
5  Dostoevsky’s philosophical education was limited, and largely second-hand. He was 
amused when Strakhov pointed out the commonalities between his views and those of various 
Western philosophers, wondering at how difficult it was to think up original ideas; and, 
though he requested philosophical works be sent to him during his period of Siberian exile, 
Strakhov reports that his volume of Hegel remained uncut (Clowes, 2004: 84-86; Frank, 1986: 





these works not insofar as they may or may not have directly influenced Dostoevsky, 
but because they illuminate the traditions of philosophy and literature to which Notes 
from Underground makes a polemical contribution, both as a new development of the 
“Hamlet” and “superfluous man” traditions and, more importantly, as an answer to 
Chernyshevsky and the rise of Nihilist utopian socialism.  
2. The Counter-Enlightenment and The Pantheism Controversy  
In Chapter 6 we considered the Sturm und Drang reaction to the rationalistic optimism 
of the Enlightenment, which Schiller portrayed as corrupting the morals of Franz 
Moor and provoking open rebellion in the more traditional Karl. But this was neither 
the beginning nor the end of counter-Enlightenment reaction: the idea that reason 
should be granted unlimited authority had always been perceived as naive or out-
right dangerous by various reactionaries and conservatives.6 
Such dissenting voices notwithstanding, many Enlightenment philosophers pro-
ceeded apace in the assurance that their rationalism was entirely benign, and that 
whatever spiritual needs human beings may have could be satisfied without recourse 
to irrational faith or traditional religious authorities. Ironically, Voltaire doubted 
whether philosophy would ever create much of a fuss, for good or for ill: “All the 
Works of the modern Philosophers put together will never make so much Noise as 
even the Dispute which arose among the Franciscans, merely about the Fashion of 
their Sleeves and of their Cowls.”7 Religion needed no special protection. In any case, 
though it was often admitted that society—and in particular the uneducated 
 
considered below: as Frank remarks, “no one who had actively participated in the ideological 
debates of the 1840s in Russia, and had mulled over the pages of Belinsky and Herzen, could 
have helped acquiring a fairly wide acquaintance with the reigning philosophical ideas of the 
time” (Frank, 1986: 42). 
6 McMahon, 2002: 68; Garrard, 2006. 




masses—required some kind of religion to protect political and moral stability, it was 
thought that reason sanctioned a limited deism capable of performing this role just as 
well as the existing church, and without spreading the latter’s corruption and super-
stition.  
Belief in the compatibility of reason and faith was indeed part of the foundations of 
the Enlightenment, as in the works of Descartes, of Newton, or of Francis Bacon, who 
commented that “I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, 
and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind; and, therefore, God 
never wrought a miracle to convince atheism, because his ordinary works convince 
it.”8 For such thinkers, true science was indeed a far more reliable defender of faith 
than was superstition: through revealing the perfection of creation, science revealed 
the existence and perfection of the creator. Bacon found it incredible that “an army of 
infinite small portions, or seeds unplaced, should have produced this order and 
beauty without a divine marshal,” and thus that “atheism is rather in the lip than in 
the heart of man”—no sane and educated person could honestly believe it.9  
As we saw in Chapter 6, this trust in the compatibility of science and faith came in-
creasingly under attack, and even progressive Enlightenment philosophers began to 
worry that reason could not on its own sustain the religious, moral and political foun-
dations of European civilization. Hume advised his readers to simply abstain from 
venturing into metaphysical enquiries that, he argued, could only lead to scepti-
cism—“so boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction!”10 Although 
atheism was openly championed by the more radical philosophers, such as the Baron 
d’Holbach, most were somewhat more cautious about dispensing with religion alto-
gether. Rousseau’s Contrat Social remarks on the necessity of a state religion to main-
tain social cohesion, and Voltaire’s quip that “if God did not exist, it would be neces-
sary to invent him” attained proverbial status.11 The philosophers of the German 
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Enlightenment were generally even less inclined towards outright nihilism than their 
French counterparts (though this may in part have been because of stricter political 
control and censorship).12 Fearing the total collapse of religion and everything that 
rested upon it, as the eighteenth century came to a close German philosophers tackled 
“a single fundamental problem” that Frederick Beiser refers to as the problem of “the 
authority of reason.”13 Should reason have the authority to criticize the foundations 
of religion and morality, regardless of the outcome—even if it completely destroys 
these foundations and violently overturns the social order? Do we therefore have to 
choose between reason and blind faith? Give reason complete authority or give it 
none at all? Neither alternative was satisfying: “Isolated sensibility, feeling without 
reason, and blind faith pull inexorably toward fanaticism; isolated reason, cold spec-
ulation, and the unrestricted desire to know lead at best to icy, carping, inactive de-
ism.”14 Along with the French Revolution, the crisis of reason’s authority had a mas-
sive impact on the development of German philosophers coming to intellectual ma-
turity in the 1880s and 1890s.15 Thus this problem continued to hold the attention of 
philosophers well into the nineteenth century, even though, after Kant, Reinhold and 
their followers (to be considered below), they were much more optimistic about hav-
ing solved it or being about to solve it; thus Beiser writes that the “chief aim” of He-
gel’s philosophy, which dominated the early nineteenth century, was to solve the 
problem posed by the pantheism controversy.16 
 
12 Beiser, 1992: 8. Kant’s most thorough attempt at harmonizing Christianity and philosophy, 
his Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason, led to his being forbidden to write on religious 
subjects (Kant, 2009: xviii).    
13 Beiser, 1987: 1. See also Pinkard, 2002: 90ff.  
14 Reinhold, 2005: 46. 
15 See, e.g., Pinkard, 2000: 30f. 
16 Beiser, 2014: 54. According to Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s famous Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) 
grapples directly with “the spiritual crisis over whether the modern authority of reason was 
itself sustainable or was itself simply too empty and arid to produce anything worthy of full 
allegiance” and attempts to move beyond the failure of “the various attempts of European life 
to shore up its normative commitments in the early modern period by reliance either on reason 
itself or something else beyond reason that would somehow ‘ground’ and reassure reason 




The problems of nihilism and the authority of reason came most forcefully to the at-
tention of philosophers in Germany with the “pantheism controversy,” which 
erupted out of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s claim that the late Gotthold Ephraim Les-
sing had, in private, admitted to being a Spinozist. This was far more than a piece of 
slanderous gossip. Lessing had been a stalwart of the German Enlightenment, and 
Spinozism encapsulated the worst anxieties of many of his admirers. Spinozism—
which, as a form of pantheism, equated God with the world and also viewed the 
world in purely mechanistic terms—was then equated with atheism and the denial of 
free will; it was thus a form of what Jacobi branded “nihilism,” in that it apparently 
undermined the basis of traditional philosophical, moral, religious and political val-
ues.17 Spinozism loomed darkly over the Enlightenment as a warning against the cor-
rosive potential of rationalism; all who cherished—or wanted to be seen to cherish—
traditional morals and religion worried that Spinozism might be lurking as an un-
wanted implication in the wings of their favourite philosophical systems.18 Jacobi ar-
gued that Spinozism was indeed the logical conclusion of Enlightenment rationalism, 
and publicized Lessing’s confession in the knowledge that it would embarrass those 
who hoped otherwise. This is in fact what happened. Many resisted Jacobi’s claim 
that all rational philosophy leads to nihilism, but agreed it was the main threat to 
modern thought; thus the defenders of reason were forced to enter into debate with 
Jacobi. The philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, an indignant friend of Lessing, was 
foremost among these, though his opposition to Jacobi was widely regarded as inad-
equate. What’s more, anxious to submit his rejoinder to the press, Mendelssohn 
rushed into the street without adequate protection from the elements, caught a chill 
and died shortly after. In the eyes of the public it was as if he had been “killed” by 
 
17 Although he gives the word a primarily theoretical significance, designating the view that 
metaphysical knowledge is impossible, Jacobi’s “nihilism” is not merely epistemological, but 
ethical and religious because he believed that theory and practice were linked: nihilism in the 
realm of metaphysics would undermine the basis of morality. As Beiser notes, “Jacobi’s use of 
the word provides all the stuff for the fiction of a Dostoevsky” (Beiser, 1987: 82).  
18 “It is remarkable how many important philosophers of the past have come to think: ‘If my 





Jacobi’s assault on his ideals; and it “was not only Mendelssohn, but the Aufklärung 
[German Enlightenment] itself that had died.”19 The belief in the compatibility of faith 
and reason that had sustained the Enlightenment since its inception was permanently 
shaken.  
As we have seen above, moreover, the question of whether or not reason is compati-
ble with faith is at the same time a question about whether, considered rationally, 
humanity can claim to be elevated above the rest of nature in any significant respect, 
better in kind and not merely by degree, more noble and not merely more intelligent; 
the pantheism controversy can thus be understood as a dispute about whether or not 
reason undermines human dignity. As Bacon had warned at the outset of the Enlight-
enment: “They that deny a God destroy a man’s nobility; for certainly man is of kin 
to the beasts by his body; and, if he be not of kin to God by his spirit, he is a base and 
ignoble creature.”20 To say that God’s existence, and therefore the divine aspect of 
humanity itself, cannot be supported by rational philosophy is to say in effect that 
reason undermines human dignity and displaces all of the values that lend nobility 
to its own aspirations. As Jacobi wrote in his 1785 Letters Concerning the Doctrine of 
Spinoza, the spark of the pantheism controversy:   
Reason that has fallen into poverty and become speculative, or in other 
words, degenerate reason, [ … ] must drag itself here and there, looking 
for a truth that left when the contemplative understanding left, for re-
ligion and its goods—just as morality must do, looking for virtuous in-
clinations that have disappeared; and laws must also, looking for the 
fallen public spirit and the better customs; pedagogy. . . .  Let me inter-
rupt here, that I be not swept off my feet by the flood coming my way.21  
Jacobi predicts that the true meaning of every aspect of human life will be swept away 
by the “flood” of nihilism, and that, having thus destroyed all the highest objects of 
their striving, philosophy and science will be forced to confront the depleted and 
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colourless picture of reality that they have themselves created, in which human be-
ings are nothing but machines. Certain of the philosophes, as we have seen, were ready 
to accept this consequence; Jacobi’s audience was on the whole far less willing, and 
feared not only for human dignity but for the very fabric of the social order. Such 
fears were naturally lent new impetus by the French Revolution, which was then 
looming and soon to erupt.22 
Jacobi’s own solution to the problem was religious: forced to choose between reason 
and faith, he embraced a non-rational faith in the incomprehensible divinity,23 argu-
ing that human dignity consists not at all in reason—which reduces everything to the 
humanly comprehensible and thereby actively debases it—but in the fact that human 
beings have been created by something so high above them that they cannot compre-
hend it. “With irresistible commanding force,“ he wrote, “the highest in me directs to 
an All-highest outside and above me; it compels me to believe in the incomprehensi-
ble, yea in what is conceptually impossible, within me and outside me, from love, 
through love.” 24  Incomprehensibility becomes for Jacobi a necessary (but not, of 
course, sufficient) criterion of divinity: anything that can be rationally understood is 
by the same token unworthy of our highest esteem.25 In this he followed the great 
 
22 Beiser, 1992: 2. 
23 Jacobi’s prioritization of faith over reason calls to mind one of Dostoevsky’s statements 
about religion. In a famous letter to N. D. Fonvizina, Dostoevsky states that if he was forced 
to choose between Christ and “the truth,” he would choose the former (Dostoevsky, 1987: 68). 
As Scanlan notes, however, this should not be taken, as it often is, as a statement of irrational-
ism—for one thing, Dostoevsky does not here state that he is forced to make this choice, only 
that he would choose Christ if he had to (Scanlan, 2002: 7). Thus it seems that Dostoevsky is 
not as pessimistic as Jacobi about the conflict between reason and faith (more on this in Chap-
ter 10, where I argue that Dostoevsky does not think that Christianity is unreasonable or un-
realistic). 
24 Jacobi, 2009: 515. 
25 Thus he proclaims with great passion that if the natural world were everything science finds 
it to be, and nothing more, then it would not be worthy of existence: “Just as this world of 
appearances, if it had all its truth in the appearances and no deeper meaning, if it had nothing 
to reveal apart from them, would become a ghastly phantom before which I would curse the 
consciousness where this horror has its genesis, and would call down Annihilation upon it 
like a Divinity,”—here I am reminded of the rhetoric of Karl Moor—“so too everything that I 





counter-Enlightenment philosopher and grandfather of the Sturm und Drang and ro-
mantic movements, Johann Gottfried Herder: “How miserably small it would have 
to be if I, a fly, could see it all!”26 Jacobi finds confirmation of human dignity in hum-
bling his rationality by means of faith in a perfection he cannot comprehend. 
In spite of his religiosity, Jacobi’s striking anti-rationalism puts him in sympathy, if 
not agreement, with more committed Stürmer und Dränger. The title character of his 
1776 epistolary novel Allwill is a romantic young man reminiscent of Goethe’s 
Werther (with the addition of a rakish mystique that anticipates Byron). Like the other 
heroes of the Sturm und Drang, he refuses to compromise his ideals or reconcile him-
self with the limitations of reality; he too is willing to sacrifice his “normal advantage” 
on the altar of his ideals. “Whoever reconciles himself on this earth of ours to a lasting 
peace of mind,” he says, “and can taste in it the fulfilment of his wishes, cannot be 
carrying a heart in his chest, but only a pump to spurt blood through his veins.—And 
that man is supposed to be happy—happy above everybody else?”27 He spurns the nihil-
ist conception of happiness—the same utilitarian conception advocated by the likes 
of d’Holbach and Chernyshevsky and attacked by the Underground Man—which 
considers human beings only in their material aspect, and does not take their higher 
aspirations into account. “The system of happiness,” he scoffs, “this is how they call 
what they want to teach us—the highest pleasure of mankind; what that is, they know 
for every possible circumstance; they have in view the harmony of all needs, the 
measure of every human power in the soul.”28 Such scientific approaches to human 
happiness are radically defective; he would fully endorse the Underground Man’s 
comparison of Chernyshevsky’s “Crystal Palace” to a chicken coop.   
 
tears the heart out of my breast, the moment I accept that it exists without connection in me to 
a higher and true Being, without being in me only symbol and image of this Being; if all that I 
have in me is only empty consciousness and poesy” (Jacobi, 2009: 515). 
26 Herder, 2004: 96. 
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Jacobi no doubt sympathizes with his hero’s disillusionment, but regards his response 
to nihilism as immature. Allwill senses that reason leads to nihilism, and so rejects 
rationalism; but he puts nothing in its place, and attempts to live without constraints, 
without “form” of any kind. (In German as in English, his very name implies a lack 
of restraint.) Thus Allwill is rebuked for his Sturm und Drang intellectual libertinism 
or “butterfly philosophy,” and advised to give order and regularity to his aspirations: 
The butterfly philosophy of people like you would gladly see anything 
called “form” banished. Everything ought to happen freehand; the hu-
man soul ought to build itself up into everything good and beautiful—
by itself; and you people do not stop to think that the human character 
is like a liquid matter that cannot have shape and permanence except in a 
receptacle; and so it never once comes into your heads to consider that 
pure water in a glass is of more use than nectar poured on mud.29  
Without by any means agreeing with the nihilists that humans ought to limit their 
aspirations to a merely animal happiness, Jacobi nevertheless asks the idealistic youth 
to reign in their enthusiasm. They needn’t accept the degrading “form” offered to 
them by nihilists—the materialistic calculations of utilitarianism—but they must ac-
cept a different kind of “shape and permanence,” namely the constraints of morality 
and good sense, lest the “nectar” of their exalted minds be dissipated in directionless 
striving, as indeed happened in the case of the heroes of the Sturm und Drang.30 Here 
Jacobi is illustrating the need for Bildung, the intellectual, moral and aesthetic refine-
ment of character lacked by impetuous romantics like Allwill. 
Jacobi’s proposed solution to the problem of nihilism is especially interesting to con-
sider here in that it marks a direct critique of the Sturm und Drang reaction to nihilism 
that Jacobi embodies in Allwill. As we shall see below, the “butterfly philosophy” of 
caprice did indeed give way to a philosophy of harmony, but not precisely in the 
purely religious direction that Jacobi espoused. Instead, it was a new philosophical 
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movement, and a reconceptualization of the role to be played by reason in philosophy, 
that—for its proponents—ushered in a culture of refinement, balance and Bildung, 
solved the problem of nihilism, and put a stop to the raging of Sturm und Drang. 
3. Kant and Reinhold 
As we have seen, Jacobi defended faith against what he took to be the vain preten-
sions of reason. Understood as a problem for human dignity, however, the pantheism 
controversy could not end in Jacobi’s favour as a triumph of faith over rationalism. 
Reason, for the Enlightenment, was a large part of what made human beings special—
is it acceptable that it could be incompatible with the other parts, morality and reli-
gion? The necessity of choosing between reason and faith was itself offensive to hu-
man dignity. It is on this point that Jacobi diverged from the Stürmer und Dränger: 
following the advice of David Hume, he was willing to ignore the demands of rea-
son—unlike, for instance, Karl Moor, who could not simply dismiss the “modern 
scribbling philosophers” even though he despised them, because he believed that he 
could not refute them. Jacobi’s anti-rationalism meant that he was, to a great extent, 
unable to appease the spirit of the age, which would not back down from reason even 
if it hesitated to fully embrace it. It was all very well to chastise Allwill for his “but-
terfly philosophy” that prefers complete “formlessness” to any kind of limitation; Ja-
cobi failed to appreciate the extent to which the only “form” available to a modern 
intellectual was nihilistic rationalism, because all of the others—morals, religion, taste 
etc.—had already been undermined by it. Jacobi was all too successful in convincing 
his readers that rationalism would lead to all-consuming nihilism unless it was re-
jected; but he underestimated the compulsion of rationalism—he failed to see that 
“you can’t object, it’s two times two makes four!”  
As such, many modern intellectuals like Allwill—or Karl Moor, or Faust, or the Un-




Bildung that Jacobi advocated as a means of restoring human dignity in the wake of 
the Enlightenment. For such people, a workable solution would have to take one gen-
eral form: a reconciliation of reason and faith that was acceptable to both, that neither 
offended the intellectual sensibilities of a modern intellectual, nor threatened the va-
lidity of humanity’s higher aspirations. Jacobi failed to appease the former. It re-
mained for another philosopher to resolve—at least for a time—and despite Jacobi’s 
protestations—the tension between reason and faith without denying either the re-
spect due to it. 
This was Kant, as popularized by Karl Leonard Reinhold, who presented Kant’s phi-
losophy for popular consumption as a remedy for the pantheism controversy. Like 
many of his contemporaries, Reinhold was deeply troubled by the threat of nihilism 
described by Jacobi; he worried that reason, in the guise of modern Enlightenment 
thought, would undermine religion and morals, robbing humanity of its dignity and 
destroying the whole basis of social cohesion.31 At the end of the eighteenth century, 
as Reinhold evocatively described it in his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy (serialized 
1786-1787, expanded as a monograph in 1790 and 1792), morality and religion were 
subject to a “shaking,” a universal controversy which threatened to result in the total 
destabilization of what he regarded as traditional European culture.32 This shaking 
was understood by Reinhold to be the natural conclusion of the Enlightenment and—
more remotely—the Reformation, which for him liberated reason from the dominion 
of Roman Catholic authority, and made it the final arbiter of all scientific, moral and 
religious matters.33 In Reinhold’s day, as he saw it, the field was divided among those 
 
31 “He believes, not without concern, that he has observed the state of our scientific and schol-
arly culture being determined by an ever-expanding quest for graspable objects, the limited 
enthusiasm of the nation for her poets and philosophers visibly decreasing, morality being 
degraded more and more widely to self-interested cleverness by teachers of morality, and the 
rights of humanity being explained by legal authorities more and more expressly in terms of 
the advantage they offer to a particular state” (Reinhold, 2005: 126). 
32 Reinhold, 2005: 131: “The most striking and characteristic feature of the spirit of our age is 
a shaking of all previously known systems, theories, and manners of representation, a shaking 
whose range and depth is unprecedented in the history of the human spirit.” 




who persisted in what he regarded as the Protestant exaltation of reason (deists, pan-
theists, atheists), those, like Jacobi, who favoured tradition and faith (Catholics, su-
pernaturalists, mystics), and the apathetic bystanders who had given up all hope of 
resolution.  
Reinhold found a solution to this stand-off in Kant’s philosophy. In his Letters, he 
presented Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781, revised 1787) as the ultimate cure for 
the problem of reason’s authority and the “shaking” that accompanied it; by glossing 
over the vast technical apparatus and focusing instead on what he took to be the pri-
mary religious and moral upshot of the work, he reconstrued Kant’s philosophy in a 
manner far more accessible and more obviously relevant to the most important issue 
of the day. Reinhold’s immense success in promulgating Kant’s philosophy lies in the 
fact that he presented it in this way as a solution to the pantheism controversy.34 
Kant’s rise to fame was thereby given a major boost.35 As the young Fichte wrote of 
Kant’s philosophy in a private letter: “What a blessing for an age in which morality 
has been destroyed from its very foundations and from whose dictionaries the word 
duty has been erased!”36 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, as presented by Reinhold, was supposed to solve the 
problem of nihilism through establishing once and for all the proper domain of reason 
and thereby “making room for faith,” as Kant himself later put it.37 Most importantly, 
reason itself was to establish the bounds of its own operations; where Jacobi denied 
rationalism simply because it threatened faith, thereby offending reason itself, Kant 
argued that reason should rein in its own ambitions without recourse to a non-
 
34 Beiser, 1987: 45. 
35 “Overnight, his teaching turned the small university town [Jena] into the center of the next 
generation of German thought and the first professional home of the German Idealists: Fichte, 
Schelling, and Hegel. It also helped to attract to Jena an extraordinary constellation of writers, 
including Schiller, Hölderlin, Novalis, and Friedrich Schlegel, who all began to focus on Kant 
and to react to him in terms of the way that the Critical system was initially presented by 
Reinhold” (Reinhold, 2005: ix). 
36 Fichte, 1988: 357. 




rational source of authority such as tradition, church or state. In other words, he ar-
gued that nihilistic rationalism was in fact irrational, and that a more consistently ra-
tional philosophy—a critical philosophy—would naturally turn back of its own accord 
before encroaching on the territory of faith, and thus not threaten the validity of hu-
manity’s spiritual needs. 
Kant’s principles were to be universally recognized and thus put an end to the inter-
nal conflicts of theoretical philosophy—mediating between empiricists and rational-
ists, realists and idealists—that had hitherto spilled over into dangerous moral and 
religious disputes like the pantheism controversy. With the rampaging theoretical 
philosophy of the Enlightenment brought to heel, morality and religion could flourish 
(without, that is, encroaching on the domains proper to theoretical reason, so as to 
preserve science and politics from the interference of religious authorities with vested 
interests). This was indeed the order of the day. As we have seen, all but the most 
radical parties wanted to retain the traditional moral and religious convictions they 
had grown up with, but reason seemed to demand that these convictions be rooted 
in universally acknowledged grounds; after all, reason does not deal in matters of opin-
ion, but ineluctable truths. According to Kant, no such universal agreement was forth-
coming only because it was being sought in domains that theoretical philosophy 
could not reasonably hope to encompass. Needless to say, however, Kant did not ul-
timately succeed in garnering the universal agreement he required; he generated as 
much controversy as he resolved, and he came under attack from all quarters. As 
Fichte would later put it, although Kant had entirely succeeded in the “practical goal” 
of assuaging the Humean scepticism of his generation, “it is not our vocation to be 
satisfied with this. We are destined for complete and systematic cognizance. It is not 
enough that our doubts be resolved and we be consigned to tranquillity; we also want 
science.”38 The theoretical foundations of the Kantian philosophy were assailed and, 
 




at the time, the attacks on Kant seemed to show that the prospects of philosophy were 
“bleak, very bleak indeed.”39  
The task of reconciling reason and faith, science and philosophy, was especially vul-
nerable. Kant had persuasively undermined all hope of providing a theoretical justi-
fication of faith through his critique of reason, but his ploy of “making room for faith” 
was widely regarded as inadequate. The old guard of the Enlightenment “insisted on 
a theoretical defense of faith, because only such a defense could satisfy the belief in 
the existence of God, immortality, and providence.” They were convinced that Kant’s 
“all-crushing” philosophy would lead to nihilism, and “[i]n their eyes Kant’s practical 
faith was only a ploy to conceal these skeptical consequences.”40 It seemed Jacobi was 
right that reason could not, even by such sophisticated means as the Critique, be 
brought into harmony with faith.  
Reinhold himself went on to find inadequacies in the Kantian project, and attempted 
to provide a “meta-critical foundation” that would protect it from accusations of scep-
ticism.41 Thus the downfall of Reinhold’s philosophy “had very serious repercussions 
for the authority of reason”42—through establishing the need for a “first principle” on 
which to ground the critical philosophy, and then failing catastrophically to provide 
such a principle, Reinhold succeeded only in undermining his master’s authority. 
Nevertheless, according to Beiser, Kant’s attempt fixed the general direction of Ger-
man philosophy for decades to come, during which time his successors devised in-
creasingly elaborate means of shoring up and enlarging the gains he had made 
against the “specter of nihilism.”43 Thus, although the authority of reason was now 
“at its shakiest point since its assertion by Descartes nearly two centuries before,” it 
would not be long before it made a complete recovery and philosophers like Schelling 
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and Hegel were again constructing elaborate metaphysical systems.44 By the end of 
the century, indeed, there was a renewal of self-confidence in philosophy and a sense 
that nihilism had actually been defeated.  
4. From Herder to Hegel 
As we have seen, the pantheism controversy was a problem for the Enlightenment 
because it suggested that the basic assumption of reason’s compatibility with faith, 
and therefore with human dignity, was mistaken. The founding thinkers of the En-
lightenment, such as Bacon and Descartes, did not doubt that to deny its divine origin 
was to rob humanity of its dignity; that considered merely as physical bodies, human 
beings were worthy of nothing but contempt—“if he be not of kin to God by his spirit, 
he is a base and ignoble creature.”45 In Germany, however, some philosophers were 
becoming increasingly convinced that the natural aspect of human beings need not 
be cause for such alarm; unlike philosophes such as La Mettrie and d’Holbach, moreo-
ver, they argued that the recognition of human materiality need not lead to nihilism 
or to the revaluation of human dignity. Although Lessing’s alleged Spinozism was 
the origin of the controversy that destroyed the German Enlightenment, pantheism 
was seen as an attractive alternative for philosophers and other intellectuals who 
sought an escape from the beleaguered fortress of Kantianism, whose imposing walls 
were now thought to rest on shaky foundations. The leader of this escape was Johann 
Gottfried Herder, who exercised an enormous influence on the shape of German phi-
losophy at the end of the eighteenth century.46  
For Herder, pantheism provides a way out of nihilism precisely because it does not 
elevate the divinity above the natural world: its divinity is not transcendent, so its 
 
44 Beiser, 1987: 325. 
45 Bacon, 1902: 45. 




nature is therefore divine. Of course, nature did not have an especially divine appear-
ance at the turn of the nineteenth century, when the Enlightenment’s materialism was 
still prevalent. Herder’s task was thus to interpret nature in such a way as to accom-
modate his vision of an immanent divinity: if the physical universe was nothing but 
an elaborate machine, as Spinoza himself was thought to profess, then pantheism 
does indeed seem equivalent to nihilism; but if, on the contrary, nature is not mere 
mechanism, but hides within its workings the same higher powers that animate our 
noblest aspirations, then it need not be thought of as a prison but as a haven for the 
human spirit. Herder therefore proposed a modified Spinozism, which replaced 
mechanism with a kind of vitalism.47  
Herder’s revival of pantheism, understood in the broadest sense as a theory of the 
identity of the divinity with the universe, had a powerful effect on the German Ideal-
ists who succeeded Kant—to some extent Fichte, and especially Schelling and Hegel. 
Despite being called “idealists,” these philosophers did not think along with Berkeley 
that the physical world was nothing but a projection of the mind. In Schelling’s Bruno 
(1802), a dialogical exposition of his philosophy at the time of his divergence from 
Fichte, the characters representing Fichte and Schelling agree on a system they both 
call “idealism” “not because it determines the real by the ideal, but because it refuses 
to grant more than an ideal status to the opposition of the real and the ideal.”48 That 
is, it is an idealism insofar as it denies the reality of the distinction between real and 
ideal, or between matter and spirit.  
The German Idealists developed different ways of proving that matter and spirit were 
fundamentally identical, but the general form of their approach remained the same: 
it involved showing that the way in which philosophers had hitherto viewed the 
world and the place of humanity in it was somehow radically defective, that the op-
position between matter and spirit giving rise to nihilism belonged only to this defec-
tive view, and that to correct it was therefore to resolve the opposition and eliminate 
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nihilism. As Hegel put it in his 1802 Faith and Knowledge (an early work written before 
he had cast off the tutelage of Schelling): 
In [true] philosophy, however, the actual and the temporal as such dis-
appear. This is called [by its opponents] cruel dissection destructive of 
the wholeness of man, or violent abstraction that has no truth, and par-
ticularly no practical truth. This abstraction is conceived of as the pain-
ful cutting off of an essential part from the completeness of the whole. 
But the temporal and empirical, and privation, are thus recognized as 
an essential part and an absolute In-itself. It is as if someone who sees 
only the feet of a work of art were to complain, when the whole work 
is revealed to his sight, that he was being deprived of his deprivation 
and that the incomplete had been in-completed. Finite cognition is this 
sort of cognition of a part and a singular. If the absolute were put to-
gether out of the finite and the infinite, abstracting from the finite 
would indeed be a loss. In the Idea, however, finite and infinite are one, 
and hence finitude as such, i.e., as something that was supposed to have 
truth and reality in and for itself, has vanished. Yet what was negated 
was only the negative in finitude; and thus the true affirmation was 
posited.49  
This passage also serves as an example of the various esoteric languages that pre-
vailed in German philosophy after Kant, and may require some exegesis. Hegel here 
calls for the elimination of “the actual and the temporal as such” or “finitude as such” 
from philosophy, not because he denies the existence of the real material world, but 
because he regards the traditional philosophical conception of the real world as fun-
damentally impoverished. What philosophers have taken to be real—namely, the 
spatiotemporal and the mechanical defined in opposition to the free creative spirit—is 
in fact a distorted vision, merely part of a larger and much richer picture. Hegel’s 
denial of “the actual and the temporal as such” is a call for the correction of this dis-
torted vision. “Finitude as such” does not exist because finitude is at bottom identical 
to infinity. When Enlightenment philosophers claimed that the physical world was a 
dead, mindless and meaningless mechanism; when they thought of the physical 
 




world as an environment hostile to their higher moral and intellectual vocations; 
when they lamented that the spiritual dimension of human striving could never be 
fulfilled; when they therefore despaired, finally, and gave into nihilism, they were 
simply deluding themselves about the world in which they lived.  
When it came to actually demonstrating the underlying spirituality of the physical 
world—and not merely asserting it in arcane language—Schelling and Hegel di-
verged. Schelling attempted to prove quasi-scientifically that the natural universe 
was everywhere imbued with life, consciousness, intelligence, spirit or reason at var-
ious levels of sophistication. This was the beginning of Naturphilosophie, the philoso-
phy of nature which took its cue from Herder’s vitalism,50 and which became ex-
tremely popular among romantics eager to uncover traces of divinity in the myriad 
forms of Nature and to overcome the “unbridgeable alienation from nature that we, 
as moderns, have come to feel.”51 In his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), an 
early but highly influential work, Schelling summarizes the task and result of Natur-
philosophie as follows: 
The necessary tendency of all natural science is thus to move from na-
ture to intelligence. [ … ] —The highest consummation of natural sci-
ence would be the complete spiritualizing of all natural laws into laws 
of intuition and thought. The phenomena (the matter) must wholly dis-
appear, and only the laws (the form) remain. Hence it is, that the more 
lawfulness emerges in nature itself, the more the husk disappears, the 
phenomena themselves become more mental, and at length vanish en-
tirely. [ … ] The completed theory of nature would be that whereby the 
whole of nature was resolved into an intelligence.—The dead and un-
conscious products of nature are merely abortive attempts that she 
makes to reflect herself; inanimate nature so-called is actually as such 
an immature intelligence, so that in her phenomena the still unwitting 
character of intelligence is already peeping through.—Nature’s highest 
goal, to become wholly an object to herself, is achieved only through 
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the last and highest order of reflection, which is none other than man 
[ … ].52  
According to Schelling, humanity need not fear its materiality because this is revealed, 
through the dual lenses of natural and transcendental philosophy, as being identical 
to its spirituality. Natural science, far from tending towards nihilism, must ultimately 
show that nature is no less divine than the human spirit; it is thus the task of science 
to “to render nature intelligent,”53 and so to uncover the stages by which this divinity 
gradually attempts to manifest itself, first in dead matter, then plants and animals, 
and finally human beings. Although Schelling’s philosophy underwent significant re-
visions throughout his career—not least as a means of keeping pace with the rise of 
his erstwhile disciple Hegel—the reconciliation of the spiritual and material aspects 
of human existence was his constant preoccupation. As he would later put it in his 
unfinished Ages of the World (1811-1815), it had been the great triumph of his philoso-
phy that “the most supersensible thoughts now receive physical power and life, and, 
conversely, nature becomes more and more the visible impress of the highest con-
cepts.”54  
Hegel attempted to reconcile matter and spirit in a somewhat different way: he fo-
cused on human rather than natural history, and constructed an elaborate system ac-
cording to which the ideal is progressively realized in the development of civilization, 
and the notion that the ideal and real are fundamentally incompatible is a mistake 
arising out of ignorance of this historical process. Where Schelling’s esoteric Natur-
philosophie appealed to an introspective generation of romantics, lovers of nature and 
dreamy idealists, Hegel’s alternative method of “reconciliation with reality” would 
appeal both to those satisfied with his claim that the world was as it should be (the 
“Right Hegelians”), and, more importantly, to a more politically-oriented younger 
generation (the “Left” or “Young Hegelians”), including radicals like Feuerbach, 
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Marx and Engels, eager for the world-historical progress of reason his system also 
promised.55  
In general, although the solution to nihilism proposed by philosophers like Schelling 
and Hegel was extremely simple in its most basic outlines, its actual elaboration gave 
rise to some of the most difficult and obscure philosophy ever produced—as the sam-
ples above suggest—inviting controversy and multiple conflicting interpretations. 
This well and truly ended the Kantian-Reinholdian dream of a universally accepted 
solution that would pacify the philosophical arena and clear a space in which human-
ity could get on with the business of living well. The project of Enlightenment thereby 
came to an end, and was replaced first and foremost by romanticism, of which Schel-
ling was the philosophical “prince.”56 During the ensuing decades, the stance of this 
prevailing philosophy, following Schelling and Hegel, was that nihilism had been 
defeated, and human dignity vindicated.57 In his 1827 lectures on the “Philosophy of 
Life,” Friedrich Schlegel could thus state that he had “no hesitation in saying that a 
living faith and a living science will never be at issue together, at least on essential 
points.”58 These developments—beginning with Kant and Reinhold—thus put an end 
to the Sturm und Drang movement: Schiller, as we saw above, ceased to regard nihil-
ism as a serious threat to civilized human beings, and in his later essays the caprice 
he had formerly embodied in the heroes of his plays was conceived instead as a relic 
of the “savage” past. 
5. The Aftermath of Idealism in Russia 
In Russia, therefore, the dominant intellectual trend of the 1830s—Dostoevsky’s teen-
age years—was the fruit of these philosophical developments: an idealistic 
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romanticism characterised by “unappeasable desires which could not be satisfied 
within the bounds of earthly life” and by “tempestuous passions.”59 This romanticism 
privileged the extraordinary over the mundane, and gave full reign to the imagina-
tion in the assurance that in elevating themselves as far as possible above the normal 
and the everyday, romantic idealists were nevertheless secure in their flights of fancy. 
Schelling had granted artists and poets a unique status as purveyors of esoteric truths 
otherwise known only to philosophers: “Each splendid painting owes, as it were, its 
genesis to a removal of the invisible barrier dividing the real from the ideal world,” 
and is quite literally a portal into the divinity of which the material world is merely 
the “imperfect reflection.”60 Those who devoted themselves to the “ideal world” did 
not see that they were courting disappointment; philosophy had assured them that 
the sublime dignity of their vision was under no threat from the real world, that the 
real world was itself sublime, and could be revealed as such by the activity of inspired 
poets. “The world must be made Romantic,” Novalis had written; “By endowing the 
commonplace with a higher meaning, the ordinary with mysterious respect, the 
known with the dignity of the unknown, the finite with the appearance of the infinite, 
I am making it Romantic.”61 As Herzen joked in his memoirs, the teachings of German 
Idealism were not only studied and debated, but taken to heart and practiced: “Eve-
rything that in reality was direct, every simple feeling, was exalted into abstract cate-
gories and came back from them without a drop of living blood, a pale, algebraic 
shadow. In all this there was a naïveté of a sort, because it was all perfectly sincere.”62  
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Taken as an attitude towards day to day existence in human society, this romanticism 
was unsustainable—not least in Russia, where the glaring contrast between the flights 
of the romantic imagination and the terrible condition of the indentured bulk of the 
population was impossible to ignore. Dostoevsky himself received a rude awakening 
at the age of fifteen, when his father was taking him and his brother to Saint Peters-
burg to enrol in the engineering school.63 As he later recalled in his Writer’s Diary, 
“My brother and I were eager to enter a new life and were terribly prone to dreaming 
of the ‘beautiful and the sublime’ (this phrase was still fresh then and was spoken 
without irony). [ … ] we dreamed only of poetry and poets. My brother wrote 
verses—three a day—and even on the road I was continually composing in my mind 
a novel from Venetian life.”64 It was on this journey that he observed a government 
courier systematically beating his driver, spurring him on to whip the horses into a 
frenzy, just as if this were the only way in which the man and the horses could be 
expected to function.65 This “disgusting scene,” apparently nothing out of the ordi-
nary in the world of government couriers and coachmen, became lodged far more 
strongly in Dostoevsky’s memory than the “novel from Venetian life” he was men-
tally composing, and served him as a kind of “emblem” when he later dedicated him-
self to the improvement of society.66 
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Experiences of this kind cannot have been uncommon at a time when elevated ro-
mantic sensibilities coexisted so closely with undisguised brutality, not to mention 
the general coarseness of everyday life. As Gogol observed in Dead Souls: although 
“some dreamy twenty-year-old youth” might find ample nourishment for his imagi-
nation in the enjoyment of a play by Schiller, he could not possibly fail to realize, as 
if doused by a bucket of cold water, that on leaving the theatre “he is back on earth, 
and even in the haymarket and near a pub,” surrounded by lecherous drunkards and 
prostitutes.67 Thus by the 1840s, which was also a period of general instability in Eu-
ropean politics, the detachment of romanticism could no longer be sustained. The 
radicals of this decade—led by such figures as Belinsky and Herzen—were breaking 
with their youthful romantic ideals, and adopting a more “realistic” and overtly po-
litical orientation.68 For “leftist Hegelian writers and Russian radicals at the middle of 
the century,” Neuhauser writes,  
the approximately forty to fifty years from the 1780’s to the 1840’s in 
Russia were now conceived as one integral whole, a period of high 
hopes and dreams, of romantic and idealistic concepts which had led 
to an excessive development of man’s sensibilities and reflective capa-
bilities to the detriment of his emotional balance, and eventually to a 
loss of the sense of the proper relationship between the subjective 
world of thought and emotions, and the objective world of concrete so-
ciopolitical existence.69   
In moving away from idealistic romanticism towards a greater emphasis on politics 
and science, the Russian intelligentsia was merely keeping in step with developments 
in Western Europe.70 This change was reflected in the literature of the day, which 
moved towards greater realism and social criticism in works like Turgenev’s Sketches 
from a Hunter’s Album, some of which I shall return to consider in due course. Even 
straightforwardly romantic writers took a more cautious approach, lacking in self-
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assurance. We may take for example Vladimir Odoevsky’s Russian Nights, published 
whole in 1844 but compiled from previously published stories and ruminations de-
riving from the ‘20s and ‘30s, and one of the most important prose works of Russian 
romanticism.71  
The work has no plot but follows a group of friends who meet to discuss diverse 
philosophical issues and read essays or short stories. The leader of the group and 
Odoevsky’s primary mouthpiece is, significantly, nick-named Faust—he is a roman-
tic idealist in the mystical-scientific tradition of Schelling.72 Odoevsky’s romanticism 
is by no means naive, however, and is aware of its own limitations. At one point, for 
example, the cast of characters is discussing why people tend to congregate at night. 
The romantic Faust posits what he calls a “mystical” explanation: the night is hostile; 
people need the sun, and so gather for protection in its absence. He is rebuffed by the 
rationalist Victor: “Oh, you dreamer! Facts are nothing to you. Doesn’t man suffer 
from the sun’s heat, like all plants?” Faust replies that the sun only hurts us because 
we feel it through the atmosphere: aeronauts don’t feel its heat when they ascend. His 
implication is that the “sun,” by which he also signifies the ideal, is good in itself, but 
can cause pain to humans because we are, like plants, shackled to the earth by our 
material bodies.73 Faust’s companions are not convinced: 
Victor: “That’s completely true, and here is another proof: beyond a 
certain limit of the atmosphere, blood came out of the aeronauts’ ears; 
it became difficult for them to breathe; and they shivered from cold.” 
  
Rostislav: “This fact, it seems to me, expresses the real and difficult 
problem of man: to rise from the earth, without leaving it.”  
 
Vyacheslav: “That is, in other words, one must seek for the possible—
and not chase in vain after the impossible.”  
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Faust answered nothing but changed the subject.74  
Faust’s unwillingness to continue this conversation suggests an unwillingness to 
tackle to the problem of nihilism head-on. Odoevsky thus registers the problem of 
harmonizing nature and spirit as well as, perhaps, the inability of traditional roman-
ticism to provide a convincing solution. The reluctance of the romantic to compromise 
his spiritual aspirations in pursuit of this harmony is also cast in a less than favourable 
light: Faust would apparently prefer to rise from the earth and leave it behind in neo-
Platonic fashion, but, unable to refute Victor, is shown up by the more moderate Ros-
tislav and Vyacheslav.  
In general, however, despite the shift away from what came to be regarded as the 
naive, otherworldly dreaming of romanticism proper, German Idealist philosophy 
remained popular and a general tendency towards excessively abstract theorizing 
still prevailed.75 As Milton Ehre observes: “The mood was anti-romantic, though ro-
manticism proved more resilient than many supposed.”76 Hegel in particular contin-
ued through the 1840s to influence the Russian intelligentsia, who afterwards re-
garded his influence as highly dubious—no better than mystical aberrations of Schel-
ling and his followers—and blamed him for continuing to distract them from real 
social and political issues even after they had decided to refocus their efforts in that 
direction.77 Bakunin’s much later recollections serve to illustrate the recalcitrance of 
these attitudes among the intelligentsia: 
Unless you lived in those times, you will never understand how pow-
erful the fascination of [Hegel’s] philosophical system was in the 1830s 
and 1840s. [ … ] This movement created a world that was infinitely 
 
74 Odoevsky, 1965: 122. 
75 Herzen provides an overview of the intellectual culture of the period in My Past and Thoughts 
(Herzen, 1968: 389-425). 
76 Goncharov, 2005: ix. 
77 As usual, these concerns had their precedent in Germany itself. As Heine wrote in his 1834 
history of German religion and philosophy, for example: “when it was observed especially 
that German young people, absorbed in metaphysical abstractions, were oblivious to the most 
urgent questions of the time and became unfit for practical life, then indeed patriots and 




broad, rich, lofty, and ostensibly perfectly rational, but that remained 
as alien to earthly life and reality as it was to the heaven of Christian 
theology. As a result, this world, like Fata Morgana neither reaching 
heaven nor touching the earth but suspended between them, turned the 
life of its adherents, its introspective and poetizing inhabitants, into an 
uninterrupted series of somnambulistic ideas and experiences. It ren-
dered them totally unfit for life, or, even worse, condemned them to do 
in the real world exactly the opposite of what they worshipped in their 
poetic or metaphysical ideal.78   
This kind of criticism was entirely commonplace.79 In fact, however, Russian roman-
ticism almost always contained the seeds of its own critique, and was never as uni-
formly dreamy and complacent as later accounts would seem to suggest. Donald 
Fanger has shown that, in general, realism as a literary movement grew out of roman-
ticism as a kind of deflation and disillusionment of its own attitudes—as indicated by 
such titles as Dickens’ Great Expectations and Balzac’s Lost Illusions.80 We shall have 
recourse to consider this trend further in due course: as we shall see in Chapter 9, the 
self-critical dimension of romanticism emerged especially in Byronism. 
6. The Resurgence of Nihilism 
Despite the hopes of some Enlightenment philosophers, for a long time it seemed im-
possible to account for human existence in purely natural terms. It seemed that hu-
man beings, unique in their possession of spirit or soul, did not belong within nature 
and were thus foreign to their own bodies and bodily inclinations, by which they 
were imprisoned and prevented from fulfilling their spiritual vocation. Within this 
paradigm, the only way of reconciling humanity with nature—and thus refuting 
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nihilism and solving the problem of human dignity—was to show that the natural 
world was actually, contrary to initial appearances, at bottom no less spiritual than 
humanity. This was in fact the approach taken by Herder and his followers, as we 
saw above. It was argued that the contradiction between the bodily and the spiritual 
needs of humanity would ultimately be resolved when we had properly understood 
and oriented ourselves within a grand scheme in which nature and spirit are one. 
For such an approach to be viable, it was necessary to interpret natural phenomena 
in such a way as to reveal their underlying harmony with the spiritual aspirations of 
humanity. As we have seen, the spiritual interpretation of nature found its apotheosis 
in the Naturphilosophie of Schelling. But, unfortunately for Schelling, his theories could 
not retain scientific credibility for long. Naturphilosophie was esoteric, mystical and, 
even if it was not entirely divorced from empirical investigation, misjudged the di-
rection in which natural science would develop in the nineteenth century.81 As the 
century progressed, chemistry and biology in particular promised to deliver at last a 
completely mechanical explanation of life82—hopes that were seemingly justified by 
the success of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection.83 The nihilistic im-
plications of this revolution were immediately identified. When Herzen, for example, 
came to realize that Schelling’s Naturphilosophie could no longer be regarded as scien-
tifically viable he recognized clearly that it would therefore be incapable of reconcil-
ing nature with human sublimity.84  
Hegel’s solution to nihilism was not as susceptible to scientific obsolescence, since it 
relied less on the interpretation of natural phenomena and more on the interpretation 
of human history (which is far more malleable), but it too succumbed as the changing 
tastes rendered its high-flown metaphysical speculations unpalatable. The waning of 
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Hegel’s popularity was precipitated by his own disciples. The radical “Young Hege-
lians” dispensed with the main apparatus of his system, which they regarded as in-
tellectual self-indulgence. As Feuerbach wrote in 1843: “The Philosophy of the Future 
addresses itself to the task of leading philosophy from the realm of ‘detached souls’ 
back into the realm of embodied, living souls; of compelling philosophy to come 
down from its divine and self-sufficient blissfulness in thought and open its eyes to 
human misery.”85 The Young Hegelians did, however, salvage Hegel’s idea of ra-
tional historical progress. 86  With the furtherance of this progress in mind, they 
worked with a view to generating real cultural and political change by means of ra-
tional criticism of all established principles that they took to conceal falsity and injus-
tice. This critique was not cautious self-examination in a Cartesian or Kantian spirit, 
however; there was no sense in which the Young Hegelians were “making room for 
faith,” or attempting to forge a truce between reason and religion, progress and tra-
dition. Here “critique” amounted to nothing more than demanding rational justifica-
tion for everything, salvaging what was considered reasonable and useful and dis-
carding the rest. Religion was the primary target. As the first of Feuerbach’s Principles 
states: “The task of the modern era was the realization and humanization of God—
the transformation and dissolution of theology into anthropology.”87 All the attrib-
utes traditionally predicated of God are actually attributes of nature or humanity or 
both; the idea that God is a separate personal entity is merely a fictional addendum 
and should be discarded.88 This approach was not entirely original. “Since the early 
eighteenth century,” as we know, “criticism had been vital to philosophy, indeed the 
hallmark of the Enlightenment itself. In advocating critique, then, the young Hegeli-
ans were waving the banner of Enlightenment and following a hallowed tradition of 
their own.”89 Thus it was a revival of the Enlightenment’s rather uncritical faith in the 
power of rational criticism, the attitude that had given rise to the problem of nihilism 
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in the first place; for less radical thinkers, this could only mean a return to the gener-
alized cultural “shaking” that had troubled German philosophy from Kant to the 
Young Hegelians’ own master: “Though it began in theology, neo-Hegelian criticism 
soon extended to other spheres. It was the task of critique to expose alienation in all 
its lairs, whether in society, economy, state, or church.”90 In exposing the irrational 
foundations of existing institutions, and demanding progressive elimination or trans-
formation of these institutions in accordance with reason, these thinkers were at the 
most general level simply carrying on the work of the philosophes. 
In the meantime, radical thought was developing in increasingly rationalistic direc-
tions in France as well. Utopian socialist thinkers like Charles Fourier, Victor Con-
siderant and Henri de Saint-Simon had argued, in the wake of the French Revolution, 
for radically different approaches to social organization based on (what they argued 
was) a more scientific attitude towards human society, in contrast to the wild specu-
lations of the philosophes.91 These writers were hugely influential throughout Europe, 
with “Saint-Simonism” in particular becoming almost a religion in its own right.92 
They agreed that the root cause of the Terror was, as we saw Condorcet suggest above, 
a lack of scientific rigour—insofar as the philosophy of the Enlightenment had failed 
to reform society in a wholly positive way, this was not because the search for a per-
fectly rigorous and useful science of politics was misguided, but rather because the 
philosophes had failed to apply sufficient rigor to their investigations; they paid lip 
service to reason, but did not attempt to furnish humanity with an exact science of 
human society. Politics demanded more science, not less. As Fourier wrote in his The-
ory of the Four Movements (1808): 
In communal interaction the passions are like an orchestra composed 
of 1620 instruments; and the philosophers who seek to guide them may 
be compared to a group of intruding children who only succeed in mak-
ing a terrible racket when they try to play the instruments. Should one 
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conclude that music is harmful to man and that the violins must be re-
strained, the basses stopped, and the flutes silenced? No, instead the 
little brats must be dismissed and the instruments given to expert mu-
sicians. [ … ] Man’s only enemies are the philosophers who wish to 
guide the passions without having the least idea of the mechanism as-
signed to them by nature.93  
Though highly critical of the meddling “philosophers,” Fourier’s supposedly more 
“scientific” approach was laden with bizarre empirical hypotheses. The number 1,620 
is an example of the absurd degree of quantitative precision with which Fourier pre-
sented his theories. In general, Fourier’s political view was that human nature, 
properly understood, would lend itself to the development of a perfectly harmonious 
society if only it was allowed to flourish and exert itself in the right directions. Previ-
ous approaches to political organization had failed because the passions had been 
inadequately understood and been forced to channel their energies down unnatural 
and destructive pathways. There are no bad passions, only passions that have been 
poorly matched with activities; thus it is only necessary to catalogue all 1,620 of the 
passions and their various combinations, and match them with suitable occupations 
calculated to harmonize in society as a whole. In practice this theory amounts to such 
naive proclamations as that Nero’s bloodthirstiness would have been a virtue rather 
than a vice if only he had been a butcher instead of an emperor.94   
In spite of the extravagance of his own theories, Fourier’s passionate call for a hard 
science of human organization resonated with a generation impressed by the progress 
of science and filled with the hope that a natural science of human life would soon 
replace the unscientific speculations of the philosophes—speculations which led, in 
popular opinion, to the Revolution and the Terror—and, crucially, replace or meld 
with Christianity to become the guiding beacon of civilization. 95  This trend was 
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intensified in the hugely influential work of Auguste Comte, disciple of Saint-Simon 
and founder of “positivism.” According to Comte, “the people are today spiritually 
trusting and subordinate towards their scientific leaders,”96 and science had already 
superseded religion as moral and political lodestar. He claims that spiritual subordi-
nation to scientists is not, unlike religious subordination, humiliating for the people 
because, while the latter is founded on an arbitrary authority, the authority of sci-
ence—and, he therefore assumes, of scientists—is founded on principles that anyone 
can recognize and understand.97 And yet Comte is also clear that the people should 
delegate responsibility for their own political, and indeed moral, situation; he rejects 
democracy completely, along with unfettered freedom of conscience.98 Anticipating 
Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, he does not mince words: “The people have been 
eliminated from the question. It is for the people that the question will be resolved, 
but they will remain external and passive.”99 He flatly denies that this could have 
negative consequences for society: “The fear of one day seeing the establishment of a 
despotism founded on the sciences is a chimera as ridiculous as it is absurd: it could 
only arise in minds that are absolutely alien to all positive ideas.”100 Comte’s refusal 
to acknowledge that his philosophy might at least lend itself to abuse by unscrupu-
lous authoritarians is hardly reassuring. In any case, it is clear that in displacing free-
dom of conscience with the absolute authority of scientists, and in placing morality 
and politics into their hands, Comte’s “positivist” philosophy is deeply nihilistic. “So-
cial reorganization has been viewed as a purely practical operation,” he proclaims, 
“whereas it is essentially theoretical.”101 The idea that theory should always precede 
practice, where “theory” is taken in a very narrow sense to designate the ruminations 
of one or another nineteenth-century intellectual, was not questioned by any radical 
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political thinkers at that time (with the exception, as we saw in Chapter 2, of Max 
Stirner); it is one of the hallmarks of nihilism.102  
* * * 
As schools of thought or discrete philosophical movements, Young Hegelian criticism 
and French utopian socialism faltered along with the failed revolutions of 1848.103 
Radicals like Marx and Engels continued to argue for scientifically informed social, 
cultural and political progress; but they attempted to distance themselves from their 
more “utopian” forebears by the now familiar means of advocating a more rational, 
more scientific approach.104 It was around this time that, predictably, the problem of 
nihilism returned in full force to the public consciousness. As Frederick Beiser has it, 
the “chief aim” of Hegel’s philosophy was to solve the problem posed by the panthe-
ism controversy; insofar as this was the case, and insofar as he had convinced his 
audience that he had succeeded in this aim, the problem naturally returned with the 
waning of his influence.105 The dualism of nature and spirit that he had attempted to 
resolve again became an urgent problem, and the threat of nihilism along with it. 
What’s more, it was given new impetus by a fresh generation of radical thinkers ready 
to embrace the nihilistic consequences of rationalism far more readily than their En-
lightenment forebears. Thus began the “materialism controversy,” which Beiser calls 
“one of the most important intellectual disputes of the second half of the nineteenth 
century” and, in effect, merely “the latest version of the old conflict between reason 
and faith.”106   
 
102 Thus the Underground Man complains of a complete lack of spontaneity and “living life” 
in nineteenth-century intellectuals (Dostoevsky, 2001: 91). Dostoevsky’s Ridiculous Man 
would later encapsulate his whole utopian spirituality in the maxim that life is higher than and 
must precede thought (Dostoevsky, 1994: 960). 
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On the side of reason, materialists like Ludwig Büchner openly professed a nihilism 
that would have scandalized Jacobi’s rationalist opponents. Of the claim that materi-
alism might be a threat to morality, Büchner is entirely dismissive. “To pretend that 
the materialism of science changes all great and noble ideas into vain dreams,” he 
writes in Force and Matter (1855), “that materialism has no future and no morality, is 
such a gratuitous assertion that it deserves no refutation.”107 He points out that there 
have always been materialists who were yet “neither fools, robbers, assassins, nor 
desperadoes.” Obviously, however, Büchner does not include the tenets of religion 
among his “great and noble ideas,” since these are not something he expects to sur-
vive scientific scrutiny; indeed, it is clear that his uncompromising vision of human-
ity’s place in the universe provides little by way of consolation for anyone who clings 
to traditional values. He argues that free will is a delusion, and happily draws the 
radical conclusion that there is no such thing as moral responsibility.108 Moreover, he 
does not attempt to put anything in the place of traditional morality; his moral project, 
insofar as he has one, is entirely negative.109 Thus, despite his assurance that materi-
alism is benign, Büchner ends his work by divesting himself of all liability for the 
practical impact of his work, which, as a supposedly disinterested inquiry into the 
truth, he takes to outrank considerations of merely human interest: 
We must finally be permitted to leave all questions about morality and 
utility out of sight. The chief, and indeed the sole object which con-
cerned us in these researches, is truth. Nature exists neither for religion, 
for morality, nor for human beings; but it exists for itself. What else can 
we do but take it as it is? Would it not be ridiculous in us to cry like 
little children, because our bread is not sufficiently buttered?110  
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To recapitulate: first, as we saw, the nihilism of the Enlightenment was perceived as 
a threat to human dignity by philosophers in Germany, who, beginning with panthe-
ism controversy, turned their attention to the “single fundamental problem” of the 
authority of reason. Following the philosophical revolutions of Kant and Herder, the 
German Idealists found a solution to this problem in the idea that the contrast be-
tween matter and spirit, real and ideal, is not fundamental or is merely an illusion. 
This assuaged the Sturm und Drang movement; the romanticism that followed was, 
in the main, self-assured in its lofty idealism, indulging in what would later be 
thought of as “unappeasable desires which could not be satisfied within the bounds 
of earthly life.”111 Spurred by the need for political and economic reform, however, 
and buoyed by progress in natural science, the radical thinkers of the nineteenth cen-
tury argued against this romanticism for what was, in effect, a return to the Enlight-
enment: sweeping rational criticism and progress in all spheres of human culture. The 
implications of these developments for the problem of human dignity did not go un-
noticed; as during the Enlightenment itself, rationalism was recognized as a threat to 
traditional notions of human dignity as transcendence over nature, and the “materi-
alism controversy” recapitulated the “pantheism controversy” of the previous cen-
tury. The way in which educated Russians responded to these philosophical devel-
opments is reflected in their literature, to which I shall now turn. 
 





Chapter 9:  Byronic Disillusionment 
1. Introduction 
Around the same time that Schelling’s and Hegel’s systems were gaining and losing 
influence, Lord Byron was having a powerful effect on literature and intellectual cul-
ture more generally. The problem of human dignity was an obsession for Byron; he 
was overawed by the sublime elevation of the human spirit above material nature; 
and he was no less preoccupied by the constraints imposed on humanity by its phys-
ical and mental limitations. Unlike the German Idealists, he did not see any way of 
reconciling the higher and lower aspects of humanity philosophically. Humans, as he 
laments in Manfred, are “Half dust, half deity, alike unfit / To sink or soar.”1 Byronism 
combines idealism and disillusionment in a way that is fundamental to the literary 
tradition leading up to Notes from Underground. It was immensely appealing to those 
romantics who were not convinced by, or, later, had become disillusioned with, the 
German Idealist solution to the problem of nihilism, and who had thereby come to 
adopt a more pessimistic view of humanity’s place in the material world. Some of the 
most important and influential works in the Russian canon, such as Pushkin’s Eugene 
Onegin and Lermontov’s A Hero of Our Time, were direct responses to this pervasive 
cultural phenomenon which, in its comfortless appraisal of the human condition, an-
ticipated the collapse of idealistic romanticism, the intelligentsia’s disavowal of its 
own “high hopes and dreams,” and the resurgence of nihilism in the second half of 
the century.  
In this chapter, I shall outline the theme of disillusionment in the work of Byron and 
his followers Pushkin and Lermontov, as well as the theme of the “superfluous man” 
that stemmed from their work and was developed by writers like Herzen, Turgenev 
 




and Goncharov. As stated in the introduction to Chapter 8, this survey will serve to 
highlight those aspects of Dostoevsky’s characterization of disillusionment that do 
not recall the caprice of the Sturm und Drang, but rather belong to this post-Byronic 
tradition of the “superfluous man.” It will thus serve as a foil for the claims made in 
Chapters 6 and 7, highlighting the kinship between the Underground Man and heroes 
like Karl Moor and Faust. As in the case of the philosophical developments consid-
ered in Chapter 8, it will also serve to illuminate the conceptual background of Dos-
toevsky’s polemic against utopian socialism.  
2. Byron 
Though not as personally significant for Dostoevsky as German writers like Schiller 
and Goethe, Byron—if only because of his pervasive influence on letters and culture 
more generally—nevertheless left an impression on Dostoevsky’s work. If the Under-
ground Man’s caprice is most closely related to the Sturm und Drang, other aspects of 
his character are recognizably Byronic. The Underground Man himself refers to By-
ron’s Manfred in passing, when mocking his former heroic dreams; but the overall 
influence of Byron on his character is more general. His irony, his deliberate vulgarity, 
his polemical mode of writing, are all Byronic traits. On the psychological level, the 
fact that his self-absorption and egotism make direct communication impossible, and 
impede healthy relations with other people, can also be seen in this light. As William 
Hazlitt noted of Byron: “He hangs the cloud, the film of his existence over all outward 
things, sits in the centre of his thoughts,” such that when enjoying his poetry “we are 
still imprisoned in a dungeon; a curtain intercepts our view; we do not breathe freely 
the air of nature or of our own thoughts.”2 The Underground Man plainly conforms 
to this Byronic stereotype. Manfred’s egotism stems from an awareness of his superi-
ority over nature—in other words, a keen sense of human dignity—and a proud 
 




disdain of people who fail to live up to his expectations. Whenever he crossed paths 
with another human being, Manfred says, he felt “degraded back to them, / And was 
all clay again.”3 The Underground Man is also avowedly proud of his own intellectual 
and cultural superiority, and likewise finds himself utterly deflated whenever he 
makes contact with other people (such as his only regular acquaintance, office chief 
Anton Antonych, whose banality acts as a counterweight to the Underground Man’s 
lofty idealism).4 The Underground Man’s masochistic mockery of his own ideals is 
also Byronic. Hazlitt paid close attention to this aspect of Byron’s work, which he took 
to be almost unique to “the Noble Lord”: 
He hallows in order to desecrate, takes a pleasure in defacing the im-
ages of beauty his hands have wrought, and raises our hopes and our 
belief in goodness to Heaven only to dash them to the earth again, and 
break them in pieces the more effectively from the very height they 
have fallen.5  
The Underground Man can hardly be said, in the Notes, to “raise our hopes and our 
belief in goodness,” but it is clear that he shares with Byron a proclivity for desecrat-
ing that which he himself has hallowed, whether by mocking his own hopes and 
dreams, or mocking what he takes to be the highest consummation of love by engag-
ing in “debauchery.”6 And even though—or precisely because—he takes himself to 
be superior to the majority of people, he takes a kind of masochistic pleasure in de-
grading himself below the lowest—debauching and courting bar fights—“as if,” as 
Hazlitt says of Byron, “the eagle were to build its eyry in a common sewer.”7 
 
3 Byron, 2000: 291. 
4 Dostoevsky, 2001: 41f. 
5 Hazlitt, 1991: 122. 
6 “I happened to glance into a mirror. My overwrought face appeared extremely repulsive: it 
was pale, spiteful, and mean; and my hair was dishevelled. ‘It doesn’t matter. I’m glad,’ I 
thought. ‘In fact, I’m even delighted that I’ll seem so repulsive to her; that pleases me. . . .” 
(Dostoevsky, 2001: 60f.). “Now I’d suddenly realized how absurd, how revolting as a spider, 
was the idea of debauchery, which, without love, crudely and shamelessly begins precisely at 
the point where genuine love is consummated” (Dostoevsky, 2001: 61). 




It is not my intention to investigate these similarities any further here, since they do 
not pertain to the psychology of caprice in which we are primarily interested, but only 
to indicate the sources of those of the Underground Man’s characteristics that set him 
apart from the Sturm und Drang heroes. My immediate purpose is to reveal the extent 
to which Byron’s influence changed the way in which writers before Dostoevsky ap-
proached the theme of nihilism and disillusioned idealism, and so to observe the man-
ifestations of this theme in the work of Byron himself and of those he influenced. By-
ron’s most direct engagement with the problem of nihilism is perhaps his play Cain, 
a later work published in 1821, which, according to Thorslev, “show[s] the Byronic 
Hero in the last stage of its development,” free from the Gothic trappings of Manfred.8 
This play is a psychological and philosophical investigation of Cain’s murder of Abel. 
As Byron construes it, the murder is ultimately prompted by Cain’s Faustian dissat-
isfaction with the limits of human knowledge and experience.9 Cain is spurred on by 
Lucifer, who, like Faust’s Mephistopheles, teases him with supernatural revelations 
that ultimately leave him unfulfilled and disillusioned.  
Cain aspires to understand the origin of the world, the nature of life and death, and 
his own place within and outside the natural world; he is proud of his aspirations and 
the knowledge that they promise, insofar as it will raise him mentally above the rest 
of creation. But Lucifer points out that Cain’s knowledge, his spiritual aspect, the 
source of his dignity, is necessarily tied to his limited human body—“chain’d down / 
To the most gross and petty paltry wants, / All foul and fulsome”10—and thereby 
prevented from attaining its full potential. Like Faust, Cain is consequently tormented 
by nihilism and the problem of human dignity: he reasons that he is unable to trans-
cend the limits of his human frame, that within this frame he will not be able to attain 
the knowledge he aspires to, and that human existence is therefore wretched.  
 
8 Thorslev, 1962: 178. 
9 Byron, 2000: 903f. 




Throughout the play we are shown the effects of Cain’s aspirations on his interper-
sonal relations. Lucifer himself cannot love; Cain can, however, and the conflict be-
tween his desire for knowledge and his love of his family “gives the drama its tragic 
conflict,” as Thorslev points out.11 He is warned that he must “Choose betwixt love 
and knowledge,”12 and, dedicating himself to the latter, is indeed compelled to aban-
don the former and eventually to murder his own brother in a state of confusion, 
exasperation, and disillusionment. 13  Just like Goethe’s Faust, then, Cain thus ad-
dresses the human consequences of the “needs of reason,” the striving of human be-
ings to understand their supernatural origins and confirm their human dignity—
which, in the Biblical setting of Cain, is literally the effects of eating the forbidden fruit 
of the Tree of Knowledge. 
Apart from his egotism, irony and intellectual masochism, Byron’s most important 
contribution to the tradition under discussion is his extreme development of the idea 
that despairing idealism is a curse borne by superior individuals, who must conse-
quently—like Cain—become alienated from the rest of humanity, incapable of shar-
ing their emotional burdens, and incapable of doing anything to improve their situa-
tions. Where the characteristic heroes of the Sturm und Drang react to their disillusion-
ment capriciously, the Byronic hero becomes despondent and gives in to spleen in 
recognition of the intractability of his despair. Like the former, he recognizes the fu-
tility of action in a world that is fundamentally hostile to the highest human aspira-
tions, but, unlike them, he does not persist in striving, fuming and fulminating against 
every constraint, straining to bend the world to his will; his disillusionment has at-
tained a higher degree of self-consciousness, and he retreats into languorous isolation 
or apathy. In these respects, Byronism influenced the shape of Russian literature 
markedly. We have already seen that several of the Underground Man’s characteris-
tics are straightforwardly Byronic; and in what follows we shall consider the ways in 
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which Byron influenced Russian portrayals of disillusionment more generally. The 
distinction between Byronic spleen and Sturm und Drang caprice is one that I would 
like to emphasize and shall return to later, as I believe it is a useful means of distin-
guishing the Underground Man’s mode of disillusionment from that of his various 
Russian predecessors, and highlighting his kinship with the Stürmer und Dränger.  
3. Pushkin and Lermontov 
Before turning to consider Byron’s most important Russian heirs, we may return 
briefly to Schiller’s psychology of idealism, for in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry he 
had already discussed the problem of inertia in a manner that anticipates Byronism 
and illuminates the way in which Byronic spleen should be understood in relation to 
the disillusioned idealism discussed in the previous chapter. The problem of inertia 
arises, according to Schiller, when the idealist is called to act in the real world, that is, 
to act in accordance with the ideal and attempt to realize it: 
The contrast between the absolute magnificence that unfailingly is his 
point of departure and the absolute insignificance of the individual in-
stance to which he has to apply the former is much too powerful. Be-
cause his will—in terms of its form—is always directed to the whole, 
he does not want to direct it—as far as its content is concerned—to frag-
ments and yet it is largely by means of small-scale accomplishments 
alone that he can prove his moral character. Thus, not infrequently it 
happens that because of the unlimitedness of the ideal he overlooks the 
limited instance of its application, and, filled with a sense of the maxi-
mum, he neglects the minimum out of which alone everything great in 
actual life grows.14  
Because the real world is so far removed from the ideal, the idealist is unwilling to 
moderate his demands in order that he may at least go some way towards realizing 
 




it. He overlooks the possibility of improving reality through “small-scale accomplish-
ments” because he sees no point in acting upon mere “fragments,” when the whole of 
reality is so radically defective in comparison with his ideals: “What he demands of 
himself is something infinite, but everything he accomplishes is limited.”15 This de-
scription applies remarkably well to the Byronic hero, whose ironic detachment and 
self-absorption are bound up with the suggestion that he need not bother himself with 
trifles because such things are beneath him. To the humble concern of the chamois 
hunter, who entreats him to have patience and trust that things may yet turn out for 
the best, Manfred replies: “Patience and patience! Hence—that word was made / For 
brutes of burthen, not for birds of prey; / Preach it to mortals of a dust like thine,— / 
I am not of thine order.”16  
Here we are recalled to the Underground Man and his impossible delusions of gran-
deur “in the style of Manfred.”17 This theme is echoed by Dostoevsky not only in Notes 
from Underground, but also in an article for the journal Time. Dostoevsky recalls a spe-
cies of “idealists” that prevailed during the 1840s in Russia, who, in point of fact, he 
labels “Byronic natures.” These represent the worst moral pitfalls of idealism, which 
in their case causes them to become utterly contemptuous of real-life problems. Ac-
cording to Dostoevsky, they “took Byronism further” than Byron himself, presuma-
bly because the latter remained an idealist to the end—he died in Greece, on his way 
to fight for the noble cause of Greek independence—while his Russian descendants 
became so disillusioned that their idealism became entirely perverted: “they mostly 
sat about twiddling their thumbs,” because they claimed that “things were so bad it 
was a waste of time even to move a finger and that a good dinner was best of all.”18 
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3.1. Onegin and Pechorin 
Dostoevsky’s analysis of such “Byronic natures” continues elsewhere, in his discus-
sion of Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin (serialized 1825-1832), which he reads as a peculiarly 
Russian development of this problem. As stated above, Pushkin was strongly influ-
enced by Byron; the “Bard of Pride” is mentioned several times in Eugene Onegin, the 
titular hero of which is an avid reader of Byron’s poetry and is plainly a Byronic char-
acter himself.19 The fact that Dostoevsky commented on this work illuminates the as-
pects of Russian Byronism that he drew upon in Notes from Underground. 
Dostoevsky explicitly blames Onegin’s Byronism on the problem of human dignity 
imported from the West: “Civilization brought its fruits and we began to understand 
a little what it meant to be a man and what his significance and dignity amounted to, 
that is, in accordance with the conceptions that Europe had worked out.”20 The West-
ern ideal of human dignity brought with it the problem of nihilism—the Enlighten-
ment was, as we have seen, regarded both as the pinnacle of human civilization and 
at the same time the greatest threat to human dignity because it came part and parcel 
with a harsh critique of traditional cultural values. Onegin discovered what “his sig-
nificance and dignity amounted to” but, at the same time, discovered that this dignity 
was chimerical. The fruits of European civilization thus left the Russian intellectual 
with nothing to do but devote himself to “skeptical self-contemplation and self-ex-
amination”21—Onegin longs for “something that cannot be destroyed by any skepti-
cism or irony” (something, as the Underground Man puts it, that he cannot stick out 
his tongue at), but because he cannot find anything which might satisfy this longing, 
he despairs.22  
Though philosophical and psychological problems are not, perhaps, at the forefront 
of Pushkin’s concerns in Eugene Onegin, he does indeed provide a diagnosis of 
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Onegin’s Byronism at the source suggested by Dostoevsky: namely, nihilism and the 
problem of human dignity. He complains that “having fought all prejudices” each 
person is now completely egoistic, morally degraded, and views other people as 
“two-legged creatures in their millions” to be exploited and discarded; values like 
love, honour and genuine friendship are thus impossible to sustain.23 This theme is 
illustrated in the main narrative of the poem: Onegin rejects the love of Tatiana and 
kills his best friend in a duel for no good reason at all, but simply out of his own 
egotism, self-absorption and stubborn haughtiness—traits sustained by his nihilistic 
inability to recognise the virtues of others or cultivate virtues in himself. As in Byron’s 
Cain, nihilistic disillusionment leads to emotional isolation and, indeed, the rejection 
of love and a senseless murder. 
Dostoevsky also recognizes in Onegin other Byronic traits that he would later grant 
to the Underground Man, including irony, self-mockery and masochism: “His con-
science whispered to him that he led a futile kind of existence; he felt the stirring of 
spiteful irony within him,”24 and this spiteful irony turned back upon the very ideals 
which had spurred him on in his quest for “a new truth,” and which had originally 
filled him with a special sense of his human dignity: “he had become embittered and 
respected neither himself nor his ideas and views; he did not respect even the passion 
for life and truth which was in him.”25 Here we see a precursor to the Underground 
Man’s ironic regrets at not having become a self-satisfied glutton like his friend “the 
connoisseur of Lafite.” For Dostoevsky, Onegin commends himself bitterly to a life of 
self-indulgence, but finds that he cannot even rest content in that: “He became an 
egoist and yet,” like the Underground Man, “at the same time, laughed at himself for 
not being able to be even a good egotist. Oh, if only he could be a real egotist, he 
would find peace of mind!”26 It is precisely because of his “heightened consciousness,” 
however, that he cannot have peace of mind and cannot settle peacefully into a certain 
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mode of life. Again, it is noteworthy that Onegin’s disillusionment does not lead to 
caprice in Sturm und Drang fashion, but rather to languorous Byronic spleen, “With 
his embittered, seething mind / To futile enterprise consigned.”27  
In his essays, Dostoevsky also mentions the other great Byronic character of Russian 
romantic literature, Pechorin, the title character of Lermontov’s A Hero of Our Time 
(1840). “In Pechorin,” he writes, the phenomenon of Byronism “reached the point of 
unquenchable, jaundiced spite of a strange and to the highest degree original and 
Russian contrariness of two heterogeneous elements: egotism to the point of self-ad-
oration and, at the same time, spiteful disrespect of oneself.”28 Needless to say, this 
masochistic egotism has a philosophical dimension. Von Gronicka suggests that “this 
schizoid state of Pechorin’s personality” is what makes him an especially fitting illus-
tration of Russia at that time, “whose intellectual climate was inextricably com-
pounded of a Mephistophelean cynical analysis of life and of self and a Faustian rest-
lessness and yearning after high ideals, doomed to remain unsatisfied.”29 Although 
both Dostoevsky and Von Gronicka are surely guilty of exaggerating the Russianness 
of this phenomenon, it is also true that Byronism was taken to what might be called 
its logical conclusion by Pushkin and Lermontov, and in such a way as to set the tone 
of the post-Byronic literature that followed in their wake. 
3.2. Faust 
This trend may have started in Pushkin’s short but highly suggestive “Scene from 
Faust” (1828).30 The basic theme of this dramatic fragment is Faust’s boredom. Faust 
demands entertainment, but Mephisto begins instead to lecture him sarcastically on 
the inevitability of boredom and the wisdom of resignation. Faust tries to protest, 
recalling the bliss of his relations with Gretchen, so Mephisto teases him about the 
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emptiness of all his former pleasures, even his love, and about the pervasive under-
current of boredom that has always corrupted his enjoyments; Faust becomes exacer-
bated and orders the demon to leave him in peace. In a slick reversal of roles that 
Faust seems not to notice, Mephistopheles begs for some task to keep him busy, and 
Faust, in a chilling display of total apathy, commands him to sink a ship full of sail-
ors—the first thing he happens to notice on the horizon.31 
Critics have noticed that Pushkin’s Faust is more disillusioned than Goethe’s; he 
seems to have given up on goodness altogether, where the latter continued striving 
until the very end.32 According to Caryl Emerson, Pushkin’s “Faust” fragment can 
best be understood not as a sequel to Goethe’s, but as an “outgrowing” or “testing” 
of his own Byronism; his Faust resembles Byron’s Manfred, except that his “disillu-
sionment and solitary, rebellious pride have now gone further and into even blacker 
regions.”33 Von Gronicka finds additionally that Pushkin’s version of Faust is some-
what more like Goethe’s Mephistopheles, a barren soul without any of the idealistic 
striving that continues to spur Goethe’s Faust into his action despite every setback 
and disappointment:  
Goethe’s Faust is bored only with those shallow pleasures which Me-
phisto serves up to him. The boredom of Pushkin’s Faust is all-encom-
passing. It springs from utter satiety, a hyperintellectualism that sick-
lies over every emotion and nips in the bud every stirring to creative 
action.34  
It seems to me that these interpretations are somewhat one-sided, and overlook the 
fact that Pushkin’s Faust puts up an impassioned—if altogether brief—opposition to 
Mephisto’s philosophy of boredom. He himself prefers to remain hopeful, and re-
bukes the devil sternly for exacerbating doubts he would rather not dwell upon: 
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“Speak no more! / You aggravate my secret woe.”35 This indicates that Pushkin’s 
Faust, like Goethe’s, has not ceased to dream and strive, even if—again like Goethe’s 
Faust—he feels deep down that his striving is futile; his very boredom is indeed a 
clear sign that he has not at all been sated. Granted, he does partake of gratuitous 
murder and destruction, which is certainly alien to the spirit of Goethe’s drama. But 
the order is given not as the directive of a cold-blooded mass-murderer, but like the 
tantrum of a spoilt child who has been denied amusement and then outwitted by his 
nanny. This reading is encouraged by the way in which Faust opens the scene, child-
ishly begging for distraction: “Demon, I’m bored.” Assuming the role of a babysitter 
intent on provoking and making fun of the headstrong child, Mephisto puts Faust in 
his place: “What of it, Faust? / For that’s the lot you’ve been assigned, / And none 
beyond his lot may go.”36 The whole dialogue continues in this vein. 
Nevertheless, whilst I would argue that Pushkin’s Faust is not the spiritual vacuum 
that he is typically taken to be, I agree with previous commentators that he represents 
a Byronic or post-Byronic transformation of Goethe’s hero. In emphasizing Faust’s 
childlike immaturity, Pushkin is pursuing a definite strategy. The Byronic hero, as we 
have seen, suffers from a heightening of the disillusionment that afflicted Sturm und 
Drang heroes like Faust; as I said above, he possesses a higher degree of self-con-
sciousness. It is in this sense that Pushkin’s “Faust” fragment is Byronic. In regarding 
Goethe’s Faust as a child he positions himself at a higher level of intellectual devel-
opment (or “heightened consciousness,” as the Underground Man would say), from 
where he can see that Faust’s disillusionment was really par for the course, and that 
having reached full maturity he is in a position to know just how naive Faust was for 
being so upset about it. It is as if Pushkin were implying that Goethe’s Faust was 
child’s play—that Goethe had barely skimmed the surface of disillusionment, 
whereas he, Pushkin, has plumbed the depths, and confronted a world so bleak and 
devoid of meaning that a man can destroy three hundred sailors on a whim. Pushkin 
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presents this terrible event as an unremarkable happenstance, without commentary 
or further elaboration, as if he—like his Faust—were affecting not to care either way. 
He thereby challenges both Goethe and Byron in a spirit of one-upmanship whereby, 
at each stage, the increasingly world-weary idealist looks back on his predecessors 
and mocks the comparative naivety of their disillusionment.  
* * * 
Thus it is with Russian Byronism the theme of disillusionment in romanticism reaches 
its fullest development; this was the starting point of subsequent Russian literature. 
Pushkin’s “Scene from Faust” establishes a trend that leads, as we shall see, to pro-
gressively harsher mockery of the disillusioned idealist. Works such as Eugene Onegin 
and A Hero of Our Time subject the flaws of their heroes to a psychological and moral 
scrutiny that reveals their authors’ own disillusionment with Byronism itself—they 
had become disillusioned with the culture of disillusionment. As Lermontov says in 
the preface to his novel, Pechorin is a “portrait composed of the flaws of our whole 
generation in their fullest development.”37 He states that the novel has a moralizing 
purpose, and refers sarcastically to those of his audience who have been “fed on 
sweets” and still believe in the heroism of tragic and romantic scoundrels. He thinks 
the realism of his depiction should have a medicinal effect on the society whose vices 
he is depicting. Thus Lermontov’s novel—the first great Russian psychological 
novel—is an attempt to expose the reality of romanticism, to subvert the cult of ro-
manticism (in particular, Byronism) by exposing its real psychological foundations 
and implications. The irony of the work is that Lermontov puts nothing in the place 
of Pechorin’s Byronism, but only a higher order of disillusionment that recognizes its 
own folly, and, like Pushkin in his “Faust,” looks down on those who have not at-
tained such insight; thus he does not escape the Byronic malaise, but only raises it to 
a higher power. In the same preface, indeed, he compares himself to Byron and denies 
any motivation for writing beyond his own whim and pleasure, as if to imply that the 
 




“moral” of his story is a joke: the common man is a fool for thinking that his affected 
Byronism is anything to be proud of, Pechorin is a fool for thinking that he is any 
better, and he, Lermontov, is himself a fool for thinking that he has attained a summit 
from which to look down on them all and moralize; the dialectic of naivety and disil-
lusionment is never-ending. In both of these respects—the psychological critique and 
mockery of romanticism, and an irony that undermines its own aims—A Hero of Our 
Time is an important precursor not only to Notes from Underground, but to several other 
works of fiction to be considered below. 
Above, I have outlined the main features of Byronic literature in their relation to the 
problem of disillusionment. In this context, we have begun to observe the difference 
between, on the one hand, the treatment of disillusioned idealism in Sturm und Drang 
literature and Notes from Underground and, on the other hand, its treatment in Byronic 
literature. As we have seen, in the former contexts disillusionment is associated with 
the phenomenon of caprice, while in the latter it is associated not with caprice but 
rather with what we can call “spleen.” To be sure, Notes from Underground draws as 
much on Byronism as the Sturm und Drang, especially in its characterization of the 
Underground Man as inert, sarcastic and spiteful—indeed, as splenetic. But whilst it 
is important to recognize the Underground Man’s Byronic traits, our concern in this 
dissertation is to understand his caprice, and we have now begun to see both why 
and to what extent this interest should lead us back to the Sturm und Drang movement 
specifically. 
4. Herzen and Turgenev 
Like Pushkin and Lermontov, Alexander Herzen stood on the cusp of the transition 
from romantic idealism to realism and was especially interested in the disillusioning 
effects of this transition on the Russian intellectual. Herzen’s works, both fictional and 




consideration. He was one of the foremost radical intellectuals of the nineteenth cen-
tury, and having come into conflict with Russian authorities, emigrated to London, 
from where he ran the Free Russian Press and campaigned for political progress and 
freedom of speech. Nevertheless, he had been nourished on romanticism and German 
Idealist philosophy, and his treatments of the theme of disillusioned idealism are es-
pecially illuminating as a result of his own ambivalent attitudes and commitments. 
4.1. From the Other Shore 
Herzen’s From the Other Shore (1848-1850), written in the disheartening aftermath of 
the failed 1848 revolutions, is the “most considered expression of [Herzen’s] mature 
moral and social philosophy,” and an important document in the tradition of Russian 
thought under consideration.38 In it Herzen examines the two main attitudes at war 
within the intelligentsia of his own generation: an increasingly disillusioned idealism 
and a (sometimes reluctant) awareness that a more realistic attitude must take its 
place. It is a sustained engagement with the same problems that, as we have seen, 
motivated works of the Sturm und Drang, German Idealism, Byronism, as well as 
Notes from Underground: the problem of idealistic yearning in an age of nihilistic dis-
illusionment; the problem of how best to orient one’s striving relative to one’s ideals 
and to a reality that is apparently hostile to them.  
In Byronism, romantic idealism was embittered and ironic; it then gave way, in the 
realist literature that followed, to mockery and censure that saw it as a stupid and 
dangerous attitude towards life and, in particular, politics. In From the Other Shore, 
Herzen was writing some time after the Byronic attitude went out of fashion, and 
regards idealism not through the lens of haughty Byronic irony, but with sad nostal-
gia. In his youth, he had been an ardent idealist, but now feels that he must shed the 
remnants of his youthful dreams if he is to continue striving and working in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century: “is poetry perhaps a disease of mankind,” Heine asked, 
 




“as the pearl is really only a morbid substance from which the poor oyster beast is 
suffering?”39 The same standpoint is captured by Belinsky in a review of Russian lit-
erature: 
Who of us in his youth has not dreamed, harboured illusions, and 
chased mirages, and who has not been disappointed in them? Who has 
escaped paying for these disappointments with heartburnings, anguish, 
and apathy, and who has not later laughed heartily at all these things? 
Healthy natures, however, only gain from this practical logic of life and 
experience; they develop and mature morally. It is the romanticists that 
perish from it.40  
At the heart of Herzen’s From the Other Shore is a dialogue between a realist, a “healthy 
nature” resigned yet resolute in the face of historical developments he now admits he 
cannot control, and a recalcitrant idealist, who—anticipating the Underground 
Man—chooses proudly to suffer continuous disappointment, and a kind of ongoing 
martyrdom, to “perish” rather than capitulate to necessity. Herzen apparently iden-
tifies with the former, but shows evident sympathy for the idealist, who—as Dosto-
evsky remarked when he met Herzen in London41—often seems to gain the upper 
hand over his interlocutor, thereby revealing the conflict of attitudes within Herzen 
himself as he struggles to divest himself of unrealistic aspirations.  
The general tenor of the dialogue is established early on. The realist: “I should not say 
that my present point of view is a particularly consoling one, but I have grown calmer: 
I have stopped being angry with life because it does not give what it cannot give—
that is all I have managed to achieve.” The idealist: “As for me, I do not want to stop 
being angry or suffering; this is so much a human right that I should not dream of 
surrendering it; my indignation is my protest; I do not want to make peace.” The 
realist: “[ … ] You mean that you do not want to accept the truth as it is revealed to 
you by your own thought—perhaps it would not demand suffering from you. You 
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repudiate all logic in advance—you give yourself the right to accept or reject conse-
quences as you choose.”42 
Herzen describes the inevitability of doubting and criticizing received opinions and 
traditional values; he acknowledges the compulsion of rationality, the necessity of 
“two times two is four.” But, having lived through the age of romanticism, he also 
acknowledges the difficulty of abandoning the convictions of one’s childhood and 
youth, and the inevitable pain that accompanies doubt and critique. The conflict be-
tween reason and faith, progress and tradition, realism and idealism, is nigh insur-
mountable, and calls for great fortitude: “I choose knowledge, and,” he writes, “let it 
deprive me of the last consolation, I will wander as a moral pauper through the world, 
but the childish hopes, the youthful dreams must be torn out by the roots. Off with 
them to the bar of incorruptible reason!”43 And yet, as he also says, “There are few 
nervous disorders more recalcitrant than idealism.”44  
All of this is highly redolent of Notes from Underground. Passages like the following 
clearly adumbrate the preoccupations of the Underground Man:45 
[W]e are unable to organize either the inner or the outer life, that we 
demand too much, sacrifice too much, scorn the possible, are indignant 
because what is impossible scorns us. We rebel against the natural con-
ditions of life, and submit to every kind of arbitrary nonsense. All our 
civilization is like that, it has developed in the midst of internecine 
moral strife; breaking out from the schools and monasteries, it did not 
emerge into life, but sauntered through it, like Faust, merely to take a 
look at it, to reflect upon it, and then to withdraw from the rude mob 
into salons, academies and books. It has made the whole journey under 
two banners: “Romanticism for the heart” was inscribed on one, “Ide-
alism for the mind” on the other. That is where the greater part of the 
disorder of our lives comes from. We do not like the simple, we do not 
 
42 Herzen, 1979: 20. 
43 Herzen, 1979: 49. 
44 Herzen, 1979: 73. 
45 Compare especially with the conclusion of Dostoevsky’s novel (Dostoevsky, 2001: 90f.). It 
has been recognized that From the Other Shore was hugely important for Dostoevsky, and in-




respect nature as we ought, we want to order her about, we want to 
cure her by magic spells, and are then surprised that the patient is no 
better; medicine offends us by its independence and self-sufficiency; we 
want alchemy, magic, but life and nature go their ways indifferent, sub-
mitting to man only to the extent to which he has learnt to work by their 
very methods.46  
The Underground Man illustrates all of these ideas and attitudes—not forgetting to 
take offence at medicine, refusing to consult doctors out of spite, and boiling over at 
the thought that his happiness depends on the whims of his teeth and the dentist 
Wagenheim! And, just like Herzen’s bitter idealist, he is well aware of the untenability 
of his own position but persists regardless, unwilling to capitulate because so much 
is at stake—human dignity itself. Herzen’s penetrating study of disillusionment, and 
of the intractability of the conflict between idealism and realism, correlates with the 
literary type he himself did much to establish: the “superfluous man.” 
4.2. Superfluous Men 
As stated above, there is a sense in which Russian Byronism contained its own cri-
tique—it dealt harshly with its heroes as victims of a kind of disorder, and thereby 
laid the foundations for such attacks on idealism and romanticism as From the Other 
Shore. Von Gronicka traces this shift to Pushkin’s “Faust” fragment; in radicalizing 
Faust’s boredom to such an extent that he himself becomes Mephistophelean, and the 
remnants of his idealistic striving are overwhelmed by spleen, Pushkin put his Faust 
“at the head of a long line of typically Russian heroes—his own Onegin, Lermontov’s 
Pechorin, Turgenev’s Rudin, Goncharov’s Oblomov, all those ‘superfluous people’ 
whose incurable malaise is that very boredom, that ennui experienced so poignantly 
by Pushkin’s Faust.”47 Edmund Kostka also regards the “Scene from Faust” as the 
“fountainhead” of the superfluous man tradition.48 As Russian intellectual culture 
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shifted towards realism and social criticism in the 1840s, therefore, romanticism had 
already paved the way for its own obsolescence. In order to complete the destruction 
of romantic idealism, it remained only for the intelligentsia to change its tone: where 
the Byronic anti-heroes of Pushkin and Lermontov were presented as deeply flawed 
but charismatic, their successors in Russian literature were increasingly unattractive 
and ultimately despicable, pitiable or ridiculous.  
What’s more, the aspirations of those naive idealists who had not yet become entirely 
despondent were subjected to harsh ridicule and belittled. Idealism is even diagnosed 
as a physical ailment by Herzen’s level-headed Doctor Krupov:   
“But it is rather unpleasant,” said the relentless Dr. Krupov, “to be a 
creature endowed with a lofty nature and still be obliged to live no 
higher and no higher than on earth. I confess that I consider such ‘loft-
iness’ a physical disorder or an attack of nerves. Take cold sponge baths 
and get more exercise, and half of your starry-eyed fantasies will dis-
appear.”49  
Pure-hearted idealism was thus rooted out of Russian literature and replaced by a 
particularly downtrodden and self-deprecating strain of Byronism. This was the 
theme of the “superfluous man,” described by Herzen in his 1846 novel Who is To 
Blame? and elaborated by Turgenev in “The Diary of a Superfluous Man” (1850), “The 
Hamlet of Shchigrovsky District” in Sketches from a Hunter’s Album (1852) and Rudin 
(1856).50 Depictions of “superfluous men” in these stories became increasingly unflat-
tering. As Isaiah Berlin wrote of Who is To Blame?: 
[Herzen’s best novel] deals with a situation common enough at that 
time—of a rich and unhappy young Russian landowner (the ‘superflu-
ous man’) vainly struggling against his environment, a figure to be-
come celebrated later in the novels of Herzen’s contemporaries, Gon-
charov, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, but especially Turgenev—the prototype 
of many a Russian Hamlet, too idealistic and too honest to accept the 
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squalor and the lies of conventional society, too weak and too civilized 
to work effectively for their destruction, and consequently displaced 
from his proper function and doomed to poison his own life and the 
lives of others by neurotic behaviour induced by the vices of a society 
which sins against the moral ideals which the author holds dear, a so-
ciety either irremediably corrupt, or still capable of regeneration, ac-
cording to the author’s social or religious beliefs.51  
Here the romantic hero has become further downgraded, losing even the dark fasci-
nation of the Byronic hero, and ceasing to be romantic and a hero altogether. His intel-
lectual superiority now counts for nothing because he is weak-willed, vacillating and 
indecisive, and a useless burden on those around him. At the time of his creation, the 
Underground Man stood at the furthest extreme of this development—many more of 
his attributes come into being in Turgenev’s variations on the superfluous man theme, 
especially his “Hamlet” type, which appeared in the preceding decade.52  
In her monograph study of his characters, Eva Kagan-Kans has commented on the 
similarity of the Turgenev’s “Hamlets” and Dostoevsky’s Underground Man.53 Her 
description of the former is equally applicable to the latter, and goes to show the im-
portance of Turgenev’s characters in the genealogy of the Underground Man: 
[The Hamlet type’s] basic traits are his egotism, lack of faith, and the 
self-analysis which inevitably accompanies these attitudes. Nothing in 
life can command his devotion, and he is preoccupied solely by his own 
ego and his own condition of life. Doubting everything, he also doubts 
himself; having no ideal, he is inspired by an irony directed primarily 
at himself. [ … ] Hamlet’s doubts and reflections [ … ] paralyze his will 
and render him incapable of action.54  
Here we have the “heightened consciousness” and concomitant inertia of the Under-
ground Man, Byronic traits that have, so to speak, atrophied and lost their heroic 
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charm in the backwaters of provincial Russia. Further similarities abound. The narra-
tor of Turgenev’s Diary of a Superfluous Man, Chulkaturin, claims just like the Under-
ground Man that he is writing only for himself, out of a personal compulsion;55 both 
are paralyzed by endless self-examination that is vented in the form of solitary literary 
reflections. Thus, Chulkaturin too complains of an impenetrable barrier between his 
feelings and his thoughts, which he himself associates with excessive self-regard.56 As 
is typical of the post-Byronic egoism of both characters, this obsessive self-analysis 
and the internal disharmony it creates also leads to interpersonal difficulties in both 
works. Perhaps not coincidentally, the love interest is called Liza in both, and each of 
the narrators is prevented from establishing a meaningful relationship with his Liza 
by virtue of his “bookishness,” his inability to express his personality spontaneously 
and without artifice, irony or mockery:57 “Farewell, Liza!” writes Chulkaturin, “I’ve 
just written these two words and almost burst out laughing. They sound so bookish. 
It’s as if I were composing some sentimental story or ending a letter of despair…”58 
The combined influence of his immersion in romantic literature and, stemming from 
disillusionment with the ideals of this literature, of his ruthless self-examination and 
self-mockery has entirely robbed Chulkaturin of the ability to engage naturally with 
his own feelings, or to express them naturally to others.   
Overall, Turgenev’s contribution to the tradition under discussion can be seen pri-
marily as a further development of the Byronic and post-Byronic themes in Russian 
literature; his “Hamlets” and “superfluous men” continue the trend begun by Push-
kin and Lermontov insofar as they further strip the idealistic hero of heroic traits, to 
the extent that he is no longer a hero at all, and so conscious of his own irremediable 
insignificance that he can hardly be thought of as an idealist either. In all respects 
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pertaining to these developments, works like the Diary of a Superfluous Man should be 
viewed as having a direct influence on Notes from Underground.  
5. Gogol and Goncharov 
It is important to consider two further literary figures, both of whom contributed sig-
nificantly to the traditional theme of disillusionment in Russian literature: Nikolai 
Gogol and Ivan Goncharov. The former is interesting here insofar as he had a strong 
influence on Dostoevsky’s characterization of disillusioned idealism, the latter as an 
example of an entirely different approach.  
5.1. Nevsky Prospect 
Generally speaking, Gogol is significant to the present investigation in two ways. On 
the one hand, in much of his fiction he depicted ordinary Russians—especially bu-
reaucrats, as in The Government Inspector (1836) and Dead Souls (1842)—in a highly 
unflattering light.59 He thereby contributed markedly to the general disillusionment 
of Russian literature itself, or the shift from romanticism to realism. Dostoevsky’s debt 
to Gogol is most obvious in his early fiction; in Poor Folk, for example, the minor bu-
reaucrat Makar Devushkin reads Gogol’s story “The Overcoat” and is humiliated by 
the brutally honest depiction of the character type on which he himself is modelled.60 
As we shall see, however, Gogol’s influence is no less pronounced in the representa-
tion of disillusionment in Notes form Underground. His vision of Russia—and in par-
ticular, of Petersburg—is fundamental to Dostoevsky’s portrayal of reality as an un-
suitable arena for the realization of lofty goals.  
 
59 Gogol, 1995: 245-336; 1961. 




On the other hand, Gogol also depicted specific instances of disillusioned idealism, 
blending tragedy and comedy to expose the pathetic naivety of youthful romantics 
(or “Schillers,” as Dostoevsky would call them). The short story “Nevsky Prospect” 
(1835) is an excellent example of this. The story follows the separate misadventures 
of two friends—the shy, sensitive artist Piskaryov and the brash army officer Pi-
rogov—in their ill-fated attempts to pursue two women who catch their respective 
eyes one day on Nevsky Prospect. It is the story of Piskaryov, a kind of deflated par-
able on the contrast between dreams and reality, that interests us here. Gogol’s intro-
duction of Piskaryov signals the fate that awaits him in the reality of Saint Petersburg: 
This young man belonged to that class which constitutes one of the 
stranger phenomena of our life and which has as little in common with 
the usual citizens of St Petersburg as a person seen in a dream has with 
the real world. This unique class is most remarkable in a city where 
everyone is a civil servant, a shopkeeper, or a German craftsman. Our 
young man was an artist.61  
For Gogol, Petersburg represents a world that is positively incapable of satisfying the 
spiritual needs of a lover of the sublime and the beautiful. It is this banal, Gogolian 
Petersburg that the Underground Man, too, inhabits. On Pirogov’s prompting, 
Piskaryov rushes off after the young brunette who caught his eye. Assuming that this 
model of beauty is a noble lady, he can hardly believe that she seems to be smiling at 
him and leading him on—ironically, he suspects that he must be dreaming—but he 
follows her, all the way to an unexpectedly run-down establishment, and discovers 
that she is in fact a prostitute. Unable to cope with this turn of events, he runs home 
in despair. When he falls asleep, however, he dreams of the young woman, and in his 
dream she really is a wealthy and enigmatic lady of the highest society; unaware that 
he is dreaming, he wonders how this turn of events can be reconciled with his earlier 
experience at the bordello.62 Upon his waking, all becomes clear, but Piskaryov is far 
from satisfied: “Oh, how repulsive was reality! How could he face it after his 
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dream!”63 Piskaryov’s reaction is not to capitulate, but instead to reject reality entirely; 
he wants only to sleep and to return to his dream. When he next falls asleep, though, 
he dreams “some vile, banal dream” about “some functionary, who was at one and 
the same time a functionary and a bassoon.”64 Like Gogol’s more bizarre tales, such 
as “The Nose” and the “Diary of a Madman,”65 Piskaryov’s exaggeratedly “banal” 
dreams serve as irritating, offensive foils for the ideal. Piskaryov longs for something, 
as the Underground Man would say, at which he cannot stick out his tongue. 
Eventually, the lady reappears in his dreams; Piskaryov begins to see her every night. 
He uses opium to prolong and enhance his encounters. Then, inspired by visions of 
marriage, he forms the plan of going to see her in reality and rescuing her from the 
life he assumes she—a noble lady at heart—must be desperate to escape from. Natu-
rally, the attempt to realize his dreams is disastrous; the women merely laugh at his 
suggestion of marriage and the life of honest hardship he offers as an alternative to 
prostitution. Driven mad by the sheer vulgarity of the real woman corresponding to 
the ideal of his imagination, he commits suicide. Gogol’s warning that Piskaryov “has 
as little in common with the usual citizens of St Petersburg as a person seen in a dream 
has with the real world” proves true: he is literally incapable of surviving outside his 
dreams, killed “by his refusal to accept reality on its own terms.”66 
The sad fate of Piskaryov is juxtaposed against the ensuing tale of the shallow and 
self-satisfied Pirogov, which is entirely comic and serves to illustrate what Gogol 
means by “the usual citizens of St Petersburg.” Having parted ways with Piskaryov, 
Pirogov follows a different woman back to the workshop of a German craftsman, her 
husband. The ensuing scene is characteristic of Gogol’s method of playfully inverting 
the priorities of romanticism by way of exaggerated, ridiculous banality:   
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Before him sat Schiller—not Schiller who wrote Wilhelm Tell and the 
History of the Thirty Years’ War, but another Schiller, one tinsmith resid-
ing at Meshchanskaya Street. Beside Schiller stood Hofmann—not Hof-
mann the writer, but a rather good shoemaker from Offitserskaya Street, 
and a good friend of Schiller’s.67 
Such apparently innocuous comic flourishes are part of a general campaign to expose 
everything that, from the perspective of idealistic romanticism, is shameful, seamy 
or—what is the same thing from the romantic perspective—merely banal about the 
real world.68 Schiller and Hofmann the craftsmen, like the dentist Wagenheim, are 
emblems of this offensive banality. For Belinsky, this meant that “Gogol strictly ad-
heres to the sphere of Russian everyday reality in his works.”69 Whether or not Gogol 
wanted to play the role of social critic that Belinsky and the progressive intelligentsia 
foisted upon him, it is true that in his tales stripped of all romantic pretentions—in-
deed, calculated to offend the romantic sensibilities—he certainly contributed to the 
decline of romanticism described at the end of Chapter 8, and the rise of the “Natural 
School” of anti-romantic realism.70 In this way, he contributed to the progressive de-
flation of the superfluous man into the object of contempt or pity depicted by Herzen, 
Turgenev and Goncharov. 
5.2. The Same Old Story 
For Goncharov, disillusionment was a particular specialty: he made it the primary 
theme of all three of his novels, The Same Old Story, Oblomov and The Precipice (pub-
lished in 1847, 1859 and 1869 respectively). The former two were highly influential 
and, since they preceded Notes from Underground, worthy of consideration here. As 
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stated, Goncharov’s treatment of disillusionment is interesting to the present investi-
gation inasmuch as it is, in certain respects, diametrically opposed to Dostoevsky’s.    
Goncharov’s first novel follows the love affairs, and concomitant emotional tribula-
tions, of an aspiring poet called Alexander Aduyev. Alexander, who has led a shel-
tered and pampered life on his family estate, arrives in Saint Petersburg to seek the 
assistance of his estranged uncle, Pyotr Ivanovich, in building his career and estab-
lishing himself as a man of letters. The disillusionment he experiences in Petersburg 
is a predictable consequence of his inexperience, his unrealistic expectations, and the 
quasi-Mephistophelean influence of his uncle, a principled nihilist. Pyotr Ivanovich 
denies the existence of love and fellowship traditionally conceived, endeavours to be 
entirely egoistic, abides by an entirely utilitarian ethics, and is no less harsh on ideal-
ism than the utopian and revolutionary Nihilists who came after him; unlike the Ni-
hilists, however, he does not regard the improvement of society as the inevitable con-
sequence of his own egoism. He is a wealthy capitalist with no interest in political or 
economic upheaval. He enjoys the finer things, the best wine, even poetry and litera-
ture—Alexander is dumbfounded to learn that he knows some Pushkin by heart—
but he seems to enjoy them only as sources of animal pleasure and not as flights of 
human spirit.71 In all of these respects, he is the exact antithesis of his nephew and is 
glad to oversee the failure of Alexander’s career as a poet and of several disastrous 
love affairs—he regards these disappointments as highly salutary for the young ide-
alist.  
One of the most illustrative scenes is also, I think, one that exerted a strong influence 
on Dostoevsky.72 His heart having been broken for the first time, Alexander goes to 
his uncle to unburden himself. Of course, Pyotr Ivanovich is the last person to offer 
emotional comfort on such an occasion, and what ensues is a comic dialogue in which 
he systemically humiliates Alexander for his naivety. He knows that Alexander will 
be unable to countenance the idea of enjoying a meal at such a time, of gratifying the 
 
71 Goncharov, 2015: 61. 




body when the soul is in torment—“Eat supper! You won’t be able to swallow a thing 
either, when you know that this is a matter of life and death”—so he orders a meal 
and a bottle of expensive wine. 73  He eats with relish, continually interrupts his 
nephew’s outpourings with jokes, derisive remarks, and complaints about the tem-
perature of his food and wine. This chapter is one of the clearest examples of a com-
mon theme in Russian literature: “The dichotomy between the naïve romantic 
dreamer and the sceptic of the transitional age,” Neuhauser remarks, “became an es-
sential feature of the characterization of post-romantic heroes in the literature of the 
forties and fifties in Russia.”74  
I mentioned in Chapter 6 that Dostoevsky maintained this paradigm in several works, 
but it is in Humiliated and Insulted that he explores the dichotomy in a manner most 
reminiscent of Goncharov’s novel.75 The young idealist Ivan Petrovich,76 an aspiring 
writer (not unlike Alexander Aduyev), is taken for a meal and humiliated by the 
wealthy sensualist Prince Valkovsky. Echoing Goncharov, Ivan Petrovich is shocked 
that the Prince wants to have supper with him, his personal and ideological combat-
ant: “I never have supper,” he says.77 While enjoying the expensive meal and becom-
ing increasingly drunk, Valkovsky mocks him for being a “Schiller” and takes pleas-
ure in embarrassing his romantic sensibilities by revealing the most sordid aspects of 
his own personality.78 As in The Same Old Story, and indeed in Goethe’s Faust, the 
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seen through me” (Dostoevsky, 2001: 11). The act of “unmasking” is repeated in Crime and 




mocker revels in exaggerating the contrast between the lofty and the vulgar, the spir-
itual and the bodily. In Notes from Underground, moreover, Dostoevsky explores the 
way this mocker-idealist dichotomy can operate within an individual person—the 
Underground Man qua sceptic mocks the Underground Man qua “Schiller” and de-
rives a kind of masochistic pleasure from doing so. (It is perhaps noteworthy that the 
wine Pyotr Ivanovich conspicuously enjoys while mocking his nephew is a Lafite—
the wine preferred by the Underground Man’s paragon of self-satisfied gluttony, the 
“connoisseur of Lafite” whose complacent sensuality he contrasts ironically with his 
own more exalted and pure-hearted sensibilities.79) 
Despite his uncle’s best efforts, the conflict between realism and idealism has pre-
dominantly negative effects on Alexander: “you created an inner conflict in me,” he 
says, “between two competing views of life and were unable to reconcile them—and 
what was the end result? I ended up wallowing in doubt—a total mess, Uncle!”80 The 
psychological result of Alexander’s disillusionment, however, is neither Sturm und 
Drang caprice nor Byronic spleen, but anger, sadness and eventually resignation and 
reform. In the end, he devotes himself entirely to his uncle’s way of life (while Pyotr 
Ivanovich, ironically, shows signs of repenting and reforming in the opposite direc-
tion).81 Overall, then, the theme of disillusionment in The Same Old Story seems to have 
influenced Dostoevsky’s portrayal of “Schillers” and their antagonists, but not to 
have had any impact on the way in which he characterizes disillusionment or its con-
sequences in Notes from Underground. 
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Goncharov’s second novel addresses the theme of disillusionment in a more oblique 
and less contrived fashion. Whereas The Same Old Story illustrates the tribulations of 
a young idealist struggling to come to terms with reality, Oblomov—a pampered and 
completely inept nobleman—is introduced as someone who has long since ceased to 
aspire towards the ideals of his youth. The dichotomy between naive dreamer and 
man of action recurs, but without open antagonism: Oblomov relies on his beloved 
friend Stolz to arrange his life and take care of his estate, while the latter merely scolds 
and pleads with him to take steps to revitalize himself.  
Oblomov suffers from a more literal variety of inertia than the Underground Man—
he spends almost his entire life lounging about at home, overwhelmed by the exigen-
cies of even the most basic tasks, and unable to perceive the advantage of taking any 
kind of decisive action whatever. Goncharov attributes Oblomov’s inertia in part to 
his nobleman’s upbringing,82 and in part to his nature: “Lying down was not for Ob-
lomov a necessity, as it is for a sick man or for a man who is sleepy; or a matter of 
chance, as it is for a man who is tired; or a pleasure, as it is for a lazy man: it was his 
normal condition.”83 But it is evidently also a product of his predilection for day-
dreaming; he indulges in fantasies, while every chance of actually realizing them slips 
away from him. Marriage seems a charming prospect to his romantic sensibilities, but 
as soon as at becomes an imminent possibility, something approaching a practical 
matter, he is terrified and withdraws.84 
Oblomov belongs in this respect to the tradition of the superfluous man. Indeed, for 
the radical critic Dobrolyubov, Oblomov was, to all intents and purposes, exactly the 
same kind of person as Onegin and Pechorin. At the end of the 1850s, he writes, the 
general audience has become fed up with empty talk and lofty rhetoric, irrespective 
of the form it takes: “But the crowd is right! Once it has realized that it is necessary to 
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set to work in real earnest, it makes no difference to it whether a Pechorin or an Ob-
lomov stands before it.“85 He doesn’t deny that Onegin and Pechorin are very differ-
ent from Oblomov in other respects, but only that they are identical in the one respect 
that now matters most, namely, the inability to work for the good of the nation. Do-
brolyubov’s remarks seem perceptive: Goncharov’s novel does contribute to the gen-
eral trend of deflating the image of the superfluous man and the disillusioned idealist 
more generally, who now appears at his most pitiful, “wearing a wide dressing gown 
instead of an austere cloak.”86 Thanks to Dobrolyubov, Oblomov became a symbol of 
the depths to which the aging members of the romantic generation, sufferers of “Ob-
lomovitis” or “Oblomovism” (обломовщина), had now fallen. 
6. Return to the Sturm und Drang 
This finally concludes our history of disillusioned idealism in the Byronic and realist 
Russian literature separating the Sturm und Drang movement both conceptually and 
temporally from the time of Notes from Underground. We have considered the various 
ingredients that Dostoevsky plucked from his nineteenth-century predecessors: from 
Byron, Pushkin and Lermontov, egotistical self-absorption and spite; from Herzen 
and Turgenev, the divesting of all heroism and grandeur from the Byronic hero, the 
vision of the “superfluous man” as a completely failed romantic, totally out of place 
in reality; from Goncharov, the confrontation between humiliated idealist and scep-
tical mocker, and the contrast between the inert mouse and the man of action; from 
Gogol, finally, the idea of Petersburg as a kind of spiritual and aesthetic void in which 
the name “Schiller” refers only to a binge-drinking tinsmith on Meshchanskaya Street. 
At the outset of Chapter 8, I raised two questions. First, to what extent is the Under-
ground Man a throwback to the Sturm und Drang movement specifically? Although 
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he belongs very much to his own time, he is—much more than any of his Russian 
literary cousins and forebears—also a throwback to their common ancestors, the he-
roes of the Sturm und Drang considered in Chapters 6 and 7. As we can see from the 
above survey, the Underground Man has something in common with Karl Moor and 
Faust that he does not share with any other major character belonging to the same 
lineage—he reacts capriciously to disillusionment. In this respect he is quite unlike 
Manfred, Cain, Onegin, Pechorin, Beltov, Rudin, Chulkaturin, Piskaryov, Oblomov—
all of whom are no less disillusioned, but none of whom express their disillusionment 
with such a mad yearning for absolute freedom. 
If the Underground Man is a relation of such heroes as Karl Moor and Faust, as I have 
claimed, what explains the huge differences between these characters? Maybe they 
are all capricious, but the heroes of the Sturm und Drang were also brave, charismatic, 
awe-inspiring; the Underground Man is the opposite of all of these traits. How, then, 
am I justified in suggesting that Dostoevsky’s narrator should be understood with 
reference to these characters? We are due an explanation of Dostoevsky’s introduc-
tion of such a raft of differences, which, we may suppose, can only serve to obscure 
his allusions to Schiller and Goethe, and thus undermine his purpose as I have pre-
sented it. On the face of it, we may suppose that such differences are to be accounted 
for by the difference in literary tastes; after all, more than eighty years separate The 
Robbers from Notes from Underground. This is more than a matter of taste, however; 
Dostoevsky needed to ensure that his Underground Man was relevant to the specific 
concerns of his audience, so that his reaction to nihilism would make sense as the 
reaction of an ordinary Russian intellectual. Thus he transposed the Sturm und Drang 
into a new key. 
What would a Karl Moor or a Götz von Berlichingen be like if transported into Rus-
sian literature in the 1860s, and made to conform to the expectations of realism and 
social commentary? He would not be so impulsive; an “educated man of the nine-
teenth century” would be far more circumspect. He would not be so powerful and 




representative of real people. He would be no less intelligent, he would be well edu-
cated, but he would likely be a small- to middle-sized cog in the Gogolian bureau-
cracy. What would Faust be like? In the first place, he would be deprived of his magic 
powers; he would be deprived of Mephistopheles; he would have precious little to 
show for his intellectual ascendency over Wagner—the latter would, in fact, be far 
better suited to life in Saint Petersburg and would excel him in the civil service. If the 
romantic, the dashing, the heroic, the gothic, the unrealistic trappings of these charac-
ters are stripped away, what remains is a parody of their former selves: their hopeless 
idealism would seem not tragic, but pitiful or ridiculous. In general, if the heroes of 
the Sturm und Drang were transposed, retaining only their basic interests and psycho-
logical characteristics, into a realistic setting of mid-nineteenth century Russia, the 
Underground Man would be the result. 
The groundwork for such a transposition already existed in the works of Russian By-
ronism and their successors; the “superfluous man” is in each of his instances little 
more than a romantic hero stripped of heroism, left with only vague aspirations and 
a gnawing sense of inadequacy. Dobrolyubov rightly identified Oblomov as an ex-
treme example of this trend: “His appearance would have been impossible had soci-
ety, at least some section of it, not realized what nonentities all those quasi-talented 
natures are, which it had formerly admired.”87 In Oblomov, the superfluous man ap-
pears in his true colours, “reclining on a soft couch instead of standing on a beautiful 
pedestal, wearing a wide dressing gown instead of an austere cloak.”88 For Dostoev-
sky, it remained only to salvage from Schiller and Goethe the one characteristic that 
had been forgotten in the meantime—that is, caprice. Only in the Sturm und Drang 
and in Notes from Underground does the disillusionment of idealism lead to caprice; in 
the Byronic tradition of literature, as we have seen, caprice is absent. Since the Under-
ground Man’s caprice is what we are ultimately trying to understand, my emphasis 
on the works of Schiller and Goethe, rather than any other source of inspiration for 
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Dostoevsky, should now make sense in theory (insofar as the analysis of Chapters 6 
and 7 was perspicacious, it should already have been justified in practice).   
7. Conclusion 
The second main question I asked at the beginning of Chapter 8 was that of why Dos-
toevsky establishes this relationship with the Sturm und Drang at all. Why does he 
rehabilitate the theme of caprice as a response to nihilism? Of course, there is no rea-
son to expect in advance that there is any meaningful answer to this question; Dosto-
evsky may simply have made a thematic choice based on his own interests, without 
having any grand purpose in mind. In fact, however, I would argue there is a more 
interesting answer, and one, moreover, that is crucial to understanding Dostoevsky’s 
polemical intent in Notes from Underground. The materials of this solution have been 
gathered in previous chapters and in the historical surveys above; as we have seen, 
Byronism coloured the way in which Russian writers reacted to the decline of German 
Idealist philosophy and its solution to the problem of nihilism and human dignity. 
The disillusionment caused by this decline was, in the first instance, embodied in 
post-Byronic characters like Herzen’s Beltov and the other “superfluous men”—mor-
ally and socially harmful, but completely ineffective and thus, politically, quite innoc-
uous. Russian Nihilism was premised on the assumption that “Oblomovitis” was the 
logical conclusion of this trend. The Underground Man, though he shares many char-
acteristics with his literary predecessors, represents an attack on this assumption; here 
the distinction between spleen and caprice is significant. Pushkin’s Onegin, like his 
Faust, suffers from a chronic boredom and indifference; Turgenev’s “Hamlets” wal-
low in uncertainty and self-loathing; Oblomov vegetates in a state of anxious dissoci-
ation; but the Underground Man represents storm and stress, caprice; he may be a 
“Hamlet” as well, but of one thing he has no doubt: that he would rather live in hell 




In Chapter 10, I shall assemble these ingredients to reach a final conclusion on the 
problem of understanding Dostoevsky’s polemic in Notes from Underground. I shall 
first move on to outline the immediate polemical background for the Notes, before, 
finally, proceeding to reconstruct Dostoevsky’s argument against Nihilist utopian so-




Chapter 10:  A Realistic Utopia  
1. The New People 
Battered by disappointments and the apparently unstoppable advance of natural sci-
ence upon the higher strata of human culture (whether religious, aesthetic or political), 
idealistic romanticism had given way first to the mockery of Byronism and then of 
post-Byronic realism. Romanticism had become a dead weight on Russian society, 
even in the eyes of its former adherents; they sought to replace it with an ideology of 
action and practical results.1 The German “materialism controversy” spilled directly 
into Russia, where radicals like Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov and Pisarev embraced 
the materialist teachings of Büchner and others, along with the moral and political 
views that naturally accompany such notions of humanity.2 The Young Hegelians 
and the French utopian socialists and positivists continued to influence the Russian 
desire for social and political criticism and progress.3 In general, by the 1860s the rad-
ical vanguard of social and political philosophy was dominated by faith in the power 
of science to explain and guide human life, and the rejection of all traditional values 
that could not be explained and obtained scientifically—in other words, it was dom-
inated by nihilism, indeed, by those who openly accepted the designation of Nihilism. 
Two of the most important documents leading up to Dostoevsky’s engagement with 
this phenomenon in Notes from Underground are Turgenev’s Fathers and Children and 
Chernyshevsky’s What is to Be Done?, published in 1862 and ‘63 respectively). To-
gether, these novels served to establish the Nihilist as a literary and cultural type in 
the early 1860s. The former was Turgenev’s attempt to understand the “new people” 
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heralded by the likes of Chernyshevsky, and especially to understand their interac-
tions with the older generation of Westernized intellectuals, including Turgenev him-
self, who upheld the ideals of civilization and progress but were unwilling to make 
such a radical break with traditional values as the Nihilists demanded.4 Dostoevsky 
would take up the same theme more directly in Demons and The Adolescent, both of 
which address intergenerational relations in the third quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury;5 in Notes from Underground, however, he turns his attention to the ideology of 
Nihilism itself, and explores its philosophical, political and psychological dimensions. 
In this respect he engages much more directly with What Is to Be Done?, which was in 
turn a response to the largely unflattering portrait of Nihilism in Fathers and Children.6 
Here I will briefly consider the polemical significance of these two novels, to round 
off the historical outline of Russian literature leading up to Notes from Underground, 
and set the scene for my final reconstruction of Dostoevsky’s polemical contribution. 
1.1. Bazarov 
Turgenev’s Fathers and Children follows the interactions of two young nihilists, Baza-
rov and his protégé Arkady Nikolaevich, with two members of the older generation, 
Arkady’s father and his uncle, Pavel Petrovich. Arkady and his father are both rather 
good-natured and do not clash violently over differences of opinion.7 Bazarov and 
Pavel Petrovich, however, become enemies. The latter simply cannot understand how 
the destruction of art, culture and love itself can be considered progress. “We act on 
the basis of what we recognize as useful,” Bazarov replies. “Nowadays the most use-
ful thing of all is rejection—we reject.”8 Turgenev’s depiction of the “nihilist” Bazarov 
caused a great deal of controversy, with many young intellectuals feeling that 
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Turgenev had caricatured and attacked their aspirations.9 The radical Dmitry Pisarev, 
however, took a bolder approach and claimed Bazarov as a hero and role-model.10 
Pisarev recognized in Bazarov a force for the regeneration of advancement of Russian 
society. Although he thinks that Bazarov is carried away to unnecessary extremes in 
his rejection of certain harmless pleasures (such as the enjoyment of nature, which 
Pisarev regards as a perfectly legitimate means of relaxing in between shifts of work11), 
he does not accuse Turgenev of caricature but praises him for recognizing that, for 
young Russians, the time is right for extreme measures to be taken. Pisarev claims 
that the history of philosophy is replete with various idealisms and corresponding 
disillusionments—“fresh hopes and fresh disappointments”—and argues that this 
cycle will only come to an end when all ideals are recognized as delusions, and hu-
manity limits its aspirations to realities;12 this is where he thinks Bazarov leads the 
way. “What is to be done?” Pisarev asks, and finds the answer in Bazarov’s uncom-
promising realism: “We must live while we are alive, eat dry bread if there is no roast 
beef, know many women if it is not possible to love a woman, and, in general, we 
must not dream about orange trees and palms, when underfoot are snowdrifts and 
the cold tundra.”13  
In fact, despite its radicalism Pisarev’s anti-idealism draws on the arguments that the 
older generation of disillusioned idealists had used in mockery of itself. “When our 
grandfathers amused themselves with Martinism, Masonry, or Voltairism,” he writes, 
“when our fathers consoled themselves with romanticism, Byronism, or Hegelianism, 
they were like youths who try desperately to convince themselves that they feel an 
irresistible need to smoke a strong cigarette after dinner.”14 The need for an “ideal” 
had always been legitimate insofar as it had stemmed from a legitimate boredom, but 
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its particular outlet—the “isms” of Western philosophy—never had anything to do 
with “the organic needs of the Russian people” but only with fashion.15 They thus 
caused a rupture between wholesome nature and unhealthy artifice, and led to such 
phenomena as the “superfluous man” and other retrograde tendencies in the Russian 
intellectual.  
Just like the romantics of the previous generation, then, Pisarev bemoans the separa-
tion of intellect and feeling, the lack of harmony in modern individuals. And he re-
gards this precisely as a romantic malaise, afflicting the older generation but not the 
“new people,” the Nihilists.16 As far as he is concerned, though, the solution is obvi-
ous and simple: internal discord arises only because many people tend to acquire ar-
tificial needs that set them at odds against their real needs. As such, we should simply 
decide to respect only those needs which can be founded in the needs of our organism 
or given a physiological justification; if we cannot expect the human organism to ben-
efit from a certain course of action, we should abandon that course as ephemeral and 
dangerous.17 In practice, this means abandoning all that the romantics and idealists 
of earlier generations held dear, and contenting oneself with animal pleasures, mate-
rial possessions, and realistic political goals. As soon as this is achieved, however, the 
spell of the superfluous man will be broken and the post-Byronic malaise afflicting 
Russian society will dissipate. Nikolai Strakhov pointed out in Dostoevsky’s journal 
Time that in his craving for meaningful activity, Bazarov is merely “a direct and im-
mediate imitator of Onegin, Pechorin, Rudin, and Lavretsky.”18 In Bazarov this crav-
ing is finally satisfied quite simply because he has managed to change the direction 
of his striving from unrealistic to realistic goals. 
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1.2. What is To Be Done? 
Chernyshevsky’s novel was designed to illustrate this new attitude. The main char-
acters are temperamentally suited to the Nihilist way of life, and have little trouble 
subordinating their aspirations to the ruthless utilitarianism it demands. Chernyshev-
sky thus includes another, far less heroic character, as a more tangible and familiar 
example of practical realism. Marya Aleksevna, mother of the novel’s heroine, repre-
sents the possibility of a correct attitude in a completely ordinary, indeed suboptimal 
person—she is ignorant, prejudiced and incapable of contributing positively to her 
daughter’s life or to society, but nevertheless possessed of a single-mindedness that 
Chernyshevsky asks his readers to admire. He admits that “the inevitable result of 
every human being’s frailty” is a division of thoughts and feelings into the categories 
of realism and idealism (of course, the more sensible a person is, the more the former 
will predominate in his or her aspirations), but argues that even the most limited per-
son should be capable of holding the latter in check. As an example, he describes 
Marya Aleksevna’s considerations on how best to deal with her daughter’s elopement; 
as is usually the case, he writes, her thoughts are divided between one “real” and 
various “ideal” plans for action. The latter involve, for instance, “a parental curse [ … ] 
followed by an explanation that such a malediction was so powerful that even the 
earth, as everyone knows, refuses to receive the remains of children cursed by their 
parents”; this plan might afford her temporary satisfaction, but it would be extrava-
gant and counterproductive. The former plan, “much less elevated,” involves capitu-
lating to the facts, however unpleasant, and discovering how best to turn a bad situ-
ation to her advantage.19  
This novel, as stated, can be seen as the most immediate stimulus for Notes from Un-
derground, and it will be worth considering the ways in which Dostoevsky engages 
with it directly before turning to consider his central argument against Nihilist uto-
pian socialism itself. As we have seen, Dostoevsky argues with his opponents on two 
main fronts: he attacks their doctrines directly, and he attacks their representation of 
 




the psychological and social impact of believing in these doctrines. Where he does the 
latter, he embodies the psychological consequences of believing in Nihilist doctrines 
in the Underground Man; in such cases, Dostoevsky is typically satirizing the charac-
ters of Chernyshevsky’s novel.20 Chernyshevsky’s Nihilists are swift, bold and deci-
sive, but the Underground Man is the opposite to a comical degree; far from having 
been emboldened and strengthened by the doctrines of modern philosophy, he has 
been weakened and corrupted. For Chernyshevsky, Marya Aleksevna’s virtue lies in 
the fact that, despite succumbing to the allure of “ideal” reflections, she does not lin-
ger on them but rather allows the “real” to predominate and decide her actions: “It’s 
a great quality, Marya Aleksevna, to be able to recognize an impossibility!” She knew 
that her “ideal” courses of action were doomed to fail, and “had the good sense and 
courage to submit to the inevitable without causing useless harm to yourself and to 
others.”21 The Underground Man, of course, takes an approach diametrically opposed 
to the one recommended by Chernyshevsky: when he wishes to take revenge on the 
officer who insulted him, he wallows for several years in a “stinking mess consisting 
of doubts, anxieties, and, finally, spittle showered upon it by the spontaneous men of 
action who stand by solemnly as judges and arbiters, roaring with laughter until their 
sides split.”22 He is fully aware of the absurdity of his behaviour, and agrees unre-
servedly with Chernyshevsky’s warning that such “endless, solitary reflections” 
achieve nothing of any value at all.23 He simply cannot, and does not want to change 
his ways; the foundations of his personality have been infected with fear and uncer-
tainty provoked by the philosophy of nihilism. Dostoevsky also parodies Cher-
nyshevsky’s hero Lopukhov, who refuses on principle to make way for high-ranking 
dignitaries on the street, by allowing the Underground Man to avenge himself by 
bumping rudely into his enemy on his holiday promenade.24 Lopukhov hurls a gen-
tleman into the mud, then condescends to pick him back up and dust him off; after 
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countless failed attempts, the puny Underground Man finally makes contact and ric-
ochets off his adversary, who fails to notice his existence! 
When the Underground Man discusses topics such as free will, rationality and egoism, 
he is engaging directly with existing Nihilist journalism, as well as Chernyshevsky’s 
philosophical essays and the dialogues on these themes in What is To Be Done?25 The 
blunt approach taken by the Nihilists made that of the Underground Man possible. 
In declaring openly that the ideals of former generations were completely worthless 
because they were unrealistic, and that only a fool or a lunatic would knowingly pur-
sue them, they may have underestimated the extent to which their opponents had 
already outdone them; after all, it was the Byronists and their realist successors, in-
cluding Herzen, Turgenev and Dostoevsky, who first mocked the delusions of ideal-
ism and recognized its untenability. The Nihilists argued that the continued obstinacy 
of idealism was empty rhetoric. “It is only against theory,” Pisarev writes, 
that materialism is waging a struggle; in practical life we are all mate-
rialists and are always at odds with our theories. The whole difference 
between the idealist and the materialist in practical life is that to the 
former the ideal is a standing reproach and a constant nightmare, while 
the latter feels at liberty and in the right so long as he is not doing actual 
evil to anyone.26  
The notion that the unrealizable ideal can become a “standing reproach and constant 
nightmare” would, however, have resonated with many of Pisarev’s opponents; 
above we saw that the idealistic interlocutor in Herzen’s From the Other Shore was 
under no illusion that suffering would be his lot in life.27 “Lord,” Gogol’s Piskaryov 
exclaims, “what a life we lead! Our dreams are constantly at war with reality!”28 More 
generally, as we know, this theme had been entirely commonplace since Byron had 
perfected the notion of the hero suffering under the weight of his own intellectual 
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superiority. Dostoevsky merely continues this tradition in Notes from Underground, in 
which—as we saw in Chapter 5 —the Underground Man is only too willing to sacri-
fice “normal advantage” on the altar of his ideals, knowing full well that no good will 
come of it.  
Whilst they might agree with Pisarev that his advice is the key to internal harmony 
and happiness, those idealists will not be swayed who, like the Underground Man, 
have already decided to forgo happiness in the name of their ideals. For the Nihilists, 
it is simply a matter of learning to profit from the “school of life,” discarding the un-
realistic dreams of childhood and learning to make the most of the world’s opportu-
nities. But as Carlyle said of Faust, “disappointment, which fronts him on every hand, 
rather maddens than instructs.”29 The idealist is unwilling to accept happiness on 
these terms. Conversely, realists like Pisarev are hardly likely to see the—not to say 
appeal, but dignity of idealism, when its dire personal consequences are admitted even 
by the idealists themselves. Jacobi may have been naive when he asked the intellec-
tuals of the Enlightenment to relinquish their commitment to reason; the Nihilists are 
no less naive in asking their nineteenth-century successors to relinquish their spiritual 
needs: “There are few nervous disorders more recalcitrant than idealism,” Herzen 
said.30 
The Underground Man has cut off the possibility of a Nihilist rejoinder, because he 
has already conceded to them their most powerful argument—namely, that idealism 
is counterproductive and tends to detract from the material well-being of the idealist. 
Such concessions are indeed the Underground Man’s best weapon against the Nihil-
ists, who depend crucially on the assumption that all humans seek their own ad-
vantage, and only go astray out of ignorance of the best way to obtain it. The Under-
ground Man shows through his own behaviour that the contrary is the case, that it is 
entirely possible for people to act deliberately against their own advantage, because 
they value certain ideals more highly than any material goods. Thus far he is in 
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agreement with traditional notions of idealism, and could expect to garner sympa-
thy—if not approval—from progressive intellectuals like Herzen and Turgenev. The 
Underground Man goes much further than this, however. He even grants to the Ni-
hilists that idealism has made him a bad person; that it has not only been a source of 
suffering, but moral and psychological corruption. As Chernyshevsky says to his 
readers in the preface of What Is to Be Done?: “You are so impotent and spiteful, all 
because of the extraordinary quantity of nonsense stuffed between your two ears”31—
in other words, because of your unrealistic notions and aspirations. The Underground 
Man’s opening statements concede to Chernyshevsky that he is impotent and spiteful, 
and even agree that the cause of his malevolence is his idealism, his “heightened con-
sciousness of the sublime and beautiful.” Here the Underground Man must lose the 
sympathy of traditional idealists, who might sacrifice material, but not moral or spir-
itual goods in the name of their ideals. In this respect, Dostoevsky draws on the theme 
of spiteful, Byronic disillusionment in the tradition of Pushkin’s Faust and Lermon-
tov’s Hero of Our Time. But, crucially, he also returns to the characteristic psychologi-
cal insight of the Sturm und Drang, the idea of all-destructive caprice; in this respect 
he goes beyond the Byronic and “superfluous man” traditions in Russian literature, 
and introduces a more volatile ingredient into his psychology of disillusionment. This, 
as I have stated, is the key to Dostoevsky’s argument against Nihilist utopian social-
ism, which I shall now turn to explicate. 
2. The Argument Against Utopian Socialism 
In Part 1, I argued against what I called the libertarian interpretation of Dostoevsky’s 
polemic in Notes from Underground, the interpretation that understands Dostoevsky’s 
problem with utopian socialism as a product of his commitment to the protection of 
freedom. I distinguished three varieties of freedom as a means of clarifying this issue: 
 




liberty, caprice, and moral autonomy. I agreed with Frank that the Underground Man 
is intended as a psychological indictment of utopian socialism, and, along with other 
proponents of the libertarian interpretation, identified the Underground Man’s ca-
price as the element of his character that renders him most unfit for membership in a 
utopian society. In his caprice he illustrates the psychological dangers of believing in 
the doctrines of utopian socialism. Although I preserved the basic framework of this 
interpretation, however, I argued that the problematic aspect of these doctrines can-
not be their incompatibility with liberty. I pointed out that if the Underground Man’s 
caprice is indeed a product of the frustration of his need for liberty, it is no less of a 
problem for Dostoevsky’s Christian utopianism than it is for utopian socialism: both 
involve the curtailment of liberty. I thus proposed that there must be some other psy-
chological explanation for this caprice if Dostoevsky’s social philosophy as a whole is 
not to be entirely incoherent. In Chapters 3 and 4, I sought the basis for such an ex-
planation in criticizing the libertarian readings of Frank and Scanlan and in examin-
ing the Underground Man’s own deliberations. The conclusion of Part 1 was that an 
explanation of the Underground Man’s caprice should be sought in his romantic ide-
alism, in his “heightened consciousness of the sublime and beautiful,” rather than the 
utopian socialist doctrines alone. I argued that rather than being a reaction to the 
threat posed to his liberty by Chernyshevsky’s utopian socialism, his caprice is a re-
action to the humiliation of his idealism by its nihilism.  
In order to understand the puzzle of why an idealistic admirer of “the sublime and 
beautiful” should precisely become capricious in response to the nihilistic frustration 
of his ideals, I turned in Part 2 to the essays of Schiller, in which, fortuitously, I found 
an explanation of this phenomenon involving the concepts of sublimity and human 
dignity. According to this explanation, caprice is not merely a backlash against the 
curtailment of liberty, like the “convulsions” of the convicts referred to by Jackson 
but, considered in all its details and rendered into a coherent theory, a much more 
complicated phenomenon. For Schiller, human beings have two aspects, a physical 




feels compelled to use its absolute freedom to formulate ideals; it measures itself and 
the rest of reality against these ideals; finally, if it finds that reality falls below its ide-
als (i.e. if its ideals are not realizable), it will feel that its freedom has been frustrated 
and has no outlet, and the individual will become capricious. To be capricious is to 
attempt to “give one’s individuality unlimited extension,” to demand that one be as 
free in reality as one is in one’s own imagination, and that reality therefore should 
conform to one’s every whim. 
According to Schiller, in brief, anyone who is aroused by the sublime to find confir-
mation of human dignity in the realization of ideals discovered in the exercise of ab-
solute spiritual freedom will become capricious if the realization of these ideals is 
frustrated. As we saw in Part 1, this is precisely the situation of the Underground Man. 
I found further illustrations of this theory in the literary works of the Sturm und Drang 
movement, and considered The Robbers and Faust in particular. Comparing them to 
Notes from Underground revealed important similarities: in all of these works, nihilism 
is responsible for the disillusionment of idealistic heroes, and these heroes become 
capricious in response to this disillusionment in the manner described in Schiller’s 
essays. Dostoevsky does not advance anything like this explanation explicitly, but he 
does prime the reader to search for some such explanation of the Underground Man’s 
caprice, and develops his character in a manner strikingly reminiscent, in certain cru-
cial respects, of the Sturm und Drang heroes created by or alluded to by Schiller. 
In general, the “underground psychology” is illuminated by these investigations. It 
became clear throughout Part 1 of the dissertation that the Underground Man’s ca-
price is caused and provoked by the conflict between his rationalism and his romantic 
idealism. This conflict causes him to become inert by undermining his confidence that 
anything it is possible to do or devote himself to is worthy of respect. His reason tells 
him, for example, that he would only be happy and contented as a “glutton and a 
sluggard,” but his idealism rejects this prospect as a degrading waste of his abilities; 
thus he does nothing and becomes nothing, because he sees no prospects of doing 




ideal as being little better than a chicken coop, but his rationalism leads him to deny 
that anything better will ever be attainable. Thus he merely vacillates and remains 
uncommitted:   
The final result, gentlemen, is that it’s better to do nothing! Conscious 
inertia is better! And so, long live the underground! Even though I said 
that I envy the normal man to the point of exasperation, I still wouldn’t 
want to be him in the circumstances in which I see him (although I still 
won’t keep from envying him. No, no, in any case the underground is 
more advantageous!) At least there one can… Hey, but I’m lying once 
again! I’m lying because I know myself as surely as two times two, that 
it isn’t really the underground that’s better, but something different, 
altogether different, something that I long for, but I’ll never be able to 
find! To hell with the underground!32 
This vacillating inertia is a simple consequence of his recognition that, given his dual 
commitments to be reasonable and to accept nothing less than fulfilment of his high-
est ideals, there is nothing he can do and nothing he can expect to happen that will 
ever satisfy him, that he will never be able to attain that “something altogether differ-
ent” whose absence alone he can perceive. Thus it is a state of constant disappoint-
ment and disillusionment with both himself and his surroundings. His caprice is in 
turn the consequence of this nihilistic disillusionment. It is an explosion of pent up 
idealism, of a longing for dignified activity that is constantly frustrated and stifled. The 
absolute freedom of his imagination, which has been wasted on what, as a reasonable 
“man of the nineteenth century,” he can only regard as impossible delusions, de-
mands an outlet, and, because it is absolute, will accept no check on its authority. This 
is why the mechanistic rationalism of the Crystal Palace provokes his rage; it disillu-
sions him and stimulates his caprice by reminding him of the futility of anything bet-
ter than a chicken coop, of the embarrassing limits of human endeavour, and it ran-
kles him with its compendium of hypothetical imperatives, of recommendations for 
the best way of satisfying every desire and obtaining every “normal advantage.” Such 
 




good sense is completely intolerable for a capricious individual who thinks of morality 
and reason themselves as a prison, and, as Karl Moor dashes himself against the in-
tractable pillars of divine and human justice, he would rather go mad than be tempted 
to live a life of such sensible satisfaction. 
By considering the literary and philosophical developments separating Dostoevsky 
from the writers of the Sturm und Drang, I then showed that this association of nihil-
ism, disillusionment and caprice was characteristic of these writers in particular, and 
that intervening writers took a markedly different approach to the theme of disillu-
sionment; we saw that the Underground Man’s main Russian predecessors belonged 
to the Byronic tradition in which disillusionment is associated with the spleen, spite, 
and inertia of figures like Manfred and Cain rather than the wild caprice of Karl Moor 
and Faust; the Byronic characters tend to withdraw into themselves in response to 
disillusionment, while the Stürmer und Dränger refuse to accept defeat and attempt to 
impose themselves further on the outside world. Although the Underground Man 
clearly possesses Byronic characteristics as well, his tendency towards and advocacy 
of caprice links him securely to the Sturm und Drang tradition; and since his caprice is 
the linchpin of Dostoevsky’s polemic against utopian socialism, it is thus to this tra-
dition that we have been led. Taken together, all of these considerations provide 
strong evidence for thinking that Dostoevsky intended Notes from Underground to be 
a revival of the uniquely Sturm und Drang reaction to nihilism, and drew upon writers 
like Schiller and Goethe in developing his attack on Chernyshevsky’s Nihilist utopian 
socialism.   
So, whereas scholars seeking to understand the social-philosophical argument in 
Notes from Underground have focused on utopian socialism itself and on the Under-
ground Man’s reactions to it, they have thereby overlooked what I take to be the key 
to Dostoevsky’s intentions, namely, the place of the Notes in the wider history of lit-
erature and ideas. They have overlooked the fact that Dostoevsky’s polemic relies 
upon themes that are not at all contemporaneous with Dostoevsky or Chernyshevsky, 




these themes, we have been able to understand, firstly, why Dostoevsky saw a con-
nection between the utopian socialist ideology and the dangerous capriciousness of 
the Underground Man, and, secondly, why he would have thought to appeal to this 
connection in particular in his polemical response to Chernyshevsky.  
With respect to the first point, we have observed that Dostoevsky—along with the 
bulk of his readership—was intimately familiar with the Sturm und Drang reaction to 
the nihilism of the Enlightenment, and that he was therefore easily able to perceive in 
it an argument against the nihilism of his own utopian socialist opponents. With re-
spect to the second point, the historical observations of preceding chapters are highly 
pertinent. The dominant mode of disillusionment in nineteenth-century Russian lit-
erature belonged, as we have seen, to the legacy of Byron. As stated, the Nihilists thus 
assumed that the idealists who resisted their goals were toothless—”superfluous men” 
and “Hamlets” who clung to their ideals out of weakness, complacency or indecision. 
Such an assumption was, it must be said, supported by the literature of the day. We 
considered several characters of this type in the previous chapter. To the Nihilists, 
therefore, those who stood against progress were merely the outdated remnants of 
the older generation; they posed no real threat and could simply be ignored. Do-
brolyubov envisaged them as workshy moralists who had climbed up trees to escape 
the swamp below, pontificating to those working to improve the environment, and 
only becoming alarmed when their own supports were being cut down for timber.33 
“Oblomovitis” was the final expression of this phenomenon, the end result of the use-
less idealism of the past.  
But Dostoevsky perceived in the heroes of Schiller and Goethe—heroes who were still 
fresh in the Russian mind, despite their older vintage—a different psychology of dis-
illusionment, and one that made the prospects of utopian socialism far less certain. If 
the socialists were intent on reviving the nihilism of the Enlightenment, Dostoevsky 
implies, they must beware of reviving the rebellious opposition that emerged in the 
 




eighteenth century as its natural concomitant. If the psychological insights of the 
Sturm und Drang are correct, the Underground Man’s capricious rage is a predictable 
consequence of any philosophy which undermines human dignity by undermining 
the realizability of the ideals which that dignity depends on. As such, Dostoevsky 
would have us believe, utopian socialism will predictably undermine its own ends by 
promoting a capricious attitude towards life that is diametrically opposed to the ra-
tional utilitarian calculations their utopian model depends upon. The morose and 
splenetic Byronic characters of the post-romantic period will, with the return of radi-
cal nihilism, give way to individuals who resemble the Stürmer und Dränger in their 
uncompromising opposition to order and rationality.  
This, then, is Dostoevsky’s argument against Nihilist utopian socialism in Notes from 
Underground. In what follows, I shall elaborate more fully on the details of this po-
lemic, address residual problems, and finally consider the manner in which it—unlike 
the libertarian interpretation of it—coheres with Dostoevsky’s Christian utopianism 
and secures the overall unity of his social-philosophical thought in Notes from Under-
ground and related texts. 
3. Idealism and Nihilism 
First we should take stock and note that despite their constituting an argument 
against nihilism and Nihilist utopian socialism, nihilism on its own does not seem to 
be the problem illustrated by the Sturm und Drang and Notes from Underground. Rather, 
it is the tug-of-war between idealism and nihilism which, for Karl Moor, Faust, and 
the Underground Man, sparks the problem of caprice. Idealism leads them to expect 
too much from the world; and nihilism convinces them that they are wrong to do so. 
But if nihilism only leads to disillusionment and caprice if it coupled with idealism, 
then what threat does the Underground Man really pose to the Nihilists? They can 




idealistic older generation, and of the pressing need for “new people” untainted by 
the prejudices and outmoded sensibilities of romanticism. Such people would pre-
sumably not suffer any ill effects from believing in nihilism, because they would not 
be wedded to any of the old ideas that make nihilism unpalatable.   
This problem is extremely pressing. Dostoevsky himself specifies that the Under-
ground Man is a necessary product of his society and culture.34 But the society he 
represents must be Dostoevsky’s own generation, which was formed by romantic lit-
erature in the 1830s, and then, under the auspices of figures like Herzen and Belinsky, 
came in the 1840s to deride its former idealistic romanticism for its lack of engagement 
with real-world problems. How then can the Underground Man serve as a living psy-
chological indictment of utopian socialism in the 1860s, as Frank maintains, and as I 
have also argued? The Nihilists can surely agree that the Underground Man is a child 
of his time; the culture of which he is a product is precisely that which they want to 
overthrow as quickly as possible.  
The solution to this puzzle is to accept that the Underground Man is a product not 
only of Nihilism or of idealism: he is a product of both. As such, his character is an 
argument against both. Dostoevsky uses him to indict not only Nihilism, which the 
Underground Man has come to accept as an adult, but the idealism of his youth as 
well, and, moreover, to suggest by this dilemma the way forward towards a third 
alternative that avoids the dangerous extremes of both.35 It is worth dwelling on the 
details of this explanation, since it is clearly pivotal to the polemical goals of Notes 
from Underground. 
We have seen that German romanticism emerged from post-Kantian philosophy as a 
response to nihilism, and, as far as its advocates were concerned, had succeeded in 
reconciling the opposition between spirit and matter that had given rise to the 
 
34 Dostoevsky, 2001: 3n. 
35 Some scholars have recognized that Notes from Underground is a double polemic against 
1840s romanticism and 1860s nihilism, but have not, in my view, succeeded in binding these 




problem of human dignity throughout the history of Western philosophy, and had 
thereby quashed nihilism at its source. The romantic reconciliation of spirit and mat-
ter finally lost its appeal, however, with the fall of Hegel’s philosophy. Intellectuals 
in Germany and Russia began at this time to resent the social and political impotence 
of post-Kantian philosophy, which they regarded as excessively abstract and rarefied. 
The Russian intelligentsia, which had been languishing under the oppressive regime 
of Tsar Nicholas I, was especially anxious to shed the otherworldly concerns of ro-
manticism and German Idealism and to devote itself to the improvement of the nation. 
Drawing on Byronic themes of disillusionment and despair, Russian realist writers in 
the 1840s and ‘50s reacted to this period of transition by developing the type of the 
superfluous man, who represented the despondency of a generation whose romantic 
sensibilities had, it now seemed, rendered them unable to address the real political 
and economic problems of the era, and whose desire for active progress was not sup-
ported by strength of will or practical abilities.  
In the 1860s, Nihilism emerged as a direct response to the perceived impotence and 
stagnation of the previous generation of radicals. Its answer was simple: if the ideal-
ism of the older generation had rendered it unfit for useful activity, then idealism 
should be jettisoned. The Nihilists thus argued that metaphysics was a waste of time, 
that humanity’s spiritual needs were not genuine needs at all, and that people simply 
needed to be educated to live in accordance with a “scientific” theory of human hap-
piness. Following in the footsteps of the philosophes, the Young Hegelians and the 
French utopian socialists, as we have seen, the Nihilists thought that in this way they 
could liberate society from its self-destructive malaise. Dostoevsky agreed with them 
that modern society was subject to this malaise—the Underground Man, as its most 
highly developed representative, was their common enemy—but he was convinced 
that the Nihilists’ efforts were totally misguided and self-defeating. In common with 
other Russian intellectuals at the time, including his utopian socialist opponents, Dos-
toevsky deplored the otherworldliness and impotence of the romantic idealism he 




progress and tangible results; it accused the Slavophiles of closing their eyes to pos-
sibilities of the future, and clinging to the past.36 No less than the Nihilists, he could 
have agreed with Feuerbach that philosophy needed “to come down from its divine 
and self-sufficient blissfulness in thought and open its eyes to human misery.”37 But 
if the idealism of the early nineteenth century was problematic, it would nevertheless 
be necessary to replace it with something that would serve to fulfil the same psycho-
logical and spiritual role—fulfil the same spiritual needs, confirm the same human 
dignity—and not simply deny the importance of this role. It is on this supposition 
that Dostoevsky’s attack on Nihilist utopian socialism depends, and from this that his 
pochvennichestvo draws support. 
Unlike the utopian socialists, then, he did not believe that idealism could simply be 
dismissed, or that the spiritual needs of humanity could simply be denied, or that the 
traditional conception of human dignity could simply be abandoned; he believed that 
fulfilment of these needs and confirmation of this dignity would always be necessary, 
and that provision must be made for them in any vision of the perfect society. As he 
wrote in his notebooks, the socialists “anticipated that there would be objections: that 
man is not willing to sacrifice so much—so they plunged right into nihilism and began 
to deny man: feeling, soul, religiousness, art, freedom, everything.”38 By incorporat-
ing this nihilism into their social philosophy the utopian socialists merely denied the 
facts of human psychology, and founded their social vision on an impoverished and 
distorted representation of real human beings—theirs is an idea that “could apply 
only to man as a beast,” as Dostoevsky writes of Satan’s suggestion that Christ should 
feed himself—and, by implication, humanity—by transforming stones into bread.39 
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But human beings are not merely beasts, and “do not live by bread alone.” Dostoev-
sky thus continues: 
And if, beside bread, man is not possessed of a spiritual life, and ideal 
of Beauty, he will languish and die, go insane, kill himself, or abandon 
himself to pagan fantasies. And since Christ carried the ideal of Beauty 
in Himself and His Word, He decided that it was better to inculcate in 
the soul of man the ideal of Beauty; bearing it in their souls, all men 
would become brothers and then, of course, they would work for one 
another and would all be rich. Whereas, if they are given bread, they 
will become enemies to one another out of sheer boredom. But what if 
they are given both Beauty and Bread at the same time? Then man 
would be deprived of labor, of individuality, of the opportunity to sacri-
fice his goods for the sake of his neighbor—in a word, he would be deprived 
of life as such, the ideal of life. And therefore, it is best to do only one 
thing: to proclaim the spiritual ideal.40 
What then of the “new people” of the Nihilists, the generation untainted by romanti-
cism, and thus supposedly immune to the conflict between idealism and nihilism that 
drove the Stürmer und Dränger and the Underground Man to caprice? Notes from Un-
derground allows the reader to deduce that although people like the Underground 
Man illustrate the worst possible degree of caprice, because they are simultaneously 
influenced by idealism and nihilism (see Chapter 7, Section 3, above), caprice is a 
problem not only for such divided people—it is also a problem for those who profess 
either idealism or nihilism in isolation, and thus a problem for the Nihilists, whose 
“new people,” despite being free from the influence of doctrinaire idealism, must nev-
ertheless feel the pull of the spiritual needs, a kind of natural and innate idealism 
striving for confirmation of human dignity. No one can be relied upon to subsist in 
the belief that human dignity conceived as sublimity is a delusion, and that human 
beings are merely animals without a higher spiritual calling—“he will languish and 
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die, go insane, kill himself, or abandon himself to pagan fantasies.” Thus Franz Moor, 
the avowed nihilist, baulks no less than his brother Karl at the thought of his own 
insignificance and subservience to natural forces beyond his control—he too is unable 
to reconcile himself with the implications of nihilism for human dignity (although, 
not being an idealist, he is less disillusioned and his reaction is less extreme). The 
“new people,” Dostoevsky also implies, will find themselves in the same position—
no matter how far they distance themselves from the dreamy idealism of the older 
generation, they will find that “man does not live by bread alone,” and that some 
provision must be made for the fulfilment of spiritual as well as corporeal needs. 
Far from leaping from romantic idealism to Nihilism, from one extreme to the other, 
it would thus be necessary to adopt a realistic idealism that could actually fulfil, and 
not merely arouse the spiritual needs of humanity as the dreamy idealism of the past 
had done. In Chapter 8, we saw that this was the aim of the romanticism that emerged 
alongside German Idealist philosophy; if realism is concern for the needs of the body 
and intellect, and idealism is concern for the spirit and “higher” cultural forms like 
art and religion, then this romanticism was an attempt to show that the two need not 
be thought of as incompatible, as they had been by the reductive materialist philoso-
phers of the Enlightenment. The philosophies of Schelling and Hegel were designed 
to reconcile the ideal and the real, to interpret the material world in such a way as to 
accommodate the ideals of freedom, love, and so on, and thereby to solve the problem 
of human dignity that troubled the philosophers of the Enlightenment. Schelling 
looked primarily to natural science as a means of uncovering traces of the ideal in 
reality; Hegel looked primarily to human history. Despite their stated intention of 
reconciling the concrete and the abstract, however, the leading theories of German 
Idealism came to be seen as empty abstractions themselves.41 Romantics like Friedrich 
 




Schlegel continued to profess philosophies of reconciliation,42 but by the middle of the 
nineteenth century, as we have seen, the scales tipped back in favour of realism.43   
Pochvennichestvo can be seen as a revival and continuation of the romantic project. The 
Slavophiles and the Westernizers were regarded by Dostoevsky as idealists and real-
ists respectively, each emphasizing one aspect of human life and failing to achieve a 
balance between them. The Westernizers, he says in a journal article, wanted to un-
derstand everything using pure intellect, on which course they “went too far” and 
turned to reductive realism, unlike the Slavophiles who didn’t even want to under-
stand anything and clung dogmatically to old forms. Of the Slavophiles he writes that 
“what they lack is life. They have no feeling for reality. Idealism stupefies, fascinates 
and—kills.”44 As an attempt to mediate between these two positions, pochvennichestvo 
maintains that both realism and idealism on their own are misguided: both parties 
were guilty of going to extremes, one of paying too little heed to the spiritual needs 
of the Russian people, the other of ignoring its economic, political and social needs. 
If he believed that the Slavophiles and Westernizers could be reconciled in poch-
vennichestvo, however, the Nihilists were another matter. The central tenet of all nihil-
ism is an explicit denial of the need to placate the inclination towards idealism. The 
Sturm und Drang movement was not at bottom a reaction to realism or a realistic ap-
proach to humanity’s physical needs, but a reaction to the failure of the Enlightenment 
to reconcile this realism with idealism; it was indeed a reaction to nihilism, which 
denies the need for any such reconciliation because it rejects idealism entirely. The 
same can be said of Notes from Underground, which reacts not against the Westernizers 
or the Slavophiles per se, but against the Nihilists whose commitment to realism at 
the expense of idealism exposes them once again to the problem of caprice. 
Dostoevsky thus achieves three polemical goals with the Underground Man: he illus-
trates the psychological dangers of both idealism and nihilism, and, in revealing the 
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shortcomings of both, adumbrates his Christian alternative—his solution to the con-
flict between realism and idealism. In order to clarify residual obscurities, I would 
argue that Dostoevsky’s solution must be thought of as having two dialectical com-
ponents, which it will be well to consider explicitly: on the one hand, he takes nature 
at face value; on the other hand, he upholds ideals which are not incompatible with 
nature taken at face value. Dostoevsky does not explicitly endorse these statements, 
but they can, I think, be deduced from what he has written, and it is important to 
elaborate on them as a way of revealing the overall cogency of his stated opinions. In 
order to understand these components, it is useful to develop Dostoevsky’s ideas in 
comparison with those of romanticism and nihilism. 
3.1. Taking Nature at Face Value 
As stated, Dostoevsky’s solution first involves taking nature at face value.45 By this I 
mean that in his attitude towards nature and natural science he does not superimpose 
an ideological lens; he does not attempt to extract from or impose upon natural sci-
ence or our everyday contact with nature anything that is not explicitly contained 
within them. In this respect he is to be distinguished from both romantics and nihilists, 
who, understood in a somewhat simplistic fashion,46 both approach natural phenom-
ena with ideological agendas: either to use them as evidence of some immanent di-
vinity, blurring the boundary between natural and supernatural, or, on the contrary, 
use them as evidence for the impossibility of values like free will and altruism. Both 
parties extrapolate from the findings of natural science in accordance with a set of 
theoretical presuppositions, and thereby depart from what I am calling “nature taken 
at face value.” Another way of putting this is to say that Dostoevsky, unlike romantics 
and nihilists, accepts that the study of nature should be fundamentally a posteriori 
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I do refer to actual thinkers as illustrations, I assume that most or all had somewhat more 




rather than guided by a priori philosophical considerations pertaining to romantic or 
nihilist worldviews.  
Chernyshevsky’s Anthropological Principle in Philosophy may be taken as an example 
of the nihilistic approach; it is laden with scientifically unsupported transitions from 
physics and chemistry to human psychology, agency and morality.47 I would there-
fore dispute Richard Peace’s claim that, for Chernyshevsky, “[t]he world around us 
is exactly what everyone sees.”48 Despite the great progress made by science in the 
intervening years, Chernyshevsky really has no more strictly scientific grounds for 
maintaining his nihilistic philosophy of human life than did philosophes like the Baron 
d’Holbach in the previous century.  
It is not the science appealed to by Chernyshevsky and other nihilists but this nihilistic 
extrapolation from science that Dostoevsky rejects. Darwinism is a useful illustration. 
The majority of radicals embraced Darwinism as a means of showing that traditional 
Christian doctrine was false, since humans descended from other animals rather than 
a special act of creation, and that the traditional notion of human dignity was there-
fore spurious.49 Thus the Underground Man mentions the fact that “it’s from a mon-
key that you’re descended” as one of his hated “laws of nature”—he evidently re-
gards it as an unpalatable proposition.50 Dostoevsky recognized, however, that the 
theory of evolution did not on its own invalidate the Christian appraisal of human 
 
47 “This rambling stroll through current ideas about the natural world had one overarching 
purpose: to build by analogy logical bridges from the, by now accepted, ‘tight’ knowledge that 
science had produced about such phenomena as the chemical reactions involved in metallurgy 
to the still disputed, ‘looser’ speculation about causality versus free will in human behavior” 
(Bethea and Thorstensson, 2016: 38). 
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prominent radicals in rejecting Darwinism (though his views on the matter were not made 
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the misappropriation of Darwinism by social and political thinkers, Dostoevsky was more 
consistent in realizing that it would not be reasonable to reject Darwinism simply because of 
the ideological use to which it might be put. 




dignity, even if it was in tension with certain Christian doctrines. On this matter we 
may consult the “science expert” of pochvennichestvo and of Dostoevsky’s journals, 
Nikolai Strakhov.51 As a disciple of Schellingian Naturphilosophie, Strakhov could em-
brace evolutionary theory as a description of the progressive development of natural 
forms towards perfection; but he took issue with the application of moral and philo-
sophical principles derived from Darwinism to humanity. Significantly, he refused to 
allow it to undermine the moral and spiritual distinction between humans and the 
rest of nature, since he regarded the preservation of human dignity (which is a quality 
inaccessible to science) as non-negotiable.52 Dostoevsky agreed with this assessment: 
“it does not really matter what man’s origins are,” he writes in a letter.53 “Evolution 
as such was not a stumbling block. As Dostoevsky saw it, all that mattered was the 
breath of God—whether we come from a lump of clay, Adam’s rib, or monkeys was 
immaterial.”54 He was opposed to “social Darwinism” and the appropriation of evo-
lutionary theory for nihilistic ends, but, because he was not morally or spiritually in-
vested in any particular scientific claims about the natural universe, he was able to 
allow to science itself a high degree of autonomy.55 
The same cannot be said of romanticism. Friedrich Schlegel, for example, regards na-
ture as “the visible veil of the invisible world, covered all over and richly ornamented 
with significant symbols and hieroglyphs”56—nature is not merely natural, but is im-
bued with supernatural significance. “Beneath the vast tombstone of the visible 
world,” he writes, “there slumbers a soul, not wholly alien, but more than half akin 
to our own.”57 It is the task of philosophy, art and religion to interpret the “hiero-
glyphs” of nature, discover its hidden meanings, and thus to commune with the soul 
that gives it life. In the same vein, Schelling wrote that “nature is a poem lying pent 
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in a mysterious and wonderful script”58 and Novalis that “[t]he world must be roman-
ticized. [ … ] When I give the commonplace a higher meaning, the customary a mys-
terious appearance, the known the dignity of the unknown, the finite the illusion of 
the infinite, I romanticize it.“59  
In accordance with this conception of nature, Schlegel takes for granted that various 
natural occurrences are caused by demonic interference; “accordingly,” he writes ap-
provingly, “some have supposed the monkey tribe not to be an original creation of 
the Deity, but a satanic device and malicious parody upon man.”60 Holding such an 
opinion of monkeys would no doubt leave a person vulnerable to serious disillusion-
ment by Darwin’s theory of evolution. Schlegel’s belief in the supernatural emergence 
of various harmful organisms is more generally in tension with modern science. His 
nineteenth-century English translator, A. J. W. Morrison, is quick to point out that the 
scientific theory upon which Schlegel’s belief rests—the theory of “spontaneous gen-
eration,” according to which, for instance, maggots arise spontaneously in rotting 
meat, and swarms of locusts arise spontaneously out of air that has been “cor-
rupted”—has been disproven and superseded.61 This in turn casts serious doubt on 
Schlegel’s claim that such phenomena as maggots and locusts betray the direct inter-
ference of evil spirits, who also plague the earth with “serpents and snakes” just as, 
in his view, certain diseases engender the production of intestinal worms in the bow-
els of human beings.62 Although the falsity of spontaneous generation does not in it-
self disprove the existence of evil spirits, it does undermine Schlegel’s argument for 
the existence of such beings. If the only good reason to believe in the devil is the ex-
istence of spontaneously generated swarms of locusts, then, since there are no such 
swarms, we should not believe in the devil. It would perhaps have been better for 
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Schlegel to adopt the approach of Strakhov and Dostoevsky, who also believe in at 
least one supernatural entity, God, but do not base this belief on any doctrinaire in-
terpretation of specific natural phenomena.63  
So, the first component of Dostoevsky’s solution to the problem of caprice—though it 
is only implicit in his characterization of both nihilism and romanticism as causes of 
the Underground Man’s caprice—is to reject both nihilistic and romantic approaches 
to nature and natural science, and to take nature at face value: to avoid making spec-
ulative claims about nature that everyday experience or progress in natural science 
could potentially refute, and to avoid “romanticizing” as Novalis recommends—that 
is, superimposing upon reality what is at bottom a comforting veneer of fiction that 
makes the unrealistic appear realistic. The purpose of this component is to ensure that 
it is possible to formulate ideals that are not unrealizable, and thus to ensure that one 
can pursue an ideal without necessarily being disillusioned.  
Anyone who has a nihilistic conception of nature will be disillusioned because, un-
derstood this way, nature is incompatible with all ideals worthy of the name: no moral 
ideals dependent upon the possibility of moral responsibility, altruism, or love, for 
example, could be regarded as realizable. Anyone who has a romantic conception of 
nature will likewise be disillusioned. Understood romantically as a “veil of the invis-
ible world, covered all over and richly ornamented with significant symbols and hi-
eroglyphs,” nature is not indeed incompatible with traditional moral and spiritual 
ideals; however, since it is in itself unrealistic, any ideals formed on the basis of a 
romantic worldview are liable to be unrealizable, and so lead to disillusionment. Thus 
the Underground Man is disillusioned because his lofty ideals of moral conduct were 
devised in complete abstraction from the realities of his mundane existence, by people 
who were not interested in devising viable moral ideals for the ordinary inhabitants 
of Saint Petersburg, the “city where everyone is a civil servant, a shopkeeper, or a 
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German craftsman.”64 They can only be regarded as realizable relative to a glorified 
version of reality, different in substance but not in kind from Schlegel’s view of nature 
as a “veil of the invisible world.” Thus army officers will not agree to fight duels with 
him, because he is an insignificant office clerk, and because the officers he runs into 
are not of the dashing and heroic kind depicted by Pushkin and Lermontov, but petty 
and self-satisfied like Gogol’s Lieutenant Pirogov.     
3.2. Realistic Idealism 
This brings us to the second component of Dostoevsky’s solution: he upholds ideals 
which are not incompatible with nature taken at face value; that is to say, he maintains 
what might be called a realistic idealism. In this respect he may be contrasted with 
both nihilists and romantics yet again. He disagrees with the nihilists insofar as he 
upholds any ideals at all; nihilism, as we have seen, is incompatible with all ideals 
worthy of the name. And he disagrees with the romantics insofar as the ideals he up-
holds are realizable relative to nature taken at face value. The lofty ideals of the ro-
mantics can only be thought of as realizable if nature is taken, not at face value, but 
instead as a blend of fact and fiction, or as a “veil of the invisible world” which blurs 
the distinction between natural and miraculous. It is because they maintain an unre-
alistic interpretation of natural phenomena that romantics can regard supernatural or 
overly lofty ideals as legitimate. Relative to an everyday or scientific conception of 
nature, however, such ideals are unrealizable.  
We may take the case of Faust as an illustration. For the nihilist, Faust’s ideal of know-
ing the absolute is entirely misguided, because there is no such absolute and conse-
quently no hope of knowing it; for the romantic, it is not misguided because 
knowledge of the absolute is not impossible.65 For Dostoevsky (as perhaps for Goethe), 
it is misguided because—though there may or may not be an absolute to be known—
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human beings are not suited to such supernatural endeavours and should set their 
sights on more realistic ideals. He agrees with the romantics that human beings pos-
sess a unique spiritual freedom, but maintains that this freedom is not best employed 
in abandoning the natural order in favour of any transcendent “Ideas of reason,” or 
in penetrating deeper into it by means of any “intellectual intuition” or insight into 
its “significant symbols and hieroglyphs.” So, while Dostoevsky’s “face value” con-
ception of nature, like that of the nihilists, cannot accommodate the overly lofty ideals 
of the romantics, it can, perhaps, accommodate at least some ideals worthy of the 
name.   
Such ideals must be lofty enough to provide confirmation of human dignity—to ele-
vate human beings above everything animal, base and contemptible in the universe—
but not so lofty as to be entirely unrealistic. Dostoevsky’s ideals are, of course, pro-
vided by the example of Christ and, in particular, his selfless love, his altruism, his 
sacrifice, which, though they are ideals worthy of our sublimity, are not supernatu-
ral—that is, they do not require transcendence over nature taken at face value, but are 
obtainable for real human beings in the real world. The ideals represented by Christ 
thus provide a genuine outlet for the absolute freedom of the human spirit, which, in 
taking them as satisfaction for its spiritual needs and as confirmation of human dig-
nity, need not fear the indignity of spiritual frustration suffered by romantic idealists 
like Karl Moor or the Underground Man.  
This positive alternative to the ideals of the Underground Man is only adumbrated in 
the first part of Notes from Underground, since Dostoevsky’s allusions to Christianity 
were interfered with by the censor; in the second part, however, they are illustrated 
concretely in the character of the prostitute Liza. After availing himself of her services, 
the Underground Man mercilessly schools Liza about her degraded condition and 
lack of prospects; succeeding where Gogol’s Piskaryov failed, he overcomes her reti-
cence and convinces her to visit him, casts himself as her noble redeemer, and, in gen-
eral, exercises power over her emotions in order to recover from the indignity of his 




apartment some days later, he is caught completely off guard; she sees him in his dirty 
dressing gown, shouting at his insubordinate servant, “behaving like a mangy, 
shaggy mongrel, attacking his own lackey, while that lackey stood there laughing at 
me!”66 The Underground Man is once again caught in a situation humiliating to his 
inflated sense of self-worth. Unable on this occasion to redeem his image, he heaps 
abuse on Liza and reveals that he never had any intention of helping her, that he had 
only been toying with her. After a long and agonizing tirade, however, the Under-
ground Man is once again caught completely off guard by Liza’s reaction:   
I’d become so accustomed to inventing and imagining everything ac-
cording to books and picturing everything on earth to myself just as I’d 
conceived it in my dreams, that at first I couldn’t even comprehend the 
meaning of this strange occurrence. But here’s what happened: Liza, 
insulted and crushed by me, understood much more than I’d imagined. 
She understood out of all this what a woman always understands first 
of all, if she sincerely loves—namely, that I myself was unhappy. [ … ] 
Suddenly she jumped up from the chair with a kind of uncontrollable 
impulse, and leaning toward me, but being too timid and not daring to 
stir from her place, she extended her arms in my direction…. At this 
moment my heart leapt inside me, too. Then suddenly she threw herself 
at me, put her arms around my neck, and burst into tears. I, too, 
couldn’t restrain myself and sobbed as I’d never done before.67 
Once again, though, his “overwrought brain” triumphs over all his emotional needs 
and his good inclinations; having exposed his weakness to Liza, his pride is wounded: 
“our roles were completely reversed. Now she was the heroine, and I was the same 
sort of humiliated and oppressed creature she’d been in front of me that evening [in 
the brothel].”68 To regain control, he takes advantage of her sexually and, when she 
leaves in a state of dejection, presses five roubles into her hand to humiliate her as 
fully as possible.  
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In this concluding episode of Notes from Underground, Liza perfectly illustrates the 
ideal of selfless and altruistic love described by Dostoevsky in Winter Notes. She for-
gets herself, despite her own suffering and the cruelty of her erstwhile saviour, and 
sees only that the Underground Man is suffering; she sees that his abuse and his in-
sults are indications of his own misery and degradation, and instead of taking offence 
she comforts him. In doing so she embodies the ideal of altruism associated with 
Christ, and presents the Underground Man—and the reader—with a real, concrete 
alternative to both the “crystal palaces” and the delusions “in the style of Manfred” 
of Chernyshevsky and the Underground Man, the nihilist and the romantic idealist. 
Christian love is the solution to the impasse reached by the rationalism of the Nihilists 
and the dogged irrationalism of the Underground Man.69 
The Underground Man was searching for confirmation of human dignity in grand 
gestures, “sublime and beautiful” adventures, dreams of Byronic superiority—in the 
lofty ideals of romanticism. His idealism was therefore frustrated, because—given his 
own humiliating circumstances, and all the more so given his nihilistic philosophy—
he perceived that his ideals were unrealizable. This is why he became disillusioned 
and, in accordance with Dostoevsky’s Sturm und Drang psychology, capricious. As a 
solution to this problem, Dostoevsky demands that the romantic idealists of his gen-
eration change their understanding of what it takes for an idea to be an ideal worthy 
of the name. The romantic Underground Man fails to recognize Dostoevsky’s Chris-
tian ideal of love—even when it is illustrated before his eyes by the selfless concern of 
Liza—because it does not fall within the range of what he would consider spiritually 
satisfying: it is not “sublime and beautiful” enough, it offends his self-esteem because 
he does not recognize it as an expression of true human dignity. He was, as he said, 
too “accustomed to inventing and imagining everything according to books and pic-
turing everything on earth to myself just as I’d conceived it in my dreams.” Never-
theless, though the Underground Man does not quite admit it, Dostoevsky plainly 
intends for us to see that the ideal embodied by Liza would satisfy the spiritual needs 
 




which incline him towards romanticism and which prevent him from coming to terms 
with nihilism.70  
* * * 
In sum, nihilists deny the viability of all ideals, and romantics, on the other hand, will 
only countenance overly lofty ideals that are viable only in relation to their unrealistic 
conception of reality. In both cases, whatever ideals are formulated, they will likely 
be perceived to be unrealizable, and the spiritual freedom exercised in formulating 
them will be frustrated, leading to Sturm und Drang reaction and caprice. Dostoevsky 
upholds an alternative ideal that can be realized in nature taken at face value. This 
then is the second component of Dostoevsky’s positive alternative to nihilism and 
romantic idealism.  
Taken together, the two components ensure that one’s ideals harmonize with one’s 
conception of reality, and that one’s conception of reality is generally accurate, such 
that one’s ideals can be said to harmonize with reality, that is, to be realizable. Dosto-
evsky takes nature at face value and rejects supernatural ideals, thereby protecting 
himself from investment in ideals which are unrealizable. His own Christian ideals 
provide genuine satisfaction for the spiritual aspect of humanity, thereby preserving 
human dignity and avoiding the problem of caprice. The challenge faced by people 
like the Underground Man is to reorient their values in this direction; Notes from Un-
derground does not offer a consoling solution to this problem, but implies that Dosto-
evsky’s readers must learn to accept the ideal of altruism despite the appeal of the 
romanticism with which they were inculcated. They must outgrow their romantic ide-
alism, and they must not lapse into nihilism but embrace an alternative, realistic, 
Christian idealism. 
 





Finally, we can also see that this explanation of Dostoevsky’s polemic does not suffer 
from the internal contradiction which led us to suspect the standard libertarian ex-
planation of being inadequate. The latter fails because it locates the cause of the Un-
derground Man’s caprice in something Dostoevsky’s own utopian ideal shares with 
that of the socialists, namely, the sacrifice of individual liberties. If liberty was so im-
portant as to preclude the possibility of a rationally ordered socialist utopia, then it 
must also preclude the possibility of a utopia founded on self-abnegation and altru-
ism. These values, though they are expressions of the variety of freedom I called 
moral autonomy, stand nevertheless in tension with liberty because a perfectly altru-
istic person would need to curtail his or her liberties for the benefit of others. Dosto-
evsky’s problem with utopian socialism cannot, therefore, consist in the socialist atti-
tude towards individual liberties. 
This deduction was confirmed by careful examination of Notes from Underground itself. 
We have seen that, for Dostoevsky, Chernyshevsky’s utopian socialism will fail, not 
because of any threat it poses to liberty, but because of its nihilistic attack on human 
dignity. Because it flatly rejects the traditional conception of human dignity, nihilism 
comes into conflict with the spiritual needs of humanity. Since, Dostoevsky believes, 
these needs are an ineliminable feature of human psychology, they cannot be obvi-
ated simply through promoting a “new people” unstained by romanticism; on the 
contrary, their satisfaction is fundamental to the mental health of all individuals. Its 
absence leads to disillusionment—not Byronic spleen and “superfluous man” dejec-
tion but, according to Dostoevsky’s Sturm und Drang psychology, to a much more 
dangerous variety. In Notes from Underground as in works like The Robbers and Faust, 
disillusionment is associated with caprice, the longing for absolutely unfettered wil-
fulness, free even from the constraints of reason and morality, as if the freedom of the 
imagination should become extended over reality. This is what the Underground 
Man calls the “most advantageous advantage,” the impossible prize for which he 




both romanticism and nihilistic rationalism, the Underground Man is merely an ex-
treme example of this tendency.71 To a lesser degree but on a much wider scale, Dos-
toevsky implies, disillusionment and caprice will be the inevitable consequence of a 
nihilistic socialist utopia. The Christian utopia of Dostoevsky’s pochvennichestvo does 
not, on the other hand, depend upon any ideals which cannot be realized in nature 
taken at face value; the acceptance of the ideal of Christ as fulfilment of one’s spiritual 
needs will not therefore lead to disillusionment, or to the problem of caprice faced by 
nihilists and romantics alike. Dostoevsky argues that a society founded on a mutual 
striving towards the Christian moral ideal would fulfil the spiritual needs of human-
ity and, crucially, thereby avoid the problem of caprice illustrated in Notes from Un-
derground.  
Whereas the libertarian interpretation leads to a contradiction between Dostoevsky’s 
argument against utopian socialism and his own utopianism, therefore, the interpre-
tation advanced here is able to reconcile these two strands of his social philosophy in 
Notes from Underground. All things considered, it thus has several advantages that 
commend it over the libertarian reading: it is justified with reference to the wider 
history of ideas and the literary tradition in which Dostoevsky was working; it is jus-
tified with reference to Notes from Underground itself; it makes sense of Dostoevsky’s 
polemic; it does not render Dostoevsky’s social philosophy contradictory. 
What are the implications of this reinterpretation of Notes from Underground? Alt-
hough the unifying interest of this dissertation has been the relatively narrow central 
aim of understanding the polemic against utopian socialism in the Notes, in pursuit 
of this goal significant conclusions have been reached about three other important 
aspects of Dostoevsky’s work: first, the idea of the “underground” itself, which Dos-
toevsky—the “poet of the underground”—evidently regarded as one of his foremost 
achievements;72 second, Dostoevsky’s contribution to “superfluous man” tradition in 
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Russian literature from Pushkin onwards; third, Dostoevsky’s attitude towards “free-
dom” in politics. 
With respect to the first point, we have advanced significantly from the idea that the 
underground psychology is a simple consequence of believing in (or emotionally re-
sisting but feeling unable to refute) determinism. Dostoevsky took pride in his psy-
chological insights into the “underground”—“it is my glory,” he wrote in un-
published notes pertaining to The Adolescent, “for that’s where the truth lies.”73 It is 
evidently important to comprehend this theme, both for the understanding of Dosto-
evsky’s psychological insights and the foundations of his social and political philos-
ophy. In his notebook, Dostoevsky is extremely brief and says little of his great dis-
covery that could not equally be said of Turgenev’s superfluous men, for instance; 
but he clearly states that the reason for the phenomenon of “the underground” is the 
loss of belief in general principles, the idea that “nothing is sacred.”74  This point, 
though highly general, has been confirmed in relation to the Underground Man: his 
overall condition can be traced to the influence of nihilism, the destruction of his cher-
ished ideals. Through examining the Underground Man in relation to the Sturm und 
Drang, we have gained a much clearer picture of the mechanism by which Dostoevsky 
imagined this “nothing is sacred” to contribute to the disease of the underground in 
the case of the Notes. Whether or not Dostoevsky’s conception of the “underground” 
or of its social and political implications changed over time is a matter for further 
research. The term itself occurs infrequently, for example in The Eternal Husband, 
where, however, none of the characters precisely resemble the Underground Man, 
and there is no hint of an argument against utopian socialism.75 It is likely then that 
the psychology of Notes from Underground cannot simply be transferred to other “un-
derground” characters, or used as a simple key for making sense of Dostoevsky’s 
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other books. But to have understood the nature and genesis of the character of the 
original Underground Man himself is surely a good place to start.  
With respect to the second point, Dostoevsky’s contribution to Russian literature, we 
have seen that although Dostoevsky continued the post-Byronic tradition of the 
“Hamlet” and the “superfluous man,” he reinvigorated it by reconnecting it with its 
roots in the Sturm und Drang tradition and the problem of human dignity which mo-
tivated it. Beyond the self-mockery of the generation whose romantic predilections 
had become obsolete and “superfluous” to the needs of the nation, Notes from Under-
ground speaks urgently of the needs of the spirit, and attempts to prove to the Nihilists 
that the phenomenon of the dejected intellectual is not wholly innocuous; such char-
acters will not simply fade into the past, to be replaced by “new people” with strong 
wills and useful inclinations. On the contrary, to the extent that Nihilism succeeds in 
its aim of banishing idealism from the intelligentsia, Dostoevsky implies, so will the 
Turgenevian Hamlets and the Oblomovs be replaced by Underground Men with a 
very different cast of mind. For the Nihilists, “Oblomovitis” was merely an inconven-
ience. The capricious Underground Man, and the Sturm und Drang attitude towards 
nihilism that he represents, is another matter entirely. Like the “odd fellow” in Winter 
Notes, who refuses to go along with the socialist project even though it is in his best 
interests, the Underground Man is a real spanner in the works: “the socialist can only 
spit and tell him he is a fool, an immature adolescent who doesn’t understand what 
is good for him.”76 And yet, as the Underground Man says, he will not listen to reason, 
because he is capricious and regards reason as a constraint on his will, and would pre-
fer not to understand what is good for him, because if he did then he would be 
tempted to limit himself to doing only what is good for him: “How about it, gentle-
men, what if we knock over all this rationalism with one swift kick for the sole pur-
pose of sending all these logarithms to hell, so that once again we can live according 
to our own stupid will!”77 According to the interpretation offered in this thesis, then, 
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Dostoevsky’s chief contribution to the superfluous man tradition in Russian literature 
is to attempt to give the type a polemical bite, and to force the Nihilists to recognize 
in the disillusionment and self-mockery of the older generation a force to be reckoned 
with: the spiritual needs of humanity, which cannot simply be ignored, even if the 
romantic older generation itself did not know how best to fulfil them. 
With respect to the third point, Dostoevsky’s attitude towards freedom, we have seen 
that any appraisal of the theme of freedom in Dostoevsky must respect the ambiguity 
of “freedom” and related terms. It is simply not possible to say, for example, that 
Dostoevsky championed the cause of freedom against utopian socialism, without be-
ing clear about which kind of freedom is at issue. Dostoevsky makes few concessions 
to his readers, and relies upon them to unravel his meanings themselves. The three 
varieties of freedom I identified in Dostoevsky’s work—liberty, moral autonomy, and 
caprice—are indeed so different from one another that no ambiguous statement of 
the importance of “freedom” for Dostoevsky can avoid falling into contradictions. 
That “Dostoevsky cared about freedom” is true; but the sense in which it is true may 
be diametrically opposed to the sense in which many critics have intended it. It is 
clear enough that Dostoevsky regards moral autonomy as vitally important, but this 
says little about his attitude towards what we would normally think of as freedom, 
namely, liberty, the absence of constraints on our actions; indeed, moral autonomy 
can be enjoyed in the complete absence of liberty, as for example in prison, or under 
an autocratic regime, and perfect moral autonomy—perfect altruism—even requires 
complete disregard for liberty. Dostoevsky thus emerges from his argument against 
utopian socialism as a far more deliberately illiberal figure than his opponents, who 
wanted to liberate humanity from precisely the kind of self-abnegating moralism that 
Dostoevsky regards as indispensable to genuine freedom. Caprice, on the other hand, 
is incompatible with both liberty and moral autonomy, since a capricious individual 
will be unable to endure the self-control demanded by the latter, and will regard the 
political structures necessary for the protection of liberty as intolerable constraints. 




Underground Man at all about the importance of freedom, for the kinds of freedom 
they care about have nothing whatsoever in common. Disambiguating the term “free-
dom” was thus essential to grasping the social-philosophical meaning of Notes from 
Underground, and should lay the foundations for any future investigation into Dosto-







D’Alambert, J. 1995, Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot, trans. R. N. 
Schwab, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Alexander-Davey, E. 2013, “Ugliness, Emptiness, and Boredom: Dostoevsky on the 
Secular Humanist Social Religion,” in Dostoevsky’s Political Thought, ed. R. 
Avramenko and L. Trepanier, Lanham: Lexington Books, pp. 115-139. 
Alulis, J. 2009, “Dostoevsky and the Metaphysical Foundation of the Liberal 
Regime,” Perspectives on Political Science, Vol 38, No. 4, pp. 206-216. 
Avramenko, R. 2013, “Freedom from Freedom: On the Metaphysics of Liberty in 
Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment,” in Dostoevsky’s Political Thought, ed. R. 
Avramenko and L. Trepanier, Lanham: Lexington Books, pp. 159-178. 
Bacon, F. 1902, Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bakhtin, M. M. 1984, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, trans. C. Emerson, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Bakunin, M. 1990, Statism and Anarchy, trans. M. Shatz, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Barstow, J. 1978, “Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground versus Chernyshevsky’s 
What Is to Be Done?," College Literature, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 24-33. 
Beecher, J. 2001, Victor Considerant and the Rise and Fall of French Romantic Socialism, 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Beiser, F. 1987, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
----1992, Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism: Genesis of Modern German Political 
Thought, 1790-1800, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
----2002, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 




Belknap, R. L. 2009, “Dostoevskii and Psychology” in W. Leatherbarrow (ed.) The 
Cambridge Companion to Dostoevskii, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 131-147. 
Belliotti, R. A. 2016, Dostoevsky’s Legal and Moral Philosophy: The Trial of Dmitri 
Karamazov, Leiden: Brill. 
Berdyaev, N. 1957, Dostoevsky, trans. D Attwater, New York: Meridian Books. 
Berlin, I. 1999, The Roots of Romanticism, ed. H. Hardy, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
----2002, Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
----2013, Russian Thinkers, ed. H. Hardy and A. Kelly, London: Penguin. 
----2019, The Sense of Reality, ed. H. Hardy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bethea, D. and V. Thorstensson, 2016, “Darwin, Dostoevsky, and Russia’s Radical 
Youth” in S. Evdokimova and V. Goldstein (eds.) Dostoevsky Beyond Dostoevsky: 
Science, Religion, Philosophy, Brighton, Mass.: Academic Studies Press, pp. 35-62. 
Boucher, D. and P. Kelly (eds.) 1994, The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls, New 
York: Routledge. 
Brown, J. K. 1986, Goethe’s Faust: The German Tragedy, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Büchner, L. 1864, Force and Matter, trans. J. F. Collingwood, London: Trubner & Co. 
Burke, E. 2015, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the 
Beautiful, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Byron, G. G., Lord, 2000, The Major Works, Oxford: University Press.  
Carlyle, T. 1908, Heroes and Hero Worship, with Essays on Goethe, London: Cassell. 
Carroll, J. 1974, Break-out from the Crystal Palace - The Anarcho-psychological Critique: 
Stirner, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Carter, S. K. 1991, The Political and Social Thought of F. M. Dostoevsky, London: 
Routledge. 




Chamberlain, T. J. (ed.) 1992, Eighteenth Century Criticism, New York: Continuum. 
Chances, E. 1975, “Literary Criticism and the Ideology of Pochvennichestvo in 
Dostoevsky’s Thick journals Vremia and Epokha,” The Russian Review, Vol. 34, No. 2, 
pp. 151-164. 
----1978, Conformity’s Children: An Approach to the Superfluous Man in Russian 
Literature, Columbus: Slavica. 
----2015, “Dostoevsky’s Journalism and Fiction,” in Dostoevsky in Context, ed. D. A. 
Martinsen and O. Maiorova, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 272-279. 
Cherkasova, E. 2009, Dostoevsky and Kant, Amsterdam: Radopi. 
Chernyshevsky, N. G. 1953, Selected Philosophical Essays, trans. ?, Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House.  
----1966, Chto delat’? Iz rasskazov o novykh lyudyakh, Moscow: Izd. 
Khudozhestvennaya Literatura. 
----1989, What is to Be Done?, trans. M. R. Katz, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Clowes, E. 2004, Fiction’s Overcoat: Russian Literary Culture and the Question of 
Philosophy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
Coleridge, S. T. 1884, Table Talk and Omniana, London: George Bell & Sons. 
----1997, The Complete Poems, London: Penguin. 
Collini, S. 2016, “The Identity of Intellectual History” in A Companion to Intellectual 
History, ed. R. Whatmore and B. Young, Chichester: Wiley, pp. 7-18. 
Comte, A. 1998, Early Political Writings, trans. H. S. Jones, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Condorcet, N. 2012, Political Writings, ed. S. Lukes and N. Urbinati, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Descartes, R. 1998, Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings, trans. D. M. Clarke, 
London: Penguin. 
Diderot, D. 1956, Rameau’s Nephew and Other Works, trans. J. Barzun and R. H. 
Bowen, Indianapolis: Hackett. 




Diment, G. 1998, “The Precocious Talent of Ivan Goncharov” in G. Diment (ed.) 
Goncharov’s Oblomov, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, pp. 3-47. 
Dostoevsky, F. M. 1964, Dostoevsky’s Occasional Writings, trans. D. Magarshack, 
London: Vision.  
----1969, The Notebooks for A Raw Youth, trans. V. Terras, Chicago: University Press.  
----1972-1990, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, 30 vols., ed. G. M. Fridlender et al., 
Leningrad: Nauka. 
----1973, The Unpublished Dostoevsky, 3 vols., ed. C. R. Proffer, trans. by T. S. 
Berczynski, B. H. Montu, A. Boyer, E. Proffer. Ann Arbor: Ardis.  
----1987, Selected Letters of Fyodor Dostoyevsky, ed. J. Frank and D. I. Goldstein, trans. 
A. MacAndrew, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.  
----1988(a), Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, trans. D. Patterson, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press.  
----1988(b), Poor Folk and Other Stories, trans. D. McDuff, London: Penguin.  
----1991, Notes from the Underground and The Gambler, trans. J. Kentish, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
----1992, Notes from the Underground, trans. C. Garnett, Mineola: Dover. 
----1993, Notes from Underground, trans. R. Pevear and L. Volokhonsky, London: 
Vintage Books. 
----1994, A Writer’s Diary, 2 vols., trans. K. Lantz, Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press.  
----2000, The Eternal Husband, trans. R. Pevear and L. Volokhonsky, New York: 
Bantam.  
----2001, Notes from Underground, trans. M. R. Katz, New York: Norton.  
----2003(a), The House of the Dead, trans. D. McDuff, London: Penguin.  
----2003(b), Crime and Punishment, trans. D. McDuff, London: Penguin.  
----2003(c), The Adolescent, trans. R. Pevear and L. Volokhonsky, New York: Alfred 




----2003(d), The Brothers Karamazov, trans. D. McDuff, London: Penguin.  
----2008, Demons, trans. R. A. Maguire, London: Penguin.  
----2009(a), Notes from Underground and The Double, trans. R. Wilks, London: 
Penguin.  
----2009(b), Notes from Underground, trans. B. Jakim, Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans. 
----2010, The Gambler and Other Stories, trans. R. Meyer, London: Penguin.  
----2012, Humiliated and Insulted, trans. I. Avsey, Richmond: Alma Classics.  
----2014, Notes from Underground, trans. K. Zinovieff and J. Hughes, Richmond: Alma 
Classics. 
Dowler, W. 1982, Dostoevsky, Grigor’ev, and Native Soil Conservatism, Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 
Ealy, S. D. 2013, “Speaking on the Lower Frequencies: Notes from Underground in 
Ralph Ellison’s America,” in Dostoevsky’s Political Thought, ed. R. Avramenko and L. 
Trepanier, Lanham: Lexington Books, pp. 181-200. 
Edie, J. M., J. P. Scanlan and M.-B. Zeldin 1965, Russian Philosophy, Vol. 2, Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books. 
Fanger, D. 1965, Dostoevsky and Romantic Realism: A study of Dostoevsky in relation to 
Balzac, Dickens, and Gogol, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Feuerbach, L. 2012, The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings, trans. Z. Hanfi, London: Verso. 
Fichte, J. G. 1988, Early Philosophical Writings, trans. D. Breazeale, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
----1992, Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) nova methodo 
(1796/99), trans. D. Breazeale, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Fourier, C. 1996, The Theory of the Four Movements, trans. I. Patterson, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
----1971, The Utopian Vision of Charles Fourier: Selected Texts on Work, Love, and 
Passionate Attraction, trans. J. Beecher and R. Bienvenu, Boston: Beacon Press. 




----1986, Dostoevsky: The Stir of Liberation, 1860-1865, London: Robson Books.   
----1990, Through the Russian Prism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Garrard, G. 2006, Counter-Enlightenments: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present, 
London: Routledge. 
Garret, D. 2012, “A Reply on Spinoza’s Behalf” in E. Forster and Y. Melamed (eds.) 
Spinoza and German Idealism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 248-264. 
Goethe, J. W. 1980, Goethe’s Plays, trans. C. E. Passage, London: Ernest Benn. 
----1987, Faust, Part One, trans. D. Luke, Oxford: University Press.  
----1988, Early Verse Drama and Prose Plays, ed. C. Hamlin and F. Ryder, New York: 
Suhrkamp. 
----1989, The Sorrows of Young Werther, trans. M. Hulse, London: Penguin.  
----1994, Faust, Part Two, trans. D. Luke, Oxford: University Press.  
Gillies, A. 1957, Goethe’s Faust: An Interpretation, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Gogol, N. 1961, Dead Souls, trans. D. Magershack, London: Penguin. 
----1969, Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends, trans. J. Zeldin, Nashville: 
Vanderbilt University Press. 
----1995, Plays and Petersburg Tales, trans. C. English, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Goncharov, I. 2005, Oblomov, trans. D. Magershack, London: Penguin. 
----2015, The Same Old Story, trans. S. Pearl, Richmond: Alma Classics. 
Graham, I. 1974, Schiller’s Drama: Talent and Integrity, London: Methuen & Co. 
Grigoryev, A. 1962, My Literary and Moral Wanderings and Other Autobiographical 
Material, trans. R. Matlaw, New York: Dutton. 
Harper, K. E. 1956, “Criticism of the Natural School in the 1840’s,” The American 
Slavic and East European Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 400-414. 
Hart, P. R. 1971, “Schillerean Themes in Dostoevskij’s ‘Malen’kij geroj’,” The Slavic 




Hazlitt, W. 1991, The Spirit of the Age, Plymouth: Northcote House. 
Hegel, G. W. F. 1977, Faith and Knowledge, trans. W. Cerf and H. S. Harris, Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
Heine, H. 2002, The Romantic School and Other Essays, ed. J. Hermand and R. C. 
Holub, New York: Continuum. 
Herder, J. G. 2004, Another Philosophy of History and Selected Political Writings, trans. I. 
D. Evrigenis and D. Pellerin, Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Herzen, A. 1956, Selected Philosophical Works, trans. L. Navrozov, Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House. 
----1968, My Past and Thoughts, trans. C. Garnett, 4 vols., London: Chatto & Windus. 
----1979, From the Other Shore and The Russian People and Socialism, trans. M. Budberg 
and R. Wollheim, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
----1984, Who is To Blame?, trans. M. Katz, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Hill, D. 2003(a), “Introduction” in D. Hill (ed.) Literature of the Sturm und Drang, 
New York: Camden House, pp. 1-46. 
----2003(b), “‘Die schonsten Traume von Freiheit werden ja im Kerker getraumt’: 
The Rhetoric of Freedom in the Sturm und Drang” in D. Hill (ed.) Literature of the 
Sturm und Drang, New York: Camden House, pp. 159-184. 
Hilliard, K. F. 2011. Freethinkers, libertines and Schwärmer: Heterodoxy in German 
literature, 1750-1800. London: IGRS Books. 
Hobbes, T. 1996, Leviathan, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hobsbawm, E. 1962, The Age of Revolution, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
D’Holbach, P.-H. T. 1999, The System of Nature, trans. H. D. Robinson, Manchester: 
Clinamen Press. 
Hudspith, S. 2004, Dostoevsky and the Idea of Russianness: A New Perspective on Unity 
and Brotherhood, London: Routledge.  
----2010, “Dostoevsky’s Journalism in the 1860s” in D. A. Martinsen and O. 





Hume, D. 1969, A Treatise of Human Nature, London: Penguin. 
----1993, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 2nd ed., Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Jackson, R. L. 1958, Dostoevsky’s Underground Man in Russian Literature, The Hague: 
Mouton. 
----1981, The Art of Dostoevsky: Deliriums and Nocturnes, Princeton: University Press.  
----1984, “Aristotelian Movement and Design in Part Two of Notes from 
Underground” in R. L. Jackson (ed.) Dostoevsky: New Perspectives, Eaglewood Cliffs: 
Prentice, pp. 66-81. 
----1995, “Dostoevsky and Freedom,” New Zealand Slavonic Journal, pp. 1-21. 
Jacobi, F. H. 2009. The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill. Trans. G. di 
Giovanni. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Jones, M. V. 1974, “Dostoyevsky and an Aspect of Schiller’s Psychology,” The 
Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 52, No. 128, pp. 337-354. 
----1976, Dostoyevsky: The Novel of Discord, London: Elek Books. 
----1990, Dostoevsky after Bakhtin, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
----2005, Dostoevsky and the Dynamics of Religious Experience, London: Anthem Press. 
---- 2009, “Dostoevskii and Religion” in W. Leatherbarrow (ed.) The Cambridge 
Companion to Dostoevskii, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 148-174. 
Kane, R. 2005, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Kant, I. 1987, Critique of Judgement, trans. W. S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett. 
----1991, Political Writings, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
----1996, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. W. S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett. 
----2002, Theoretical Philosophy After 1781, ed. H. Allison and P. Heath, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
----2007, Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. G. Zoller and R. B. Louden, 




----2009, Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason, trans. W. S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: 
Hackett. 
Karamzin, N. 2012, “Poor Liza” in D. Gasperetti (ed.) Three Russian Tales of the 
Eighteenth Century, DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, pp. 179-196. 
Katz, M. R. 1988, “Dostoevsky and Natural Science,” Dostoevsky Studies, Vol. 9, 
pp. 63-78. 
----2002, "But This Building: What on Earth Is It?" New England Review, Vol. 23, No. 
1, pp. 65-76. 
Kelly, A. 1988, “Dostoevskii and the Divided Conscience,” Slavic Review, Vol. 47, 
No. 2, pp. 239-260. 
----1991, “Irony and Utopia in Herzen and Dostoevsky: From the Other Shore and 
Diary of a Writer,” The Russian Review, Vol. 50, ppl. 397-416. 
----2016, The Discovery of Chance: The Life and Thought of Alexander Herzen, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Kirk, I. 1974, Dostoevskij and Camus, Munich: Wilhelm Fink. 
Kirwan, J. 2005, Sublimity: The Non-Rational and the Irrational in the History of Aesthetics, 
New York: Routledge.  
Kistler, M. O. 1969, Drama of the Storm and Stress, New York: Twayne Publishers. 
Klinger, F. M. 1992, “Sturm und Drang,” in Sturm und Drang, ed. A. C. Leidner, New 
York: Continuum. 
Knapp, L. 1996, The Annihilation of Inertia: Dostoevsky and Metaphysics, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press.  
----2016, “Darwin’s Plots, Malthus’s Mighty Feast, Lamennais’s Motherless 
Fledglings, and Dostoevsky’s Lost Sheep,” in S. Evdokimova and V. Goldstein (eds.) 
Dostoevsky Beyond Dostoevsky: Science, Religion, Philosophy, Brighton, Mass.: 
Academic Studies Press, pp. 63-81. 
Kostka, E. K. 1965, Schiller in Russian Literature, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press.  
----1975, Glimpses of German-Slavic Relations from Pushkin to Heinrich Mann, 




Kuehn, M. 2009, Kant, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lamport, F. 2003, “The Drama of the Sturm und Drang” in D. Hill (ed.) Literature of 
the Sturm und Drang, New York: Camden House, pp. 117-139. 
Leatherbarrow, W. J. 1981, Fedor Dostoevsky, Boston: Twayne Publishers.  
----2005, A Devil’s Vaudeville: The Demonic in Dostoevsky’s Major Fiction, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
----2010, “Conservatism in the Age of Alexander I and Nicholas I” in W. 
Leatherbarrow and D. Offord (eds.) A History of Russian Thought, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 95-115. 
Leidner, A. C. (ed.) 2006, Sturm und Drang, New York: Continuum. 
Lermontov, M. Y. 2009, A Hero of Our Time, trans. N. Randall, London: Penguin.  
Lewes, G. H. 1908, The Life and Works of Goethe, London: J. M. Dent & co. 
Locke, J. 1960, Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lord, R. 1970, Dostoevsky: Essays and Perspectives, London: Chatto & Windus. 
Lyngstad, A. H. 1975, Dostoevsky and Schiller, The Hague: Mouton.  
Macpherson, J. 1996, The Poems of Ossian, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Marx, K. and F. Engels, 1978, The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd edition, trans. R. C Tucker, 
New York: Norton. 
Matlaw, R. E. 1976, Belinsky, Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov: Selected Criticism, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
McKinney, D. M. 1978, “Notes from Underground: A Dostoevskean Faust,” 
Canadian-American Slavic Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 189-229. 
McMahon, D. M. 2002, Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-
Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McReynolds, S. 2004, “Dostoevsky and Schiller: National Renewal Through 
Aesthetic Education,” Philosophy and Literature, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 353-366. 
Meisel, M. 2016, “Theater” in D. A. Martinsen and O. Maiorova (eds.) Dostoevsky in 




Mettrie, J. O. de La, 1994, Man a Machine and Man a Plant, trans. R. A. Watson and M. 
Rybalka, Indianapolis: Hackett.  
Miller, R. D. 1992, The Misinterpreting of Goethe’s Gretchen Tragedy, Harrogate: The 
Duchy Press. 
Mochulsky, K. 1967, Dostoevsky: His Life and Work, trans. M. A. Minihan, Princeton: 
University Press.  
Morson, G. S. 1994, Narrative and Freedom: The Shadows of Time, New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
----2010, “Tradition and Counter-Tradition: The Radical Intelligentsia and Classical 
Russian Literature” in W. Leatherbarrow and D. Offord (eds.) A History of Russian 
Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 141-168. 
Mortimer, S. 2016, “Religion and Enlightenment” in A Companion to Intellectual 
History, ed. R. Whatmore and B. Young, Chichester: Wiley, pp. 245-257. 
Neuhauser, R. 1974, “Romanticism in the Post-Romantic Age,” Canadian-American 
Slavic Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 333-58.  
Novalis, 1997, Philosophical Writings, trans. M. M. Stoljar, Albany: SUNY Press. 
Offord, D. 2009, “Dostoevskii and the Intelligentsia” in W. Leatherbarrow (ed.) The 
Cambridge Companion to Dostoevskii, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 111-130. 
----2015, “Nihilism and Terrorism” in Dostoevsky in Context, ed. D. A. Martinsen and 
O. Maiorova, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 48-57. 
Odoevsky, V. F. 1965, Russian Nights, trans. O. Olienikov and R. Matlaw, New York: 
Dutton. 
Orwin, D. T. 2007, Consequences of Consciousness: Turgenev, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy, 
Stanford: University Press.  
Paperno, I. 1988, Chernyshevsky and the Age of Realism, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
Paris, B. 2008, Dostoevsky’s Greatest Characters, New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 




Passage, C. E. 1946, “The Influence of Schiller in Russia 1800-1840,” The American 
Slavic and East European Review, Vol. 5, No. 1/2, pp. 111-137. 
Peace, R. 1971, Dostoyevsky: An Examination of the Major Novels, Cambridge: 
University Press.  
----1992, “The Nineteenth Century: The Natural School and its Aftermath, 1840-55" 
in C. A. Moser (ed.) The Cambridge History of Russian Literature, 2nd ed., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 189-247. 
----2010, “Nihilism” in W. Leatherbarrow and D. Offord (eds.) A History of Russian 
Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 116-140. 
Pinkard, T. 2000, Hegel: A Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
----2002, German Philosophy 1760-1860, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Plato, 1997, Complete Works, Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Pope, A. 2006, Major Works, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pugh, D. 2000, Schiller’s Early Dramas: A Critical History, Rochester, NY: Camden 
House. 
Pushkin, A. 2007, Boris Godunov and Other Dramatic Works, trans. J. E. Falen, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
----2008, Eugene Onegin, trans. S. Mitchell, London: Penguin.  
Reinhold, K. L. 2005, Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, trans. J. Hebbler, Cambridge: 
University Press. 
Rogers, J. A. 1974, “Russian Opposition to Darwinism in the Nineteenth Century,” 
Isis, Vol. 65, No. 4, pp. 487-505. 
Rousseau, J.-J. 1987, The Basic Political Writings, trans. D. A. Cress, Indianapolis: 
Hackett.  
Ryan, V. L. 2001, “The Physiological Sublime: Burke’s Critique of Reason,” Journal of 
the History of Ideas, Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 265-279. 
Saint-Simon, H. 1975, Selected Writings on Science, Industry and social Organisation, 




Scanlan, J. P. 1970, “Nicholas Chernyshevsky and Philosophical Materialism in 
Russia,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 65-86. 
----2002, Dostoevsky the Thinker, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Schelling, F. W. J. 1978, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. P. Heath, 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.  
----1984, Bruno, trans. M. G. Vater, New York: SUNY Press. 
Schiller, F. 1992, “The Robbers” in A. C. Leidner (ed.) Sturm und Drang, New York: 
Continuum. 
----1993, Essays, ed. W. Hinderer and D. O. Dahlstrom, New York: Continuum.  
----2003, Intrigue and Love and Don Carlos, ed. W. Hinderer, New York: Continuum.  
Schlegel, F. 1847, The Philosophy of Life, and, Philosophy of Language, in a Course of 
Lectures, trans. A. J. W. Morrison, London: Bohn. 
Seeley, F. F. 1994, From the Heyday of the Superfluous Man to Chekhov: Essays on 19th-
Century Russian Literature, Nottingham: Astra Press. 
Sharpe, L. 1991, Friedrich Schiller: Drama, Thought and Politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Shaw, A. 2010, “Alexander Pushkin’s ‘Scene from Faust,’” New Criterion, Vol. 28, 
pp. 32-36. 
Shestov, L. 1969, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Nietzsche, trans. B. Martin and S. Roberts 
Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 
Simons, J. D. 1967, “The Nature of Suffering in Schiller and Dostoevsky,” 
Comparative Literature, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 160-173 
----1972, “The Myth of Progress in Schiller and Dostoevsky,” Comparative Literature, 
Vol.  24, pp. 328-337. 
Stahl, E. L. 1954, Schiller’s Drama, Oxford: Clarendon. 
Stirner, M. 1995, The Ego and Its Own, trans. D. Leopold, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Taylor, C. 1991, “The Importance of Herder” in E. and A. Margalit (eds.) Isaiah 




Terras, V. 1964, “Problems of Human Existence in the Works of the Young 
Dostoevsky,” Slavic Review, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 79-91. 
----1969, The Young Dostoevsky (1846-1849): A Critical Study, The Hague: Mouton. 
----1974, Belinskij and Russian Literary Criticism, Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press. 
----1998, Reading Dostoevsky, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. 
Thorslev, P. L. 1962, The Byronic Hero: Types and Prototypes, Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota. 
Tocqueville, A. 2011, The Ancien Regime and the French Revolution, trans. A. 
Goldhammer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Turgenev, I. S. 1970, Home of the Gentry, trans. R. Freeborn, London: Penguin.  
----1975, Rudin, trans. R. Freeborn, London: Penguin.  
----1990, Sketches from a Hunter’s Album, trans. R. Freeborn, London: Penguin.  
----1999, First Love and Other Stories, trans. R. Freeborn, Oxford: University Press.   
----2009, Fathers and Children, trans. M. R. Katz, New York: Norton.   
Villadsen, P. 1981, The Underground Man and Raskolnikov: A Comparative Study, trans. 
D. R. Frickelton and L. Rendboe, Odense: Odense University Press. 
Voltaire, 1994, Letters Concerning the English Nation, ed. N. Cronk, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Von Gronicka, A. 1985, The Russian Image of Goethe, 2 vols., Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press. 
Waldeck, M.-L. 1986, The Theme of Freedom in Schiller’s Plays, Stuttgart: Hans-Dieter 
Heinz. 
Ward, B. 1986, Dostoyevsky’s Critique of the West: The Quest for Earthly Paradise, 
Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press.  
Wasiolek, E. 1964, Dostoevsky: The Major Fiction, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
Woehrlin, W. F. 1971, Chernyshevskii: The Man and the Journalist, Cambridge, Mass.: 




Woodhouse, C. M. 1951, Dostoievsky, London: Barker. 
Young, S. J. 2015, “The Crystal Palace” in D. A. Martinsen and O. Maiorova (eds.) 
Dostoevsky in Context, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 176-184. 
